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ABSTRACT
THE SOVIET UNION AND EGYPT, 1947-1955 
RAMI GINAT
This research deals with the political history of the 
Middle East, with special reference to Egypt. It aims to 
explore, describe and analyse the events which led to the 
involvement of the Soviet Union in Egyptian affairs. 
Attention is given to the domestic and foreign developments 
in the U.S.S.R., Egypt and the Middle East in general, which 
created a favourable atmosphere for Soviet penetration into 
Egypt. It examines the change in the Soviet position towards 
the Arab-Israeli conflict after the partition resolution of 
29 November 1947 was adopted by the General Assembly of the 
United Nations.
This study disproves the current belief that arms supplies 
from the Soviet bloc to Egypt started in September 1955; it 
shows that such supplies were reaching Egypt as early as 
1948. Furthermore it shows that Soviet-Egyptian commercial 
relations increased steadily from 1948 until 1955.
The dynamics of Soviet penetration into the area can only 
be understood by tracing the roots and motives of Soviet 
policy after the Second World War. The strengthening of 
Soviet influence and the improvement of their position in 
Egypt in the second half of 1955, was a result of a long 
process of gradual political and ideological developments 
in Egypt, beginning in the late 1940's. The pre-1955 
agreements, so far neglected, are of vital importance in 
the establishment of Soviet hegemony over Egypt and other 
Arab countries.
-3-
The study examines the interaction between political 
history and the history of ideas. It assumes that there was 
a gap between ideology and Realpolitik in the Soviet 
approach towards the Third World generally and the Arab 
World in particular.
The research is based upon extensive use of British, 
American and Israeli official files, as well as Arabic and 




Table of Contents......................................... 4
Acknowledgments........................................... 7
Part One: Doctrine vis-^-vis Realpolitik.....................  8
Chapter One: Soviet Doctrine Concerning the Arab
World.......................................  9
A. Continuity and Change in Consolidating and 
Shaping Soviet Doctrine up to the early
1950' s ..............................................  9
B. Methods and Vehicles for Carrying out the
Soviet Doctrine....................................  14
a. Ideological Warfare................................ 14
b. Soviet Activity in the Greek Orthodox
Church..............................................  19
C. The Soviet Union and the Local Egyptian 
Communist Elements................................. 24
Chapter Two: The Egyptian Communist Movement and 
its Role in the Internal Political 
Arena up to 1955...........................  32
A. The Emergence of a Communist Party in Egypt  33
a. The Egyptian Communist Movement in the 
Inter-War Period...................................  33
b. Communist Activity in the Second World War
and its Aftermath.................................. 35
B. Some Ideological Dimensions in the Communist 
Design Concerning the Egyptian National
Struggle............................................  38
a. British Imperialism - the Arab's Enemy..........  38
b. The Internal Popular Struggle for Democracy
and against Collaborators......................... 40
c. The Need for Co-operation with External 
Forces for the Solution of the Egyptian
Problem.............................................  41
C. Communist Political Activity and its
Influence, 1947-1955..............................  43
a. Communist Activity and its Effects on 
Unification in 1947................................ 43
b. The Establishment of D.M.N.L.- The
Communists' "Golden Era"..........................  46
c. Continuous Internal Splits and External 
Pressures...........................................  53
d. The Coup D'etat and its Implications Jo^il#
Communist Movement, 1952-1955....................  65
-5-
Chapter Three: The Relationship between Communism
and Islam................................. 72
A. Communism and Islam...............................  72
B. The Various Approaches to the Issue as 
Introduced by Egyptian and Arab
Intellectuals......................................  79
Part Two: The Beginning of the Soviet Involvement in
Egyptian Affairs: The Dynamics of Penetration, 
1947-1955.............................................  88
Chapter One: The U.S.S.R. First Steps in the
Egyptian and Middle Eastern Arena........  88
A. Soviet Support for the Arabs.....................  89
B. The Soviet Position Concerning the Palestine 
Issue, 1947-1948...................................  102
Chapter Two: The Soviet Response to the Western 
Powers Attempts to Persuade Egypt 
and other Middle Eastern Countries 
to Form a Middle East Defence 
Organization, 1947-1952...................  121
A. The Crystallization of the U.S. Containment 
Policy and its Extension to the Middle
East................................................  121
B. Continuity and Change in Soviet-Egyptian 
Relations after the Palestine War................ 132
a. First Soviet-Egyptian Commercial Agreements,
1948-1949...........................................  138
C. The Policy of the Wafd Government towards
the East-West Conflict, 1950-1952................ 146
a. The Formation of the Policy of Neutralism......  146
b. The Tripartite Declaration and its
Implications.......................................  151
c. The Egyptian Position towards the Korean War.... 154
d. The Strengthening of Relations between Egypt 
and the U.S.S.R. - the Collapse of Nanas'
Government.......................................... 164
e. The Improvement of Economic Relations under
the Wafdist Government, 1950-1952................ 191
Chapter Three: Soviet-Egyptian Relations under
Nasir, 1952-1955......................... 205
A. Soviet Response to the July 1952 Coup D'etat.... 205
B. Stalin's Successors' Policy towards Egypt......  211
C. Nasir's Neutralism and the Baghdad-Pact........  239
► i
D. Nasir and the Non-Alignment Camp................  264
Chapter Four: Egyptian Arm Deals with the Soviet
Bloc and their Implications.............. 270
-6-
A. Negotiations for Arms, 1954-1955....................  273
B. The Conclusion of Arms Deals with the Soviet
Bloc................................................. 278
C. British and American Response to the Arms
Deal................................................. 296
Chapter Five: Soviet-Egyptian Economic Relations
under the Military Regime, 1952-1955.......301
Conclusion................................................. 314
List of Sources...........................................  319
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This thesis was carried out under the supervision of Professor 
Elie Kedourie. I would like to express my deepest gratitude for 
his unstinting help and advice and for his indefatigable patience.
I would like to acknowledge the assistance extended to me by 
the staff of the following archives and libraries: The Public 
Record Office, the British Library, the Library of the London 
School of Economics and Political Science, the Middle East Centre 
at Saint Antony's College and the B.B.C. Written Archives in Great 
Britain; the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, the Harry S. Truman 
Library, the National Archives, the Washington National Records 
Center, the Princeton University Library, the New York Public 
Library and the United Nations Archives in the United States; the 
Israel State Archives, the Dayan Centre Library and the Library of 
the Tel-Aviv University in Israel.
I wish to display my appreciation to the Anglo-Jewish 
Association, the Ian Karten Charitable Trust, Mr. Eric Nabarro and 
the Lara Trust, the London School of Economics and Political 
Science in London, Dr. Martin Peretz and the Clark Estates, New 
York, for their generous research grants.
I would like to include Professor Israel Gershoni from the 
University of Tel-Aviv who supervised my M.A. thesis and provided 
me with the necessary encouragement and inspiration to pursue my 
Ph.D. studies. I would also like to mention Professor Itamar 
Rabinovich and Professor Yaacov Ro'i from the University of 
Tel-Aviv, former teachers, for their encouragement and knowledge.
This work could not have been carried out without the invaluable 
support and generosity extended to me by Mrs. Sylvia Kedourie and 
her family. It would therefore be appropriate to dedicate this 
work to them, to convey my deepest gratitude and love.
Finally I would like to thank my parents and family for their 





SOVIET DOCTRINE CONCERNING THE ARAB WORLD
A. Continuity and Change in Consolidating and Shaping 
Soviet Doctrine up to the early 1950,s_____________
In his study The Soviet Union and the Middle East/ Walter
Laqueur divided the Soviet doctrine towards the Arab world up to
1954, into five main periods. The first period was from November
1917, when the Bolsheviks took over up to 1921. There was little
information then and less interest in what really went on in
Asia, despite the fact that much lip service was paid to the
revolutionary potentialities of the East. The second period was
from 1921 up to 1928. During these years the Soviets had not
appreciated the potential role of the intelligentsia in the
national movement, and were unwilling to take advantage of the
great appeal of nationalist slogans. The third period had begun in
1928, when a significant change took place in the Soviet general
doctrine. This new line was shaped by the Sixth Congress of the
Comintern in 1928. A period of tensions and revolutionary conflict
had begun as a result of communist setbacks in Europe, the crisis
in the far East, and certain internal processes within the Soviet
Union. These changes pushed the Soviets to be more involved in the
Middle East political events. Their rigid doctrinaire line
regarding the role of the national bourgeoisie in the struggle for
liberation in the third world had been softened a little. This
period was ended sometime in 1935 as a result of political events
inside Europe. The fourth period was between 1935 and 1945. The
Soviet attention was focused on the Central European and Far 
► •
Eastern danger zones. Less attention was paid to Middle East 
affairs. The fifth period started in 1945 and went to 1954.
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Considerable stress was put on the national liberation movement in 
Asia, but it was argued, at the same time, that this movement 
would succeed only under communist leadership^-.
Laqueur's division, apart from his argument concerning Soviet 
policy towards the Middle East in the fifth period, is accepted. 
This last period will be discussed at length in this study.
The Soviet Union's attempts to increase its influence in the 
Arab world, and to bring it under communist control had become 
apparent shortly after the 1917 Bolshevik revolution took place. 
For instance, In 1919 Lenin published an appeal to the Muslims of 
the world in which he declared inter alia:
"Muslims of the entire world, victims of the capitalists, 
wake up! Russia has abandoned the pernicious policy of 
the Czars with regard to you and offers you a helping 
hand in your efforts to overthrow British tyranny. Russia 
will give you full religious freedom and political 
autonomy. Pre-war frontiers will be respected, no Turkish 
territory will be given to Armenia, the Dardanelles will 
remain Turkish and Constantinople will remain the 
capital of the Muslim world... 11.
Lenin's appeal and the Soviets' efforts to increase their 
influence were not crowned with success, mainly because of their 
inconsistent attitude towards Islam. For instance, as opposed to 
the above appeal, the Soviets organized a "communist congress of 
the peoples of the East", at Baku, in September 1920; the congress 
had been called to act in support of "proletariatism dictatorship" 
based on an atheistic and materialistic philosophy which rejects 
and scorns both Islam and Christianity . Prior to the congress,
1. Walter Laqueur, The Soviet Union and the Middle East 
(London:1959), pp.7-158.
2. A report on "Communism and Islam", prepared by the research 
Dept, of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, 30 September, 1951, 
Records of Israel Foreign Ministry, (FM) 2530/8/A, Ginzakh 
Hamedina, Jerusalem (hereafter cited as I.S.A., FM with 
appropriate filing designation). See also: "Soviet policy 
towards the .Arab East" Bulletin, Institute for the study of 
the U.S.S.R., Vol. 15, No. 3, March 1968, pp. 29-30.
3. Cornelius Van Engert, "Some notes on Islam and Communism",
22 March 1951, in: a report from British Embassy, Washington
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Lenin had reached the conclusion that the Eastern peoples need not 
go through the capitalist stage of development. This could happen 
with the assistance of the Soviet Union, and would lead to 
Communism, without having to pass through the capitalist stage^.
The Third Comintern Congress in June 1921 recognized that the 
prospect of immediate revolution in the West had failed and 
therefore "without a revolution in Asia, the proletarian 
revolution cannot be victorious" . The Fourth Congress m  
November 1922 emphasized the need of collaboration with the 
national movements irrespective of the absence of a revolutionary 
wing within them. The resolutions passed by the Fifth Comintern 
Congress in June 1924, restated the need of collaboration with the 
bourgeois nationalists on the basis of a "united front" whose 
validity encompassed the whole East. Support for the leadership of 
the nationalist movements, it was said, was unconditional .
Nevertheless, this doctrinaire line was rarely translated into 
action. In his first years in power, Stalin held the view that the 
revolution could only be achieved under communist leadership. The 
implementation of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine, was connected, 
according to Stalin's theory, with the rejection of any 
compromise with the capitalist world. Stalin considered this 
doctrine as "the science of the development of society, the 
science of the working class movement, the science of the 
proletarian revolution, the science of the building of the 
communist society; this science of history is based on a
10 May 1951, F0371/91184, E1024/20G, Public Record Office 
(hereafter cited as F0371 with appropriate filing reference). 
See also: M. Leshem, "Soviet propaganda to the Middle East", 
Middle Eastern Affairs, January 1953, pp. 1-3.
1. Hashim S.H. Behbehani, The Soviet Union and Arab Nationalism 
1917-1966 (London: 1986), pp.5-7. D. Boersner, The Bolsheviks 
and the National and Colonial Problem (Paris: 1954), p. 272.
2. Musa Budeiri, The Palestine Communist Party 1919-1948 (London: 
Ithaca Press, 1979), p. 1.
3. Ibid, p . 2.
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dialectical analysis which explains all history...in terms of the 
conflict and contradiction in human affairs, in particular, of 
conflict between economic classes". Stalin said, that according to 
this doctrine, the violent take-over by the progressive classes, 
from the ruling classes, was inevitable. "At the present stage in 
history, the struggle is between Capitalism and Socialism. The 
Soviet form of state organization is the only true Socialism, 
which it is the duty of communist parties everywhere to extend by 
all means within their power^".
In July 1928, the Sixth Congress of the Comintern decided to 
support the national struggle for liberation of the colonial 
peoples and those who achieved only formal independence. Despite 
the fact that the social content of the nationalist movement in 
the Arab world did not fit with the Marxist-Leninist pattern, or 
Stalin's theory, this new accomodationist approach was reflected 
in Soviet broadcasts, which encouraged Persian and Arab 
Natlonali sm .
The programme of the Comintern regarding the struggle against 
imperialism in colonial and dependent areas and the role of the 
local communist parties m  conducting it was as follows :
"To fight against feudalism and the pro-capitalist forms 
of exploitation and to develop systematically the peasant 
agrarian revolution... to fight against foreign imperialism 
and for national independence... the Communist International 
supports every movement against imperialist violence in the 
colonies, semi-colonies and dependencies themselves ... the 
communist parties in the imperialist countries must render 
systematic aid to the colonial revolutionary liberation 
movement and to the movement of oppressed nationalities 
generally... the communist parties in the colonial and 
semi-colonial countries must carry on a bold and consistent 
struggle against foreign imperialism and unfailingly conduct
1. Paper on the "communist state in theory and practice", 
prepared by the F.O., 29 May 1949, F0371/86731, NS1023/3G.
2. Leshem, Ibic|, pp.7-8.
3. Information memorandum No. 26, "Soviet Communism", Dept, of 
State, 29 December 1948, in: Records of Charles E. Bohlen, 1942- 
1945, Box 5, National Archives, Washington D.C.
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propaganda in favour of friendship and unity with the 
proletariat in the imperialist countries".
This policy was translated into action in November 1928/ when
the U.S.S.R recognized the complete independence and sovereignty
of the new state of Yemen in a treaty of friendship and trade
signed in Sana, the capital of Yemen. Trade agreements had also
been signed with Turkey, Persia and Afghanistan^ .
The Soviet decision makers had realized that the revolutionary
process in this area would be connected with an extended struggle,
in which the revolutionary movement was expected to pass through
three different stages :
a. The immediate aim was the exclusion of the colonialist element; 
that would be achieved with the creation of a united national 
liberation movement, with the participation of all classes.
b. After the national independence would be achieved, the local 
communist party should lead the workers and peasants towards a 
social revolution.
c. The end of this process would be, the taking of control by the 
communist party.
This policy was formulated comprehensively, at the seventh 
Comintern congress in 1935, and intended mainly to induce the 
nationalists elements to conduct a massive struggle against 
western colonialism. The Soviets believed that when the struggle 
ended, the road to power would be open for the communist party.
The content of the new-look policy regarding the battle against 
colonialism, as it was accepted and confirmed by the Seventh 
Comintern Congress was as follows:
1. Bulletin, Ibid, p.30.
2. Ivar Spector, "program of action of the communist party of 
Egypt", Middle East Journal, Vol. 10, No. 4 (Washington: 1956), 
p. 427; A. Yodfat, Arab Politics in the Soviet Mirror (Tel- 
Aviv: 1973), pp.1-4; G. Lenczowski, "Soviet policy in the 
Middle East", Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 1,
1954, pp. 52-54.
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"In colonial and semi-colonial countries, the most 
important task of the communists consists in working to 
create an anti-imperialist popular front. To this end they 
must engage the broad masses in a national-liberation 
movement against growing imperialist exploitation and cruel 
slavery and for expulsion of the imperialists and national 
independence, actively participate in mass anti-imperialist 
movements led by national reformists, and arrange joint 
action with national revolutionary and national reformist 
organizations on a basis of a concrete anti-imperialist 
platform .
This was the Soviet method of implementing its doctrine within 
the Third World, mainly, up to the second world war, and according 
to its assessment, the Arab world was an integral part of it. The 
Arab communist parties became the main element by means of which 
the Soviets wished to deepen their penetration into that part of 
the world. To achieve this purpose, they concentrated their 
efforts on the nurture and encouragement of local communist 
parties in the hope that they would act as the revolutionary 
vanguard who would lead the masses towards a revolution and take 
over.
As suggested by George Lenczowski, the Soviet doctrine had two
7essential objectives :
a. The establishment of a communist society through violent means 
if necessary?
b. Linking the area to the Soviet Union in some form of dependent 
relationship.
From the Soviet viewpoint, up to the late 1940's, there was no 
significant change in their doctrine towards the region. The same 
goals and aspirations continued to motivate their political 
activity.
The external image of the Soviet Union within the Arab world was 
improved as a result of Soviet entry into the Second World War on
1. Rezolyutsii VII Vsemirnogo Kongressa Kommunisticheskogo 
internatsionala, Moscow, 1935, pp.27-28, in: Bulletin, ibid, 
p . 31.
2. G. Lenczowski, "Soviet policy in the Middle East", ibid, p.52.
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the side of the allies. Furthermore, the Soviet achievements at 
the end of the war, particularly their joint occupation of Iran, 
with Britain, gave them a respectable introduction to the Middle 
East.
B . Methods and Vehicles For Carrying Out The Soviet Doctrine
a . Ideological Warfare 
One of the most popular means taken by the Soviets to attract 
public attention and influence opinion, was the conduct of 
ideological warfare in a variety of media. This ideological 
activity focused on, and took place mainly in the so-called 
"bourgeois countries", and within the colonies and semi-colonial 
countries which were ruled by capitalist powers. Ideological 
warfare became a prominent political weapon, inside and outside 
the Soviet Union, either to mislead people as to the significance 
and virtuous motives of the policies of the Soviet Government 
compared to other, evil, powers, or actively to foment discontent. 
Therefore, propaganda activity became the principal tool used by 
the Soviet Government to establish its superiority-'-. The 
Soviet purpose was not the creation of a new positive atmosphere 
in the international arena, but to manipulate and subvert. The 
long-term aim of their propaganda, was to speed up the world
Dispatch 610 from British Embassy, Cairo, 25 April 1945, 
F0371/46003, JK1522. Memorandum on "Propaganda Directed to 
Egypt by the Soviet Authorities", from British Embassy-Cairo, 
14 September 1945, Ibid, J2962/440/16.
On the Soviet propaganda activity see also: "The Communist 
State in Theory and Practice", a paper sent from Joint 
Services Staff College, Latimer, Chesham to Services Liaison 
Department, F.O., 19 January 1950, F0371/86731, NS1023/3G; 
Information memorandum No. 26, "Soviet Communism", Department 
of State, 29 December 1948, in: Records of Charles E. Bohlen, 
1942-1945, Box 5. "Some Characteristics of Soviet Propaganda", 
Department of State memorandum, 9 March 1949, Foreign Office 
Posts of the* Department of State, Record Group (RG) 84, Cairo 
Embassy-General Records, 1949: 350.21, Box 207, Washington 
National Records Center, Suitland Maryland (hereafter cited as
RG 84 with appropriate filing reference).
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revolution which would be the first step to world progress. The 
following pattern was shaped by Lenin in 1918, and adopted by his 
followers1 :
"International policy: Support the revolutionary movement 
of the socialist proletariat in the advanced countries 
in the first place. Propaganda. Agitation. Fraternization.
A ruthless struggle against opportunism and social- 
chauvinism (i.e., deviation from the doctrine). Support of 
the democratic and revolutionary movement in all 
countries in general,and particularly, in the colonies 
and dependent countries. Emancipation of the colonies, 
federation,as a transition to voluntary amalgamation".
The possibilities of turning the peoples of the Middle East 
against the British had been earnestly considered by the Soviet 
leaders, including Lenin and Stalin; they wished via the 
ideological vehicles to agitate the masses against the British, 
and create a better atmosphere for their future penetration.
Soviet ideological activity, or propaganda activity in 
western terms, began to gather momentum in the Arab countries 
after the end of the second world war. In Egypt, this activity had 
been organized and carried out through the Soviet Union legation 
in Cairo, headed by *Abd al-Rahman Sultanov, a second secretary 
of Muslim origin, and Sakolov, the Press Attach^. In April 
1945, it was reported by the British Embassy in Cairo, that the 
principal Soviet vehicles for the diffusion of propaganda were 
books and pamphlets for sale to the public, and material issued to 
the press. Most of the material did not contain direct communistic 
propaganda, it was said, but tended to display to the Egyptian 
people all the advantages of the Soviet Union created by the
1. Paper entitled "Some characteristics of Soviet Propaganda" 
prepared by the Department of State, 9 March 194-9, in: RG 84, 
Cairo Embassy-General Records, 1949: 350.21, Box 207.
2. Top secret report from American Embassy, Cairo, 8 April 1945, 
General Records of the Department of State, Record Group (RG) 
59, 861.202$3/4-845, Nati onal Archives, Washington D.C. 
(hereafter cited as RG 59 with appropriate filing reference).
- 16 -
communist system. Some of the books were written by local 
authors in Arabic, and some were translated into Arabic. For 
example, Bolshevik Russia, by (Isam Muhammad Sulaiman, described 
the reasons for the Soviet achievements in domestic and foreign 
affairs; Lenin and Stalin, printed in the U.S.S.R., talked about 
the history of the revolution and of Russia's contribution to 
victory; Soviet Cultures by A. Yudin has as its main theme that 
all cultures but the Soviet, were decadent; citing that, before 
the war, there were ten times more students in the U.S.S.R. than 
in Germany^.
The Soviets did not focus all their efforts on distributing 
books; the selection of books and pamphlets, and the extent of 
sales were very limited. Even so, there was a great demand for 
information about the Soviet way of life. It was also reported by 
the British Embassy that revolutionary leaflets were being 
distributed by Soviet agents to workers in the towns. The 
following leaflet demonstrated the advantages of Socialism and 
claimed that Socialism was not incompatible with Islam:
"Socialism is not against Islam or against any other 
religion. It does not oppose any creed or any form of 
worship or devotion, but it is the universal panacea.
It is the cure and salvation of the poor and the fruit 
of a great effort of the will...It has proved itself 
strong and steadfast in all troubles. It has spread its 
wings over divers countries, and in the end Socialism 
will triumph .
Since its establishment in 1943, the Soviet legation in Cairo, 
had attempted to press the Egyptian authorities to permit 
publication of a newspaper which would be written in colloquial 
Arabic; they wished that by the use of an understandable language, 
the process of diffusing their ideas to the masses would become 
easier and their messages would be delivered directly to the
1. F0371/46003, J2962/440/16, ibid.
2. Ibid, appendix E.
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people. The Egyptian authorities gave permission to the Soviet 
legation to print a weekly publication, Bulletin de la Presse 
Sovietique. By doing so, they prevented the Soviets from reaching 
the Egyptian masses in their own language. In addition, the Soviet 
legation had heavily subsidised the Egyptian communist magazine, 
al-Fajr al-Jadld. Oral propaganda, by Arabic radio broadcasts from 
the U.S.S.R. to the Arab world, was used as another pipeline for 
the Soviets, to advance their interests*.
The Soviets were also involved in the founding and financial 
support of Egyptian trade unions, teacher unions and student 
unions (affiliated to the World Federation of Trade Unions) .
The Soviet legation in Cairo became the main active centre 
for the transmission of communist propaganda in Egypt. In April, 
1945, it was reported by Nuqrashi Pasha, the Egyptian Prime 
Minister, that there was tangible evidence that the Soviet 
legation was involved in the creation of subversive cells inside 
the Egyptian Army and in attempts to spread Soviet propaganda in 
the industrial classes. Nuqrashi pointed out that until 1945, 
there had been no definite indication of such activities in Egypt, 
but that since he had assumed office in February 1945, he had 
received reports from the Ministry of the Interior to the effect 
that the Soviet Legation in Cairo had become active in the 
spreading of propaganda which, in his opinion "was of a 
sufficiently serious character as to cause his government some 
concern" .
1. Ibid, appendix c. See also dispatch 986 from American Legation, 
Cairo, 20 August 1945, RG 59, 861.20283/8-2045.
2. See a note on Communism in the Sudan, prepared by the Secretariat 
Central office, Khartoum, 16 February 1949, in: F0371/73471, 
J1855/10113/16.
3. Top secret letter from American Embassy, Cairo, 8 April 1945,
RG 59, 861.20283/4-845. It was also reported that documentary 
films were being shown at the Soviet Legation and intended
to introduce to the Egyptians the positive aspects of the
U.S.S.R.; see, Ibid, 15 January 1948, 861.20283/1-1548.
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A very interesting description of Soviet activity in Egypt was 
given by P.M. Denieprov, the Charge d'affaires of the Soviet 
Legation. In a conversation which took place on 4 January 1946, 
with Lyon, a member of the American Legation^-, Denieprov 
complained of a feeling of uneasiness in Egypt because of the 
number of arrests which had been made of alleged communists. 
Denieprov said that the Soviet Legation had arranged an exhibition 
at the Agricultural Society, which contained exhibits from the 
various Soviet Republics, photographs, pamphlets, copies of the 
constitution of the U.S.S.R., etc. He pointed out that certain 
Egyptian students had found this exhibition interesting and had 
requested pamphlets. The Egyptian Government had done all possible 
to "limit the influence of the exposition" said Denieprov.
According to his words, Arabic copies of the Soviet constitution 
were printed in Moscow and sent to Egypt for distribution. These 
copies had been favourably received and had created much interest 
but had also met with governmental opposition. Denieprov said that 
all the stories about the propaganda being spread by the Soviet 
Legation were exaggerated. "You have heard them, they are really 
scared of us, aren't they?", said Denieprov to Lyon. Lyon 
emphasized that Denieprov never denied that the Soviet Legation was 
disseminating a considerable amount of propaganda, but he obviously 
intended to give the impression that the allegations referred to 
were ridiculous. Denieprov mentioned the influence of the events in 
Iran on the Soviet position in Egypt. He said that the fact that 
Egyptians were saying that the whole business was being engineered 
by the Soviets was causing anxiety in Egypt among a few officials; 
in his view, most people were quite indifferent to the whole 
situation and the average Egyptian was very little concerned
1. Enclosure No. 1 to dispatch 1260 from American Legation, Cairo,
7 January 1946, RG 59, 711.83/1-746.
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about anything that did not touch him personally. Denieprov said 
that very few Egyptians were interested in Communism "the people 
are completely without hope or desire...the people are just 
deadened and have no expectations". The upper ruling classes, said 
Denieprov, "with which we come in contact are entirely motivated 
by fear of Communism, but in the middle class there is slight 
interest in Communism, as well as among the so-called 
intelligentsia". He emphasized that there was no revolutionary 
movement or activity in Egypt, and that the only interest in 
Communism was a slightly academic one. Denieprov said that the 
Soviet Legation had very little contact with the Egyptians either 
during working hours or socially, and while the Egyptian officials 
and important Egyptians accepted all the invitations extended to 
them by the Legation, hospitality was never returned. "They seem 
really to be afraid of getting into close contact with the 
Soviets"*.
b. Soviet Activity in The Greek Orthodox Church
Despite the fact that there was no room for religion in
communist doctrine, the Soviets attempted to assert control over
the Orthodox Church in the Middle East and to use it as a 
political instrument for their own purposes.
The Patriarchs of Antioch, Alexandria, Jerusalem and 
Constantinople were invited to Moscow in January 1945 to attend 
the General ecclesiastical Assembly convoked to elect a new 
Patriarch of Moscow.Several months later, in May 1945, the
Church's new head, Aleksei, arrived for a visit in the Middle East
which included Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Egypt. These 
religious contacts, said Sir R. Campbell, had obviously a
1. Ibid.
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political background, namely, the promotion of Russian, and 
therefore also, communist influence among the Orthodox minorities 
of Egypt and the Middle East*.
In addition to the Soviet Church's direct links with local
clergy, said Yaacov Ro'i in his book Soviet Decision Making
in Practice, the Soviet diplomats assigned to Near Eastern
capitals began to reveal an interest in the Holy Places,
pilgrimages and the various organizations and institutions
7connected with the Church and the Orthodox religion .
In Egypt, this activity was concentrated mainly in Alexandria, 
but it extended to Cairo as well. Soviet aspirations were crowned 
with success in the Greek Orthodox Church of Alexandria as a 
result of support given by Christophoros II, the Greek Orthodox 
Patriarch of Alexandria, mainly after his return in January 1945 
from Moscow where he had participated in the election of a new 
Patriarch0 .
Father Alexis, Priest of the local Russian Orthodox Church of 
Alexandria, was involved in communist activity and it was well- 
known that the Soviet Legation had financially supported his 
Church. Consequently, tn March 1947, he was given fifteen days 
to leave Egypt by the Egyptian authorities4 .
1. Sir R. Campbell was the British Ambassador in Egypt at this 
time. See dispatch 106 from Campbell, Cairo, 3 February 1947, 
F0371/63046, J675/422/16G. Yaacov Ro'i, Soviet Decision Making 
in Practice (New Jersey: 1980), pp.34-35.
2. R o 1i , ibid, p.35.
3. On the visit of Christophros II, and on the inter-Orthodox 
relations, see: dispatch 513 from the American Legation, Cairo, 
26 January 1945, RG 59, 883.404/1-2645;
Paper on "The Russian Church and the Eastern Patriarchates" 
prepared by the Research Department of the F.O., March 1950, 
F0371/81977, E1781/2. See also Record of Conversation, took 
place on 15 December 1948, at the Department of State, between 
Baxter, Division of Greek, Turkish and Iranian Affairs, the 
Greek Ambassador and Athenagoras, the newly elected Ecumenical 
Patriarch, RG 59, 883.404/12-1548.
4. A-17 (Airgram) from American consulate, Alexandria, 14 March 
1947, RG 59, 861.404/3-1447.
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In 1946 the Patriarch of Alexandria went on another visit to 
Moscow and in 1947 the Patriarch of Moscow, Sergei Alexis visited 
Alexandria-*-. Christophoros II had close relations with the heads 
of the Soviet Legation. Towards the end of 1948, it was reported 
that he had received three separate visits by the First Secretary 
of the Soviet legation in Cairo, and at his request, had accepted 
as an employee in the Patriarchal Library, a Greek subject who was 
known to be pro-communist. Later on, the librarian was arrested by 
the police and placed in an internment camp following an 
investigation which disclosed that he was engaged in communist 
activities. Efforts to have the librarian released were made by 
Christophros II, but his efforts were not successful because the 
arrest was carried out upon orders from the Ministry of 
Interior . In addition, the Head of the Patriarchal Labor 
Employment Office was a communist who had engaged communists to 
work with the British Forces in the Suez Canal Zone .
Moreover, in the election of the Patriarch of Istanbul,
Christophoros II favoured the candidate who was nominated by 
Moscow4 . On 14 November 1948, at the ceremony when the Greek 
Orthodox Patriarchal Library was transferred to new quarters, a 
place of honor in the front row was given to Alexis Shvedov, First
1. Dispatch 83 from American Consulate, Alexandria, 15 November
1948, RG 59, 883.404/11-1548.
2. Ibid. See also dispatch 84, ibid, 17 November 1948, 883.404/11 
-1748. Dispatch 101, ibid, 20 December 1948, RG 59, 883.00B/12 
-2048. Broadly speaking, a significant number of communist 
activists in Egypt were of Greek origin and many of them had 
come to Egypt as refugees after the German occupation in 1941. 
It would be therefore possible to assume that the Patriarch's 
pro-Soviet attitude was not exceptional among the Greek 
population in Egypt. See dispatch 96, ibid, 9 December 1948, 
883.404/12-948. Dispatch 116 from American Consulate, 
Alexandria, 2 March 1955, RG 59, 774.00/3-255. On the activity 
of Greek communists in British camps located at the Suez Canal 
zone, see, dispatch 61 from American Consulate, Port Said, 26 
July 1949, RG 59, 883.00B/7-2649.
3. Dispatch 11 from American Consulate, Alexandria, 17 January
1949, RG 59, 883.404/1-1749.
4. See dispatches 83 and 84, ibid.
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Secretary of the Soviet legation in Cairo. The attendance of a 
Soviet official at a religious ceremony was a matter of interest 
because as a rule no representative of the Soviet Government was 
allowed by his superiors to attend such a ceremony*.
At the beginning of 1949, it was reported that the Patriarch of 
Alexandria was going to assent to the establishment in Alexandria 
of a chapel to be run or directed by the Patriarch of Moscow, 
Alexis^.
Whether or not we accept Christophoros II's defence that he was 
anti-communist and that there had been a misunderstanding about 
some of his activities , the main point was, that the homeland 
of atheism, which waged an internal, continuous campaign against 
all religions inside her boundaries, was ready to sacrifice 
some of the basic ideas in her doctrine in order to achieve a 
political benefit. The use of the Orthodox Church as a shelter for 
hiding communists, or conducting subversive activity on behalf of 
Soviet interests, was an essential change in their doctrine, which 
took place as a result of Soviet foreign policy developments after 
the second world war. For the realization of their goals in the 
Middle East, they were ready to support and encourage every local 
group who had a sympathy for, or any sort of link to, the 
U.S.S.R., not necessarily on the basis of ideology. A further 
illustration, according to British and American reports, concerns 
the Egyptian Armenians. The Armenians desired to see the Armenian 
provinces in Turkey freed and linked to the Armenian Soviet
1. see dispatch 84, ibid.
2. Dispatch 11, ibid, 17 January 1949, RG 59, 883.404/1-1749.
3. This statement was made by Christophoros II on 21 January 1949, 
during a conversation with Robert L. Buell, American Consul 
General to Alexandria, and Charilaos Zamarias, Greek Consul 
General to Alexandria. See record of conversation in dispatch 
13, ibid, 26 January 1949, 883.404/1-2649. See also, dispatch 
11, ibid; and dispatch 98 from American Embassy, Cairo, 28 
January 1949, RG 59, 883.404/1-2849.
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Republic, therefore, they supplied propaganda agents for the 
Soviets. It was stated that the Charg^ d'affaires of the Soviet 
Legation, Denieprov, was in touch with local Armenian cultural 
organizations in promoting Soviet cultural propaganda*.
Yet, up to the late 1940's, Soviet political activity 
concentrated mainly in nurturing and preparing the local 
communists to be able to lead the future revolution.
1. Memorandum from the American War Department to the Department 
of State, 23 May 1946, RG 59, 861.20283/5-2346.
Dispatch 536 from British Embassy, Cairo, 11 April 1945, 
F0371/46003, J1412. On this subject see also, Intelligence 
Report No. 5914, "Problems and Attitudes in the Arab World: 
Their Implication for US Psychological Strategy", 19 May 1952, 
U.S. Declassified Documents Reference System, U.S., 1979, 314A. 
"The Soviet and Islam", The Times (London), 28 January 1949.
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C. The Soviet Union and the Local Egyptian Communist 
Elements ____  ______________________
Soviet strategic interests in the Middle East up to the late 
1940's concentrated mainly on Iran1. Yet, the guiding principle 
for communist activity in the Arab world had been formulated 
by the Sixth and Seventh Congress of the Comintern .
The principle of struggling against imperialism for national 
independence had served as a guiding light for all the communists 
in the Near East for a long period. The tactic adopted by them 
was, on the one hand, a massive attack on imperialism and its 
handmaiden domestic reaction, and on the other hand, to picture 
the U.S.S.R. as a powerful friend of small peoples who were 
struggling for their national independence. They hoped that once 
the imperialist powers had been expelled and independence 
achieved, they would be able to take over.
Soviet legations opened in some Arab countries in 1943. The 
Soviets took great care that their representatives should be able 
to integrate themselves easily and speedily in the new milieu.
For instance, Daniil Solod, the first Soviet minister in Syria 
and Lebanon, spoke Arabic; the second secretary in the Cairo 
Legation, *Abd Al-Ra^iman Sultanov was a Muslim and Arabic
1. The Soviets were involved in internal political affairs in Iran 
mainly, with a massive support to the Communist Party-the 
Tudeh. The Tudeh was almost strong enough to take over the 
government in 1947. On the political capacity of the party and 
its interaction with the Soviet Union, see C.I.A. report 
entitled: "The Tudeh Party: Vehicle of Communism in Iran", 18 
July 1949, President's Secretary's Files, Subject File: Central 
Intelligence Reports-ORE 1949 (No. 17-24, Box 256), Harry S. 
Truman Library, Independence Missouri. "Communist Party 
Capabilities in the Middle East and North Africa", Department 
of State Intelligence Report, 24 November 1952, R&A Reports,
IR 6044, National Archives, Washington D.C. See also,
The Times, ibid.
2. See pp. 11-13. See also, report on "The strategy and tactics of 
world Communism", U.S.A. Government printing office,
Washington: 1948, in: RG 84, Cairo Embassy-General Records, 
1948: 800c, Box 187.
-25-
speaker* .
The Soviet Legation in Beirut served as a centre for communist 
activities in the Middle East. Representatives of Telegrafnoe 
Aqentstvo Sovetskogo Soiuza (Tass- Telegraphic Agency of the 
Soviet Union) in Beirut were also actively engaged in 
communist contacts and activities. Furthermore, visits of 
representatives of the Cominform to Lebanon were known. Communist 
representatives from Eastern European countries, mainly Yugoslavia
(up to the crisis with Moscow on 1948), were thought to be active
2propagandists .
According to Egyptian press reports the Yugoslav legation in Cairo 
gave material and moral support to Egyptian communists. The Soviet 
Legation, it was said, attempted to avoid suspicion and therefore 
refused to receive the Egyptian communists, abstaining 
from having any connection with them. The Soviets used the 
Yugoslavs for pursuing the Soviet goals of encouraging subversive 
movements and providing for their needs. By doing so, the Soviets
wished to prevent any diplomatic friction with the Egyptian
•a . . .  . .
authorities . Indeed, the activities of the Yugoslav legation in
Egypt created a lot of tension with the Egyptian authorities.
For instance, in July 1948, the police closed a club in Alexandria 
which was run by Yugoslav agents and used as a centre for 
communist activity4 . However, it would be an exaggeration to say 
that the Soviet Legation in Cairo was not involved in local 
communist activity. The legation sought to become the patron of
1. Y. R o 'i , Soviet Decision Making in Practice, pp. 33-34.
2. F.O. Research Department memorandum of 21 July 1948, on 
Communism in countries outside the Soviet orbit,'F0371/71651, 
N9471/31/G. The Times, ibid.
3. See dispatch 275 from American Embassy, Cairo, 3 April 1948,
RG 59, 883 .0,0/4-348 .
4. File No. 800B from American Consulate, Alexandria, to American 
Embassy, Cairo, 1 July 1948, RG 84, American Embassy-General 
Records, 1948: 800c, Box 193.
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Egypt1s workers. According to Egyptian press reports, the Soviet 
Union sent financial support to workers striking in Egypt and 
organized the student and worker demonstrations that hit Egypt in 
February-March 1946. The Soviet Legation's short-range aim was the 
establishment of a national united front in Egypt to struggle 
against Britain*.
In the Egyptian elections at the beginning of 1945, members of 
the Soviet legation had been in touch with the communist 
candidate. In addition, the Soviet minister in Cairo warned the 
Egyptian Prime Minister, that there must be no harassment to 
communist candidates. The Soviet Minister said that he was not 
"disposed to argue or discuss varying national ideologies as the 
Egptian public, so largely illiterate, were not fitted for such 
stuff, and as the Egyptian Prime Minister he must see to it
. , On
that they were not subjected to it *
In April 1945 it was reported that King Faruq worried about
local communist activities and particularly about the role the 
Soviets might have played in them. The Egyptian Director General 
of Public Security, Hassanain Pasha, was quoted as saying that he 
was convinced "that the Russians will aim at the capture of Egypt 
as being the heart and nerve of the Middle East". That was the 
reason for his opposition to the establishment of diplomatic 
relations with the U.S.S.R. He put the blame on Nafthas Pasha for 
having been too forward in this matter .
Hassanain said inter alia, that Henry Curiel, an Egyptian Jew,
the founder and leader of the Communist party M.E.L.N. (the 
Egyptian Movement for National Liberation), ran a bookshop in 
which Soviet propaganda literature was prominently displayed. The
1. Ro'i, pp.35-36.
2. Dispatch 25 from British Embassy, Cairo, 25 January 1945, 
F0371/46003, J1440.
3. Dispatch 536, ibid, 11 April, 1945, ibid, J1412.
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literature presented different aspects of Soviet social activities 
in an attractive light/ and found its readers mainly among 
Egyptian students*.
The attitude of the Soviet Legation to Egyptian communist 
activity, seemed to be ambivalent. On the one hand, to prevent any 
friction with the Egyptian authorities, they avoided direct 
support of the local communist movement. On the other, there was 
evidence of a steady support, mainly moral and financial, which 
was given to individuals and organizations to propagate pro-Soviet 
sentiments.
As was pointed out previously, the qualifications of <Abd 
al-Rahman Sultanov were useful in carrying out his activities.
He became the most popular member of the Soviet legation. As 
a Muslim, his prestige among Muslim circles was high. It 
brought him into much closer contact with the population as 
a whole. He was known to have paid several visits to Al-Azhar. In 
these visits, he demonstrated his knowledge of Islam and attempted 
to prove that Islam and Communism can co-exist. Likewise, Sultanov 
was active in organizing communist meetings to stimulate the 
development of cells. He even attended meetings in some of 
them^.
Of the local communists activists, Fathi al-Ramli was known to 
be one of the most prominent figures who had direct contact with 
the Soviet legation. He was supported financially by the Soviets 
in order to diffuse their propaganda. Despite the fact that Ramli 
did not have an official party which connected him to the 
communist movement, he was known by most educated people as a
1. Ibid. On Henry Curiel see also pp.35-36. On Soviet communist 
activity in the Sudan see: letter No. 22(36.11.17) from the 
Governor of the Sudan to the British Ambassador, Cairo, 13 
March 1947, F0371/63082, J1450/16G.
2. Report on "The Development of Communism in Egypt" from British
Embassy, Cairo, 7 April 1945, F0371/46003, J2211/440/16.
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communist. Those who had heard of him, mainly through his articles 
in the press, considered him as one who was supposed to have an 
unaccountable supply of money. For instance, it was said that 
students cynically took money from him; they considered him as 
"an eccentric whose pockets were full of ready cash"^.
An American secret report based upon information given by 
Egyptian communists who worked according to Soviet orders, 
outlined the Soviet methods of implementing their interests
o , ,
in the Middle East . According to this information, Odessa was
an important centre of the Soviet Intelligence High Command in 
the Middle East and was in direct contact with Istanbul, Haifa, 
Beirut, Port Said and Alexandria. From Odessa, secret 
instructions, communist propaganda in Arabic, and specially 
trained Soviet agents infiltrated through these ports to the 
interior of Arab countries. Two Soviet Black Sea command vessels 
were engaged in servicing Soviet intelligence requirements, 
under cover of commercial and repatriation activities. Communist 
and Soviet intelligence activities in the Middle East were for 
a time financed exclusively by shipments of gold and platinum, 
which were usually transported by these vessels to Beirut, where 
the Greek Navigation Lines Co. received the cargo for distribution 
elsewhere. Communist agents at Alexandria and Port Said handled 
the allotment for Egypt, sending the metal to Cairo. The 
Alexandria division of Soviet Intelligence, emphasized the report, 
had been proved responsible for the subversive activities in 
harbour, docks and customs houses of Alexandria. The report
1. Report on "Propaganda directed to Egypt by the Soviet 
Authorities" from British Embassy, Cairo, 14 September 1945, 
ibid, J2962/440/16.
2. Secret report on "Ramification of Soviet Intelligence System", 
from American Embassy, Cairo, 10 February 1947, RG 59, 
883.00/2-1047.
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also indicated direct contact between Odessa and Henri Curiel, 
and that Dnieprovski, the commercial attache of the Soviet 
Legation in Beirut, had twice visited Egypt after June 1946 to 
bring orders from Odessa to Curiel1. Likewise, the Egyptian 
Under-Secretary of State for the Interior, <Abd al-Ra^iman lAmir, 
said that the Egyptian police was informed that communists had 
infiltrated into the Muslim Brotherhood, the Mi?r al-FatSt and 
into the Wafd, as the Communist Party was illegal and communists 
could not act openly. The Soviet Legation, it was said, "had 
supplied their agents with funds to pass on to their adherents in 
these societies" .
The role to be taken by the local communist parties, was based 
upon the theory of Dimitrov, the Communist ideologist, and was 
adopted by the mainstream of the Egyptian communist movement.
This theory proposed:
"We wish to make out of our parties a political power for 
the working class movement in the capitalist countries 
and to establish them as a political factor with the 
highest degree of activity. We want them to follow a 
strong Bolshevist plan for the masses, not to confine 
themselves to propaganda and criticism; also to give the 
masses slogans for the fight to realist the dictatorship 
of the proletariat ".
A British intelligence memorandum on the development of 
Communism in Egypt confirmed that the general policy of the 
Egyptian communists was in step with the line adopted by communist 
movements elsewhere. In Egypt, the first step was to achieve
1. Ibid. _
2. Memorandum of conversation between *Abd al-Ra£man fAmir and 
P.H. Ireland, First Secretary of American Embassy, Cairo, 18 
November 1948, in dispatch 944, from American Embassy, Cairo, 
19 November 1948, RG 59, 883.00/11-1948.
3. Letter No. (E)200/128 from R.M. Shields, a representative of 
the British Security Services (S.S.R.), Cairo, to T.C. 
Ravensdale, British Embassy, Cairo, 9 August 1947, F0141/1158, 
66/72/47. Shields received this information from the Egyptian 
Security Services who supplied him with a copy of two articles 
submitted by a member of the Egyptian Communist Party to the 
Central Committee.
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Egyptian independence from British institutions and influence. 
Their propaganda and activity was concentrated in a constant 
attack on British Imperialism and American capitalism. The main 
channel of the communist propaganda was the weekly newspaper,
Al-Jamahir. The editor was Mahmud al-NabawT al-LatTf, a lawyer, 
who was known to be in contact with both the Tass Agency and 
the Yugoslav legation. It was said that the Soviet legation 
subsidised his activity*.
The response of the Egyptian communists to the international 
communist split which arose as a result of the dispute between 
Tito and Stalin in 1948, was definite support for the latter.
Tito was attacked and described as a traitor and his country, 
Yugoslavia, described as a colony of America. Tito's attempts to 
preserve his country's independence and build socialism on a firm 
foundation would fail. The Egyptian communists declared that 
the struggle for liberation of Egypt and other dependent 
countries was part of the world struggle against imperialism. This
struggle was an integral part of a common struggle of the world
2democratic bloc under the leadership of the Soviet Union .
The contacts between the Soviet legation and the local 
communists were conducted at the highest level of clandestine 
activity. Both the American and British Embassies confirmed that 
it was very difficult to establish independent proof that the 
Soviets had subsidised the communist movement in Egypt in the 
early 1950' s, Although both Embassies were informed by the 
Egyptian authorities that the Polish, Czech and Soviet legations 
had been used as channels for dissemination of funds and
1. Letter No. (E)20/2/24 from Campbell, Cairo, 18 March 1948, 
F0371/69250,> J1890/1262/16. A-12 from the American Embassy, 
Cairo, 8 January 1948, RG 59, 883.00/1-848.
2. "Project of the Egyptian Communist Party Programme", in letter 
No. 1014/3/50, from British Embassy, 9 January 1950,
F0371/80354, JE1041/1G.
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propaganda to communists. The contacts which had existed with the 
Yugoslav legation appeared to have ceased after Tito's break with 
the Cominform. Contacts between Egyptian communists and communist 
party personnel in Western Europe were known to the Egyptian 
authorities-*-. Al-MisrT reported in April 1951 on despatches 
received by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from Egyptian 
legations in Central Europe. The legations informed the Ministry 
on the relation between communist activities in Egypt and 
Cominform agents in those countries. Likewise, the Egyptian 
Foreign Minister was informed of a possibility of the infiltration 
of these agents to Egypt by means of forged documents. As a 
result, all routes of entry into Egypt were closely guarded and 
a list of dangerous persons distributed to all passport
o . . . .
offices . Towards the end of 1951, while Britain became involved 
in disputes with Egypt and Iran, reports from Rome's Sciampino 
Airport showed that Soviet diplomats, technicians and "civilian 
employees" had been streaming into the Middle East for what 
described as various missions .
In spite of the above connections, one American report estimated 
that a considerable amount of communist activity was of a "home­
grown" variety taking its line from Soviet radio broadcasts, 
contacts with various foreign communities and occasional contacts
with western European communists and Eastern European diplomats 
4in Egypt .
1. "Survey of Communism in countries outside the Soviet Orbit" by 
F.O. Research Department, report No. RC/19/50, 1 January 1950, 
F0371/86751, NS/1052/12G. Ibid, report No. 2192/5/50G, 1 July 
1950, F0371/86902, NS2192/40G. Report entitled, "Communism in 
Egypt", from American Embassy, Cairo, 17 March 1950, RG 59, 
774.001/3-1750. Report on Egypt, Department of State, 5 July 
1950, RG 59, 611.74/7-550.
2. Dispatch 2514 from American Embassy, Cairo, 20 April 1951, RG 
59, 774.001/4-2051.




THE EGYPTIAN COMMUNIST MOVEMENT AND ITS ROLE IN THE 
INTERNAL POLITICAL ARENA UP TO 1955__________________
In a discussion of the beginnings of the Soviet Union's 
involvement in the Middle East generally/ and Egypt in particular, 
it would be impossible to disregard the main element by means of 
which the Soviets wished to deepen their penetration into that 
part of the world. They concentrated their efforts on the nurture 
and encouragement of the local Communist Party in the hope that it 
would act as the revolutionary vanguard which would lead the 
masses towards a revolution. This was the Soviet method of 
implementing their strategy within the Third World, as mentioned 
above.
The Soviets were mistaken in their appreciation of the political 
capacity of the communist movements in the Arab world in general, 
and of Egypt in particular. One of the main reasons for Soviet 
miscalculation was inter alia, the influence of two models with 
limited success, the Iranian and Indian communist parties, and the 
fact that the Soviets did not make necessary distinctions between 
individual countries in the Third World.
Many long studies which have dealt with the Arab and Egyptian
communist parties have interpreted the persecution and harassment
of these parties as an indication that they constituted an
important factor in the various struggles for power. However, a
deeper study of the subject will show that in fact, the repression
of these parties was a result of their illegal activities on
behalf of the Soviets and not because they were a potential threat
to the established order. In reality, their political influence
among the masses was so minute that it would have been impossible 
► •
to meet Soviet expectations.
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This chapter will discuss various dimensions of the real 
potential of the Egyptian communist movement and try to 
demonstrate that estimates of the influence of this marginal 
movement have been widely exaggerated.
A . The Emergence of a Communist Party in Egypt
a . The Egyptian Communist movement in the inter-war period
In 1920 the Egyptian Socialist party was established by Joseph
Rosenthal, Husni al-*ArabT and Antun Marun. In 1922 the party was
accepted into the Comintern and changed its name to "The Egyptian
Communist Party", at which point Rosenthal who opposed this step
withdrew from the party*.
The party published in 1921 its first political credo, which
sharply denounced the "brutal aggression by which British
militarist and colonial officials have replied to the sacred
demands of Egypt" .
The objective of the founders of the Communist Party was to
create a party of the proletariat, but they failed to realize
this, and not a single worker became a party leader. The number of
party members remained small, and most of them were intellectuals
of middle class origin. The most remarkable phenomenon was that
many active figures were Europeans and Jews. The party had
attempted to infiltrate the Trade Unions and in 1923 a
confederation of Unions was established which stood for a
3communist orientation .
In 1924 these communists organized strikes in Alexandria and in
1. Walter Z. Laqueur, Communism and Nationalism in the Middle East 
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1957), pp. 33-34'. Selma Botman, 
The Rise of Egyptian Communism, 1939-1970 (New York: 1988), pp. 
1-6 .
2. Laqueur, ibid, p.34.
3. Ibid, p.34-35; see also a memorandum prepared by Israel 
Foreign Ministry on Communism in the Middle East, 2 August 
1954, I.S.A., FM2403/13/B.
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other industrial centres, but the strikes were suppressed by the 
Wafd Governments which dissolved the confederation and formed "The 
National Labour Union" which was led by Wafd members.
In the middle of 1925 the party was declared illegal, and 
henceforth it ceased to exist as an organized element*.
Stalin determined in 1925 that in countries such as China and 
Egypt, the communists should create a united political front with 
the "Revolutionary Bourgeoisie" which would be expected to 
conduct a constant campaign against the imperialists.
The 1928 Comintern congress confirmed Stalin's line and the 
Egyptian communists were called upon in this congress, to take 
over the Trade Unions to reduce the influence of the "National 
Bourgeoisie". In addition, the Communist Party was encouraged not 
to confine its activity to the urban proletariat, but to 
infiltrate the society of the fellahin; but there was a 
significant gap between the doctrine and its application. 
Inevitably, the Communist Party's political power decreased after 
being declared illegal, and it could not operate effectively in 
opposition to the Wafd. To counteract this the Comintern sent 
European delegates to Egypt, in the middle 1920's, posing as trade 
agents in an attempt to establish a new party leadership. However, 
the efforts failed. The Syrian communist Mahmud WahTb Malik was 
sent in 1934 by the Comintern to Egypt on a similar mission in the 
hope that he would succeed better, but his mission was not crowned 
with success. The Egyptian authorities reacted to the Comintern's 
attempts by arresting most of the militant figures of Communist 
Party. In spite of this, a few communist groups continued their
1. M.S. Agwani, Communism in the Arab East (Bombay:Asia Publishing 
House, 1969), pp.5-6.
2. As opposed to the "National Bourgeoisie" which was represented 
by the Wafd, and considered by the communists as cooperating 
with British imperialism.
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activity in Cairo and Alexandria, But without directives from the 
Comintern, communist activity was stamped out entirely by the end 
of 1930's1 .
b . Communist activity in the second world war and its aftermath
The communist movement was reborn in Egypt during the second 
world war. Several studies have suggested that the reason for 
this could partly be the shattered image of Egyptian political 
institutions. For example, the Wafd accepted British army 
assistance in a successful effort to take over the government; the 
British interference in Egyptian domestic affairs and the King's 
submission to their demands, considerably damaged his authority. 
The leftists were enjoying a more favourable atmosphere as a 
consequence of the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany. The 
communists could offer a rational alternative to the existing 
Egyptian political system. A vital factor in the emergence of the
Communist party was the rapid growth of industry during the second
2world war and the resultant growth of the working class .
In spite of these suitable conditions the movement itself was 
weak, its members few and the various factions divided .
Marxist study circles which constituted the beginnings of
1. Laqueur, Communism and Nationalism, pp. 37-41. Mohamed Heikal, 
Sphinx and Commisar (London: Collins, 1978), pp.42-45. In 
relation to the programme of action of the Communist Party of 
Egypt in that period, see: Ivan Spector, Middle East Journal, 
Vol. 10, No. 4 (1956), pp. 427-437; this programme was 
published by the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute in Moscow in 1934.
2. A. Cohen, The Arab Labour Party, (Tel-Aviv: 1947), pp.36-39 
(Hebrew). Agwani, Communism in the Arab East, pp.31-32. On the 
increasing industrialization of Egypt after the war see: U.S. 
Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States- 
1947 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1971),Vol. 5, p. 
546 (hereafter cited as FRUS with appropriate year and volume 
number). See also, Joel Beinin and Zachary Lockman, Workers on 
the Nile (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1987), pp. 
4-8.
3. See dispatch from Campbell, British Embassy, Cairo, 3 February 
1947, F0371/63046, J675/422G.
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a new communist movement were established in Cairo and Alexandria 
in 1941. From these circles grew almost twenty different communist 
groups in the following years. This split constituted one of the 
main characteristics of the Egyptian communist movement.
Two main factions were:
a. M.E.L.N.- "The Egyptian Movement for National Liberation" (al- 
Haraka al-Migriya lil-tafrrir al-WatanT), which was founded by 
Henry Curiel, an Egyptian Jew*.
b. "Iskra" (al-sharara), was founded by Hillel Schwarz,also a Jew. 
Both groups consisted of thirty members, all foreigners. The
two opposed one another on tactics; the M.E.L.N. called for 
immediate action among the masses, and insisted that the party 
should embark upon a rapid Egyptianization and proletarization 
process, whereas Iskra emphasized the need for the mobilization 
of a revolutionary reserve of Marxist consciousness and of
intellectuals in order to establish a sound base from which
2popular activity could follow .
1943 saw the emergence of new communist groups influenced by 
Soviet successes in the war. In Alexandria the talica faction was 
established by young Wafd dissidents; in Cairo there was al-Fajr 
al-JadTd which published a weekly paper under the same name; this 
weekly was one of the most important communist periodicals in 
Egypt. The number of active members increased, and in 1945 the 
M.E.L.N. itself contained about one thousand members and 
supporters .
At the beginning of 1946, the communists faced direct 
confrontation with Isma'il SidqT; SidqT accused the Egyptian
1. On Henry Curiel's life and activity see, Gilles Perrault, A Man 
Apart (London: Zed Books Ltd, 1987).
2. Rauf *Abbas IJamid, al-baraka al-^ummalTyya fi Misr 1899-1952 
(Cairo: 1968), pp. 265-268. Laqueur,Communism and Nationalism, 
pp. 42-43. Heikal, Sphinx and Commissar, p.47-48.
3. cAbbas tfamid, ibid, pp.418-419. Heikal, ibid, p.47-48.
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communists of a conspiracy with the Zionist movement; in February 
1946, more than twenty students were killed as a result of clashes 
with the police (the *Abbas bridge incident); this incident led to 
the communist proclamation of a general strike On 21
February. In the demonstration which broke out on the same day, 
three demonstrators were killed and more than a hundred were 
injured. Later on, during the first half of July 1946, over 200 
persons were arrested on charges of communist activity*.
The Soviets considered the February 1946 strikes in Cairo and 
Alexandria as "the most important event in the political life of 
the country" .
Many studies which have dealt with the subject have suggested 
that these events constituted the turning point of the communists' 
political reputation in the political arena.
1. Telegram from American Embassy, Cairo, 14 July 1946, RG 59, 
883.00/7-1446. Airgram (A) 4499 from American Embassy,
Damascus, 18 July 1946, RG 59, 883.00B/7-1846. Dispatch 1741 
from American Legation, Cairo, 14 August 1946, RG 59, 883.00B/7 
-2246. See also, Cohen, the Arab Labour Party, p.158. Agwani, 
Communism in the Arab East, p.45. Heikal, ibid, pp.47-48. Jean 
and Simonne Lacouture, Egypt in Transition (London: Methuen & 
Co. Ltd, 1958), pp. 259-260. On communist activity in Port Said 
in that time see: Dispatch 34 from American Consulate, Port 
Said, 21 September 1946, RG 59, 883.00B/9-2146.
2. A. Kannunnikuv, "Rise of Labour Movement in Near East",
Professional'nyii Soiuzy (Moscow), No. 4, April 1947, see 
translation to English in: RG 84, Cairo Embassy-General 
Documents, File Subject-1947: 800, No. 3, box 166.
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B. Some Ideological Dimensions in the Communist Design 
Concerning the Egyptian National Struggle___________
a . British Imperialism-the Arab's Enemy
The communist explanation for the malady affecting the Egyptian 
people was concentrated and focused on one main factor, British 
Imperialism:
"British imperialism did not make any positive contribution 
to the Egyptian people during its rule in our country; the 
opposite, it strove to concentrate its efforts on breaking 
all the economic, social, political and scientific options 
of our people" .
The communist press attacked and condemned the British and other
Western imperialist powers by pointing out constantly that all
existing Egyptian defects were caused by British imperialism.
According to a prominent publicist in a1-fair al-jadid, there were
7many reasons to justify struggle against imperialism :
"Imperialism is chiefly responsible for our internal and 
external situation... imperialism weakened the popular 
strata in Egypt. The great monopolies (al-ifrtikarat al-kubra) 
in our country are in the hands of foreign capital... British 
Imperialism is chiefly responsible for backwardness in our 
economy, by its control of its main branches (the land, 
foreign trade,banks); thereby, it has always paralysed our 
industrial development... it is also chiefly responsible 
for backwardness in our political life. The constitution 
has emerged under the official shadow of a British occupation 
and has awarded extensive rights to the executive...
British Imperialism is the defender of various Fascist 
regimes, and brought the middle classes under its rule and 
used them against the popular strata... the main aim of 
the National Movement (al-haraka al-watanTya) in Egypt is to 
eradicate this situation which we find in our country".
The communists saw themselves as a vanguard at the spearhead of 
the struggle against imperialism, and the only force which would
1. Sadiq S a (d, "daur al-jamahir fi al-^araka al-watanTya wa-al- 
mufawadat al-haliya", Al-Fajr al-Jadld (Cairo), Mo. 29, 10 
April i946, p.9.
2. §adiq S a (d, "al-tabrir min al-isti*mar al-Britani wa al- 
mufawaqlat al-haliya", Al-Fajr al-Jadid (Cairo), No. 26, 20 
March 1946, pp. 14-15.
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be able to challenge British Imperialism; this could be realized
because the Egyptian Government and the Royal court had
collaborated with the British imperialists, and the communists
call to establish a full democracy would impart a significant
function to the popular stratum in Egyptian political life*.
The communists attacked the Egyptian Government frequently
because of its compromising and indulgent attitude towards the
British, an attitude which could not lead the Egyptian people to
o
full independence .
The communists absolutely rejected a continuation of this
particular mode of negotiation with Britain, and called for more 
3militant means :
"If we had checked the reports published [by the Egyptian 
Government], and those who published them, we would have 
found in all of them weak solutions which are based upon 
negotiations and bargaining with Britain, and they contain 
a call, which would be in the Government's interests, to 
the people to accept the solution that is agreed on with 
Britain".
The communists called repeatedly for the termination of the 1936 
treaty with Britain, because only by doing so, could the Egyptian 
Government negotiate with Britain as an equal and not from the 
inferior position which was created by the treaty^*.
The full independence of Egypt would be achieved only by the 
fulfilment of the following three conditions-^:
a. British evacuation of Land, Sea and Air bases.
b. The avoidance of any alliance with Imperialist Britain.
c. The avoidance of a special position for it.
1. Rushdl Salih, Al-Fajr al-Jadid (Cairo), No. 16, 11 January 
1946, p .3.
2. * All Ghazi, "di*aya ljizbiya am matalib qawmiya" ,'Al-Fajr al- 
Jadid (Cairo), No. 8, 1 September 1945, p.4.
3. Taha Sa*d *Uthman, "al-amana al qawmiya", Al-Damlr (Cairo), No. 
272, 3 October 1945, p.l.
4. Afrmad Sacid, Al-Fajr al-Jadid(Cairo), No. 27, 27 March 1946
p . 1 0 .
5. S a ‘Td Khlyyal, Qadiyatuna wa-majlis al-Smn", Al-Fajr al-Jadid 
(Cairo), 27 March 1946, p. 8.
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b. The Internal Popular Struggle for Democracy and against 
Collaborators__________________________________________________
The communists saw the anti-British struggle as only one aspect
of the Egyptian national struggle; the second aspect was in the
sphere of internal struggle,a struggle for Democracy and against
Egyptian "Reactionary Elements" which according to the communist
viewpoint had collaborated with the British imperialists1 :
"it will be a mistake if we divide the National Movement 
into two phases-one of them being against imperialism and 
for the military evacuation, and the second against reaction 
(al-raj <Iya), for an Economic Democracy, and liberation from 
the influence of Imperialist Economics. It is impossible in 
the first phase to collaborate with Egyptian Reaction for a 
military evacuation because we know certainly that it (the 
Reaction) hopes for the continuance of military occupation 
with a view to leaning upon it [as a means of} confronting the
rise of democracy... therefore, the National Struggle (al-kifah
al-watanT) considers the military evacuation and freedom from 
economic and political imperialism as being of equal 
importance. It is a combined and not a separate struggle".
The popular strata were the great force which was supposed to 
conduct the struggle against imperialism for democracy. In the
0  K1-
meantime, the communists called to the "Nationally Conscious"
people in each stratum and class, to join the popular strata in 
o
their struggle :
"we want to clarify to Loyal Nationalists (al-wafaniyyin 
al-mukhlisTn) that for the benefit of the popular strata and 
first and foremost the working class, these strata must turn 
to the Vertebral Column (al-*amud al-faqrl) in our struggle 
against imperialism because imperialism is in complete 
opposition to its interests Cthe working class}. Therefore, 
the Loyal Nationalists should concentrate on giving support to 
its quest for liberty, and to move forward with it towards the 
realization of its aim, which is also the national aim".
But the communists were conscious of the fact that most of 
the working class and fellahin did not support them. Likewise,
1. Shahdl *Atiya, "al-qadlya al-wataniya al-yaum", Al-Fajr 
al-Jadld, (Cairo) No. 39, 19 June 1946, pp.10, 23.
2. Ibrahim al-Kashif, "daur al-muthaqafin al-ahrar fi al- 
ftaraka al-wa£aniya", Al-Fajr al-Jadld (Cairo), No. 28, 3 April 
1946, p.5. On this subject, see also, Muhammad Amin, "al- 
dlmuqratlya al-Misrlya", Ibid, No.5, 16 July 1945, p.5
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they were conscious of the historical experience which taught them 
that the existence of a poor and oppressed "working class" is not 
sufficient, and they realized that the popular strata could not 
create a revolution by themselves, and it was necessary to spur 
them to action by the intensification of political activity and 
political education. This role was destined for the vanguard of 
intellectuals and the enlightened who would lead the popular 
national movement; these people were called in the communist 
periodicals, the "Liberal Intellectuals" (al-muthagafun al- 
ahrar )1.
c. The Need for Co-operation with External Forces for the 
Solution of the Egyptian Problem__________________________
The communists demanded that the Egyptian problem be removed
from bilateral discussions with Britain, and instead be
internationalized by being given the support of other Superpowers
and the United Nations organization, with a view to moving it
forward towards the achievement of independence. In the
international arena, Egypt could have achieved support by the
Great^owers, primarily, the Soviet Union, and the United States
W, J
too, which was resisting British imperialist tendencies. It was
vital that they make use of the favorable international atmosphere
created at the end of second world war: an atmosphere of
cooperation between peoples, the establishment of democracies and
o
a feeling that the end of Imperialist Epoch was m  sight .
The most lucid articulation of this idea was expressed in Al-Fajr 
al-Jadld:
"we believe that our national problem is insoluble Cif dealt 
with] separately from world-wide developments and with 
a disregard for the streams of freedom which are flowing in
1. Ibrahim al-Kashif, Ibid, pp.4-5.
2. Rushdl Saliti, Al-Fajr al-Jadid (Cairo),No. 7, 16 August 1945, 
p p .3-4.
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the world at this time...among the Great Powers (al-duwal 
al-(uzma) there are Cp°wers3 which call for the application 
of the conventions which were signed during the war. 
Furthermore, the Soviet Union... demands the evacuation of the 
British army from Egypt and Palestine..." .
Egypt was among the founders of the United Nations organization
in 1945, and in 1946 was elected a member of the Security Council.
The communists accepted willingly that choice and called for the
use of the Security Council and the General Assembly for an anti-
British struggle. In their view, membership in the Council allowed
Egypt a direct access to the powers, an opportunity which Egypt 
o
had to use .
In this international battle, which the communists intended to 
begin, a special place was designated for the Soviet Union. The 
Soviet Union was described as the capital enemy of imperialism 
wherever it was, and as the friend of the people who were 
struggling for their independence. In their opinion, Egypt should 
establish friendly relations with the Soviets because the two 
countries had a common interest regarding the struggle against 
British Imperialism. The Soviet support of Egypt in the 
international arena could help it in its struggle against Britain 
and its aspiration to achieve full independence :
"the Soviet Union is a Superpower {which acts'] for liberty, 
and the proof of that is in its known positions at the 
San-Francisco conference and in the Palestine, Syria and 
Lebanon issues. Egypt wants also that the homeland should 
benefit from {the policy of] this Great Power in its struggle 
against English Imperialists".
1. "Qagliyatuna al-wa^aniya duwallya", Al-Fajr al-JadTd (Cairo 
No. 17, 19 January 1946, p.21
2. S a ‘id Khiyyal, "ilia majlis al-amn", Al-Fajr al-JadTd (Cairo), 
No. 19, 30 January 1946, p.11. _ _
3. Ibid, "innaha maa*rakat al-wa^anlya wa-al-dlmuqratiya", Al-Fajr 
al-JadTd, No. 16, 11 January 1946, p.7.
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C . Communist Political Activity and its Influence 1947-1955
a . Communist activity and its effects on Unification in 1947
Despite the fact that communist factions claimed a few
achievements in their political activity in 1946/ and there were
indications of increased communist activity among labour groups in
Egypt, the extent of their influence was very limited even among
social groups which apparently had Leftist affiliations*.
According to Sir R. Campbell's report, the Egyptian Trade Union
movement was still in its early stages and only a few smaller
Trade Unions were led by communist figures; most of the prominent
o
unions were not under the communists' influence to any extent .
The Soviet appreciation of Egyptian Trade Union development
was quite different; they did not make the necessary distinction
between the varieties of Trade Unions and considered them as a
well-organized unit with clear and obvious goals:
"The powerful National-Liberation and labour movement in 
Egypt, which has developed with special intensity since end of 
second world war, has greatly strengthened the position, 
role and importance of Egyptian Trade Unions.
In spite of existing reactionary laws, a congress of Trade 
unions made its appearance in Egypt in May 1946" .
The weakness of the communist movement at the beginning of 1947
and its disorganization and inability to lead the masses towards
a revolution, were reflected clearly in a British report that
pointed out that the communists themselves had realized that under
1. See for instance a report prepared by the American 
Legation in Cairo, regarding the strikes which took place 
on January 10th, 1946; The report discerned inter alia 
the role of communists in organizing and conducting 
these strikes, in, Dispatch 1270, 10 January 1946, RG 59, 
883.5045/1-1046. See also a report from American'Embassy, 
Cairo, 22 March 1946, RG 59, 711.83/3-2246.
2. See dispatch 106 from R. Campbell, Cairo, 3 February 1947, 
F0371/63046,. J675/422/16G.
3. A. Kannunnikov, "Rise of Labour movement in the Near East", 
ibid.
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present internal and external socio-political conditions it would
be impossible to bring about any revolutionary changes:
"The communists in Egypt are willing to bide their time 
until they are satisfied that they themselves are really 
well organized, that the forces of repression are weakening, 
and that an undoubtedly strong revolutionary tide is running 
in the country" .
On the other hand the Egyptian authorities had promulgated
a series of decree-laws which were intended to prevent the growth
of communist influence and activity. The first to come was decree-
law no. 116, which was apparently promulgated as a consequence of
several strikes which took place in July 1946, among Government
employees, which the Government thought were supported inter alia
by communists? Art. 124(b) related indirectly to that by
decreeing: "penalties will be inflicted upon whoever coerces
or tries to coerce officials or public employees by force or
terrorism, or threat or any other illegal method..." .
Later, on 19 August 1946, Decree-law No. 117 was promulgated
and was intended to amend the penal code in connection with the
3punishment of subversive activities .
Despite the authorities' efforts to limit communist activity and 
influence, the next few months saw a strengthening of the communist 
position in Egypt and a marked increase in overt communist 
activities. According to British sources, the increasingly 
effective propaganda activity of the communists in Egypt had 
latterly reached alarming proportions, particularly in articles 
published in the press and not merely in those periodicals which 
the communists managed to bring directly under their own control.
1. Top secret letter No. 66/11/47, from Campbell, 14 January 1947,
. F0141/1158.
2. Dispatch 40 from Cmpbell, 15 January, 1947, Ibid, No.66/6/47, 
regarding tl)e July Decree-law; see more details in: Dispatch 
1737 from American Legation, Cairo, 22 July, 1946, RG 59,
883.0OB/7-2246.
3. Dispatch 40, ibid.
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These sources attributed the communist success to the
authorities' failure "to press home any charges against communists
placed under arrest despite the vigilance of the police"
Nuqrashi pasha, the Egyptian Prime Minister said that according
to an authentic information he had received, the existence in
Egypt of a communist executive organization was definitely
established. The central committee of this organization in Egypt
was reported to be working closely with Daniil Solod, the Soviet
o
Ambassador to the Lebanon .
Campbell pointed out that the recent acquittal of communists was
due influence exerted by the palace in the hope of conciliating
U.S.S.R. on the eve of the Egyptian appeal to the United
Nations . There was one more reason for the strengthening of the
communist position, according to a well-known communist, Anwar
Kamil, who was reported as having said, that the Wafd had fostered
communist propaganda because of its desire to embarrass not only
the cabinet, but also the palace and the British Embassy^.
Campbell's appreciation of the communists ability to engage in
socio-political activity had been resonably accurate; he did not
distinguish between communist short and long-term activity;
Campbell wrote;
"There is little doubt that communist propaganda is indeed 
on the increase and that this development is inevitable 
so long as there is in power a government which neglects 
social reform and so long as it is in the immediate interest
1. Letter N o .365(66/34/47) from Campbell, 1 May, 1947, Ibid.
The Soviets regarded the trials being held in Egypt against 
communists as activities of the reactionaries who barter the 
interests of the Egyptian people on "the pretext of a so-called 
communist peril"; see New Times (Moscow), 17 May 1947.
2. Top Secret Dispatch from American Embassy, Cairo', 26 May 1947, 
RG 59, 861.20283/5-2647.
3. F0141/1158, ibid. See also, statement by the U.S.A. and U.K. 
groups regarding subversive activities in the Middle East, 
Washington, undated, FRUS 1947, Vol. 5, pp. 610-611. On the 
Egyptian appeal to the U.N. see pp. 97-101.
4. F0141/1158, ibid.
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of a majority opposition to exploit this neglect... even if 
when in power, the opposition actually and successfully 
carries social reform into effect, the communists could 
presumably then turn their attention to other methods of 
attack"*.
b. The establishment of D.M.N.L.- The Communists' "Golden Era"
A process of change was taking place towards the middle of 1947,
when the communist factions gained success in their efforts to
2organize themselves as an established movement .
The framework for collaboration and unification among Egyptian 
communist groups was formulated into an ideological and practical 
program. The aims and methods were as follows:
"The movement which is based on the principles of Marxism- 
Leninism, aims at forming a Communist party in Egypt with 
the object of leading the fight for national liberation, 
the improvement in the material and educational level of 
the people and to mould the masses into a new social system. 
The fundamental mission of the movement is to forge the 
Egyptian Communist party out of the teaching of Marxism- 
Leninism, to share in the national and democratic fight in 
all its forms of propaganda and incitement, and exercise 
within itself discipline and self-criticism.
In the present political situation our movement is inevitably 
an illegal formation which makes it incumbent on members to 
adhere strictly to the security regulations. But the movement 
must always struggle to extend its lawful activity and form 
a legal movement" .
The successful fusion which took place in July 1947 between the 
two most important communist groups- "The Egyptian Movement for 
national liberation" and "Iskra", was the most important feature 
in the evolution of the communist movement in Egypt. The new 
common framework was called "The Democratic Movement for National
1. Ibid.
2. Letter No. (E)20/2/3, ibid, 26 August 1947; Dispatch 364 from 
Campbell, 1 May, 1947, ibid, 66/31/47. See also a translation of 
a "manifesto by the Democratic Movement for National 
Liberation", sent from American Embassy-Cairo, 28 July, 1947,
RG 59, 883.00B/7-2847.
3. Arabic document entitled "Regulation of the communist 
organization (No. 1)", supplied to Campbell by the Egyptian 
Defence Srcurity Officer. The Document was found with
a group of persons who were suspected of holding a communist 
meeting; the document was written on 1 December 1946, and was 
anonymous; see dispatch 364 from Campbell, 1 May 1947, ibid, 
66/31/47.
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Liberation" (al-haraka al-dimuqratiya lil-tahrir al-watanT) *.
The importance of the new union was stressed in a circular 
letter sent by D.M.N.L. to its members; this circular said inter 
alia: "We have striven for unity in order to make the 
revolutionary movement secure and to do away with all cross 
currents... such currents may become dangerous as political
o
deviations lead to weakening of the working class" .
The party central committee enjoined that the movement had to
strive for the formation of a National Front, comprising the Wafd,
the Kutla and any advanced political groups. By doing this, they
would act as the vanguard, and gain the maximum for the
progressive cause from the wave of nationalism and heightened
political consciousness. Moreover, it would widen the experience
of the working class, impress upon them the necessity of having
3allies, and strengthen their political outlook .
The communists described the change which took place and brought 
about their strengthening as follows:
"We are now passing through another stage. We have established 
ourselves among important sections of the workers and we have 
almost become the greatest political force in the university. 
Our influence has spread to the country and extends to 
different groups of intellectuals; we have also penetrated to 
the poor quarters in the capital; the two principal forces of 
the movement have joined together, and we are now quickly 
approaching the stage of a party of the masses" .
The communist criticism of the opposition parties was explained 
by their failure to organize the people round themselves;
1. Letter DS(E) 20/2/24 from R. M. Shields, S.S.R., Cairo, to Sir 
Walter Smart, British Embassy, Cairo, 10 July 1947, ibid. See 




4. See a tract which was written by the central committee of the
D.M.N.L. and circulated amongst members of the organization, 
in: Letter DS(E) 330/6 from R.M. Shields, S.S.R., Cairo, to T.C 
Ravensdale, British Embassy, Cairo, 15 July 1947, ibid, 
66/66/47. See also dispatch 649 from British Embassy, Cairo, 26 
July 1947, ibid.
-48-
therefore, the people looked to new forces for their leadership, 
for the realization of their major demands which could only be 
fulfilled by complete British evacuation of the Nile Valley, 
Democracy and a raising of the standard of living for the 
proletariat^-.
If so, what was the political programme of the unified party 
regarding the Sudanese issue and the National question?
In two articles which were written by a member of the new party 
and submitted to the central committee it was said with regard to 
the Sudanese issue:
"Egyptians and Sudanese should fight in a united struggle to 
drive imperialism out of the Nile Valley, together with the 
granting to the Sudanese of the right to decide their future 
so that they may enjoy either unity or separation after the 
imperialists have been expelled... thus our plan means exactly 
to leave talking about the future of the Sudan aside so that 
it should not be a cause of splitting up the struggle between 
Egyptians and Sudanese on one hand and among the Sudanese 
themselves on the other" .
In the programme of the Egyptian Communist Party which was 
published later, there was a clarification of their attitude 
towards the ideal pattern of a future union with the Sudan:
"We want a union of Egypt and the Sudan founded on a basis
of equality with a right of self-determination for the
Sudan, including the right to secede. We want economic, 
geographic and political unity. We want the abolition of 
British rule in the Sudan and the abolition of the 
Legislative Assembly. We want the immediate withdrawal 
of the British Army and the handing oyer of all 
administrative posts to the Sudanese" .
In the period between the second half of 1947 and the beginning 
of 1948 it seemed clear that while the communist movement was more
or less in its infancy, it was rapidly gaining strength among the
workers and students not only in the cities but in the provinces.
1.. Ibid.
2. Letter DS(E) 200/128 from R.M. Shields, S.S.R., Cairo, to T.C. 
Ravensdale, British Embassy, Cairo, 9 August 1947, ibid, 
66/72/47.
3. See the "Programme of the Egyptian Communist Party", in: 
F0371/80354, JE1041/G.
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According to a memorandum on the development of Communism in 
Egypt, prepared by the British security service representatives in 
Cairo, the communist movement was engaged in strengthening and 
developing its own organization underground and was meeting with 
a certain success. It was said, that the "Special Section" of the 
Egyptian Ministry of Interior determined that the movement was far 
stronger than it had ever been. The memorandum emphasized that for 
the first time communist propaganda was being taken to the 
provinces through the medium of the school teachers many of whom 
were members of the D.M.N.L.; amongst the students, the communists 
were the stronger factor and were continually campaigning amongst 
the workers*.
The same appreciation was expressed by prince*Abbas HalTm, the 
leader of the Egyptian Labour party; he emphasized the strength 
of Communism in Egypt and warned the government that it must be 
fought by new ideas and not by prisons .
The control of the movement was concentrated in the central 
committee which was responsible for the policies of the movement, 
its organizational forms, its finance and its activities. The 
central policy of the movement was in step with the line adopted 
by communist movements elsewhere
Communism continued to make headway among the workers and 
students in Egypt; American reports indicated a limited 
infiltration of Communism into the army and police ranks, because 
the Egyptian Government did not act effectively to stop it, by 
means of severe measures, and it seemed as though the movement
1. Memorandum No. DS(E) 20/2/24 from Campbell, Cairo, 10 March 
1948, F0371/69250, J1890/1262/16.
2. A-2546 from American Embassy, Cairo, 8 March 1948, RG 59,
883.00B/3-548.
3. See note no.' 1.
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could develop rapidly^-.
The pro-government Egyptian press had stressed frequently that 
the danger of Communism in Egypt had been exaggerated by Britain 
in order to frighten Egypt into coming to terms with it.
A particular emphasis was put on the seriousness with which the 
government authorities regarded the situation .
The communist method for achieving influence and support inside 
Al-Azhar could be considered as a case from which we can learn how
they made their comprehensive frontal attack on other 
organizations and institutions which held a key positions in 
Egypt. In a pamphlet which was circulated among D.M.N.L.'s members 
it was said:
"We now aim at forming a democratic party which would be free 
of all imperialist and reactionary control. Men of religion 
in this country have always played an important part against 
imperialism- French, Turkish and English. At present Al-Azhar 
is standing at a cross-roads, between the people and the 
bourgeoisie. The importance of Al-Azhar is as follows: they 
are the religious body which assists reaction; their men 
represent the working class; they enjoy spiritual confidence 
among the people; their roots go deep among many classes of 
Egyptian-Teachers, Preachers, Imams, etc" .
The communists who realized their importance planned to win them 
away from "Reaction and the Palace", and to make them join their 
national struggle. In the communist view the men of Al-Azhar 
could be the best Egyptian fighters against "Reaction and 
Imperialism". According to the British S.S.R.'s report, these 
efforts were meeting with some success^.
1. Ibid. See also, a report on: "Student Communist Activities at 
Faruk 1 University", from American Legation, Alexandria, 17 
May 1948, RG 59, 883.00B/5-1748. Telegram 631 from American 
Embassy, Cairo, 29 May 1948, RG 59, 890.00B/5-2948.
2. Dispatch 275 from American Embassy, Cairo, 3 April 1948, RG 59, 
883.00/4-348.




Campbell confirmed that Communism in Al-Azhar was stronger;
furthermore, since April 1948, there had been some further
development of Communism in Egypt. He said that communists were
also actively campaigning amongst the workers. According to
information given by him, the Egyptian authorities had discovered
a considerable quantity of communist literature (about 3000 books)
which had reached Egypt from Syria and Iraq*.
The communists' well-established position in Egyptian
Universities could explain also some successes among Sudanese
students. This was brought about because of the Egyptian
Government's policy of offering scholarships to Sudanese students;
later, these students in Cairo opposed the Egyptian authorities
and drifted into communist clubs and societies. They became on the
whole strong exponents of Communism when they returned to the 
o
Sudan .
Several important strikes, including those at Shubra in 1946 and 
at the Mahala al-Kubra textile factory, in the autumn of 1947 and 
at Qasr al-*Aini hospital in Cairo in April 1948, were known to 
have been to a considerable extent communist-inspiredJ .
The Egyptian authorities had tried to limit the extent of 
communist development and its expansion. The Egyptian Prime 
Minister Ibrahim (Abd al-Hadi said on 24 February, 1949, that he 
was going to "lay his hand on every communist centre throughout 
the country", after the discovery of four communist centres^.
1. Ibid.
2. Top Secret letter from the Sudan Government, khartum, 2 January 
1949, F0371/73471, J236/10113/16G. Regarding the interaction 
between the Egyptian and Sudanese communists, see: F0371/90125, 
J10115/10.
3. Top Secret letter RC/19/50, "Survey of Communism in countries 
outside the Soviet orbit", prepared by E.J.W. Barnes of F.O. 
Research Dept., 1 January, 1950, F0371/86751, NS/1052/12G.
4. Secret letter 88/14/49 from Campbell, 26 February, 1949, 
F0371/73476, J1937/10118/16G.
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King Faruq said regarding the above, that "the communists might 
still give severe knocks, but he thought that the forces of law 
and order would now be able to give them more that they got", that 
is to say, strict measures would be taken^.
On March 16th, 1949, the Egyptian Prime Minister told Campbell
that he thought the Egyptian authorities were making "satisfactory
2progress in the matter of Communistic cells and activities .
By the end of March the police began to root out a number of 
cells, starting with the foreign Jewish element. The Egyptian 
Government gradually prepared public opinion to associate 
Communism with Zionism. Furthermore, there was a rift inside the
o
movement between the Jews and the others .
Campbell's realistic appreciation of the communists' political 
activity in Egypt was consistent all along the period under 
discussion, even while its seemed as though Communism was 
being strengthened. For instance, he concluded from the 
events which took place after the communist unification, that 
"it is rather early yet to hazard an opinion, whether the 
nationalist aspect of communist activity in Egypt is likely to 
result in the production of Pro-Russian feeling among the masses 
and whether, if it did, the politicians would feel tempted or 
bound to follow such sentiment in their foreign policy"^.
The same appreciation was outlined in an American report; the 
report said that "best information available to us does not 
lead... to believe that is liable to reach point where organized 
communist coup d'etat might be expected even in event of a serious
1. Dispatch 45 from Campbell, Cairo, 2 March 1949, F0371/73476, 
J10118/16G.
2. Secret letter 88/4/49G from Campbell, 23 March 1949,
F0371/73476, J3502/10118/16G.
3. Letter 228(742/2/49) from Campbell, Cairo, 19 April 1949, 
F0371/73474, J3567/10116/16.
4. Dispatch 134 from Campbell, Cairo, 18 March 1948, F0371/69250, 
J1890, 1262/16.
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military reversal in Palestine... although it may be weaker than 
formerly, Wafd still constitutes the strongest political entity in 
Egypt enjoying, as it does wide popular support"1.
The Egyptian authorities campaign against Communism and its 
spread was strengthening the above assumption, in particular, the 
decline of Communism during 1949.
In April 1949, Campbell said, that there was mixed up talk 
about the spread of Communism in Egypt; no distinction was usually
made between a revolutionary feeling among younger intellectuals
2and articulate Marxism linked with Soviet doctrine .
Campbell attributed the setback to Communism during 1949 not 
only to police measures but also to the fact that "the popularity 
which the Soviet Government had enjoyed in 1947 as a result of its 
support of Egypt's claims over the Sudan was reversed in latter 
half of 1948 by its attitude over Palestine"^.
c . Continuous Internal Splits and External Pressures
The amalgamation between the two main components of D.M.N.L. 
was not successful in the long term. Soon after the fusion, 
the old rivalry among its members had recurred. One of the 
main reasons for disunity was the deep cleavage between those who 
believed that it was necessary to build up in the first place a 
strong body of intellectuals imbued with communist ideas in order 
that the ideology might achieve ultimate success, and the other 
groups who considered that the immediate aim should be to inspire
1. Report written by S. Pinkney Tuck, American Embassy, Cairo,
29 May 1948, RG 59, 890.00B/5-2948. See also: Top Secret 
memorandum by Hare (the American chief of the division of 
South Asian affairs), Washington, 5 November, 1947, FRUS 1947, 
Vol. 5, pp.579-580.




the working classes with a revolutionary and communist spirit. In 
May 1948, most of Iskra members had retired from the party*.
The process of deterioration which took place in the middle of 
1948 inside the D.M.N.L.'s ranks was caused by external and 
internal factors; it was hard to work in harmony, when they were 
definitely forced underground after the Egyptian Government's 
declaration's of a state of emergency, and the introduction of 
Martial Law in May 1948, when the war in Palestine began. The 
immediate action which took place as a result was the arrest of 
three hundred communists, including most of the leaders; from that 
time there were frequent arrests, and most of the active 
communists were arrested and put in jail; the state of emergency 
continued up to February 1950; consequently, communication 
between the communist centres in Cairo and Alexandria with their
branches in the periphery was cut off, and communist activity
2
almost entirely stopped .
The Soviet Union criticised Martial Law and its implications for 
Egyptian society; this tendency was reflected clearly in an 
article published in Trud on July 1949. The Soviet attack was 
based mainly upon extensive quotation from Nal^ias Pasha's 
criticism of the Law, and intended indirectly to warn the Egyptian 
authorities against continuing their persecution of communist
1. Top Secret No. RC/19/50, "Survey of Communism in countries 
outside the Soviet orbit", prepared by F.O. research Dept., 
4_February 1950, F0371/86751, NS/1052/12G. See also,
Tariq al-BishrT, Al-Haraka al- SiyasTya fi Misr, 1945-1952 
(Cairo: 1972), pp.417-419, 426-427.
2. F0371/86751, ibid. Tariq al-BishrT, ibid, p.420. Laqueur, 
Communism and Nationalism, pp.45-46. See also Letter 
1014/29/50 from British Embassy, Cairo, 9 April 1950, 
F0371/80354, JE10111/3G. Dispatch 263 from American Embassy, 
Cairo,17 March 1949, RG 59, 861.20283/3-1749. Dispatch 27 from 
American Consulate, Port-Said, 26 April, 1949, RG 59,
883.00B/4-2649. Dispatch 626 from American Embassy, Cairo, 24 
June 1949, RG 59, 883.00B/6-2449.
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groups ^ :
"In May of this year (1949), the Government of Egypt passed a 
Law extending Martial Law for another year; it had been 
introduced in the country in connection with the military 
activities in Palestine, which as is well known concluded 
long ago. Egyptian society is indignant about the Law. the 
recently published manifesto of the leader of the bourgeois- 
reformist Wafd2party, Nahljas Pasha, serves as vivid 
testimony to this. NahftSs Pasha accused the government of 
exploiting exceptional powers for purposes having nothing in 
common with those for which they were established. It has 
made of these powers a death-dealing weapon against its 
political opponents, stifling freedom, persecuting innocent 
people and suppressing free fighters".
In accordance with the authorities' official line, the Egyptian 
press published several anti-communist articles; the articles 
attacked Soviet Communism and its negative implications for 
Muslim society. The appearance of Communism in Egypt came as a 
result of British pressure on Egypt to establish diplomatic 
relations with Soviet Russia and glorify Soviet successes during 
the second world war; the Egyptian press and the Egyptian state 
broadcasting system had been instructed by the government to 
disseminate pro-Soviet propaganda; "this propaganda tended to give 
Egyptians a rose-coloured view of Communism, a view which the 
government took no steps to eradicate after the conclusion of
o
second world war" .
The Egyptian communists own view of the latest events was 
reflected in a pamphlet issued by D.M.N.L. and entitled "No. 3 
Resistance-an Armed Struggle to expel the Imperialist and build
1. "Egyptian public demands repeal of Martial Law in the country", 
Trud (Moscow), 10 July 1949, in: Dispatch A-738 from American 
Embassy, Moscow to American Embassy, Cairo, 14 July 1949,
RG 84, Cairo Embassy-General Records, File Subject-1949:350,
No. 1, box 206.
2. The Soviets' view of Wafd as bourgeois-reformist reflected a 
significant change in the Soviet view of the internal political 
situation in Egypt and its readiness to cooperate with 
non-communist political parties which were supported by the 
Egyptian masses.
3. Report on recent anti-communist articles in Egyptian press, from 
American Embassy-Cairo, 4 April 1949, RG 59, 861.20283/4-449. 
Report on "anti-communist Newspapers Editorial", 17 March 1949, 
ibid, 861.20283/3-1749.
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Popular Democracy"; the view expressed in the pamphlet concerning 
the Martial Law was as follows^:
"Martial Law was declared last year as a pretext to protect 
the Egyptian army's line of communications in Palestine. The 
Government's real object, however, was to put an end to all 
opposition. To this end "political detention" was invented by 
the police, and innocent patriots were arrested and thrown 
into jails without any reason except that the police 
authorities receive their instructions from the Anglo- 
American Intelligence Bureau".
With regards to international affairs the communists accused the
imperialist camp of using war as the means to divert peoples'
attention away from national problems and of exterminating
Communism which was struggling "to ensure the people's bread and
liberty". War was the only solution to the problems of the
decaying Capitalistic System. On the other hand, the Soviet Union,
as on several occasions affirmed by Stalin and other responsible
men desired peace and had no economic interests which necessitated
o
the kindling of war .
The Foreign Office Research Dept.'s survey of Communism in 
Egypt, determined in January 1950 that the D.M.N.L.'s attempts 
to infiltrate the armed forces or police forces had not met with 
success, since no concrete instance of communist activity in 
either of them was known. In addition, there was no evidence 
of the existence of Communism in the civil service .
The communists were however, very active in the industrial 
field during 1949; however, their efforts to capture Trade Union 
did not succeed^.
1. Dispatch 699, "Recent comments on communist propaganda 
activities in Egypt", from American Embassy-Cairo, 16 July 
1949, RG 59, 883.00B/7-1649. See also: RG 84, Cairo Embassy- 
General Records, File Subject-1949: 350.21, b o x -207. It is 
important to point out that D.M.N.L.'s pamphlet issued only 
a few days after Trud's article was published and it is easy 
to trace the textual similarity between them.
2. Ibid. •
3. F0371/86751, NS1052/12G, ibid.
4. Letter 38/65/49 from Mayall, British Embassy, Cairo, 14 May 
1949, F0371/73474, J4281/10116/16.
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The same policy which was outlined and implemented by the 
Egyptian authorities during 1949, in their fight against 
Communism and its spread continued in 1950's.
An American memorandum on Communism in Egypt, determined that 
it was difficult to have an accurate assessment of the extent of 
the influence and the popular appeal of Communism as a political 
force and as a philosophy; it was said that severe oppressive 
measures, including the arrest of known communists and communist 
suspects under Martial Law, had kept the communists in the 
underground and limited the party's activities*. Indeed, the 
Minister of the Interior, Siraj al-Din Pasha, announced in a press
conference that a special office had been created for the purpose
2of combating the communist movement .
The anti-communist activity undertaken by the Egyptian 
authorities led to the arrest of many communists, including their 
leaders, and to the discovery of many cells all over the 
country. On 27 July 1950, Henry Curiel was arrested by the
, q
police and deported from Port-Said on 27 August .
At the same time, struggle against Communism was conducted in 
the Egyptian press; Al-Musawwar published an article stating that 
Egypt would never become communist since the principles and 
traditions of Islam were inconsistent with Communism"*.
1. Report on Communism in Egypt, from Jefferson Caffery (the 
American Ambassador), Cairo, 17 March 1950, RG 59, 774.001/3- 
1750.
2. Dispatch 697 from American Embassy, Cairo, 7 April 1950, RG 59, 
774.001/4-750.
3. Dispatch 518 from Caffery, Cairo, 20 March 1950, RG 59, 
774.001/3-2050; Dispatch 600, ibid, 18 March 1950, RG 59, 
774.001/3-2950; Dispatch 638, ibid, 3 April 1950, RG 59, 
774.001/4-350; Dispatch 716, ibid, 11 April 1950, RG 59, 
774.001/4-1150; Dispatch 154, ibid, 27 July 1950, RG 59, 
774.00/7-2750; Dispatch 336, ibid, 11 August 1950, RG 59, 
774.001/8-1150; Dispatch 503, Ibid, 29 August 1950, RG 59, 
774.00/8-2950.
4. FikrT *Abaza, Al-Musawwar (Cairo), In: dispatch 273, ibid, 7 
August 1950, RG 59, 774.001/8-750. See also, Muhammad al-Tibi, 
Akhir Sa*ah (Cairo),in: dispatch 333, ibid, 11 August 1950,
RG 59,774.001/8-1150.
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A later British memorandum of July 1950, attempted to evaluate 
communist political capacity? the report determined that 
Communism in Egypt was very weak and the propagation of 
communist principles was forbidden by the Egyptian penal code; 
consequently, all communist organizations in Egypt were illegal. 
The number of communist elements in Egypt was estimated at the 
maximum 2000. There were no communist members of parliament but 
there were at least four deputies who could be classed as fellow- 
travellers forming a left-wing within the Wafd party which was in 
power at that time. The memorandum pointed out that the communist 
movement in Egypt drew most of its support from student elements, 
and most of the leaders were students. The memorandum determined 
that the communist group had negligible influence*.
The same appreciation was expressed in an American report, 
issued in November 1950; the report dealt with the political 
stability of Egypt, and rejected the allegation that communist 
influence had seriously increased in Egypt during 1950, and 
emphasized that the Monarchy was definitely a stabilizing force in 
Egypt2 .
According to an American policy statement prepared in the office 
of Near Eastern Affairs, the Arab States were all opposed the 
Communism and generally successful in minimizing or suppressing
*3
existing communist activities through restrictive measures .
1. Report on Communism in Egypt, No. 2192/5/50G, from Chancery, 
Alexandria, 1 July 1950, F0371/86902, NS2192/40G.
The same appreciation was expressed in the British "Cabinet 
Overseas Negotiations Committee Working Party on Egypt" meeting 
held on 25 October 1950, and on 20 November 1950; see: 
CAB134/502, O.N(E) (50)1? CAB134/502, O.N(E) (50)2. The same 
estimate of the number of all communist elements was given in 
an American Intelligence Report Which was prepared by the 
Department of State on 19 May, 1952, in: U.S. Declassified 
Documents Reference System, U.S., 1979, 314A. p. 12.
2. "Harold Hoskins' Report on Middle East Trip", American Embassy, 
Cairo/ 11 November 1950, RG 59, 774.00/11-1150.
3. FRUS 1950, Vol. 5, p. 271.
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The administrative measures against communists in Egypt were 
the responsibility of the "Special Section" of the Ministry 
of the Interior which collected and collated all information on 
communist activities and suppressed communists by arresting 
them. In general these administrative measures were effective. The 
"Special Section" tackled them with reasonable success, and the 
comparative disorganization of the various communist groups was 
attributed inter alia to its activities^-.
The process of Egyptianization inside the communist movement 
was completed in the period 1950-1952, particularly, after 
the leader of the party, Henry Curiel was expelled to Italy 
and Sulaiman al-RifacT succeeded him.
Communist activity became possible when the state of emergency 
came to an end, at the beginning of 1950. The communists started 
a new political line when they realized that their aims could not 
be achieved without widening the framework of cooperation with 
the main opposition groups; this was the communists' short-term 
aim and first priority, and they were ready to sacrifice some 
basic elements in their ideology for its realization.
The framework of cooperation was achieved after the D.M.N.L. 
and Aftmad Husain's Socialist party founded the "Democratic Popular 
Front" (Jabhat al-Sha*b al-Dimuqratiya) in August 1951. Formally, 
the Muslim Brotherhood did not join the front, but they actively 
collaborated with it, particularly after the Egyptian Government 
had announced the unilateral abrogation of 1936's treaty but
1. Report on "Anti-Measures taken against communists in Egypt", 
from Sir R. Stevenson (Sir R. Campbell's successor), Cairo, 28 
February 1951, F0371/91177, E1017/2G. See also a'minute on 
"Anti-Communist measures in Middle Eastern countries", by H.A. 
Dudgeon, 1 March 1951, F0371/91177, E1017/3G; Dispach 401 from 
Caffery, Cai,ro, 8 January 1951, RG 59, 774.001-851; "Egyptian 
Government continues firm measures against communist 
activities", from Gordon Mattison, American Embassy, Cairo, 20 
April 1951, RG 59, 774.001/4-2051.
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could not implement its decision because the British refused to 
accept it.
A leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, SalSlj al-*AshmawT, was 
quoted as saying, that "at the present time the Brotherhood does 
not find any real objections which would prevent the Brotherhood 
from establishing a common front with the communists against our 
common enemies, the imperialists". Indeed, the front with Muslim 
Brotherhood collaboration organized an anti-British campaign which 
included strikes, riots and demonstrations in the Canal Zone, 
Cairo, Alexandria and Port-Said-*-.
The communists also concentrated their propaganda and other 
activities in another group- the "Partisans of Peace Movement" 
(Harakat Ansar al-Salam), which was established in 1950. This 
movement included the Socialist Party, the National Party, the 
Muslim Brotherhood, communists and the Wafd's left wing.
The movement pretended to be a non-political organization, but 
it called actively for abrogating the 1936 treaty, British 
evacuation, and the establishment of friendly relations with 
the Soviet Union. The movement sought, with only limited success, 
to exploit the feeling of neutralism prevalent in the area in 
order to create hostility towards the west. The movement 
achieved some success but failed in its efforts to become a 
massive popular movement .
The communist threat in Egypt had always caused some concern 
because of the vast potential for its exploitation which existed.
1. Report on "The Muslim Brotherhood: Entrance into new phase 
under legal status of the Societies Law occurs without 
disorder, interview with (Ashmawi", from Caffery, Cairo, 4 May 
1951, RG 59, 774.00/5-451. See also: "Report of a meeting of 
opposition and extremist Egyptian groups", ibid, 17 July 1951, 
RG 59, 774.00/7-1751. Aghwani, Communism in the Arab East, pp. 
45-47. Al-BishrT, al-haraka al-sTy~5sTya fi Misr,pp. 429-432.
2. Report on "Communist influence in the Middle East", prepared in 
the British F.O., 22 January 1952, F0371/98239, E1017/1. See 
also, Al-BishrT, ibid, pp. 439-442.
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But it failed in its efforts to exploit the existing conditions.
The American estimate of the factors of instability in Egypt
concluded that the "communists are getting a great deal of
cooperation from the Egyptian Government and ruling classes who
could not be more helpful in their crass and total failure to do
anything towards alleviating the important problems which face
Egypt t o d a y " b u t  the main problem of Egyptian Communism
was the internal continuous splits among its components factions
which had weakened the movement. The domestic result of
collaborating with other political groups brought about sharp
contradictions and splits among the communist factions, mainly,
between D.M.N.L. and the "Egyptian Communist Party" (founded at
the end of 1949). The Communist Party accused D.M.N.L. of
deviations, opportunism, and inability to conduct a social 
2campaign .
In the period between the end of 1951 and mid-1952, there was no 
known development among the various communist groups, and 
according to an American source, the local Communist party was 
exploiting discontent with local conditions but had not been
r>
trying "to spread the gospel of Marxism" .
The anti-communist wave continued during 1952; Caffery, the 
American Ambassador in Egypt, pointed out in February 1952,that 
anti-communist measures had been taken particularly since ^All 
Mahir's government had been established immediately after the
1. Report on "stability as instability in Egypt", from Caffery, 
Cairo, 13 August 1951, RG 59, 774.00/8-1351. See also, a 
report on "Communism and Extremism in Egypt- proposals on how to 
combat them", from Caffery, Cairo, 25 September 1951, RG 59, 
774.001/9-2551. The same appreciation was expressed by
Dr. Afrmad tfusain, the former Egyptian Minister of Social 
Affairs, in a conversation with Caffery, see: Caffery, Cairo,
4 September 1951, RG 59, 774.00/9-451.
2. Bowker, F.O.* to Gascoigne, British Embassy, Moscow, 18 
September 1952, F0371/98239, E1017/2.
3. FRUS 1951, Vol.5, p.437.
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Cairo riots of January 26th, and it was known to be strongly 
anti-communist even if not actually Pro-Western^.
An American intelligence report which analysed the political 
implications of the Cairo riots, called them "the most costly 
disorder in terms of property and life which have occurred in 
Egypt or the Near-East for many years"; the report assumed, that 
the planners and ideologists of these riots were the Egyptian 
Socialist Party leaders, that the other major dissident groups, 
that is to say, the Muslim Brotherhood and communists played only 
a small part; the communists and probably the Muslim Brotherhood, 
it was said, were not well enough organized internally or 
sufficiently centralized to make any broad decision quickly, and 
bring their members into extensive action; the communists were 
very few in numbers; however, the report determined that of all 
the subversive groups in Egypt, the communists had the most to 
gain from widespread disorder and total discredit of the regime; 
"although, January 26th was their best opportunity to date, they 
were apparently almost completely unprepared and powerless" .
What was the Soviet view of the internal political situation in 
Egypt and its influence on the communist dynamics of development, 
in other words, what was the Soviet appreciation of the communists 
political ability?
According to an article published in Problems of Economics, the 
Soviets had considered the campaign of strikes of the working 
class as a struggle for achieving their elementary political
1. Caffery, Cairo to the Dept, of State, 1 February, 1952, in:
FRUS 1952-1954, Vol. 9 pp. 1759-1760.
2. "Some political implications of the Cairo riots ,of January 26 
1952", Dept, of State intelligence report, 7 April 1952,
R&A Reports, OIR 5808, National Archives, Washington D.C. See 
also, Record of conversation between Stevenson and Faruq, 30 
January 1952; F0371/870, JE1018; Report on the riots of 26th 
January from British Embassy, Cairo, 31 January 1952, F0371/ 
98871, JE1018/36; and F0371/96873, JE1018/86.
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rights. Many strikes, it was said, "were closely connected with
the popular anti-imperialist activities, with the popular struggle
for p e a c e " T h e  article emphasized that the most important
proof of the political, ideological and organizational growth of
the proletariat was the "ceaseless growth of the Communist
Party"; despite the oppressive "sub rosa conditions", the
persecutions and terror, the Communist Party had developed into
a strong political force:
"The Communist parties in the Arab countries are not only the 
most advanced, but in many cases the most numerous and 
influential political parties in their countries... they are 
the most consistent fighters for national independence for 
the Arab countries... the communists of the Arab countries 
raise the national and class self-consciousness of the Arab 
workers, they imbue them with the great ideas of Narxism- 
Leninism" .
The article said inter alia, that the communist participation and 
activity in the popular movement of the peace partisans, 
inseparably connected it with the tasks of the national liberation 
of the Arab countries .
The Soviets unrealistic appreciation of the political capacity 
of the communist movement in Egypt, as outlined in Problems of 
Economics, was exposed inter alia, in an article published in an 
Egyptian communist publication, called "The Truth" (al-Hagq). The 
article was considered as an Egyptian communist self criticism 
(nagd dhatT), and made plain the weakness and difficulties 
hampering the local communists, a small and always factionalized 
movement of which membership was concentrated chiefly among the 
foreign communities of Egypt; the Communist Party admitted that 
its experience of working with the vast majority of Egypt's 
population - the peasantry, was slight if not non-existent.
1. V. Lutsky, "The national liberation struggle in the Arab 
countries", Problems of Economics (Moscow), No. 5, 5 June 




"Truth" made a serious appeal to the communists, to concentrate 
their efforts on the nurture and encouragement of the peasants in 
the hope that they would act side by side with the communist 
movement for the implementation of its aims:
"(Communists] have got to understand all the facts about the 
peasants, to know their circumstances and their way of 
thinking...we should put on record step by step every 
experience we gain so that we would be in position to lay 
down a detailed plan for dealina with them... our contacts 
with farmers are still limited" .
The Egyptian communists self criticism which is given above, was 
certainly accurate and realistic; the events to come would 
illuminate the real political power of the communists, and their 
inability to anticipate, and prepare themselves for political 
change.
I. The Truth, 21 May 1952. The Truth was a clandestine publication 
of Egyptian communists? it was mimeographed ostensibly only for 
circulation* among party leaders. See, "Communist party 
capabilities in the Middle East and North Africa", Intelligence 
report of the Dept, of State, 24 November, 1952, R&A Reports,
IR 6044, ibid.
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d. The 1952 Coup D'etat and its implicationsfofc Communist 
Movement 1952-1955 ______
There was apparently little communist influence in the army, but
evidence of a few communists among the Free officers-*-. However,
Communism drastically declined as a result of the officers' coup
dJetat. The new regime was convinced of the need for effective
security measures to combat communist subversion; the military
authorities had planned the establishment of a committee to plan
7and coordinate anti-communist activities .
General Muhammad Najib, the temporary leader of the free
officers, was quoted as saying:
"the first thing we must do is put our own house in order 
unless we can raise standard of living of fellow men, we 
are wasting our time and in long run Egypt will go communist, 
and we are determined that it shall not go communist. 
Communism is against every thing we believe .
Although, Egypt's new regime had declared its hostility to
Communism, and asserted that it was the chief threat which faced
the country, it released a number of communist leaders^.
Communists were certain to have a try at turning the change to
their profit. Their immediate response to the July coup d'etat
was the establishment of a new political party, named, "The
1. On the relations between Communism and the Free Officers before 
and soon after the coup, see, Selma Botman, The Rise of 
Communism, pp. 115-131. See also, Abdel Malek, Egypt: Military 
Society (New York: Vintage Books, 1968), p. 70. "Weekly summary 
of events, Egypt and the Sudan", office memorandum from Fowler 
to Stabler, 28 July, 1952. RG 59, 774.00/7-2852.
2. Dispatch 182 from Caffery, Cairo, 25 July 1952, RG 59, 
774.00/7-2552; Dispatch 238, ibid, 2 August 1952, RG 59, 
774.00/8-152; Dispatch 327, ibid, 11 August 1952, RG 59, 
774.00/8-1152; "Egypt's new era-the first three weeks", 
dispatch 151 from Caffery, Cairo, 18 August 1952, RG 59, 
774.00/8-1852.
3. Record of conversation between Caffery and General Najib, 
dispatch 666 from Caffery, Cairo, 11 September, 1952, RG 59,
. 774.00/9-1152.
4. Department of State Intelligence report on "Communist Party 
capabilities in the Middle East and North Africa", 24 November 
1952, R&A Reports, IR 6044, National Archives, Washington D.C. 
The support which was given by the D.M.N.L. to the Free 
Officers before the coup was probably the main reason for the
release of communist leaders. See Botman, ibid.
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Democrat ic Party"; the author of the new political framework was 
Fatl/i al-RamlT.
The straight communist line taken by the Egyptian communists 
regarding the new situation was to contribute to the confusion 
that existed; accordingly, they alternately attacked and defended 
the "blessed movement" of the army; the new framework appeared to 
be a defender of the new regime*.
The constitution of Fathi al-Ramll's "Democratic Party" was very 
comprehensive and dealt with all the spheres of Egyptian political 
life and reflected the communist line; the political programme 
called inter alia to3-:
a. Expel all foreign troops from Egypt and the Sudan.
b. Reject all military projects and alliances which may be 
proposed by imperialist governments and which constituted a threat 
to international peace.
The attitude of D.M.N.L., the main communist group, towards the 
new changes was reflected in a manifesto issued by it; the 
manifesto expressed its support of the Najib regime:
"The response of the Egyptians to the military movement and 
their unconditional support of it had a very deep 
repercussions on the country. The movement aimed at realizing 
the national aspirations... our glorious nation now feels 
that its liberty is being restored through the intervention 
of the army......
The drastic struggle against communists and Communism which had
1. "Communist front party in Egypt", Dispatch 532 from Caffery, 
Cairo, 15 August 1952, RG 59, 774.001/8-1552.
2. See the full text of "constitution of new Communist front party 
in Egypt" in: dispatch 270 from Caffery, Cairo, 30 August 1952, 
RG 59, 774.001/8-3052. Regarding the campaign of the communist 
front against Egyptian participation in any Middle East defence 
plans, or any such alliance with the western powers, see, 
dispatch 662 from Robert Rayne, American Embassy', Cairo, 13
. October 1952, RG 59, 774.00/10-1352; "Speech of Egyptian
delegate at Vienna Peace Conference", dispatch 1262 from Robert 
Mcclintock, American Embassy, Cairo, 27 December 1952, RG 59, 
774.001/12-2752 (the Middle East defence subject will be 
discussed in later chapters). On the relationship of the 
D.M.N.L. with the Free Officers movement, see Selma Botman, 
ibid, pp. 119-123.
3. See footnote no. 1.
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begun at the end of 1952 was continuing and sharp measures had 
been taken by the Egyptian security forces. The Intelligence 
section of the Egyptian army, the G-2, uncovered during March 
1953, the principal cell of the Egyptian Communist Party in Cairo, 
and more than twenty people were arrested and propaganda used 
by the party members was confiscated^-.
In July 1953 Nasir said that a special military tribunal was 
established to try people accused of communist activity? 
furthermore, it was said, that "this represents beginning of an 
operation to get all active communists firmly behind bars on 
conviction under the Egyptian Laws which make overt communist
o
activity a criminal offense . The Egyptian press announced on 
8 July, that nineteen communists would be tried in the military 
court on July 15. The Cairo court of Cassation had ruled that 
persons who had been accused previously of communist activities 
were not entitled to amnesty under the General Amnesty Law? this 
exception was intended to prevent communists from appealing for 
amnesty because their crimes were considered as "a social crime of 
attempting to overthrow the present social system of the country", 
this sort of crime not being within the scope of the political 
amnesty .
On July 16th, it was reported in the Egyptian press, that two 
different cases against forty-three people accused of 
participating in a communist organization would be brought to the 
high military court on 27 July and 5 September^. The Egyptian 
Gazette reported on December 29 a trial held at the supreme court
1. Dispatch 1808 from Caffery, Cairo, 9 March 1953,'RG 59, 
774.001/3-953.
2. A letter from Caffery, Cairo, 9 July 1953, RG 59, 774.001/7-953.
3. Dispatch 91 from Caffery, Cairo, 9 July 1953, RG 59,
774.001-953
4. Dispatch 160, ibid, RG 59, 774.001/7-1753? see also, dispatch
230 from W. Angie Smith (Regional Security Officer), Cairo, 25
July 1953, RG 59, 774.001/7-2553.
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in Alexandia, against eight persons accused of communist 
activities *.
The strong measures taken against communists continued during
1954. The government had been actively engaged in trying to
suppress all communists groups in Egypt by arresting many
Communists and communist sympeil^izers. The question of who was
responsible for the Cairo fire of January 26th, 1952, was
rediscussed in the trial of Fuad Siraj al-DTn, the former Minister
of Interior; in his testimony before the revolutionary tribunal,
<Ali Mahir, the former Prime Minister, blamed communists and
other elements for the fire; by his evidence, cAli Mahir
contributed significantly to the continuous campaign against 
o
Communism . At the end of January 1954, forty four people were 
accused of having joined a communist organization (the 
D.M.N.L.), among them the leader of D.M.N.L., Sulaiman al-Rifaci; 
they were accused of attempting to destroy the existing social and 
political system, and to establish an Egyptian society identical 
with the system in the Soviet Union, "using the revolutionary 
methods of Lenin and Stalin such as inciting workers to strike, 
forcibly occupying premises, perpetrating acts of violence, and 
instigation of class warfare" .
1. Dispatch 1548 from American Embassy, Cairo, 30 December 1953,
RG 59 774.00/12-3053; see also, dispatch 1419, from Caffery, 
Cairo, 11 December 1953, RG 59, 774.00/12-1153; dispatch 74 
from Donald Edgar (American General Consul), Alexandria, 25 
February 1954, RG 59, 774.00/2-2554.
2. Dispatch 1592 from Caffery, Cairo, 7 January 1954, RG 59, 
774.00/1-754.
3. Dispatch 1852, ibid, 4 February 1954, RG 59, 774.001/2-454; the 
trial was opened on 13 November 1954, before the Supreme 
Military Court in Cairo; see some more details in: dispatch 
964, ibid, 19 November 1954, RG 59, 774.001/11-1954. The trial 
of twenty five people charged with the same illegal activity 
opened on 3 July; see more details in: dispatch 33, ibid, 6 
July, 1954, RG 59, 774.001/7-654; dispatch 383, ibid, 4 
September 1954, RG 59, 774.001/9-454. Regarding the arrest of a 
large number of individuals who have been described as "the 
most dangerous communist group" in Egypt, see, dispatch 2123,
ibid, 8 March 1954, RG 59, 774.00/3-854.
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The main significant development took place on March 15th, when 
the Criminal Investigation Department of Alexandria raided the 
premises of what the Egyptian press described exaggeratedly as 
"the most important communist cell in the whole Middle East which 
is considered to be main centre of communist activities in the 
region"*. Towards the end of May 1954, the chief of the 
communist section of the Security Police, Ahmad Hilmi, reported 
that almost 130 communists were held in detention camps and about
o
200 communists were in prison . As a result of official 
activity against communists, the communist activity had been 
limited to a marginal and an insignificant extent.
The Egyptian Government's fight against Communism included 
propaganda which intended to remove communist influence by 
emphasizing the negative elements of Communism and describing it 
as religion which ordered its followers to "pray to Moscow,not to 
Mecca". The propaganda apparatus was built within the ranks of the 
"Liberation Rally Organization". Their activity included 
distribution of pamphlets clarifying the danger of Communism to 
Muslim society, and used for that purpose the mosque Imams, 
particularly in the provinces .
The anti-communist official line was emphasized and reflected 
in Nasir's interviews and speeches during 1954. In a statement to 
the press on 22 March, he asserted that "each time an accord 
with Britain becomes a possibility, the communists, who mask their 
activities under the pretext of nationalism, attempts to sabotage
1. Dispatch 2265 from Caffery, Cairo, 24 March 1954, RG 59, 
774.001/3-2454.
2. Dispatch 2761 from Paul Lunt,American Embassy, Cairo, 25 May 
1954, 774.001/5-2554.
3. Memorandum prepared by the Egyptian public affairs officer 
concerning the Egyptian government anti-communist activities, 
dispatch 2760 from Caffery, Cairo, 24 May 1954, RG 59, 
774.00/5-2454.
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the agreement"^. On 3 August, Nasir put the blame on the 
U.S.S.R. as the planner of communist activity in Egypt:
"We are fighting an open battle in Egypt with communists.We 
are convinced they are working under Soviet direction;and by 
nature of situation Egyptian communists could not approve 
of this present government because we are working for 
peace and stability whereas what they want is 
disorder" .
In his speech at a Liberation Rally meeting, on 21 August 1954, 
Nasir accused communists of collaborating with Zionists, for the 
purpose of creating anarchy and disorder .
Communism and communists continued to be used deliberately 
as a vulnerable target by Nasir and his administration during 
1955; The Soviet-Egyptian arms deal of September 1955, did not 
bring about any significant change from the local communist point 
of view. After the arms deal was concluded, Nasir said in respect 
of the dangers of communist infiltration, that the position of his 
regime internally was very strong and that Egypt had nothing to
4
fear .
In spite of the sharp measures taken against them, the 
communists did not give up, but their efforts were not crowned 
with success; the following description given by Richard Sedlacek, 
(the Czechoslovak Commercial Attache in Lebanon and Syria from 
April 1953 to March 1955), who defected on 27 March 1955, will 
illuminate some of the communists tactics and methods after the 
1952 coup d'etat:
"the Revolution of 1952 damaged Communism's chances in 
Egypt considerably...first the communists tried to work 
with all of the groups opposing the revolution... in an
1. Dispatch 2248, ibid, 22 March 1954, RG 59, 774.00/3-2254; see 
also, dispatch 79 from British Embassy, Cairo, 2'2 March 1954, 
F0371/108458, JE1198/13.
2. Ibid, 4 August 1954, RG 59, 674.00/8-454.
3. Dispatch 177 from Stevenson, Cairo, 23 August 1954, F0371/ 
108458, JE1198/29.
4. British Embassy, Cairo, 15 December 1955, F0371/113787, 
JE10393/1; based upon an iformation given by NajTb al-RawT(from
the Embassy of Iraq in Cairo), after his interview with Nasir.
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attempt to capture the revolution and use it for our own 
purposes. Under the direction of Egyptians receiving 
instructions from Moscow,these forces attempted to 
infiltrate the ranks of the revolutionaries, to subvert 
the Egyptian armed forces,to use the success of the 
revolution for our own purposes,to take over from the 
officers who planned and executed the revolution. This was 
discovered by the new Egyptian Government, and a number of 
our Egyptian communists were jailed or fled the country.
We had to use a new method then: we tried to either 
overthrow the revolution or to discredit it by calling 
the Revolutionary Government a pawn of the west. We 
created as much dissension as we could, among university 
students,through communists working in the press, through 
dissatisfied workers, through poor illiterates gathered 
from the streets of Cairo's old city who would shout any 
slogan for or against any body for a few coins to buy 
food .
The description which is given above and the facts given in 
this chapter indicate how far the Soviets were mistaken in their 
assessment of communist political capacity, furthermore, their 
direct and indirect involvement and support for communist 
caused a total repression and a continuous struggle against 
Communism in Egypt.
1. "Communism in Egypt", 20 October, 1955, White House Office, 
National Security Council Staff Papers, 1948-61, Subject 
File-OCB 091-Egypt (September 1954-February 1957), Dwight D. 
Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas (it was not explained in 
the American report when and why Richard Sedlaeck made his 
statement). See also his statement on 30 March 1955, at Beirut 
airport before his departure to London, in: Arab News Agency, 
30 March 1955, SWB, p. 35.
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COMMUNISM AND ISLAM
Soviet attempts to increase their political influence in the 
Arab world after the second world war, and their successes of the 
mid-1950's raised a very important and interesting question, how 
large can a gap be tolerated between ideology and reality in 
political life? In other words, what was the role and influence of 
the ideology in the shaping and implementing of foreign policy?
The relationship between Islam and Communism has been the 
subject of considerable attention in both Western and Middle 
Eastern research. Many scholars have attempted to illuminate one 
or more aspects of this issue.
This chapter outlines some of the approaches to this 
relationship. It will focus on the change in the Soviet attitude 
towards Islam as it was reflected in their official post-war 
publications and writings, at the beginning of the 1950's. 
Likewise, this chapter will examine the internal discussions on 
ideological concerns within Arab intellectual circles.
A . Communism and Islam
Communism is a comprehensive system of thought. It is 
a doctrine about reality, an ideal, and a call to action. 
Communism, as generally understood today, is the ideology of 
those who accept Marxist Leninist dialectical materialism, 
including the acceptance of the principle of being a great 
power and of a solidly organized group of nations under its 
hegemony; the ideal and cause of a worldwide movement.
Communism is a materialistic conception of reality interpreting 
human-social-historical reality as dominated by economic 
determinism. This view holds that every essential historical 
change is determined by the socio-economic processes which
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preceded it. The meaning of history does not derive from divine 
power which is from without? rather, historical evolution is an 
internal movement - the pattern of socio-economic evolution is 
that which endows history with its meaning. It comes from within 
the society and is not imposed from the outside. The 
implementation of the struggle against exploitation and 
suppression would come about as a result of the materialistic 
evolution within the society and will be induced by internal 
forces (autodynamics), rather than by external, metaphysical ones. 
Communism is predicated on the emphatic rejection of God.
With the abolition of God, goes the abolition of the absolute 
in any form. Communism is a revolt against the capitalist 
system, an antithesis to the bourgeois civilization of the 
19th and 20th centuries1.
Islam, as opposed to Communism, is a religion that accepts the 
absolute power of God. Islam like Communism, claims universal 
validity. There can be no question of the importance and status of 
Islam, since it was and still rooted deeply in Muslim society. 
Professor Elie Kedourie declares that it would be impossible to 
understand the character of the Muslim society without 
understanding its religion . To quote Professor Kedourie, "Islam
1. K. Marx and F. Engels, "Manifest Hamiflaga Hakommonistit" (The 
Manifest of the Communist Party), in: Marx and Engels, Ktabim 
Nibharim - Helek A ' (Selected Writings - Part A 1)/ (Merhabia: 
1942), pp. 298, 322-323. V.I. Lenin, "Hamedina Ve-Hamahapeka" 
(The State and the Revolution), in: Lenin, Ktabim Nibharim 
(Selected Writings - Part A 1), (Merhabya:1942), PP.146-145.
K. Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy 
(Chicago: 1911), see the preface of the book. Shlomo Avineri, 
Mishnato Hamedinit Ve-Hahebratit shel Karl Marx (The Social and 
Political Thought of Karl Marx), (Tel-Aviv: 1976), pp.193-238. 
Information memorandum No. 26, "Soviet-CommunisirP1, Dept, of 
State, 29 December, 1948 in: Records of Charles E. Bohlen 1942- 
1952, Box 5, National Archives, Washington D.C.? Charles Malik, 
"The Challenge of Communism", 17 January, 1951, in: Record of 
Policy Planning Staff, 1947-1953, Box 8, National Archives, 
Washington D.C.
2. Elie Kedourie, Islam in the Modern World (London: 1980), P.33.
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is not only the badge of Muslim society; it has remained, until 
the very recent past, the constitutive and regulative principle of 
Muslim life in its temporal as well as its spiritual concerns"1.
The Marxist view of the study of Islam has not been quite as 
homogeneous. As suggested by Professor Bernard Lewis in his book, 
Islam in History, this view can be divided into three main
o
approaches . The first is the doctrine of the Asiatic mode 
of production, as outlined by Marx and Engels, in which the Islam 
and the Islamic world had received little attention.
The second approach, is the attempt made by Stalin to disregard 
the Asiatic mode of production, and to fit the history of Islam 
into the authorized sequence of the ancient, feudal and bourgeois 
modes of production; the underlying theme behind this change was 
"to refute rather than to explain, Islamic beliefs, and to 
discredit any view of the Islamic past which might nurture Muslim 
pride and encourage opposition to Soviet rule in Muslim lands", 
said Lewis. Politically, up to the mid-1940's, the Soviet attitude 
towards the Muslim world based upon such an approach. However, 
the Soviet leaders faced a tangible conflict concerning the 
attitude to be taken towards the Muslim minorities in the 
U.S.S.R. on the one hand, and Muslims in other parts of the world, 
mainly the Arab world, on the other. The policy adapted by Lenin 
and Stalin, intended to isolate the Soviet Muslim issue, by 
adapting it to the Marxist solution. Briefly, that policy was 
based upon the following elements^:
a. All Soviet citizens are equal,including the Muslims;
1. Ibid.
2.. Bernard Lewis, Islam in History (London: 1973), pp.26-29.
3. Alexandre Bennigsen and Marie Broxup, The Islamic Threat to the 
Soviet State (London: 1983), pp.25-27. See also, Alexandre 
Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush, Muslim National Communism in 
the Soviet Union (Chicago: 1979).
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religion in the U.S.S.R. is a private affair and not a criterion 
for national self-determination; therefore there cannot be such a 
thing as a Muslim nation.
b. The U.S.S.R. is a proletarian Marxist-Leninist state, the 
fatherland of Communism. Communist ideology is compulsory and has 
no rival. In case of conflict between nationalism and Communism, 
the latter prevails.
c. National differences will disappear, national cultures will 
survive only as folklore.
The massive campaign against Islam, launched around 1928, 
intended to destroy Islam in the Soviet Union bringing about 
equality between Russians and Muslims. This policy was governed 
by Marxist arguments against all religions. It was said that Islam 
is the "opium of the toiling masses, distracting them from the 
social struggle against the exploiting parasites; it has played 
and is still playing a reactionary role, being an instrument for 
the spiritual oppression of the workers... it is a fanciful, 
fallacious and anti-scientific creed... Islam, a spiritual creed 
is a hangover from the pre-socialist past, it is a mere survival 
doomed to disappear... Marxism-Leninism and religious ideology are 
therefore incompatible and irreconcilable... the communist party 
cannot remain indifferent or neutral towards religion... it must 
fight it and it must defeat it"*.
Of all the religions, Islam was claimed to be the most
conservative and the least social; Islam belongs to the past, not
even to the capitalist stage of evolution, but to the feudal era.
o
As such, it has no place in a society of advanced socialism .
Lewis' third category includes a group of colonial historians, 
mainly, French, British and Dutch whose approach, while
1. Bennigsen and Broxup, Ibid, pp.44-49.
2. Ibid.
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resembling the second approach,is defined less dogmatically.
For instance, in Marxism and the Muslim World, Maxime Rodinson, 
a French Marxist, rejected the idea that Muhammad's mission 
was purely a miracle, and nothing in the evolution of the 
Arab society had paved the way to it. Islam was defined as a 
"theoligico-political religion, a means not only for each 
individual to seek his own salvation but for the creation of a 
society in keeping with divine law, with the sharia". Rodinson's 
conclusion of this definition is: "political and social 
motivations are implicit right from the start"-*-. Rodinson 
attempted to prove that doctrinal incompatibilities between Islam 
and Communism have nothing to do with the strengthening of
communist political and social influence, even in Muslim
? . . . .countries . This approach became the guiding principle of
Soviet policy towards the Arab world after the end of the Second 
World War. The appearance of Communism in its most militant form 
after the War posed a challenge to the Muslim world. Soviet 
achievements on the Eastern front during the war, greatly 
impressed the Asian and African peoples.
The Soviet Union made determined efforts to increase its influence 
in the Arab World. However, Soviet decision- makers realized 
that the atheistic tenets of Marxism did not appeal to a 
conservative society whose entire way of life was dominated by 
religion. In order to demonstrate that Islam and Communism are not 
in conflict with each other and can successfully coexist, 
communist ideologists had to reformulate the previous ideological 
discourses hostile to Islam dating from the earlier period. These 
new syntheses of Communism and Islamic thought included statements
1. Maxime Rodinson, Marxism and the Muslim World (London: 1978), 
pp.9-10.
2. Ibid, pp. 34-56, 76-119. See also, "The Soviet and Islam", The 
Times (London), 28 January 1949.
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such as*:
a. Communism is not incompatible with Islam; on the contrary, both 
support the fundamental rights of man, Communism, or at least 
socialism, was really originally a Muslim philosophy. "If Muhammad 
were living today he would probably be a communist". The fact that 
millions of Muslims live in the Soviet Union and have fought for 
her shows that Islam flourishes in a communist society.
b. The Qur'an is just as opposed as Communism to the 
"concentration of great wealth in the hands of a few by forbidding 
monopolies and usury, and by not recognizing the rights of 
primogeniture".
c. Both systems condemn class distinctions and make a virtue of 
poverty. Both regard marriage as only a civil contract, and both 
insist that everybody must work either for himself or for 
others. Both point with pride to the fact that servants enjoy a 
footing of friendly informality with their master's family, and 
that there have been many instances of the humblest subjects 
rising to the highest social and political positions.
d. A man can earn good wages in the U.S.S.R., but he cannot be a 
usurer or exploit his fellows. The same applies to the Muslim 
state.
e. Communism and Islam are both universal brotherhood , neither
o
discriminate between races, religious or class .
1. Report on "propaganda directed to Egypt by the Soviet 
authorities", from British Embassy, Cairo, 14 September 1945, 
F0371/46003, J2962/440/16. Cornelius Van Engert, "Some notes on 
Islam and Communism", 22 March 1951, from British Embassy, 
Washington, 10 May 1951, F0371/91184,E1024/20G. See also some 
more attempts to find communist parallels in the Qur'an, in: 
Walter Laqueur, Communism and Nationalism in the Middle East 
(London: 1957), pp.5-6.
2. The new attitude toward Islam in Soviet official publication is 
reflected in the moderate definition of Islam in the Soviet 
Encyclopaedia in 1953 and 1972. See, "Islam", in: B. A. 
Vedenskii (ed.), Bol*shaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia (Moskva:
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The above developments led to a revision in western research 
regarding Islam's relationship to Communism in the early 
1950's*. The previously accepted view held that Islam was a firm 
barrier to Communism. The new view held that the Islamic barrier 
to Communism derived from the social rather that the religious 
aspect of Islam. The failure of Islam to solve the contemporary 
social problem of the Muslims had created a better atmosphere for 
communist infiltration. For instance, M. Halpern, in his book,
The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa, 
said inter alia: "Communism is peculiarly attractive for Muslims 
who are prepared above all to look for a modern revolution as 
total in its concepts, emotional appeal,and the social control it 
exercises as was Islam in the past. For Muslims... Communism
becomes attractive both because of the fundamental similarity of
2its form and the fundamental difference of its content" .
Walter Laqueur pointed out that the Soviet approach to Islam 
was derived from both political and social considerations. 
According to him, the relationship between Communism and Islam was 
more complicated than in the case of other religions, for two 
primary reasons. First, active persecution of Islam inside the 
Soviet Union could be an obstacle to increasing their influence in 
the Middle East and elsewhere in Asia, and could create 
unfavorable impressions. Second, Islam is not only a religion but
1953), pp. 516-519; "Islam", in: A. M. Prokhorov (ed.), ibid, 
(Moskva: 1972), pp. 484-487.
1. The new approach in western research was reflected in the 
writings of: Kenneth Cragg, "The intellectual Impact of 
Communist upon Contemporary Islam", Middle East Journal 
(Washington), Vol.8, No. 2, Spring 1954, pp.127-138. Bernard 
Lewis, "Communism and Islam", in: International Affairs 
(London), January 1954, Vol. 30, pp. 1-12. Manfred Halpern,
"The implications of Communism for Islam", The Muslim World 
(Connecticut), No.l, January 1953, pp. 28-41.
2. Manfred Halpern, The Politics of Social Change in the Middle 
East and North Africa (New Jersey: 1963), pp. 159-160.
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also a way of life. Liquidating Islam, said Laqueur, involves 
abolishing an entire social system, with its manners, customs, 
laws, and specific way of life. Laqueur based his view on the 
resolution accepted by the Twelfth Party Congress regarding the 
need for atheist propaganda; it was noted by the Congress, 
stressed Laqueur, that for a variety of historical and social 
reasons, the influence of Islam in the U.S.S.R. was stronger than 
that of the Orthodox Church^.
B. The Various Approaches to the Issue as Introduced by 
Egyptian and Arab Intellectuals_______________________
In the programme of the Egyptian Communist Party, it was
declared that it was wrong that Islam should be the official
religion of the state since Egypt included Jews and Christians in
addition to the Muslims majority. The Egyptian state must not be
tied to any religion but be a National State for the people,
irrespective of their religion. Religion must be separate from the
state and from all its institutions, it was said in the 
7programme . Nevertheless, the Arab Marxists wished to 
demonstrate that Islam and "Scientific Socialism" were not in 
conflict with each other, and that the two can coexist 
successfully .
In the social realm Arab Marxists discovered useful elements 
derived from the founder of Islam, and in socialism, they found 
some points in common with Islam, attempting ideological 
continuity. In their opinion, the first Caliphs had bequeathed to
1. Laqueur, The Soviet Union and the Middle East, pp. 56-60.
2. "The programme of the Egyptian Communist Party" in: letter 
No. 1014/3/50 from British Embassy, Cairo, 9 January 1950, 
F0371/80354, JE1041/1G.
3. The Arab Marxists view was well expressed in the Marxist 
periodical, Al-Tali(a , in an article written by its editor, 
LutfT al-KhulT; see, Al-Tali*a (Cairo), March 1966, p.5.
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the masses the revolutionary principles of struggle against 
imperialism, monopoly, tyranny, and backwardness. In other words 
they attempted to nationalize and socialize Islam*:
"the Islamic view-that of Muhammad, Abu-Bakr, <Umar and 
is the revolution's view of tyranny, imperialism, monopoly 
exploitation, and backwardness. Hence, it was accepted by the 
masses, who are breaking the chains of tyranny through 
revolutionary action and with their sweat and hard 
efforts are building the liberty, unity and humanity 
of socialism... with the power of Islam, the liberty and 
socialist revolution and the culture of progressive 
Arabism (al-^uruba), we shall confront the reactionary, 
imperialist and mercantile alliance".
The Arab Marxist intellectuals have argued that there is only 
one form of "scientific socialism", but they have accepted the 
fact that "scientific socialism" (ishtirakTya ^ilmTya) must adapt 
itself to new historical circumstances. For example, after the 
emergence of newly independent countries, socialist ideas were 
widely accepted by social groups other than the working classes. 
The conclusion to which these writings lead is that the transition 
to socialism becomes possible even in underdeveloped societies. 
While there is only one authentic socialism, there are various 
"national roads" leading to its realization .
The intellectual father of modern "Arab Socialism" during the 
1940's was the founder and ideologist of the Syrian B a (th 
Party, Michel *Aflaq. <Aflaq produced a doctrine which was based 
on traditional Arab elements on the one hand, and on socialist 
elements taken from "scientific socialism" on the other. fAflaq 
understood the importance of Islam to Arab Muslims and its 
positive and crucial role in their entire way of life. *Aflaq 
emphasized the difference between his Arab Socialism and Marxist 
Socialism. He attempted to integrate Islamic spiritual-religious
1. Ibid, p .8.
2. Fauzi M. N a j j a r ,  "Islam and Socialism in the U.A.R.",
Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. Ill, No.3 (1968), pp.
186-187.
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elements as an essential component of "Arab Socialism". (Aflaq 
observed that Islam evolved in an Arab milieu, culture, and 
language. The language in which Islam had appeared was Arabic. 
Islam interprets events, phenomena, and ideas in accordance with 
the Arab mentality and tradition and expresses the Arab way of 
thinking and philosophy of life. Islam glorifies several Arab 
characteristics and decries others. However,the characteristics 
judged by Islam, whether approvingly or disapprovingly,are all 
Arab characteristics*; therefore, Islam is integral to Arab 
nationality and inseparable from it. <Aflaq emphasized the
idealistic element in the "Arab Socialism" doctrine, while
2rejecting the materialistic philosophy :
"The communist philosophy is based upon materialism and 
explains historical development by the economic factor, 
which is, in its view, all-pervasive. The Ba<th philosophy 
rejects that materialist approach and argues that 
idealistic and spiritual factors have a crucial influence in 
the development of human society. Therefore,the spiritual 
movements which have appeared in the Arab context, such as 
Islam, are not alien to the Ba*th philosophy and do not 
contradict it".
Despite the fact that <Aflaq does not accept the philosophical
method of scientific socialism, he has been influenced to a great
. 3extent by its doctrine. As he said :
"It is a mistake to understand from our idealistic approach 
that we advocate the perpetuation of the present wasteful 
conditions or that we have delusions that economic reform 
might be implemented easily by just waiting in anticipation 
for the appearance of goodwill. Furthermore, it should not be 
presumed that we reject realist thought or that we disregard 
the claims advanced for scientific thought. We believe that we 
should be realistic in the way we think and concrete as 
though we were materialist. We should not attempt to 
correct the ills of society through illusions, miracles, 
or obscuring reality, but should rather examine its evils 
in order to amend and correct the situation. The exploiting 
ruling classes will not surrender their wealth
or its intersts just because we call upon them to do so
1. Michel ^Aflaxg, fi sabll al-Bafth (Beirut: 1963), p.58.




for the good of the nation, for reason and progress. For 
that, what are required are struggle, political consolidation, 
and earnest thought".
From the above, it follows that the idealistic element is 
integrated with the revolutionary; thus "revolutionary idealism" 
emerges in <Aflaq's thought.
The prominent spiritual dimension in cAflaq's ideology which he
conjoins to almost any theme, makes it impossible to deny religion
in principle. <Aflaq has stated that he cannot accept atheism as a
dogma, whether in its religious or spiritual sense; that is to
say, he cannot accept atheism "on any matter which goes beyond the
sensible" (ilfrad bikul shai* khSrij fan al-mabsus)*. In contrast
to Communism's "shallow" atheistic solution, *Aflaq advocates
something different: he believes in mankind and in its capacity to
fight against the exploitative elements of society, which tried to
subordinate and to mould religion in accordance with their own 
o
needs .
"Arab Socialism" was adapted to the circumstances and history of 
the Arab nation. There can be no question of the importance and 
status of Islam, since it was and still is deeply rooted in the 
Arab environment. The Arab masses would reject any attempt to 
implement an ideology in which the Islamic religious element did 
not constitute a cornerstone; and indeed, Islam has been an 
integral part of the doctrine of Arab Socialism. The proponents 
and shapers of Arab Socialism have presented Islam in its positive 
dimension. In so doing they have wished to simplify the process of 
transmitting socialism to Arab society.
The attitude of the leaders of Islamic orthodoxy towards 
Communism, the prospects of its application in Muslim society 
and the elementary differences between these doctrines, was
1. (Aflaq, fT sabTl al-Ba^th, pp. 126,133.
2. Ibid.
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expressed very clearly by the Rector of Al-Azhar University, 
al-Shaykh Muhammad Husain, in an interview he gave to Al-Ahram^.
In order to emphasize the essential contradictions, the Shaykh 
outlined briefly some of the main basic ideas of Islam and 
Communism, and made a comparison between them, for the purpose of 
illuminating the superiority of Islam in relation to Communism.
He said inter alia, that Islam had intervened to correct errors, 
recognizing the original tendency of human nature, and attempting 
to direct it in the right direction; the principle of individual 
landownership was recognized by Islam but in a moderate way; it 
required that land should be acquired by legitimate methods, 
and it had imposed on Muslims certain duties and obligations 
regarding the poor for the prevention of injustice and 
exploitation. Islam recognized that men differ in intellect, 
capacity and the power to earn a living and to be useful to 
society. These differences were of the very essence of human 
nature and were the cause of the differences of the conditions of
o
living . Communism, said the Shaykh, pretended that it had 
already destroyed the vice of exploitation and of limiting wealth 
to a few individuals by taking away that wealth and giving it to 
the society. However, emphasized Muhammad Husain, if we study the 
matter deeply, we would have realized that the question of 
"production and distribution of products under the communist 
regime was confined to a small group of individuals". Under the 
communist regime, "a few individuals live in palaces and enjoy all 
sorts of luxury, not less than what the old Tzars enjoyed, while 
the people lead a monotonous life of wearisome toil and drudgery 
which is in no way better than the life of the laboring classes in
1. Al-Ahram (Cairo) , 25 November 1952; see also dispatch 1008 
from Caffery, Cairo, 28 November 1952, RG 59, 774.001/11-2852.
2. Ibid.
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other countries^". The Shaykh stressed that Islam was not only a 
religious institution but was also a social and financial one, and 
to deprive a Muslim of his liberty in social and financial matters 
was to deprive him of certain important elements which were of the 
very essence of Islam and which, in the estimation of every devout 
Muslim, were far superior to any other institution, especially 
Communism which persecuted every institution contradicting it. 
Islam was foremost among such persecuted institutions because it 
contradicted Communism in every respect .
The director of the Mosques Department in the Ministry of 
Wakfs, Shaykh <Abd Allah al-Marji, outlined their struggle against 
Communism through the medium of the mosques. He said that his 
department had a staff of efficient Imams versed in Islamic 
studies whose principles can guarantee happiness to mankind. "They 
can explain these principles to the people, thus building a 
bulwark between the Islamic society and communist 
infiltration" .
Communism,and primarily atheism, one of its basic principles 
had been used as a target in the Egyptian press, mainly by those 
who adopted or represented the government official view, but also 
even by those who considered themselves independent. The 
condition of the Muslims in the Soviet Union was discussed in an 
article written by Al-Ahr*am. The article complained of 
discrimination against the Muslims because of their religion; it 
gave a picture of Muslims who lived in the Crimea and had been 
driven from their homes after the second world war, to other 
areas by the Soviet Government, with Russians citizens relocated
1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. "Recent Anti-Communist Articles in Egyptian Press", dispatch 




In the pro-government newspaper, Al-Asas, the writer charged
that Communism advocated complete freedom for women. It advocated
the abolition of classical Arabic and the adoption of colloquial
Arabic with the ultimate aim of prohibiting study of the Qur*an
and the practice of Islam. Communism advocated economic equality,
despite knowing it was absurd to believe people are equal
in intelligence or strength. People should not expect equal wages
o
even though given equal opportunities .
The distinction between Communism and Islam, the dangers of
communist ideas to the Muslims, and the socialist alternative, was
outlined by Afymad Husain, the author of the work "The Socialism
Which We Preach". An attempt to prevent the publication of the
work, was made by the Egyptian Public Prosecutor who claimed that
the work approved and propagated Communism. This matter came
before *Abd al-fAzIz Sulaiman, the President of the Cairo Court of
First Instance. On 16 April 1951, in his decision to release the
work for publication, Sulaiman established that the work did not
represent a violation of the Law. Communism, said Sulaiman, is
aware that religion is not in accord with its principle of
depriving property owners of their goods; it looks at the life of
men from a materialistic and purely mechanical angle. Ahmad
Husain's work, stressed Sulaiman, did not favour a regime which
advocates the abolition of private property, realizing that
3religion is opposed to any such hateful system because :
"To each man belongs that which he has, and the earth is the 
gift of God to the faithful, from whence they seek their 
sustenance and whereof their children and grandchildren 
inherit their limited portion, subject to the command of
1. Nur Muhammad, Al-Ahram, in: ibid.
2. * Abbas al-cAqqad, Al-Asas, in: ibid.
3. "Work on the Egyptian Council of State", from Caffery, Cairo,
14 May 1951, RG 59, 774.3/5-1451.
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God to reserve to the poor and needy a portion to be fixed 
according to the individual means and the public needs. Thus 
an individual may voluntarily, or in obedience to law, abandon 
a portion of his goods to the benefit of those without 
property. It goes without saying that individuals may acquire 
a fortune or be reduced to penury as the result of a single 
transaction or of a transaction which has turned out badly. 
This is a law which lasts as long as the world endures."
According to Husain, said Sulaiman, the remedy for misery, 
sickness and ignorance would become possible with the limitation 
of property without abolishing it. The socialism advocated by 
Husain, represented a spiritual growth and had its root in depths 
of the Egyptian nation itself; the purpose would be achieved 
without using force or violence, but by urging men to entertain 
fraternal relations with each other and to seek to live in the 
shadow of peace. Husain criticised Communism and the extremists of 
the left for denying the past and making enemies of religion; and 
criticised communists who believe in material things and deny that 
which lies behind these things; "effects do not exist without 
cause and the fact of showing abhorrence of poverty, illness and 
hunger is not the result of mere material necessity, but of an 
aspiration towards an ideal based on absolute justice. If it was 
merely a question of simple materialism, the strong would have 
despoiled the weak". Obviously then, an evolution supported by 
morality was essential. Muslims were considered by the Qur'an as 
a middle nation who were partisans neither of the extreme right or 
the extreme left, and that socialism, as presented in the Middle 
East, found its support among the Muslims who form a moderate 
party. Socialism, according to Husain, was the basis of religion; 
this socialism was of a distinctive character in harmony with the 
beliefs of the people of the Middle East who followed an oriental 
rather than a western socialism, and whose Islamic religion 
proclaimed equality among people, whom God had created without
-87-
distinction, all were equal before the law*.
The Egyptian official and traditional approach regarding Islam
and Communism was summed up clearly by Nuqrashi Pasha, then
Egyptian Prime Minister, during a conversation with the American
Secretary of State, in Washington on 1 August, 1947. Nuqrashi said
that Egypt feared Communism and was anti-communist in sentiment,
primarily because Communism was contrary to(^th^ Islam. Islam, said
Nuqrashi, stressed the rights of the individual, it respected
private enterprise as well as private property. Basically,
o
Islam was opposed to the concept of Communism .
In his book Communism and Nationalism , Walter Laqueur 
outlined two arguments. The first, that the problem of the 
affinity between Islam and Communism is of secondary importance in 
regard to the relations between the U.S.S.R. and the Muslim 
world. The second, that Islam has gradually ceased to be a serious 
competitor to Communism in the struggle for the soul of the 
existing and potential elites in the countries of the Middle East. 
Laqueur1s first argument falls into line with the development of 
political events in the Middle East during the 1950's; the 
Soviet relations with the Muslim world had not been influenced by 
any ideological contradictions. Contrary to Laqueur's second 
argument, neither Communism nor any other ideology, could 
constitute a threat to the superiority of Islam in the Muslim 
society.
1. Ibid.
2. Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, in: RG 84, 
Cairo Embassy-General Documents, File Subject: 1947, 710, 
No.11, Box: 165.
3. Walter Laqueur, Communism and Nationalism, pp. 6-7.
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PART TWO
THE BEGINNING OF THE SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN EGYPTIAN 
AFFAIRS: THE DYNAMICS OF PENETRATION, 1947-1955
CHAPTER ONE 
THE U.S.S.R.'S FIRST STEPS IN THE 
EGYPTIAN AND MIDDLE EASTERN ARENA
After the Second World War, Soviet policy towards the Middle 
East was intended to end British hegemony in the area and to fill 
the vacuum as soon as conditions would allow.
Soviet doctrine towards the area had already been shaped by the 
Sixth Congress of the Comintern in 1928, and its implementation 
had taken place soon after the Second World War. The rigid 
doctrinaire line regarding the role of the national bourgeoisie in 
the struggle for liberation was softened. Despite their arguments 
that the struggle for liberation in the Arab world would succeed 
only under Communist leadership, the Soviets were in practice 
willing to support and cooperate with any Arab government who 
wished to liberate its country of foreign troops. They did not 
take into account the socio-political nature of these governments, 
even when such governments as was the case with Egypt had declared 
the Communist Party illegal.
This policy was first carried out at the United Nations when the 
U.S.S.R. sided with Lebanon, Syria and Egypt. This new and 
flexible policy, as future events were to demonstrate, disproves 
the belief current among scholars that Soviet interests and 
political activities during Stalin's period were marginal and 
focused mainly on nurturing Communist parties, and that the 
implementation of such a policy has been taking place gradually 
only after his death in March 1953.
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A . Soviet Support for the Arabs 
The first significant political dialogue between the Soviet 
Union and the Arab governments took place at the beginning of
1946. In an attempt to increase their influence in the Middle 
East, the U.S.S.R. approached the President of Lebanon, Bishara 
al-Khuri, on 10 January 1946, with the proposal to negotiate 
a secret treaty. After consultations and discussions between the 
Lebanese and Syrian Governments, both agreed to receive the first 
formal proposal of a treaty from the U.S.S.R*.
A secret Syrian-U.S .S.R. treaty was signed on 1 February 1946 in 
Beirut. Daniil Solod was the Soviet negotiator and signatory. The 
treaty included inter alia the following clauses:
a. The U.S.S.R. agree to support the Syrian Government in all 
steps which the latter may undertake in order to establish 
complete independence. The U.S.S.R. will back Syrian demands for 
immediate evacuation of all French and British troops;
b. The U.S.S.R. agrees to assist in the cultural development of 
the country. A considerable number of teachers will be sent 
from the U.S.S.R. to assist the Syrians in general to organize
a native Syrian educational system, freed from foreign influence;
c. The U.S.S.R. recognizes the need for signing a broad treaty 
with Syria as soon as possible, including provisions affecting 
economic, commercial and navigational questions. The Soviet Union 
agrees to send a sufficient number of military personnel to Syria, 
comprising military instructors and high ranking officers, in
1. The information was given to the Department of State by the War 
Department, Office of the Assistant Secretary of War, Strategic 
Services Unit, on 15 February, 1946; according to the War Dept, 
the information was believed to have come from a group of 
Russians in Paris, without any further corroboration; see RG 59 
761.90D11/2-1546. The American Embassy in Moscow, could not 
confirm or deny that such a secret treaty had been signed; see 
Airgram 316 from American Embassy, Moscow, 12 April, 1946, RG 
59, 761.90/4-1246.
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order to help Syria to build up as rapidly as possible a national 
army of some strength;
d. The Syrian Government agrees to give the U.S.S.R. most favoured 
nation treatment.
A secret treaty between the U.S.S.R. and the Lebanese Government, 
based upon these clauses, was signed two days later
An official visit to the U.S.S.R. of a combined Lebanese-Syrian 
cultural mission between 15 February and 18 March 1947, could be 
considered as a step forward in Arab-Soviet rapprochement. The 
delegation was invited by the Soviets for the promotion of 
cultural relations between the U.S.S.R. and the outside world. The 
delegation visited a great number of industrial and cultural
9 . . —  . —  ^centres . At the conclusion of the visit, Dr. Kamil Ayyad , 
a member of the delegation said:
"It gives us the greatest joy to have returned from the 
U.S.S.R., that new state which is considered to be in the 
foremost ranks of the states of the world, with a conviction 
that this great country has been able to, in spite of all the 
obstacles in its way, to make great strides towards the 
realization of a comprehensive culture...a culture which does 
not recognize the distinction of origin and race, which 
repudiates the expansionist and imperialist ideology... and 
which believes in peace and independence for all the nations 
of the world. We hope that our visit would herald a wider
1. Ibid. On 15 February, 1946, during a discussion in the Security 
Council of the U.N. on Syrian and Lebanese demands for a speedy 
and complete removal of British and French troops from both 
countries, the U.S.S.R. supported both demands. On the Soviet 
position, see Y. R o 1i , From Encroachment to Involvement,
A Documentary Study of Soviet Policy in the Middle East, 1945- 
1973 (Jerusalem: 1974), pp. 29-30. It is important to point out 
that during the Palestine war in 1948, the largest shipments of 
arms to the Arabs from the Eastern bloc had gone to Syria and 
Lebanon; see C.I.A.'s report on "Possible Developments from the 
Palestine Truce", 27 July, 1948, in: U.S. Declassified Documents 
Reference System, U.S., 1975, 4F.
2. Letter No. 428/1/44 from R.K. Roberts, British Embassy Cairo,
13 March 1947, F0371/62154, E2448/2448/89. Dispatch 26 from 
American Legation, Beirut, 31 March 1947, RG 59, 761.90E/3- 
3147. Dispatch 607 from American Embassy, Damascus, 31 March 
1947, RG 84, Cairo Embassy-General Records, 1947:800, box 169.
3. Dr. Ayyad was an able member of the Syrian Board of Education. 
It was reported that he had always been of Communist 
inclination. See dispatch 607, ibid.
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reciprocation of cultural and mutual relations between our 
countries and this great state..." .
The process of rapprochement between Egypt and the U.S.S.R. was
quite slow when compared with the rapprochement with Syria or
Lebanon. An American assessment of Soviet expansionist tendencies
in the Middle East assumed correctly that it would not be so
quickly noticed in Egypt as in other Middle Eastern countries
nearer the Soviet border. However, the American report noted that
because "of Egypt's strategic position, the possibility of
increased Soviet pressure therein cannot be safely overlooked".
It was estimated that Soviet interest in Egypt in the long term,
would probably be directed towards replacing the British 
o
influence .
The Soviet official line regarding the development of political 
events in Egypt after the second world war was outlined in a 
public lecture delivered in Moscow by Lutski, a well-known Soviet 
Orientalist. Lutski considered the Wafd as the centre of 
resistance to British Imperialism. He described it as a liberation 
movement so influential by 1920 that Britain feared it might be 
forced to abandon the protectorate. The current political 
situation in Egypt was marked by a struggle between $>idqT Pasha, 
Nuqrashi Pasha and their supporters on one hand and the National 
Liberation Movement on the other. The Wafd led the National 
Liberation movement, said Lutski, but it had no progressive 
economic policy. The progressive parties had agreed on the 
necessity of withdrawing British troops and on Nile Valley unity. 
SidqT Pasha and Nuqrashi Pasha did not seek immediate British 
withdrawal. Their reactions to progressive demonstrations took the
1. Kamil Ayyadtwas quoted in the Communist newspaper Sawt 
al-Sha fb , 25 March 1947; see dispatch 26, ibid.
2. Letter from American Embassy, Cairo, 22 March 1946, RG 59, 
711.83/3-2246.
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form of severe measures against the communist and Progress 
factions. Lutski said that Sudan and Egypt were intimately 
connected because of racial kinship, and economic ties growing out 
of the vital importance of the Nile to both. The British aim was 
to take exclusive control of Sudan so as to create pressure on 
Egypt. Regarding American activities in the Middle East, Lutski 
pointed out how United States infiltration had squeezed Britain 
out of Egypt's foreign trade^.
The Soviet view of the Egyptian political scene distinguished 
between two main parties: The ruling circles characterised by 
their conservative approach and affiliated with the west; and the 
progressive forces, calling for a national liberation struggle.
The latter was supported by the Soviet Union. Indeed, Soviet 
propaganda emphasized its support for the "Egyptian national 
liberation movement" but not of the Egyptian Government.
The question of Anglo-Egyptian relations and the future of the 
1936 treaty had been the subject of considerable attention in the 
Soviet press. Radio Moscow reported on 23 December 1946, a new 
crisis in Anglo-Egyptian relations as a result of Britain's 
refusal to accept Egypt's demands for complete independence, the 
withdrawal of British troops, and the unification of the Sudan
1. The explanation of the Soviet positive attitude towards the 
Wafd party was given in Bol'shaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia,
Vol.15, 1952, p. 461; the Wafd was the party of the national 
bourgeoisie. After the second world war, the Wafd occupied "an 
objectively progressive position on the question of denouncing 
the enslaving agreements with Britain and Egypt's refusal to 
participate in the aggressive measures of the Anglo-American 
bloc in the Near East"; see Yodfat, Arab Politics in the Soviet 
Mirror, p. 32-33. The translation of Lutski's lecture was given 
in Telegram 1 from American Embassy, Moscow, 27 January 1947,
RG 84, Cairo Embassy-General Documents, 1947: 710, No. 1, box 
. 165. See also commentary by Hassanov, "British Hampering 
Egyptian-Sudanese Unity", 29 January 1947, Radio Moscow in 
Arabic, Summary of World Broadcast, 3 (b) U.S.S.R.- for abroad 
(iv)-(v), British Broadcasting Corporation, Written Archives 
Centre, Caversham Park, Reading (hereafter cited as SWB with 
appropriate filing reference).
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with Egypt. Constant hypocritical promises to evacuate Egypt and 
grant the country independence remained on paper, said the 
broadcast. The change of government in Egypt on 9 July 1947, and 
the fact that Nuqrashi Pasha became premier, did not bring about 
concrete change. The Premier continued the policy of "silence and 
mystery" taken by his predecessor, SidqT Pasha. According to the 
Soviets, the crisis in Anglo-Egyptian relations continued as 
acute as ever, and numerous facts indicated that the Egyptian 
people intended to press even harder for their national aims*.
New Times published an article entitled "British Imperial 
Defence Plans and their Implications". The British imperialists, 
said the author, were trying to justify their expansion in the 
Near East by the need to protect communications with India through 
the Mediterranean. This was designed "to mask the fact that the
purpose of a large army in peacetime is to perpetuate and increase
2the yoke on the peoples of...the Near and Middle East" .
The anniversary of the Anglo-Egyptian agreement of 1899 about the 
Sudan was announced as a day of mourning in Egypt, said Radio 
Moscow. It quoted the Egyptian press demand for the termination of 
British occupation of Egypt and the Sudan, and said further that 
Egyptian people regarded the treaty of 1899 as the first step 
taken by Britain to separate the Sudan from Egypt. Britain imposed 
this agreement on Egypt and succeeded in separating the Sudan from 
the motherland of Egypt. "The Egyptian people are today striving
1. Commentary by D. Melnikov, "New Crisis in Anglo-Egyptian 
Relations", Radio Moscow in English, 23 December 1946, in:
SWB 3 (b) U.S.S.R.- for abroad (ii). B. Raiiskii, "Angliia i 
Egipet", Trud (Moscow), 22 December 1946. P. Viemov, "Na 
blizhnem Vostoke", Trud (Moscow), 19 December 1946. "Debate in 
Egyptian Chamber of Deputies on Position of New Government", 
TASS report from Cairo, 19 December 1946, in: F0371/66297, 
N166/166/38v "Egypt: British Civilians to Continue Occupation", 
1 January 1947, in: SWB 3 (a) U.S.S.R.-Home (iii).
2. M. Galaktionov, "British Imperial Defence Plans and their 
Implications", New Times (Moscow: 1946), No.22.
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for the union of the two lands and also demand the abolition of
all treaties and agreements imposed on them by Britain", said the
Soviet broadcast*.
The manifestations of sympathy by the Soviet Union for the
Egyptian demand for the evacuation of British troops from Egypt
had been positively accepted by Egyptian statesmen. For instance,
on 19 December 1946, a pro-Soviet statement was given by Kamil
al-Bindari, the Egyptian minister to the U.S.S.R. Bindari said in
Moscow that it was necessary immediately to submit the draft of
the Anglo-Egyptian treaty for examination by the United Nations.
In the U.N., he said, "it will have a favourable reception... Egypt
must have complete independence and be able to use her natural
rights on equal terms with all Great Powers and U.N. members. It
must not be bound by any pledges with any Great Power... Egypt can
count upon the Soviet Union's absolutely friendly attitude... the
Soviet peoples and Government have a deep friendship and respect
o
for the Egyptian people" .
The Anglo-Egyptian negotiations and the failure to achieve any 
acceptable solution on both sides had been subject to considerable 
attacks in the Egyptian press. The anti-British tendency served 
Soviet interests. Numerous quotations from Egyptian newspapers 
were published in Soviet newspapers. Considerable prominence was
r>
given to the Egyptian Senate demand for the cessation of Anglo- 
Egyptian negotiations and a proposal to the Egyptian Government to 
appeal to the United Nations on this issue. For instance, Akhbar 
al-Yawm was quoted as saying that the negotiations had completely
1. Commentary by Hassanov, "Sudan and the Complete Independence of 
Egypt", 22 January 1947, Radio Moscow in Arabic, SWB 3 (b) 
U.S.S.R.- for abroad (i).
2. "Egyptian Minister's Moscow Statement to AP", 19 December 1946, 
SWB, 3(a) USSR-Home (V).
3. "Egyptian Appeal to UN Proposed", 24 January 1947, SWB 3 (a)
U .S .S.R.-Home (ii).
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fa i led and that the Egyptian Government had decided to approach 
the security council to demand the evacuation of all British 
troops from Egypt and the Sudan*.
On 27 January, 1947, it was reported by the Egyptian press that 
V. M. Molotov, the Soviet Foreign minister, had invited for talks 
Bindari Pasha, the Egyptian Minister in Moscow, and informed him 
that the Soviet Union was ready to support in the U.N. the members 
of the League of Arab States and likewise to support Egypt on
the Sudan question. This was denied by a Tass announcement which
2
said that this did not correspond to fact. Pravda reported that 
BindarT Pasha fully approved the Tass denial. In reply to the 
Soviet denial, *Abd al-Rahman Azzam, the Arab League's secretary, 
said: "I fail to understand the policy of the U.S.S.R.; it changes 
colour every day" .
Towards mid-1947, the Soviet position regarding the Anglo- 
Egyptian dispute was ambiguous. On one hand, on March 24, during a 
conversation between Bevin and Stalin, the latter had stated that 
he had no intention of opposing British policy with regard to 
Egypt4 . Tass declared that Anglo-Egyptian relations were the 
affair of Britain and Egypt, and that the Soviet Union did not 
contemplate intervening . On the other hand, the Soviet press 
continued attacking Britain and the U.S.A. It accused the British 
of accepting the American proposal to mediate in the Anglo-
1. "Anglo-Egyptian Negotiations: Egyptian Press", 26 January 
1947, SWB, 3 (a) U .S .S .R .-Home (v).
2. Telegram 579 from American Embassy, London, 28 January 1947,
RG 59, 761.90B/1-2847. Telegram 2 from American Embassy,
Moscow, 29 January 1947, RG 84, Cairo Embassy-General 
Documents, 1947:710 No. 1, box, 165.
3. Egypt (Telegraph Service) Arab News Agency in Arabic, Cairo,
29 January 1947, SWB, 6B (1) Egypt.
4. Top secret memorandum of conversation, by the director of the 
Office of European Affairs, Washington, 7 May 1947, in: FRUS 
1947, Vol. V, pp. 771-772. See also, 0. H. Brandon, "Soviet 
Policy on the Middle East", Sunday Times (London), 25 May 1947.
5. Letter No. 369(64/42/47), from British Embassy, Moscow, May 
1947, F0371/66308, N5863/52/38.
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Egyptian question*, despite the American Government having no
9 • tintention of offering mediation . Vecherniaia Moskva declared 
that neither evacuation nor the unification of the Sudan with 
Egypt had entered into the calculations of the British but that 
they aimed at maintaining exclusive control over the country; the 
British were trying to block the appeal to U.N. and were going 
ahead with their concentration of troops in the canal zone. The 
Egyptian Government was depicted as having resisted the British 
only under the pressure of public indignation .
The underlying reason behind Stalin's expression of 
understanding towards British interests in the Middle East and 
of sympathy for the British case in Egypt was an intention to 
create tension in the relations between the U.S.A. and the U.K. 
surrounding the Anglo-Egyptian dispute; while the U.S.A. would 
push the British to settle the dispute the U.S.S.R. would not 
interfere. The Soviet union aimed to prevent the U.S.A. from 
acting as intermediary. The Soviets realized that in such a 
position the Americans could force the British to reach an 
agreement with Egypt, that its outcome would be an increase in 
American prestige in Egypt. They wished the dispute to be brought 
before the Security Council of the U.N. There they would be able 
to demonstrate their friendship to the Arabs by supporting their 
demands^.
1. Radio Moscow in Persian, 6 April 1947, SWB, 3(b) U.S.S.R.- for 
abroad (vi). Ibid, 8 April 1947, (iv). Radio Moscow in Arabic,
23 July 1947, SWB, U.S.S.R., p. 31.
2. FRUS, ibid.
3. P. Razin, "K polozheniiu v Egipte", Vecherniaia Moskva, 27 May 
1947.
4. This approach was well-expressed in Soviet publications during 
mid-1947. See for instance: Bulletin de la Presse Sovietique, 31 
May 1947, in: dispatch 2583 from American Embassy, Cairo, 4 
June 1947, RQ 59, 861.20283/6-447. K. Serezhin, "United States 
Policy in the Middle East", New Times (Moscow), No. 24, June
1947. L. Kraev, "Obrashchenie Egipta v sovet Bezopasnosti", 
Komsomol1skaia Pravda, 1 August 1947. See also a report on
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As a result of the failure to reach a solution of the Anglo- 
Egyptian dispute, the Egyptian Goverment headed by NuqrashT Pasha, 
decided to bring the Egyptian demand for the revision of the 1936 
treaty before the Security Council of the U.N. On 21 July 1947, 
Nuqrashi went to the U.S.A. On 5 August, NuqrSshi submitted the 
Egyptian case to the Security Council in a speech in which he 
demanded the immediate and complete evacuation of British troops 
from Egypt and the cessation of British administration in the 
Sudan1. On 1 August 1947, Nuqrashi had had a conversation with 
Marshall, the American Secretary of State, in Washington. NuqrashT 
said among other things, that in the appeal to the U.N. Egypt 
looked to the U.S.A. for support, for without such support Egypt
could not win. He said that Egypt had attempted to formulate its
2policies generally in accordance with those of the U.S.A.
The tactic taken by the Egyptian delegation to the U.N. was 
twofold. On the one hand, it meant to allay the fears of the 
various delegations who believed that there would be a connection 
between Egyptian's independence and the spread of Communism.
Egypt, its delegation argued, was strongly anti-Communist because 
Communism was contrary to Islam. On the other hand, Egypt 
expressed its readiness to cooperate with any power in order "to 
overcome any sign of danger threatening the East". This expression 
was intended mainly to demonstrate to the U.S.S.R. Egypt's 
neutrality in the inter-bloc conflict. Egypt would also side with
"Soviet Foreign Policy Based on the Press for April and May 
1947", in dispatch 1443 from American Embassy, Moscow to 
American Embassy, Cairo, 8 July 1947, RG 84, Cairo Embassy- 
General Records, 1947:800, box 167.
1. Y. Ro'i, From Encroachment to Involvement, pp.41-42.
P.J. Vatikiotis, The Modern History of Egypt (New York: 
Frederick A. Prager, 1969), pp. 363-364.
2. Memorandum of conversation, by the American Secretary of State, 
1 August 1947, in: FRUS 1947, Vol. V, pp. 785-786.
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the Soviet Union whenever necessary. The Egyptian delegation 
believed that this tactic would satisfy the Soviet bloc who would 
help Egypt to gain votes in the U.N. Assembly*.
The Egyptian efforts to pass a resolution calling for the 
immediate withdrawal of British troops from Egypt and the Sudan 
were not crowned with success. Several resolutions were presented 
by members of the Security Council, but none of them was 
adopted .
The Soviet press criticised Nuqrashi Pasha soon after he 
addressed his speech at the Security Council. It said that he 
clearly intended "to reduce opposition influence from the Wafd and 
to prepare the ground for an American loan" . Even so, only the 
Soviet and the Polish representatives supported the Egyptian 
demand, but both expressed reservations about Egyptian claims 
regarding the incorporation of the Sudan into Egypt.
The Soviet position was presented to the Security Council on 20 
August by Andrei Gromyko who said inter alia:
"The U.S.S.R. understands and sympathizes with these national 
aspirations on the part of Egypt and its people towards an 
independent existence on the basis of sovereign equality with 
other states and peoples. If we are to be guided by the high 
principles of the United Nations, the legitimacy of these 
Egyptian demands cannot be disputed....All this justifies the 
U.S.S.R. delegation's conclusion that Egypt's request for the 
immediate withdrawal of all United Kingdom troops from the 
territory of Egypt and the Sudan is well founded. For this 
reason the U.S.S.R. supports this request. With regard to the 
future of the Sudan...we do not know what the Sudanese want 
and what they are striving for. Without accurate information 
as to the aims of the Sudanese people, it is difficult for the 
Security Council to take any decision on this question" .
The American position concerning the Anglo-Egyptian dispute was
1. FRUS 1947, ibid. Radio Cairo, 21 May 1947, SWB, 8B (1) Egypt- 
Home (i ) .
2. See FRUS 1947, Vol. V, pp. 796-812. Telegram 2384 from 
Permanent U.K. Representative to the U.N., New York, 26 August 
1947, FO 181/^1028, File No. 158, Part II.
3. Tass transmission, 20 August 1947, SWB, U.S.S.R., p. 12.
4. Security Council, 2nd Year, No. 80, 20 August 1947, pp.2109- 
2111, in: Ro'i, ibid, pp. 42-44.
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ambivalent. On one hand, they believed that the continued presence 
of British troops in Egypt would impose a liability not only on 
Britain but on the U.S.A. and the Western world in general. They 
thought that relations with the Arab world could be seriously 
impaired for many years to come. On the other hand, British troops 
in the area served as a stabilizing factor. A complete withdrawal 
of British troops from the Middle East would leave no great power 
in this area, thus exposing it to Soviet aggression or 
infiltration*. The U.S.A. was therefore interested in an early 
settlement of the controversy through a resumption of negotiations. 
This approach was reflected very clearly in the speech of Herschel 
Johnson, the American Ambassador to the U.N., on 20 August before 
the Security Council. He noted that the Council did not feel 
justified in condemning the U.K. and that the Council had genuine 
sympathy for the Egyptian desire for complete independence. He 
expressed his hope that Egypt and the U.K. would reach an 
agreement^.
The Soviet Union's unconditional and decisive support of the 
Egyptian government in their dispute with the U.K. had significant 
implications for the short term. Many and different political 
factions in Egypt had begun to consider the Soviet union as a real 
friend of the Arab National Movement in its struggle against 
imperialism. Demonstrations in favour of the Soviet Union took 
place at the end of August 1947 . Sawt al-Umma and al-Misn 
printed the text of a letter to Gromyko saying: "We appeal to 
Comrade Gromyko on behalf of the educated Egyptian Youth to use
1. Memorandum by Henderson, the Director of the Office of Near 
Eastern and African Affairs to Lovett, the Under Secretary of 
State, 28 August 1947, in: FRUS 1947, Vol. V, pp.800-801. 
Telegram from Marshall, The American Secretary of State to 
Johnson, the Acting U.S.A. Representative at the U.N., 8 August 
1947, in: FRUS, ibid, pp.787-789.
2. FRUS, ibid, pp.797-798.
3. Dispatch 1022 from American Embassy, Cairo, 25 August 1947,
RG 59, 883.00/8-2547.
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the right of veto if the majority of the members of the Security 
Council pass a resolution against the demands of the Egyptian 
people. We take this opportunity to thank Comrade Gromyko for his 
noble attitude which will always be remembered by the Egyptian 
people"^.
C.I.A. reports suggested that owing to the American policy
concerning the Anglo-Egyptian dispute, a favourable atmosphere for
o
the Soviet Union m  Egypt had been created . One report 
determined that Soviet relations with Egypt were not close, but 
the Egyptians, "although shunning any strong alignment with the 
U.S.S.R., have tended in recent years to look more towards the 
Soviet Union in the hope of gaining support for the Arabs in 
counteracting unpopular U.S. and U.K. policies in the Middle
o , . ,
East" . One more achievement was attributed to the Soviet Union 
arising from its tactics. With his arrival in Cairo from New York 
on 20 September 1947, NuqrashT stated that Egypt would consider 
the possibility of neutrality in the international arena. Egypt
would seek the support of other powers in its struggle against
. 4Britain .
In response to the Soviet stand at the Security Council, FarTd 
Zayn al-DTn, the Syrian Minister to Moscow said on 12 August 1947, 
that Syria should work to widen economic exchanges with the Soviet 
Union. The relations with the Soviet Union arose from "our joint 
stand during the recent world war against Nazism... also we both 
are members of the U.N.O., and Soviet Russia was one of the first
1. Ibid.
2. "The Current Situation in Egypt", 16 October 1947, President's 
Secretary's Files, File Subject: Central Intelligence Reports-
. ORE 54, 1947, (No. 44-64, Box 254), Truman Library. "The 
Current Situation in the Mediterranean and the Near East", 
ibid, 17 October, 1947, ORE 52, 1947, Box 254.
3. C.I.A., ORE 54, ibid.
4. RafifT, Fi A fgab al-Thawra al-Misriyya (Cairo: 1951), Vol. iii, 
p. 234 in : Vatikiotis, ibid, pp. 364, 482.
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nations to stand by us in our case against France and in our 
struggle for freedom and independence"^-. On the other side, 
a pro-Egyptian line was reflected in the Soviet press, encouraging 
the Egyptian people to express more indignation about the 
indecisive policy taken by its government in the Security Council 
discussions. For instance, Pravda stated that the remaining 
foreign troops on Egyptian and Sudanese territories violated the 
sovereignty of these countries. In exchange for the latest promise 
to evacuate British troops, British diplomats sought to impose a 
burdensome military alliance, which was said to elicit indignation
in Egypt. The Security Council had to take steps to secure British
2
withdrawal .
The development of the events surrounding the Anglo-Egyptian 
dispute, led to an essential change in the superpower equation in 
the Middle East. A new factor was included into this equation - 
the Soviet Union. The expressions of sympathy and active support 
for Egypt in the international arena created a new opportunity for 
the Soviet Union to be involved actively for the first time in 
Egyptian affairs. As a result of these events, the Soviet Union 
began to play an important role in shaping Middle Eastern affairs. 
The next event on the Middle East agenda was the Palestine issue, 
in which the Soviet Union played a crucial role.
1. Airgram 319 from American Legation, Damascus, 12 August 1947, 
RG 84, Cairo Embassy-General Records, 1947: 800, box 169.
2. Pravda (Moscow), 2 September 1947, in: Airgram 1737 from 
American Embassy, Moscow, 6 September 1947, RG 5'9, 
741.83/9-647. Radio Moscow in English, 28 August 1947, SWB, 
U.S.S.R., pp.16-17. Radio Moscow in Arabic, 9 September 1947, 
SWB, U.S.S.R.. , pp.12-13.
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B . The Soviet Position concerning the Palestine Issue 1947-1948
The Palestine issue had absorbed the attention of the Soviet
Union since the autumn of 1946. At that time, Soviet delegates to
the U.N. General Assembly stressed the need for an immediate
solution to the Palestine issue, which had been nothing but the
result of British imperialist policy. Therefore, the future of 
Palestine should be discussed and determined only by the members 
of the United Nations*.
By the beginning of 1947, the British government realized that 
the main object of Soviet policy with regard to Palestine was to 
embarrass them by stimulating anti-British feeling and 
encouraging the growing restlessness and dissatisfaction, thus 
attempting to undermine the British position in the Middle East.
As outlined by a British report, no overt support was given to 
either side to the conflict, that is, Soviet propaganda 
represented both Jews and Arabs as being equally the victims of
o
British imperialism .
The Soviet press tended to stress the substantial differences 
between the policies of the U.S.A. and Britain. U.S. policy 
towards Palestine, said Hassanov on Radio Moscow, had seriously 
complicated the country's problems and had caused deep indignation 
in the Arab East. The American programme in Palestine was regarded 
by Arab circles as an attempt to strengthen the influence of
-3
U.S. capitalism, he added .
On 2 April 1947, a formal request to include the Palestine 
question on the agenda of the forthcoming Regular Session of the
1. Ro'i, Soviet Decision Making in Practice, pp. 46-49.
2. Report on "Soviet and Communist activities", prepared by F.O. 
Research Dept., 24 February, 1947, F0371/66294, N2370/49/38. 
Hassanov, "The Palestine Problem", Radio Moscow in Arabic, 2 
February, 1947, SWB 3 (b) U.S.S.R. for abroad (i-ii).
3. Hassanov, Radio Moscow in Arabic, 19 March, 1947, ibid, 
(ii-iii). See also, Ro'i, ibid, pp.48-53.
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General Assembly was submitted to Trygve Lie, the Secretary 
General of the U.N., by the British government1.
The Soviet official position concerning the Palestine problem 
was outlined by Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. On 14 May, 
in a statement before the First Special Session of the U.N.
General Assembly, he dealt with the problem of Palestine:
"...The legitimate interests of both the Jewish and Arab 
populations of Palestine can be duly safeguarded only through 
the establishment of an independent, dual, democratic, 
homogeneous Arab-Jewish State...If this plan proved impossible 
to implement, in view of the deterioration in the relations 
between the Jews and the Arabs...it would be necessary to 
consider the second plan ...which provides for the partition 
of Palestine into two independent autonomous states, one 
Jewish and one Arab. I repeat that such a solution of the 
Palestine problem would be justifiable only if relations 
between the Jewish and Arab populations of Palestine indeed 
proved to be so bad that it would be impossible to reconcile 
them....
No definite or final decisions were adopted by the General 
Assembly's Special Session. It decided that a commission to study 
the question would be formed and would present its report to the 
Assembly's session in September 1947.
During the summer of 1947, the Soviet Union continued to pursue 
an ambivalent policy towards the Palestine problem and its 
solution as outlined by Gromyko's speech. The development of 
events after the end of August 1947, enabled the Soviet Union to 
make its final decision, that is to support the partition of 
Palestine. On 27 August, the commission voted on the form of 
government that was to replace the Mandate. The majority of its 
members favoured partition. On 26 September, the British 
government announced that it had decided to abandon the Mandate.
On 16 September, the Second Regular Session of the General 
Assembly had opened and on 23 September, set up an Ad Hoc
1. Ro ' i , p . 65 .*
2. United Nations Official Records of the First Special Session of 
the General Assembly, Papers of Harry N. Howard, File Subject: 
Middle East Chronological File- 1947, box 13, Truman Library.
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Committee on the Palestine question. On 3 October, during the 
committee discussions, the first East European country to do so, 
Czechoslovakia, announced its support for partition^-. The 
U.S.S.R. announced its support only after United States delegate 
Herschel Johnson had committed his government to this solution 
too. On 11 October, the Soviet representative, Semion Tsarapkin, 
said: "relations between Arabs and Jews reached such a state of 
tension that it had become impossible to reconcile their points of 
view on the solution of the problem. The partition plan on the 
other hand, offered more hope of realization" . On 25 November 
the Ad Hoc Committee completed its work with the adoption of the 
partition proposal and the Palestine question was returned to the 
Plenary session. On 26 November, in a statement before the U.N. 
General Assembly, the Soviet Representative, Ambassador Gromyko, 
who supported the partition of Palestine into Jewish and Arab 
States, explained the Soviet position. He said that Jews and Arabs 
in Palestine did not wish or were unable to live together. 
Partition of Palestine was, therefore, the only workable solution. 
Gromyko did not agree that this decision was contrary to Arab 
interests or directed against either of the two national groups 
inhabiting Palestine. In his statement Gromyko spoke in a 
conciliatory tone vis-a-vis Arab representatives saying:*^
"The Government and peoples of the U.S.S.R. have entertained 
and still entertain a feeling of sympathy for the national 
aspirations of the nations of the Arab East. The U.S.S.R. 
attitude towards the efforts of these peoples to rid 
themselves of the last fetters of colonial dependence is one 
of understanding and sympathy. Therefore, we do not identify 
with the vital national interests of the Arabs the clumsy 
statements made by some of the representatives of Arab states 
about the foreign policy of the U.S.S.R. in connexion with the
1. Ro'i, ibid, pp. 76-84.
2. Ibid, p. 84.>
3. United Nations, Official Records, General Assembly, Second 
Session, 26 November, 1947, papers of Harry N. Howard, File 
Subject: Middle East Chronological File-1947, box 13, Truman
Library.
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question of the future of Palestine. We draw a distinction 
between such statements, which were obviously made under the 
stress of feeling emotions, and the basic and permanent 
interests of the Arab people. The U.S.S.R. delegation is 
convinced that Arabs and the Arabs States will still, on more 
than one occasion, be looking towards Moscow and expecting the 
U.S.S.R. to help them in the struggle for their lawful 
interests, in their efforts to cast off the last vestiges of 
foreign dependence".
As early as this statement, the Soviet Union was making 
determined attempts to prevent their positive image with the Arab 
public from getting worse, because of the anti-Soviet propaganda 
in the Egyptian press.
For instance, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood attacked the U.S.S.R. 
for its inconsistent policy towards the Arab world. On one hand, 
it supported Egyptian demands in the Security Council. The Soviet 
Union was referred to with great respect in the Egyptian press 
because of this. On the other hand, soon afterwards, the Soviet 
representative at the U.N. General Assembly supported the 
partition of Palestine although this partition was against all 
humanitarian principles and against the U.N. Charter itself. "The 
Russians are using the U.N. today for their own ends. They 
support freedom or oppose it as it suits them...they supported 
Egypt because they wanted to put the British out of the 
Mediterranean and replace them instead"-^. Shaikh IJasan al-Bannia 
said that the support of the Zionists' plans by the United States 
had come as a greater shock to the Arabs than the support of the 
Soviet Union. A1-Banna emphasized that he had always expected the 
Soviet Union to oppose the true interests of the Arabs and 
Islam^.
1. "And Russia", Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun (Cairo), 17 ^October, 1947, 
Enclosure No. 3 to Dispatch No. 2979 from the American Embassy, 
Cairo, 24 October, 1947, RG 59, 867N.01/10-2447. See also, Al- 
Ikhwan al-Muslimun, 4 January, 1948, Airgram 2273 from American 
Embassy, Cairo, 10 January, 1948, RG 59, 883.00/1-848.
2. Memorandum of Conversation between Shaikh IJasan al-Banna, 
Supreme Guide of Ikhwan al- MuslimUn and Philip W. Ireland, 
First Secretary of Embassy, Enclosure No. 1 to Dispatch 2979, 
ibid.
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The Soviet propaganda machine had launched a massive 
counterattack aiming to preserve recent Soviet achievements in the 
Arab world which were mainly due to its support of Egypt during 
the Security Council discussion of the Anglo-Egyptian dispute. On 
13 November Pravda published an article by Belokon entitled "The 
real and imaginary friends of the Arab people". Belokon said that 
the real threat to the Arabs' freedom came from the imperialist 
powers, the U.K. and the U.S.A. He emphasized the efforts made by 
the Soviet delegation at the U.N. to bring about a withdrawal of 
British troops from Arab territories. The Soviet Union was the 
only superpower to support the Arabs' legitimate demands.
Palestine had become an arena of bloody clashes and a hotbed of 
unrest in the Middle East as a result of British imperialist 
inability to follow a peaceful policy. Despite criticism and 
attacks from the Egyptian press, he wrote, the Soviet Union would 
adhere to its decision in favour of the partition of Palestine, 
which was regarded as a right and just solution of the problem^-.
Support for the partition plan by both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. 
paved the way to its success. On 29 November, it received the 
necessary two-thirds majority in the Assembly. As a result, both 
American and Soviet prestige was undermined throughout the Arab 
world. The implications from the American point of view were even
worse. U.S. policy towards Palestine, shaped by president Harry S.
2 . . .Truman , angered the Egyptian ruling circles and damaged solid
1. A. Belokon, "0 podlinnykh i mnimykh druz'iakh Arabskikh 
narodov", Pravda (Moscow), 13 November, 1947. See also 
commentary by Hassanov, Radio Moscow in Arabic, 31 October, 
1947, SWB, U.S.S.R., p. 20. Hassanov said in this connection 
that "it is stupid to believe that the Soviet representative's 
declaration at the U.N. can be regarded as a danger to the 
Eastern countries", tfassanov, "Egyptian Misrepresentation of 
Soviet Attitude to Palestine, 26 November, 1947, ibid, pp. 
21-22.
2. Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation; My Years in the State 
Department (New York: Norton, 1969), pp. 169-171. See also,
John Snetsinger, Truman, the Jewish Vote, and the Creation of
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American-Egyptian friendship. Furthermore, it led to hostile 
reactions in other Arab states^.
Despite the U .S .-U.S .S.R. agreement on key questions concerning 
Palestine and the Soviet allegation that "everybody was aware 
that the U.S.S.R. had neither material, nor any other interests in
o
Palestine" American intelligence reports concluded that the 
Soviet decision to support partition was derived from a wish to 
realize the following aims:
a. To secure early withdrawal of the British from Palestine;
b. To participate in the establishment of the Jewish and Arab 
states, thereafter, to create a situation sure to provoke 
conflict in Palestine and great unrest throughout the Arab 
world;
c. To take an active part in maintaining order in the country. 
Broadly speaking, the Soviet interests in the Middle East suffered 
less damage than the Americans'. While the Soviet Union also voted 
for partition and therefore incurred some of the blame, the 
original Soviet stand was in favour of a unified state in 
Palestine, if it was possible. Indeed, the Soviet Union accused
Israel (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1974). Alan Bullock, 
Ernest Bevin: Foreign Secretary, 1945-1951 (New York: Norton, 
1983), pp. 170-172. Zvi Ganin, Truman, American Jewry, and 
Israel, 1945-1948 (New York: 1979).
1. "Comment on Paper on Soviet Policy", by Henry S. Villard from 
the office of the Under Secretary of State, 5 December, 1947, 
in: Records of the Policy Planning Staff 1947-1953, box 23, 
National Archives, Washington D.C.; "Indications of Anti- 
American Bias in Egyptian Mail", Dispatch 97 from American 
Embassy, Cairo, 5 February, 1948, RG 59, 711.83/2-548. Barry 
Rubin, The Arab States and the Palestine Conflict (Syracuse: 
Syracuse University Press,1981), pp. 168-184.
2. Belinkov, "The Soviet attitude to Partition", 2 December, 1947, 
Radio Moscow in Turkish, SWB, USSR, p.28.
3. Central Intelligence Agency, "Review of the World Situation as 
it Relates to the Security of the U.S.", 14 November, 1947, in: 
U.S. Declassified Documents Reference System, U.S., 1977, 179B. 
Central Intelligence Agency, "The Consequences of the Partition 
of Palestine'1, 28 November, 1947, President's Secretary's 
Files, File Subject: Central Intelligence Reports-ORE 55, 1947, 
(No. 44-46, box 254), Truman Library.
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the British government of implementing a policy of "divide and 
rule", a policy that had made a unified state impossible and 
therefore left partition as the only just solution*. In an 
article entitled "The Arab East and the Palestine Question" Nev 
Times attempted to indicate the consistency of Soviet policy 
regarding the solution of the Palestine problem. It asserted that, 
although Soviet representatives in the U.N. had affirmed the 
advantages of the minority recommendations for a single state, 
they considered the proposals for division the only course 
possible under existing conditions and had only one purpose, 
namely, to hand Palestine over to the peoples inhabiting it. Nev 
Times accused "British propaganda" of working on Arab fears of 
isolation. It promised the Arabs the support of the anti- 
imperialist camp .
Attempts to justify the Soviets' stand on the partition resolution 
were made by the Egyptian pro-Communist weekly, Al-JamahTr. It 
pictured the U.S.S.R. as a friend of the Arab and Islamic nations. 
The Soviet Union supported Egypt at the Security Council: "Gromyko 
stood up and shouted at the top of his voice that the Soviet Union 
would never accept a decision which did not secure the 
unconditional evacuation of the Nile Valley". The first Soviet 
proposal in May 1947 called for the formation of a democratic 
independent federal union in Palestine. This proposal was rejected 
by the "Arab fascists" with remarks about future "bloody battles" 
and kicking the Jews out of Palestine. By doing so, they paved the 
way for the partition plan to become the only acceptable
1. Commentary by Hassanov, Radio Moscow in Arabic, 11 December 
1947, SWB, USSR, pp. 23-24.
2. Interpretative Report on Soviet Foreign Policy based on the 
Press for November 1947, prepared by the American Embassy, 
Moscow, 23 December, 1947, W.N.R.C., RG 84, Cairo Embassy- 
General Documents, File Subject-1947: 800, box 167.
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solution^.
In the period between 30 November 1947 and 14 May 1948 Soviet
efforts were mainly focused on preventing attempts to postpone
implementation of the resolution of November 29. The U.S.S.R.
acted so that the partition plan would be implemented according to
the U.N. Assembly resolution. The Soviet Union was satisfied that
U.S. influence and prestige in the Arab world had fallen to a low
ebb as a result of its support for partition. The unfavourable
political conditions for the western powers in the Arab world were
largely used by Soviet propaganda which encouraged and supported
this tendency. Soviet propaganda tended to attack both British and
o
U.S. policies in the Middle East . The Soviet press claimed that 
the strife in Palestine was undoubtedly the direct result of 25 
years of British trusteeship and of the policy of "divide and 
rule". The British attitude to the future of Palestine as 
reflected in its position in the U.N. General Assembly, was 
evasive and ambiguous. The British press had not only made the 
gloomiest possible forecasts for the future of the Middle East, 
but had actually prompted Arab reactionaries to follow a certain 
policy should the Assembly decide on partition. By instigating the 
Arabs against the Jews it had in fact been trying to demonstrate 
that it was impossible to implement the U.N. decision in a 
peaceful manner .
Since the very beginning of 1948, owing to an escalation of 
violence between Jews and Arabs, a process of re-examination of 
U.S. policy towards Palestine had taken place. The suggestion by
1. Airgram 623 from American Embassy, Cairo, 10 December, 1947,
RG 59, 883.00/12-1047.
2. Papers of Harry S. Truman, Naval Aide Files, 26 January, 1948, 
File Subject: State Dept. Briefs, January-April 1948, box 21.
3. M. Alekseev/ "Podozritel'naia voznia vokrug Palestinskoii 
problemy", Trud (Moscow), 7 January, 1948. S. Belinkov,
"Intrigi imperialismov na Arabskom Vastoke", Izvestiia, 
(Moscow), 23 January, 1948.
-110-
the Department of State for a provisional trusteeship intending to 
postpone the implementation of partition was supported by 
President Truman. The plan was to transfer discussion of the 
Palestine question from the Security Council to the Trusteeship 
Council. But this was boycotted by the Soviet Union^. In the 
period between 30 March to 14 May 1948, the U.S. acted with 
determination in the Security Council to prevent the resolution of 
29 November from being implemented. However, the U.S.S.R. did all 
in its power to prevent the partition resolution from being 
altered. The U.S. change of policy over the partition provoked 
critical comments from Soviet representatives in the U.N. On April 
20, in a statement before the first committee of the U.N. General 
Assembly, Gromyko expressed concern that partition had not been 
implemented in Palestine. Gromyko blamed the inaction on the U.S., 
the U.K., and certain other states, and noted that the U.S. now 
preferred to revise the General Assembly recommendation rather 
than implement it. The Soviet Union, said Gromyko, felt that the
trusteeship proposed by the U.S. would lead to further fighting
? . . . .and would create a threat to peace . The Soviet Union criticised
also the Arab League because of its stand concerning the future of 
Palestine. The Arab League aggravated the situation, said Radio 
Tashkent, instead of helping towards a peaceful settlement of the 
question and reconciling hostile religious and political groups in 
Palestine. The Arab leaders preferred to act on the orders of the 
British Government, "recruiting volunteers for the so-called 
'Sacred Arab Army', equipped with British armoured cars and U.S. 
aircraft which was to enter Palestine for the alleged defence of
1. Ro'i, ibid, pp. 118, 135.
2. United Nations, Official Records, Second Special Session of the
General Assembly, Main Committees, in: Papers of Harry N. 
Howard, File Subject: Middle East Chronological File
(Folder 1), 1948, box 13.
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Palestine Arabs". The League defended the interests of U.S.
imperialism and supported American plans aimed at the enslavement
of the countries of the Near East^. The actions of*Abdallah, the
king of Transjordan and reactionary Arab leaders against Palestine,
said Pravda, were a component of the general Anglo-American plan
for the solution of the Palestine problem. The existence of such
a plan had become apparent as soon as the U.S. changed its
attitude towards the Palestine question. The Palestine Trusteeship
plan, said Pravda, was a deliberate reversal and intended to
establish "the selfish interests of U.S. oil monopolies". The
actions in Palestine of the reactionary Arab leaders were designed
to assist the realization of Anglo-American economic plans and to
create a fictitious Arab sovereignty which the United States and
o
Britain would recognize de jure .
As far as the Arab Communist Parties were concerned, the Soviet 
policy towards Palestine put them in an awkward dilemma. On the 
one hand, the vast majority of Arab political groups and the 
popular feelings were against partition and such support implied 
swimming against the current. On the other hand, they were 
bound to the line dictated by Moscow. Officially, the Communist 
parties expressed their support of partition, yet, their 
decision to do so was not universally accepted by all of the 
members. Soon after the outbreak of the Palestine war, these 
parties were significantly weakened as a result of domestic 
quarrels and persecution by their respective governments .
1. Commentary by Nasredinnov, Radio Tashkent, 26 March, 1948, SWB, 
USSR, p. 30.
2. M. Marinin, "Chto skryvaetsia za krizisom v Palestine", Pravda 
(Moscow), 4 May, 1948.
3. On the Egyptian Communists attitude towards Palestine see,
Selma Botman, The Rise of Egyptian Communism, pp. 86-91.
Heikal, Sphinx and Commissar, pp. 48-50. On the Palestine 
Communist Party response to partition, see, Musa Budeiri,
The Palestine Communist Party, pp. 231-242, 264-267.
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However, the establishment of the State of Israel on 14 May was 
an important victory for the Soviet Union in the international 
arena. Consistent Soviet support for the partition plan 
had proved to be, in the short term, a wise step compared 
with the inconsistent stand taken by the U.S.A. The policies 
of the two powers, from the Arab point of view were about 
the same. Up to the partition resolution on 29 November 1947, the 
Soviets could be claimed as the supporters of the unworkable idea 
of establishing a single state in Palestine, a plan which was 
widely approved by the Arabs, while the U.S. supported partition 
as the only practicable solution. From March 1948, the new U.S. 
policy towards Palestine was intended to appease Arab anger 
created by its previous policy. At this time the U.S.S.R. acted 
against Arab interests concerning Palestine. Nevertheless, the 
Soviet stand did not bring about to a deep rift in its relations 
with the Egyptian leadership. Determined to express his gratitude 
for the help the Soviet Union had given Egypt in the U.N.,
NuqrashT Pasha refused to follow Prince Muhammad fAli's advice to 
sever relations with the Soviet Union and its satellites*.
The violent clashes between Jews and Arabs in Palestine reached 
their climax when the Arab countries declared war in May 1948. 
During the war, the Soviet Union and its satellites supported the 
Jews in every way in their struggle for survival. According to 
Professor Ro'i, the military aid which the Soviet bloc extended to 
Israel, was a major factor in enabling the Jews to gain important 
military victories; it was also a significant factor in the 
promotion of Soviet political and strategic ambitions in the Arab
1. Record of conversation between R. L. Buell, American Consul
General, Alexandria, and Prince Muhammad <AlT, 25 May, 1948, RG 
59, 883.00/3-2548. On the King Faruq's anti-Soviet approach, 
owing to Soviet support of Israel, see, Telegram 1487 from 
Campbell, Cairo, 29 October 1948, F0371/69177, J7016.
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World. To quote him, "The desire that the British be expelled from 
Palestine and their position in the entire region weakened 
justified the unusual step of exceeding the bounds of purely 
political backing in the international arena as well as the 
political risks involved in strengthening Israel's fighting 
potential both with personnel and arms supplies"*. At the very 
beginning of the war, the Soviet Union justified its support of 
Israel by claiming that the State of Israel had been proclaimed in 
accordance with the resolution passed by the U.N. and they 
therefore recognized its establishment. As to the Arabs, the 
Soviet mentioned frequently that they had defended and would 
continue to defend the independence of the Arab states and 
peoples. The Arab war against the new young Jewish State was not 
intended to protect Arab national interests or their independence, 
but was against the rights of the Jews to create their own 
independent state^. Nevertheless, there was much (of? evidence to 
indicate that arms shipments from the Soviet bloc had been made to 
Egypt and other Arab states. On 24 February 1948, it was reported 
by the British Foreign Office that an Egyptian military mission 
had visited Prague. The Egyptian mission conducted with the 
approval of the Czech Government, negotiations with individual 
Czech firms, on the following linesJ:
a. The Egyptian Government wished to purchase a considerable
1. Ro'i, ibid, pp. 159-160.
2. "K Sobytiiam v Palestine", Pravda (Moscow), 29 May, 1948.
3. Letter No. 126/19/48 from Campbell, 18 March 1948, F0371/
69200, J2003/46/16. Secret letter from F.O. to British Embassy, 
Cairo, 19 April 1948, ibid. Minute by R. Johnes from the 
Egyptian Department in the F.O., 7 May 1948, ibid, J3064/46/16. 
Secret letter No. 126/33/48 from British Embassy,' Cairo, 3 May
.1948, ibid. See also report of the C.I.A. entitled, "Probable 
Effects on Israel and the Arab States of a U.N. Arms Embargo",
5 August 1948, President's Secretary's Files, File Subject: 
Central Intelligence Reports- ORE 48-48, box 255, Truman 
Library. C.I.A. report entitled, "Possible Developments from the 
Palestine Truce" 27 July 1948, in: U.S. Declassified Documents
Reference System, U.S., 1975, 4F. Later on, in July 1951, a
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quantity of certain 7.92 mm rifles and the corresponding small 
arms ammunition;
b. A Czech firm offered to establish in Egypt both a small arms 
factory and a small arms ammunition factory;
c. Payment was to be half in cotton and half in sterling.
Indeed, it was more than a coincidence that on 3 March 1948,
Egypt signed barter agreement with the Soviet Union to exchange
38.000 tons Egyptian cotton for 216,000 tons Soviet wheat and
19.000 tons corns cereals*.
FuJad Hafi^, the Egyptian Director of Military Intelligence 
confirmed that an Egyptian military mission had held talks in 
Czechoslovakia. He stated, that if the western powers would be 
unable to supply the Egyptian Government with arms and the 
necessary factories, Egypt would definitely purchase arms from
o
Czechoslovakia .
Vigorous measures were taken by the Soviet Union to put an end 
to the Palestine war. These were mainly in debates and meetings in
the Security Council. During the second half of May, the Security
Council sessions dealt mainly with the Palestine issue. On 15 May
British military report confirmed that the Egyptian armament 
industry manufactured, under license, the Zlin 381, a Czech 
light transfer aircraft. The Zlin 381 was described by the 
British as a light trainer which could not be used as a combat 
aircraft. See, Draft Memorandum from N.K. Reeve, Ministry of 
Defence, to R.C. Mackworth-Young, F.O., 3 July 1951, F0371/ 
90174, JE1192/26G. On arms shipments from Czechoslovakia to 
Syria in the end of 1947, see, Pinhas Vazeh, Hamesimah-Rekesh 
(The Mission-Arms Acquisition), (Tel-Aviv: Ma'arkot, 1966), 
pp. 153-157. Vazeh said that towards the end of 1947, a Syrian 
military mission purchased from Czechoslovakia 8,000 rifles and 
6,000,000 cartridges. According to him, the arms was to be 
given to Arab units who were due to take part in the invasion 
to Palestine.
1-. Telegram 304 from Campbell, Cairo, 4 March 1948, F0371/
69249, J1542/1246/16. Telegram 228 from American Embassy,
Cairo, 4 March 1948, RG 59, 661.8331/3-448.
2. Letter No. 126/33/48, ibid. The U.S.A. and Britain had first
suspended arms shipments to the Middle East in late 1947 pending 
resolution on the Palestine situation. When war broke up in May 
1948, both powers wished to avoid an arms race in the area.
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in his reply to an Egyptian statement that the intervention in 
Palestine was designed solely to restore order and security 
in that country, Vasilii Tarasenko, the Ukrainian delegate, 
said that, "according to the rules of the international community, 
each Government has the right to restore order only in its own 
country"*. On 20 May, he said that the existence of the State of 
Israel was a reality. Israel had the right to defend its territory. 
None of the Arab States whose troops had entered Palestine, 
stressed Tarasenko, could claim that Palestine formed part of its 
territory. A day later, Gromyko declared: "The U.S.S.R. delegation 
cannot but express surprise at the position adopted by the Arab 
States in the Palestine question, and particularly at the fact 
that those states...have resorted to such action as sending their 
troops into Palestine and carrying out military operations aimed 
at the suppression of the national liberation movement in 
Palestine . Later on, on 27 May, Gromyko submitted a proposal to 
the U.N. Security Council for a cease-fire in Palestine within 36 
hours. At the same time, the U.K. representative submitted a 
draft resolution calling for a cease-fire, calling upon the 
parties to refrain from introducing fighting personnel or men of 
military age into Palestine during the cease-fire period, and 
instructing the U.N. Mediator, Count Folke Bernadotte , and the 
Truce Commission to supervise observance of the cease-fire^.
On 28 May, the U.S.A. supported the Soviet proposal; nevertheless, 
on 29 May, the Security Council rejected the Soviet proposal 
and adopted the British proposal, which was condemned by
1. Ro'i, ibid, pp. 235-236.
2. See excerpts from statements of the representatives of the 
U.S.S.R. in the Security Council in 1948, in, ISA, FM2475/7.
3. Count Folke Bernadotte was appointed U.N. mediator on 20 May
1948.
4. Papers of Harry N. Howard, 27 May 1948, File Subject: Middle 
East Chronological File (Folder 1), 1948, box 13.
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Gromyko1 . The Arab representatives denounced the Soviet proposal 
and criticised the ambivalent policy of the Soviet Union towards 
the Arab world. The Syrian delegate, Faris al-KhUrT was quoted as 
saying^:
"We have always appreciated the Soviet stand on Egypt, Syria 
and Lebanon, but over Palestine, the Soviet Union is adopting 
an opposite position. There the U.S.S.R. is supporting 
precisely the uninvited guests trying to give them more rights 
than to the owners of the country...From these facts we can 
conclude that the Soviet stand in the other instances did not 
result from sympathy for the Arabs but perhaps from hatred of 
the guests...its stand was not designed to protect weak 
peoples but to lessen the authority of its opponents. Such a 
motive will of course lessen our gratitude"
The Soviet press responded to Arab attacks by defending Soviet
reasons for supporting Israel. New Times noted that the invasion
of Palestine had been by Arab troops financed, armed and trained
by Britain. Therefore, Soviet proposals in the U.N. were being so
"consistently opposed" to Arab reactionary interests. The Arab
countries were "not fighting in defence of national interests or
for their independence". Quite the contrary, the State of Israel
was the one defending its national freedom owing to Arab
3aggression .
In an attempt to implement the U.N. resolution of 29 May, 
Bernadotte asked the U.S.S.R, the U.S.A. and the U.K. whether they 
could supply him with observers. The idea of sending British 
observers was rejected by both the State of Israel and the
U.S.S.R.; they considered the U.K. as a party to the Palestine
4war .
The question of the nature of the observers had been a subject 
to a considerable disagreements between the powers. On 7 June, 
Gromyko declared before the U.N. Security Council that the Soviet
1. Ibid, 28 May 1948. See also Ro'i, ibid, pp. 237-238.
2. Ro'i, ibid, p. 239.
3. Tass for abroad, 9 June, 1948, SWB, USSR, pp. 17-18.
Radio Moscow in Arabic, 10 June, 1948, ibid, p.18.
4. Ro'i, ibid, p. 240.
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Union was prepared to send observers to Palestine to fulfil the 
functions provided for in the Security Council resolution of 29 
May. During the discussion, Faris al-KhurT, the President of the 
Security Council, declared his understanding that Bernadotte had 
applied a certain number of military observers from the states 
which were members of the Truce Commission; the U.S.A, French
and Belgian* representatives confirmed this statement. Gromyko
2objected to this and said :
"If the governments of some countries consider that the mere 
fact of the U.S.A., France and Belgium being members of the 
Truce Commission had already determined in advance that these 
countries are to send their military observers to Palestine, 
we can not agree to that view. The question arises: why is it 
that these countries would alone send or would be the ones 
permitted to send military observers?"
The Soviet attempt to challenge the Security Council formula and 
allow the U.S.S.R. also to send military observers failed.
The Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs of the State 
Department argued that Gromyko's statement of 7 June would be 
directly contrary to United States interests in the area . The 
Department of State agreed with the Joint Chiefs of Staff's view 
concerning the dispatch of Soviet observers to Palestine^. They 
also rejected any involvement of U.S. forces in maintaining 
peace in Palestine. The Joint Chiefs of Staff summarized their 
position as follows:
"It would be incompatible with the security interests of 
the United States to have either United States or Soviet
1. The three countries were members in the Truce Commission.
2. Papers of Harry N. Howard, 7 June, 1948, File Subject: Middle 
East Chronological File (Folder 1), 1948, box 13, Truman 
Library.
3. Office Memorandum from Kopper, Office of Near Eastern and 
African Affairs of the State Dept. (NEA) to Merriam, Division 
of Near Eastern Affairs at NEA (NE), 8 June, 1948, Records of 
Policy Planning Staff, box 30, National Archives.
4. This subject was raised up again in the Security Council on 15 
July, 1948. ’See Ro'i, ibid, p.247.
5. A Report to the National Security Council by the Secretary of 
State, 3 September, 1948, President's Secretary's Files, File
Subject: N.S.C. Meeting No. 19, box 204, Truman Library.
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satellite forces introduced into Palestine. They therefore 
recommend that the United States policy neither endorse nor 
permit a decision by the United Nations to employ military 
enforcement measures in Palestine".
Earlier, on 19 August, the Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded that
the entry of Soviet forces into Palestine would have the most
far-reaching strategic implications in that the Soviets "would
then be entitled to land or sea lines of communication, either of
which would entail the very serious consequence of Soviet entry
into other Middle East areas". The extent of Soviet forces would
be unlimited, because it would be impossible to rule it.
Therefore, the way would be paved for Soviet military domination
in the Middle East'*'.
The Soviet demand to send military observers to Palestine, and 
by doing so, to gain a foothold in the Middle East, was never 
realized. Up to the end of the war, they continued to support 
Israel and looked forward to its crushing victory over the Arabs. 
There were several reasons why the Soviet Union decided to support 
the State of Israel in its formative stage. Soviet interest 
had mainly been in increasing their influence and the creation 
of new favourable conditions in the Middle East which would bring 
about a drastic change. That is to say, the establishment of a new 
order in an area which was under the domination of western powers 
whose leaders were anti-Communist and who were an obstacle to any 
possible rapprochement from the Soviet point of view, even when it 
supported Arab national aspirations in the international scene.
The change in the Soviet position concerning the creation of a 
single state in Palestine, presumably, derived among other things, 
from the ingratitude of Arab countries like Egypt, Syria and 
Lebanon who applied to the U.N. with a demand to liberate their 
countries from’foreign troops, fully supported by the Soviet Union
1. Ibid, 23 August, 1948.
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and its satellites; Despite Soviet support, these countries
continued to suspect Soviet motives and emphasized their dislike
of Soviet Communism, preferring cooperation with western powers.
Soon after the Egyptian case was discussed in the Security
Council, the Soviet Union changed its stand concerning Palestine
and supported the establishment of Jewish and Arab states. The
Soviets believed that their support for the Jewish State in its
infancy would increase their influence and eventually lead to
Soviet domination in a strategic area while the policies of the
western powers, particularly Britain, were more or less in favour
of Arab interests. Holding Palestine would enable the extension of
Soviet domination in the rest of the Middle East by promoting
instability and insecurity* throughout the neighbouring
Arab countries. This plan was not crowned with success mainly
because of the development of political events in the young
Jewish State. Soon after the war, Israel demonstrated its neutral
and independent policy in the inter-bloc struggle. This policy did
?not fall m  line with Soviet interests . The Soviet Union's
1. C.I.A. Report entitled, "Possible Developments from the 
Palestine Truce", 27 July, 1948, in: U.S. Declassified 
Documents Reference System, U.S., 1975, 4F. See also C.I.A. 
Report, "Probable Effects on Israel and the Arab States of
a U.N. Arms Embargo", 5 August, 1948, President's Secretary's 
Files, File Subject: Central Intelligence Reports O.R.E. 1948, 
No. 48-48, box 255. See also "Monthly Review of Soviet 
Tactics", prepared by British Foreign Office, 6 February, 1948, 
F0371/71648, N1509/31/38. Dispatch 204 from American Legation, 
Jidda, 19 August 1948, RG 84, Cairo Embassy-General Records, 
File No. 800 (1948), Box 187.
2. See letter 4349/4114/Z/l from Israel Foreign Ministry to Golda 
Meyerson, the Israeli Minister to Moscow, 26 January 1949,
I.S.A., FM2513/13. Report on "The world politics and Israel" 
by A. Levavi (First Secretary of IsraelLegation in Moscow), 6 
June, 1949, I.S.A., FM2514/15. See also Record of conversation 
between Necas, the Consul General of Czechoslovakia in
. Jerusalem and Mikhail Mukhin from the Soviet Legation in 
Tel-Aviv, on the policies of Israel and the Arab States, 11 
July, 1949, I.S.A., FM2457/14. Letter from Gideon Refael,
Israel delegate to the U.N. on his conversation with Tsarapkin, 
Soviet representative to the U.N., 13 December, 1949, I.S.A., 
FM2513/14. "Monthly Review of Soviet Tactics", ibid, 16
December, 1948, F0371/71653, N12985/31/G.
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conclusion about Palestine was that the way to achieve domination 
in the Middle East would be not through Israel but through Arab 
countries, mainly Egypt. Therefore, a significant change in their 
policy concerning the Arab-Israeli conflict took place. With the 
ending of the war in Palestine, the pendulum of support had swung 
back to the Arab side.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE SOVIET RESPONSE TO WESTERN ATTEMPTS TO PERSUADE EGYPT 
AND OTHER MIDDLE EASTERN COUNTRIES TO FORM A MIDDLE EAST 
DEFENCE ORGANIZATION, 1947-1952.____________________________
A. The Crystallization of U.S. Containment Policy and its 
Extension to the Middle East_____________________________
The end of the Second World War was also the beginning of a new 
war- the cold war. This war was being conducted between the two 
primary powers, the United States, the new leader of the western 
world, and the Soviet Union, the leader of the Eastern bloc. Each 
side intended to increase its influence and domination in areas 
which were not fully identified with one of the two camps.
One of these areas was the Middle East. The prominent change in 
Soviet policy towards the Middle East related mainly to Greece, 
Turkey and Iran; countries which constituted the northern tier of 
the Middle East.
After the end of the war, the Soviets had been involved by 
exerting pressure on their Iranian and Turkish neighbours, and by 
supporting the Communist-instigated civil war in Greece. In 1945, 
they terminated their twenty-year treaty with Turkey and demanded 
territory on Turkey's eastern border, and participation in the 
defence of the Turkish straits. In the meantime, they sought 
to create a "Democratic National Autonomous Government" in 
Azerbaijan in northwest Iran as well as in Kurdistan. To prevent a 
communist take over in these countries, the U.S.A. agreed to a 
British appeal on 24 February 1947, to undertake the financial and 
military burden of Western aid to Greece and Turkey, hitherto a 
British responsibility. The new American policy concerning that 
part of the world aimed to strengthen and stabilize - the existing 
regimes, to stop the spread of Communism and Soviet influence, and 
to protect American major economic interests in the Middle East, 
especially, the development and exploitation of petroleum
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resources. This new policy was known as the Truman Doctrine.
The Truman Doctrine, announced on 12 March 1947, acknowledged for 
the first time, that the United States had to be actively involved 
as a Middle Eastern power, as the senior representative of 
Western interests in the northern periphery of the Middle East^. 
The Department of State assessed that the security of the 
whole Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East would be jeopardized 
if the U.S.S.R. were to obtain control over any of the above
O
countries . American and British policy-makers concluded 
that the Middle East, in its entirety, was no longer secure from 
Soviet penetration. Of all the Arab states, Egypt was likely to be 
the one with the most strategic importance from the Western Powers 
viewpoint. To quote a C.I.A. report^:
"Egypt should normally be considered along with the Arab 
states, for much of its significance arises from the strategic 
importance of these states and Egypt's influential position 
among them. Geographically, however, it is important to the 
defence of the Eastern Mediterranean. It has the advantage, 
defensively, of being separated from potentially hostile areas 
of Europe by sea and land barriers. Offensively, Egypt is a 
potential base for operations to counteract threats from the 
north against the Suez Canal area or the oil-rich lands of the
1. Nadav Safran, From War to War (New York: 1969), pp. 92-100. 
Ro'i, From Encroachment to Involvement, pp. 66-67. Walter 
Laqueur, The Soviet Union and the Middle East, 136-137, 191. 
George McGhee, Envoy to the Middle World (New York: Harper & 
Row, 1983), pp. 18-20. Bernard Lewis, "The United States Turkey 
and Iran", in: H. Shaked and I. Rabinovich (eds.), The Middle 
East and the United States (New Jersey: 1980), pp. 165-180. On 
the historical evolution of United States policy in the Middle 
East after 1945, see Elie Kedourie, "The Transition from a 
British to an American Era in the Middle East", in: ibid, pp. 
3-9. On the American and British economic interests in the 
Middle East, see, FRUS 1947, Vol. V, pp. 551-558.
2. Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State, Washington, 
undated, FRUS 1947, Vol. V, pp. 575-576.
3. On the strategic importance of the Middle East to Britain after 
the second world war see, John Marlowe, Modern Egypt and Anglo 
Egyptian Relations 1800-1952, 2nd ed. (London: 1958), p. 321. 
John Campbell, Defence of the Middle East-Problems of American 
Policy (New York: 1958), pp. 5, 15-16. John Badeau, The 
American Approach to the Arab World (New York: 1968), pp.17-22.
4. C.I.A., The’Current Situation in Egypt", 16 October 1947, 
President's Secretary's Files, File Subject: Central 
Intelligence Reports, O.R.E. 1947, No. 54, box 254, Truman
Library.
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Middle East. Having been a supply base in two World Wars,
Egypt also has housing, air, and transportation facilities 
which would be valuable factor for any modern military force 
entering the area".
The Americans and the British were aware of the fact that the 
economic situation in Egypt and many of the Middle Eastern 
countries was certainly not healthy. By the end of 1947, both 
estimated that if some economic and social reforms were not made 
and if the low standard of living was allowed to continue, a 
fertile field would be provided for the spread of communism and 
later on, for Soviet penetration^-.
American policy aimed therefore to take the appropriate measures 
to promote the political and economic development of the peoples 
of the Middle East. The Americans stressed that if the obvious 
Soviet expansionist aspirations in the Middle East would be 
realized it would have a disastrous outcome not only for American 
interests in the area but for the general American position 
vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. It was therefore essential that Soviet 
expansion in the Middle East should be contained . The Americans 
believed that Britain should continue to maintain primary 
responsibility for military security. It was made clear by the 
Americans that, for reasons of regional security and stability, it 
would be necessary for British troops to remain in the area. The 
American position concerning the future of British troops in the 
Canal zone was as follows:
1. C.I.A. No. 54, ibid. On the British view see, Memorandum from 
Bevin, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to 
Marshall, the American Secretary of State (Moscow, undated), 
FRUS 1947, Vol. V, pp. 503-505.
2. Memorandum prepared by the Dept, of State, entitled, "The 
British and American positions" (Washington, undated), ibid, 
pp. 513-514. The American Joint Chiefs of Staff considered 
that in case of war with the Soviet Union, the latter would 
attach much significance to oil production and resources of the 
Middle East*and to the Suez Canal area. See Memorandum for the 
Secretary of State by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, undated,
C.C.S 600.6 Middle East (1-26-48) 5.1, National Archives,
Washington.
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"Since under conditions of modern warfare troops in the Suez 
Canal area can no longer be considered to constitute an 
adequate defence of the Canal, since their evacuation is 
ardently desired by the Egyptians and since their continued 
presence might prove to be a liability rather than an asset 
from the point of view of possible Russian aggression, we hope 
they can be removed elsewhere in the area at an early 
date"1 .
Nevertheless, the Americans stressed that pressure on Britain to 
evacuate its troops from Egypt, without having an adequate
2alternative base, would not be m  line with American interests .
To review and coordinate their policies in the Middle East and 
Mediterranean area, official representatives of the United Kingdom 
and the United States held talks in Washington from 16 October 
to 7 November 1947. During the course of the conversations, both 
sides agreed that the security of the Eastern Mediterranean and of 
the Middle East was vital to the security of the United States and 
of the United Kingdom. This objective, it was said, could be 
implemented only if Britain maintained its strong strategic, 
political and economic position in the region. It was emphasized 
by both parties, that in order to protect their joint interests in 
the area, they should respond firmly to any Soviet endeavours to
q
spread or deepen its influence . On 4 December 1947, Marshall 
and Bevin held talks in London. The question of the Washington 
Middle East discussions came up. Both Secretaries confirmed that 
the American President and the British government had endorsed the
1. Memorandum prepared by the Department of State, entitled, 
"Specific Current Questions" (Washington, undated), ibid, pp. 
521-522.
2. Ibid. See also footnote no. 3.
3. The American group was headed by R.A. Lovett, Under Secretary 
of State, and included among others, L.W. Henderson, Director, 
Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, J.D. Hickerson, 
Director, Office of European Affairs. The British Group was 
headed by Lord Inverchapel, the British Ambassador to 
Washington, and included among others, M.R. Wright, Assistant 
Under Secretary of State, Foreign Office, London. On the 
subjects which were under discussions, see, FRUS 1947, Vol. V, 
pp.563-626. Public Record Office, CAB134/500, M.E.(0)(47) 4th 
Meeting. F0371/68041.
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principal recommendations put forward by respective participants
in the conversations. They also agreed that the Soviet Union
should be informed that the Middle East was an area vital to
British and American interests, but without revealing the
substance of their discussions*.
We do not know whether the Soviet Union was informed of the
Anglo-American dialogue or not. However, by the end of 1947, the
Soviet press started to attack the activity of the Western powers.
It was claimed by the Soviets that Britain and the United States
had been working on a plan to form "a Near Eastern bloc". Of all
the Middle Eastern countries, most attention was given to Turkey.
Turkey's foreign policy, it said, was dictated by its "Foreign
Masters". Turkey had made active efforts to persuade the Arab
states to form an Eastern bloc with the participation of Iran and 
9
Greece .
Considerable efforts to protect British interests in Egypt and 
to persuade the Egyptian government of the necessity to reach an 
acceptable solution for the extended conflict, were made by the 
British government throughout 1948. The fears of Soviet 
penetration into Egypt and the Middle East continued to engage the 
shapers and makers of Middle Eastern policy in Britain and the 
U.S. Britain was willing not to be physically present in this area 
but asked for certain promises of re-entry in an emergency and the 
acceptance of its supervision and advice concerning the 
maintenance of military facilities .
1. Top secret letter No. 6, from P.J. Dixon (the private secretary 
of Bevin) to Secretary of State, Prime Minister, Minister of 
Defence, M. Wright, 4 December, 1947, F0371/68041, AN/45/45G. 
FRUS 1947, pp. 624-626.
2. "Turkish Warmongers and the Formation of a Near Eastern Bloc",
10 November 1947, Radio Moscow in Persian, SWB, USSR, pp. 16-17. 
"U.S. Domination in Turkey", 11 November 1947, Radio Moscow in 
Turkish, SWB, ibid, p. 17. B. Krymskii, "Komu nuzhen
'Blizhnevostochnyii Blok'", Pravda(Moscow), 19 July 1948.
3. See letter from Alexander, Ministry of Defence to Bevin, 14
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The Egyptian position as outlined by Nuqrashi Pasha, the Prime 
Minister, rejected the British proposals of linking together the 
question of evacuation and measures required for the defence of 
Egypt. Nuqrashi called for unconditional withdrawal which was the 
universal wish and desire of the Egyptian people. To allay 
Western powers' fears of communist infiltration in Egypt, Nuqrashi 
said that the policy of the Egyptian government and the sentiments 
of the people were anti-communist. "The government and the people 
knew which side they must choose and had made their choice. They 
knew they must see to their defence in conjunction with of the 
western democracies, and they would do so". He also said that the 
anti-communist campaign would reach its climax when British troops 
withdrew from Egypt. Nuqrashi stressed that British troops 
remaining in Egypt was used as an argument by communists in order 
to attract public opinion and to weaken position of the 
government. Favourable conditions for the spread of communism and 
communist influence could thus be created, said Nuqrashi*.
Nuqrashi Pasha kept to this position until his assassination at 
the end of 1948, even when pressed by King Faruq to take a 
moderate approach in the Anglo-Egyptian dispute. The king 
instructed Nuqrashi to accept the principles of siding with the 
West in case of need and to seek agreement on the requirements of 
defence on a technical basis at a technical level. Nuqr'Sshl's 
position was that he would not agree to any conversations except
January 1948, F0371/69173, J735/G; "Chiefs of Staff 
Committee-Egypt Military Requirements", 20 November 1947, ibid, 
C .0.S .(47) 238(0).
1. Telegram 242A from Campbell, Cairo, 20 February 1948, ibid, 
J1263. Another pro-western statement was given by Khashaba 
Pasha the Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs on 25 February 
1948, during his conversation with Campbell; see, Telegram 34 




Increasing attention was paid by the Soviet press to Anglo- 
American activity in the Middle East during 1948. It claimed that 
an Eastern Military bloc to include Turkey, Greece and the Arab 
countries, was being planned under Anglo-American sponsorship.
Both powers aimed to conclude a new treaty with Egypt and to form 
a strong bridgehead in Egypt for attack on the U.S.S.R. The Soviet
press attacked Arab and Egyptian ruling circles. It accused them
of supporting actively the endeavours of western powers for 
deepening their political and economic penetration. The statements 
by Egyptian statesmen that Egypt's interests lay with the western 
powers arose from the fact that they occupied important posts in 
various trading companies which were British. King Faruq, said 
Tass, had expressed a desire that the Anglo-Egyptian defence 
measures should be converted into "a collective instrument
o
comprising all members of the Arab League" .
A series of steps taken by the Soviet Union in the Middle East
by the beginning of 1949, were considered by the western powers as
Soviet endeavours to further its political interests in the area. 
These steps led to increasing fears of Soviet offensive intentions 
in the area.
According to reliable information given in March 1949, the 
Polish Minister in Cairo received a top secret telegram from the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Warsaw warning him, and asking him
1. See record of conversation between King Faruq and Campbell, 
in Telegram 1484 from Campbell, Cairo, 28 October 1948, 
F0371/69194, J7002. Telegram 1485, ibid, 29 October 1948, ibid, 
J7008. Telegram 1571, ibid, 15 November 1948, F0371/69195, 
J7320/G.
2. M. Melekhov, "Arabskaia Liga i nezavisimost Arabskikh stran", 
Pravda(Moscow), 24 March 1948. S. Topolev, "American 
Monopolies In Egypt", New Times, 7 July 1948. "Egypt as a 
bridgehead for attack on the U.S.S.R.", Radio Moscow In Arabic, 
21 December 1948, SWB, USSR, p.22. "The Anglo-Egyptian 
Negotiations", Tass in Russian, 15 December 1948, ibid, pp. 
15-16. Radio Moscow in Arabic, 12 November 1948, ibid, p. 27.
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to warn his staff, to be prepared for any emergency. It was said 
that recent shifts in the Soviet political high command should be 
regarded as signifying an increase and not a lessening of tension 
in the world^.
At the same time, considerable efforts were made by the U.S.S.R.
and East European countries to establish civil aviation
connections with Egypt. British and American policy makers
concluded that such attempts, made by the Soviet Government
in various strategic areas in the world, were intended to extend
o
Soviet influence*1:
"The two Governments have been keeping close watch on attempts 
by the the Soviet Government to extend their influence by the 
establishment or expansion in certain areas of the world 
of semi-government Soviet agencies which, under the cover of 
official or commercial functions, carry on subversive 
propaganda and espionage. The establishment of Soviet or 
Soviet controlled services to these areas, apart from being in 
itself a means for the exertion of this influence, renders the 
working of such agencies more effective by providing rapid and 
easy communication between them and the Soviet Union. One of 
the areas to which particular attention has been paid in this 
respect was the Middle East".
Soviet efforts were not met with success. The Egyptian 
Government was not prepared to grant the requested rights .
The Anglo-American understanding on key issues encouraged 
Britain to consolidate a framework of cooperation in Middle 
Eastern affairs to include the U.S.A. and France. Thereafter, 
attempts were made by Britain in 1949-1950, to crystallize a 
coordinated policy with these powers^.
1. Top Secret letter No. 134/6/49 from British Embassy, Cairo, 14 
March 1949, Public Record Office, F0141/1345. A C.I.A. report 
considered that since the North Atlantic Pact (signed in April 
1949) was the most definitive effort the U.S. had made to 
counter Soviet policy, "a strong Soviet-Communist reaction is 
already under way". See C.I.A., "Review of the World 
Situation", 16 March 1949, President's Secretary's Files, File 
Subject: N.S.C Meeting No. 3-49, box 205, Truman Library.
2. F.O. secret memorandum No. 25(W7748/189/G) to Campbell, Cairo, 
10 January 1949, Public Record Office, F0141/1358, 290/1/49G.
3. Minute by Mayall, F.O., 1 Febuary 1949, ibid, W290/1/49G.
4. See F0371/75051 and F0371/81914. See also summary of
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Officially, the Americans decided not to participate in the 
Anglo-Egyptian defence talks. They feared that participation in 
technical talks with Egypt might implicitly constitute a 
commitment to Egyptian defence. To quote George McGhee, the 
Assistant Secretary of State: "We wanted the British to hang on in 
the Middle East as long as possible. We did not want to have to 
replace them"^. However, the American and British Governments 
agreed on key issues concerning the defence of Egypt. Both powers 
expressed their shared concern over the expansionist policy of the 
Soviet Union. They therefore decided to approach King Faruq and to 
emphasize that the defence of Egypt was a matter of concern to all 
because the Suez canal and Delta areas would be key objectives 
for Soviet aggression:
"the Russian aggressive attitude and potential danger has 
compelled HMG to take stock of the general defence position 
and to consider certain preparations to meet Russian 
aggression...HMG and USG have been keeping in close touch on 
defence questions..."
Two different and contradictory views existed among the Egyptian 
leadership regarding this subject. On the one hand, King Faruq 
claimed that a war with the U.S.S.R. was a real possibility. 
Furthermore, he was convinced that the U.S.S.R. would not only 
attack Europe but that it would also attack the Middle East with 
Egypt as the main target. Egypt must therefore prepare in order to
discussion between M. Wright of the British F.O. and G. McGhee 
of the American Dept, of State, 19 December 1949, Records of the 
Policy Planing Staff 1947-1953, box 30, National Archives, 
Washington D.C.
1. George McGhee, Envoy to the Middle World: Adventures in 
Diplomacy (New York: Harper & Row, 1983), p. 53.
2. See top secret letter 312/CCL from British Defence Coordination 
Committee for Chiefs of Staff to Ministry of Defence, 7 March 
1949, F0141/1365, W/352/30/49G. Top Secret letter 3126 from 
F.O. to British Embassy, Washington, 18 March 1949, F0371/
73555, J2061/1199/16G. Top Secret report entitled "Appreciation 
of the Middle East Strategical Situation", prepared by Lieut- 
Colonel H.B. Calvert, 11 November 1949, F0371/73563,
J8337/11922/16G.
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play its role in general Middle East defence*. On the other 
hand, Ibrahim <Abd al-Hadi Pasha, the Prime Minister, held the 
same view as his predecessor, Nuqrashi Pasha. He claimed that the 
danger of communism was less in the Middle East than in other 
parts of Europe and Asia^. The former Prime Minister, IsiricilTl 
Sidqi, attacked the idea of a collective security pact. He 
declared that, "the conclusion of such a pact would be more 
dangerous to Egypt than Russia's discovery of the atom bomb" .
The question of what should be the attitude of Egypt in a 
future worldwide conflict had engaged many Egyptian politicians.
A significant number believed that Egypt should take a neutral 
position. For instance, Taha Husain Bey, the noted Wafdist author, 
spoke strongly in favour of Egyptian neutrality in case of war. He 
stressed that despite the fact that neutrality would be difficult 
and very expensive, It would pave Egypt's way to independence. 
Muhammad Khattab Bey, former Secretary General of the Chamber of 
Deputies, advised Egypt to adopt an attitude of neutrality and 
stated his belief that world war was inevitable. Fu*ad Siraj 
al-Din Pasha, the Secretary General of the Wafd Party, said that 
Egypt should adopt the attitude which best suited its national 
interests. LutfT al-Sayyid Pasha, former Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, assumed that war was impossible. He saw no reason to 
consider Egypt's possible attitude in case of war.
1. Telegram No. 139 from British Embassy, Cairo, undated, 
F0141/1365, 500/40/49G. Dispatch No. 138, ibid, 7 March 1949, 
352/29/49G. Top secret letter from Douglas, the American 
Ambassador in the U.K., 22 March 1949, in: FRUS 1949, Vol. VI, 
pp. 199-202. Later on, during a conversation between Faruq and 
Caffery, the American Ambassador, the king express the same 
apprehension; see dispatch (no number) from American Embassy, 
Cairo, 28 October 1949, RG 59, 883.001 Farouk/10-2849.
2. Dispatch 169 from American Embassy, Cairo, 21 February 1949,
RG 59, 883.002/2-2149.
3. Dispatch (no number) from American Embassy, Cairo, 26 October 
1949, RG 59, 890B.00/10-2649.
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A pro-western approach was reflected in the words of Mahmud 
Hasan Pasha, the former Egyptian Ambassador to the U.S. He stated 
that in the event of war he expected Egypt to take the side of the 
Western bloc because it could not cooperate with communism. The 
same line was taken by Fikri *Abaza Bey, the president of the 
Egyptian Press Syndicate. He considered that Egypt would align 
itself with Britain in the event of war because Britain was the 
closest state to Egypt and would defend Egypt against 
communism*.
1. On the debate see dispatch 411 from American Embassy, Cairo, 
23 April 1949, RG 59, 883.00/4-2349. See also dispatch 263, 
ibid, 17 March 1949, RG 59, 861.20283/3-1749.
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B. Continuity and Change in Soviet-Egyptian Relations after 
the Palestine War._______________________________________ _
Whether fears of Soviet penetration and the spread of Communism 
were based on solid grounds or not, Soviet-Egyptian relations 
remained officially correct. Nevertheless, Egyptian leaders 
showed no inclination to tolerate any extension of Soviet 
influence. The vigorous measures taken against communism and the 
tremendous endeavour to contain its spread, created a tension in 
the relations between the two countries. Moreover, the Egyptian 
alignment with the Western powers indicated fear and distrust of 
the Soviet Union and a basic attitude of unfriendliness towards 
it. In addition, by the end of 1948, the U.S.S.R. had violated the 
terms of a cotton-wheat barter agreement signed in March 1948, by 
selling on the world market the Egyptian cotton it received at a 
price with which even Egypt could not compete*.
Soviet policy towards Israel and the Arab-Israeli conflict since 
the establishment of Israel had been bitterly and indignantly 
received by the Egyptian and the Arab States. This policy found 
its expression in consistent support given to Israel at the U.N. 
by the Soviet bloc. In addition to this, the Soviets made possible 
the emigration of many Jews from Eastern European countries to 
Israel. According to Necas, the Consul General of Czechoslovakia 
to Jerusalem, the U.S.S.R.'s relations with Arab countries 
remained unchanged because it was impossible to do any real 
bargaining with them. To quote Ne^as, "the Arabs are primitive and 
think themselves clever; on the one hand, they are threatening the 
West to join the East, on the other hand, they are bargaining all
1. C.I.A. report entitled "Arab States", 27 September 1949, 
President's Secretary's Files, File Subject: Central 
Intelligence Reports SR-13, box 260. See also Policy Statement 
on Egypt prepared by the Dept, of State, 5 May 1949, in FRUS 
1949, Vol. VI, pp. 214-215. On the barter agreement, see, pp. 
138-142.
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the time with the West and trying to squeeze various concessions 
out of the British and the Americans. The British have lost 
very much of their elan but have carefully avoided admitting 
it or aiding the U.S.A. in Arab countries". Necas appreciated that 
it was nonsense that the U.S.S.R. should be seriously thinking of 
Arabs as allies. He attacked the Arab leaders by saying that, 
"there are as yet no Arabs (leaders) who have the right to speak 
for their people and the feelings of the governing classes are 
well known to the U.S.S.R." Necas concluded that the Soviet Union 
did not look upon the Arabs as a nation, or even a group of 
nations. "The Arab countries are a kind of hereditary estate, in 
which landlords do what they like"^.
The Soviet leadership was interested that the Arab-Israeli 
conflict should not be resolved. It believed that the 
existence of Israel could serve as a firm barrier which would 
impede the process of crystallization and integration of 
the area politically, economically, socially and military 
under Western control. Soviet activity in the Middle East intended 
to slow down the efforts of Western powers to found and reinforce 
Middle East defence organization under their domination. At that 
stage, the interests of the U.S.S.R. were to preserve the 
competition between the U.S. and Britain. The U.S.S.R. acted to 
sharpen the existing conflicts between the Arab countries and 
between the national and religious minorities living in various 
Arab countries and their rulers. It also encouraged the awakening 
of class fermentation .
1. See Record of conversation between Necas, the Consul General of 
Czechoslovakia in Jerusalem and Mukhin from the Soviet Legation 
in Tel-Aviv, on the policies of Israel and the Arab States, 11 
July 1949, I..S.A., FM2457/14. The content of the conversation 
was given to the Israeli Foreign Ministry by Necas.
2. Report on "The World Politics and Israel" by A. Levavi, 6 June 
1949, I.S.A., FM2514/15. See also C.I.A. review of the world
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By its continuous and consistent support of Israel, the U.S.S.R. 
restricted the possibilities of increasing its influence and the 
prospects that communist propaganda would be successful in 
the Arab world. These possibilities and prospects which 
were objectively restricted, had been clearly known to Soviet 
policy makers. For instance, with reference to the information 
that the U.S.S.R. decided to reject giving a loan to Israel, 
Vyshinskii, the Soviet delegate to the U.N., said: "I can say that 
nothing would prevent us from giving the loan in spite of some 
foreign pressures...Arab and non-Arab"*. However, during 1949, 
there were several indications showing that the Soviet Union was
not willing to neglect its interests in the Arab world in favour
2
of Israel :
a. The insistence that the U.N. partition resolution of 29 
November 1947, should be implemented, that is, the establishment 
of Arab state beside Israel. Israel was accused of inclining to 
and supporting the U.S. in the international arena. Israel's 
position at the U.N. had been shown by voting in favour of the 
Western powers. According to the Soviets, Israel's policy could 
no longer be considered as neutral.
b. The anti-Zionist line taken by Soviet broadcasts in Arabic.
situation, 21 December 1949, P & 0 350.05(21 Dec. 49), National 
Archives, Washington D.C. Top Secret report entitled 
"Appreciation of the Middle East Strategical Situation", by 
Lieut-Colonel H.B. Calvert from the War Office, F0371/
73563, J8337/11922/16G. Secret memorandum M.E.(O) (49) 14 
on "Economic and Social Development in the Middle East", by 
Cabinet Middle East Committee, 10 May 1949, CAB134/501.
1. See, "Vyshinskii Comments on U.S.S.R. Loan to Israel", 26 
October 1949, I.S.A., FM2457/14. See also a report on recent 
developments in relations between Egypt and Czechoslovakia, by 
P. Dixon, the British Ambassador to Czechoslovakia, in letter 
No. 257/1/49, 4 March 1949, F0371/73487, J2135/10312/16.
2. Letter from Gidon Refael, Israel delegate to the U.N., about 
his conversation with Matrapkin, Soviet delegate to the U.N.,
13 December*1949, I.S.A. FM2513/14. See also, K h . Grigor'ian, 
"Anglo-amerikanskoe sopernchestvo na Blizhnem Vostoke", Krasnyi
Flot (Moscow), 16 July 1949.
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c. Soviet propaganda concentrated in highlighting the differences 
between the interests of the Arab masses and the policy of the 
Arab rulers whom they considered to be manipulated by the Western 
powers.
Throughout 1949, the Soviet policy of promoting instability and 
insecurity in the Middle East was extended. The Soviet Union 
rejected the possibility of lifting the arms embargo which was 
imposed by the U.N. Security Council. It benefited from the 
existing state of tension in the Middle East by indirectly 
supplying arms to both sides. Since the beginning of 1949, there 
had been many reports of Czech arms going via Poland to the 
Eastern Mediterranean. According to a senior official in the 
Egyptian government, the U.S.S.R was pressing offers of tanks, 
guns, ammunition and agricultural implements on the Egyptian 
government. On 5 July, the Israeli Minister to Czechoslovakia 
told his British counterpart that he knew for certain that the 
Egyptian government was making considerable purchases of arms 
mostly small arms and automatic weapons in Czechoslovakia for 
export to Egypt. E.A. Chapman-Andrews of the British Embassy in 
Egypt, confirmed that according to the Joint Intelligence Board's 
quarterly report on the arms trade for the period mid-January to 
mid-April 1949, arms to the value of a few thousand dollars, 
originating in Czechoslovakia had been delivered to Egypt^.
Through the press and radio, the Soviet Union continued,
1. On the Soviet position concerning the arms embargo, see minute 
by Beith, F.O., 7 July 1949, F0371/75104, E8780/1192/65. On 
the supply of Czech arms to Egypt see, Telegram No. 278 from 
P. Dixon, British Embassy, Prague, 12 May 1950, F0371/81958, 
E1192/84; Letter from H. Gresswell, Ministry of Defence, to 
F.O. and War Office, 23 March 1949, F0371/73549, J3020/1194/16; 
On the conversation between the Israeli Minister and P. Dixon, 
the British Ambassador to Prague, see, Telegram No. 148 from 
Dixon, 8 July 1949, F0371/73561, J5640/11919/16; Telegram No. 
461 from Chapman-Andrews, Alexandria, 31 August 1949, ibid, 
J7094/11919/16.
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throughout 1949 to attack consistently the Western powers'
defence plans in the Middle East and the Arab leaders attitude
towards these plans. Britain was accused of putting pressure on
Egypt for a new alliance based on the 1936 treaty*. The army
paper, Krasnaia Zvezda noted that in Egypt and Iraq the national
liberation movement was growing and the people were more and more
insistent in their demand for the expulsion of foreign troops and
the liquidation of unequal treaties and agreements. The British
colonizers, it said, were particularly interested in strengthening
their position in the Middle East by suppressing the progressive
o
forces m  the Arab countries . The workers of the Arab 
countries, stressed Krasnaia Zvezda, remembered the U.N. speeches 
by representatives of the Soviet Union in defence of Egyptian 
demands for the immediate evacuation of British troops from their 
lands. As a result of the Soviet position, popular demonstrations 
of gratitude to the Soviet Government took place m  Cairo .
Much attention was given by the Soviet press to the Anglo- 
American contradictions in Middle Eastern affairs. It was 
emphasized that both powers aimed to achieve a maximum political
1. See Radio Moscow in Arabic, 18 February 1949, SWB, USSR, p.38. 
See also, ibid, 15 May 1949, Part IV-Egypt. In an article 
entitled "Map of the World", Egypt was placed in the category 
of nations described by Lenin as "formally politically 
independent, but in actual fact caught in the snares of 
financial and political dependence". This situation had been 
made possible, it said, as a result of the British enforcement 
of the 1936 treaty on Egypt. See, Kinov, "The Map of the 
World", ibid, 30 November 1949, SWB, USSR, pp. 29-30. See also, 
Radio Moscow in Arabic, 22 July 1949, ibid, pp. 28-29.
2. "Angliiskie Voiiska v Akabe", Krasnaia Zvezda (Moscow), 27 March
1949.
3. G. Osipov, "Shpiony daiut interv'iu" Krasnaia Zvezda (Moscow),
17 July 1949. See also, Radio Moscow in Arabic, SWB, USSR, 3 
May 1949. Trud blamed the Americans for the suppression of 
liberation movements and the enslavement of the Mediterranean 
countries and "their enticement into anti-Soviet adventures for 
the benefit of Wall Street. See, F. Zviagin, "Sredizemnomorskii 
Pact- Orudie Amerikanskikh imperialistov", Trud (Moscow), 16 
February 1949.
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and economic domination. The Middle East, it said, became a place 
of pilgrimage for many prominent politicians from Britain and 
U.S.A. The British government had been searching for a way to 
strengthen its position in this strategically important area, 
and to create some defensive barriers against the actions of 
American competitors. But despite of the increasing rivalry 
between them, said Literaturnaia Gazeta the British and the 
Americans "are developing the idea of uniting the countries of the 
Near and Middle East into a military union"^.
1. G. Osipov, "Zagovor podzhigateleii voiiny na Blizhnem Vostoke", 
Literaturnaia. Gazeta (Moscow), No. 57, 16 July 1949. "Anglo- 
amerikanskie intrigi na Blizhnem Vastoke", Krasnaia Zvezda 
(Moscow), 25 June 1949. Kh. Grigor'ian, "Anglo-amerikanskoe 
soperncestvo na Blizhnem Vostoke", Krasnyi Flot (Moscow), 16 
July 1949.
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a . First Soviet-Egyptian Commercial Agreements 1948-1949
Prior to the Second World War, trade between the Soviet Union
and Egypt had been practically at a standstill because for many
years there had been no commercial agreements between the two
countries. Under the Egyptian Law No.2 of 14 February 1930, the
goods from communist countries were liable upon importation to a
100% surtax. Moreover, the Egyptian governments at that time,
discouraged trade with the U.S.S.R. fearing communist
infiltration1. Soon after the end of the Second World War Egypt
became interested in developing commercial relations with the
Soviet bloc purely for the economic benefits.
In July 1945, the Egyptian press reported the Ministry of
Finance's announcement, that Egypt could import from the U.S.S.R.
on a Sterling payment basis. However, the practical application
was uncertain pending clarification of what items the Soviets
o
could furnish and how shipments were to be made . This 
announcement marked the beginning of a long but successful 
negotiation which was concluded on 3 March 1948, with an agreement 
to barter. The agreement was signed in Cairo, at the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. The Egyptian signatory was A^imad Muhammad
1. See dispatch 73 from Stevenson, Cairo, 14 March 1952, F0371/ 
96925, JE1052/183G. The purpose of the economic chapters in 
this research is mainly to focus on trade relations between 
the two countries. It also examines the implications of
these relations on the total balance of foreign trade of Egypt. 
Yet, the economic history of Egypt is a subject of a separate 
research, and it is not to be reviewed in this study. See for 
instance comprehensive accounts on this subject in, Charles 
Issawi, Egypt at Mid-Century, an Economic Survey (London:
Oxford University Press, 1954). Ibid, Egypt in Revolution, an 
Economic Analysis (London: Oxford University Press, 1963).
For general accounts on the economic history of the Middle East 
see, ibid, An Economic History of the Middle East and North 
Africa (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd, 1982). Elie Kedourie (ed.), 
The Middle Eastern Economy (London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd, 1977)
2. This information was confirmed by the Egyptian Import Permit 
Department and by the British Embassy in Cairo. See telegram 
1440 and airgram A-386 from the American Legation, Cairo, 19 
July 1945, RG 59, 661.8331/7-1945.
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Khashaba, Foreign Minister, and the Soviet signatory was M. 
Men'shikov, Deputy Minister of Foreign Commerce. According to this 
agreement, Egypt would supply the Soviet Union with 38,000 metric 
tons of cotton^ from stocks owned by the Egyptian government, in 
exchange for 235,000 metric tons of grain composed of 216,000 
metric tons of wheat and 19,000 metric tons of maize. The goods 
from both parties were to be delivered to the port of Alexandria 
in instalments, to be made, within a maximum period of four 
months, from the date of the signing of the agreement. The values 
were to be calculated in Egyptian pounds. An account in this 
currency was to be opened at the National Bank of Egypt, in the 
name of the Bank of the U.S.S.R. All amounts paid to the U.S.S.R. 
for the grains imported into Egypt, were to be deposited in that 
account, while the value of the cotton, exported by Egypt, was to 
be deducted from that account. A protocol signed simultaneously 
with the barter agreement provided that the contracting parties, 
grant each other "most favoured nation" status in their trade in 
agricultural and industrial products. Soviet and Egyptian trade 
relations with adjacent countries were not affected. The protocol 
also provided for continued negotiations with the purpose of 
concluding another barter agreement for the exchange of 12,000 
metric tons of cotton, from Egyptian government stocks, in 
exchange for ammonium, sulphate, tobacco and especially wood .
1. Cotton crop was Egypt's main product to be exported, and 
constituted more than 80% by value of all Egyptian exports. On 
cotton and Foreign trade see, Issawi, Egypt in Revolution, pp. 
221-222.
2. During 1946 and 1947 Egypt did not export to the U.S.S.R. at 
all though it imported from the U.S.S.R. to the value of
£E.1,620,000. See figures and details in dispatch 73, ibid. On 
the negotiation see, telegrams 83 and 98 from the American 
Embassy, Cairo, 27 and 31 January 1948, RG 59, 661.8331/1-2748 
and 661.83331/1-3148. Radio Cairo, 10 February 1948, SWB,
Middle East, Egypt, p. 62. On the agreement see, F0371/69249, 
J1542/1246/16, J1953/1246/16, J1795/1246/16, J2089/1246/16, 
J2442/1246/16. Telegram 228, dispatches 187 and 313 from
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This was the first such agreement to be signed btween the U.S.S.R. 
and a member of the League of Arab States.
A few weeks after the signing, Khashaba, the Foreign Minister, 
outlined the motives behind his government decision to 
conclude such an agreement with the Soviets. In a conversation 
with the Greek Ambassador to Cairo, Khashaba accused the U.S.A. 
and Britain of conducting an anti-Arab policy. He stressed that 
these two powers made many mistakes, and continuously alienated 
the Arabs, mainly, by the American attitude to the Palestine 
question and the British policy regarding Egypt and Iraq. Egypt, 
said Khashaba, had asked the Anglo-Americans to relieve a local 
wheat shortage, by exchanging rice for wheat, but this had been 
refused because of the desire of both these powers to replace 
the then Egyptian government, with one, which would sign a 
favourable treaty with the U.K. Under these circumstances, 
he emphasized, Egypt had been obliged to ask the Soviet Union for 
wheat "in order to avoid a Communist revolution". However, the 
Minister stressed that, the talks with the Soviet Commercial 
Commission in Cairo, had dealt exclusively with the barter of 
cotton and wheat and were without political content^-.
The Egyptians first experience of barter with the Soviets
American Embassy, Cairo, 4 and 6 March and 17 April 1948, RG 
59, 661.8331/3-448, 661.8331/3-648 and 661.8331/4-1748. See 
full text of the agreement as published by the Soviet Foreign 
Ministry, in: Ministerstvo Inostrannykh del SSSR, SSSR i Strany 
Afriki 1946-1962, Dokumenty i Materialy, Tom I (Moskva: 
Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoii Literatury, 1963), 
pp. 94-96.
1. On the conversation (the date is not given) see, Department of 
State, Memorandum of Conversation between Paul Economou-Gouras, 
Counselor, Greek Embassy, Washington, and Leonard J. Cromie, 
the Branch of Greek, Turkish and Iranian Affairs' of the 
Department of State, 23 March 1948, RG 59, 783.00/3-2348.
It is noteworthy that King Faruq was not happy that 
negotiation^ between Egypt and the Soviet Union were taking 
place. During the talks, he became worried by the presence of 
the Soviet delegation and suggested the Egyptian government 
that the negotiations be ended quickly. See, airgram A-878 from 
American Embassy, London, 14 April 1948, RG 59, 661.8331/4-1448.
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was not quite satisfactory. Several months later, Egyptian 
officials were informed, that some of the cotton delivered to 
the Soviets, had been offered for resale to various other 
countries at prices below that of the Egyptian market, and in 
direct competition with Egyptian sales. According to Egyptian 
officials, the agreement had prohibited resale*. They 
expressed their dissatisfaction telling the Soviets furthermore, 
that the quality of the goods received from the U.S.S.R. and the 
values agreed especially relative to the U.S. dollar would make 
the Egyptian government extremely reluctant to agree to further 
commerce with the Soviet Union . Reacting to this development, 
Nuqrashi explained the advantages of dealing with the Soviets. He 
stressed that, "it was the Soviets who had really helped Egypt at 
a critical time by practically preventing starvation through the 
supply of wheat and maize to Egypt in return for Egyptian cotton. 
The action of the Soviet Union...had been in marked contrast to 
the negative attitude of the International Emergency Food Council 
...(Which) had been unhelpful to Egypt". Then he criticised the 
Soviets for breaching the agreement. He said that the Soviet move 
had persuaded him against any similar dealings . On 10 September 
1948, it was reported in La Bourse Eqyptienne that the Egyptian 
government was preparing a note of protest, for delivery to the 
Soviet Minister in Cairo. The note said, that the U.S.S.R. had 
seriously breached the March agreement, which had stipulated that
1. See airgram A-392 from American Embassy, Cairo, 10 June 1948, 
RG 59, 661.8331/6-1048.
2. See airgram A-625 from American Embassy, Cairo, 11 September 
1948, RG 59, 661.8331/9-1148.
3. Nuqrashi said the above mentioned on 3 July 1946, during a 
conversation with Patterson, the American Ambassador. See 
telegram 913 from Patterson, Cairo, 6 July 1948, RG 59, 611. 
8331/7-648..
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the Egyptian cotton would be consumed within the U.S.S.R.^.
The Soviet breaching of the March 1948 agreement had negative 
implications for the political and economic relations between the 
two countries. Soviet efforts throughout 1949 to persuade the 
Egyptian government to further exchanges under the agreement 
failed. The Soviet offers included, 100,000 tons of wheat, large 
quantities of agricultural machinery, and Arabic keyboard 
typewriters, in exchange for Egyptian cotton . In July and 
August 1949, Egyptian officials from the Ministry of Supply 
stated that discussions between Egypt and the U.S.S.R. on the 
exchange of cotton for Soviet wheat were to be indefinitely 
postponed. They explained that Egypt had already imported large 
quantities of wheat from Yugoslavia and Syria . During 1949, 
however, the Soviets did buy considerable quantities of Egyptian 
cotton on the open market^.
The following tables show in figures the sharp drop m  
trading between Egypt and the Soviet bloc during 1948-1949. The 
rate of exchange was one Egyptian pound (L.E.)to $4.15 U.S.
1. See airgram A-625, ibid. In reaction to the anti-Soviet 
campaign conducted by Egyptian press, the Soviet press argued 
that this was "a move by British and Egyptian businessmen" 
against the U .S .S.R.-Egyptian trade agreement of March 1948.
See for instance, Radio Moscow in Arabic, 7 October 1949, SWB, 
USSR, p.38.
2. On the Soviet offers and the conversations between the two 
countries throughout 1949, see, airgram A-196 from Patterson, 
Cairo, 15 February 1949, RG 59, 661.8331/2-1549. Airgram A-618, 
ibid, 27 May 1949, 661.8331/5-2749. A minute by A.N.
Cumberbatch from the Commercial Secretariat of the British 
Embassy in Cairo, 23 February 1949, F0141/1373, 624/1/49G. 
Letter 624/2/49 from Cumberbatch to the Ministry of Food, 10 
June 1949, ibid.
3. See airgram A-797 from Patterson, Cairo, 22 July 1949, RG 59, 
661.8331/7-2249. Arab News Agency, 3 August 1949, SWB, Arab 
World, p. 53.
4. See dispatch 73, F0371/96925, ibid.
5. The figures were taken from the following sources: Report No. 
164, prepared by H.G. Minnigerode, Second Secretary at the 
American Embassy, Cairo, 23 August 1949, RG 59, 661.8331/8- 
2349. Enclosure 1 to dispatch 930 from Hazel T. Ellis, 

















































The tables show that the volume of Egyptian exports to the Soviet 
Union fall to a value of only L.E.252,027 for the first half of 
1949 compared with the total of L .E .6,409,764 for the same period 
of 1948. The extent of imports from the U.S.S.R. also indicate of 
a slight fall.
From the tables we can see that Egypt exported much more, to the 
Soviet bloc than it imported, and also that Egypt had a favourable 
balance of trade with the Soviet bloc in the first half of 1948 
and of 1949. We can also note that during the first half of 1949, 
there was a significant increase of exports to Poland and 
Czechoslovakia. However, the total exports to all Soviet bloc 
countries dropped in 1949 to L .E .4,095,327 while imports remained 
stable.
1. The figures were taken from enclosure 1 to dispatch 2042 from 
American Embassy, Cairo, 26 February 1954, RG 59, 874.00TA/2- 
2654. By this time imports represented a fifth to a quarter 
of Egypt's national income while exports were somewhat
lower. See, Issawi, Egypt in Revolution, pp. 222-224.
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From the following table1 we learn how very much less business 
took place between Egypt and the Soviet bloc, than with the 
Western powers in 1949. The table shows Egypt's trade with foreign 









































































All Countries 166.5 100.0 135.7 100.0 -30.8
From these figures we see that 37.3% of Egypt's imports came 
from the Western powers (Britain, U.S.A. and France) and 27.5% of 
the exports went to these countries. Only 2.8% of the imports came 
from the Soviet bloc whilst only 11.5% was exported to them. 
Nevertheless, from the Egyptian point of view, its trade with the 
U.S.S.R. proved to be profitable, and 1949 ended with a trade 
balance in favour of Egypt of L.E. 10,900,000. The balance with
1. The reasons for the differences between the figures given in 
this table to the ones given in the previous table are twofold. 
First, the previous one covered only the period between January 
to June 1949. Second, despite the fact that, no important 
barter agreement between the Soviet and the Egyptian 
governments were reported, it was known that the Soviets bought 
considerable quantities of Egyptian cotton on the open market. 
See for instance dispatch 73, F0371/96925, ibid. Letter 112.17/ 
1/50 from British Embassy, Moscow, 10 February 1950, F0371/ 
80429, JE11338/1.
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the Western powers was unfavourable to the extent of 
L.E.24,800,000.
From the above we can clearly see, that, trade with the Soviet 
bloc improved Egypt's overall adverse balance of trade position, 
ending 1949 with a deficit of L .E .30,800,000. Thus, it becomes 
clear, why despite Egypt's political reservations, Egypt 
endeavoured to promote trade with the Soviet bloc*.
1. On the barter agreements between Egypt and Eastern European 
countries during 1949, see, report No. 164 from Minnigerode, 
ibid. F0371/73537.
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C. The Policy of the Wafd Government towards the East-West 
Conflict 1950-1952__________________________________________
a . The Formation of the Policy of Neutralism.
The elections which were held on 3 January 1950, returned a 
Wafdist majority to the Egyptian Parliament. Nafrhas Pasha formed a 
new government which continued up to 27 January 1952^. The 
government's foreign policy led to a turning point in Egyptian 
relations with the Western and the Eastern blocs. For the first 
time, senior Egyptian ministers declared a neutral policy of 
non-alignment. This new policy found its expression in Egypt's 
abstention on the Security Council Resolution of June 27 1950, 
on the Korean war.
The primary aim of the Soviet government in the Arab world was 
to eliminate Western influence and to undermine the strategic 
position of the Western powers in the Middle East. The principle 
of the definite rejection of any Western presence in Arab lands 
which, both the Soviet and the Wafd Governments stood for, created 
a basis for future understanding and cooperation in the 
international arena. The Wafd victory received little prominence 
in the Soviet press. The Wafd was described as a "Bourgeois-
/
Nationalist Party". Izvestiia cited the French paper 'L'Humanite' 
which stated that since the Wafd changed its policy by calling for 
democracy and independence from Britain, they were correcting 
their previous mistakes, and had thus won the massive support of 
the population*6. As early as 1950, the Wafd party was described 
by the Soviets as "Bourgeois-Reformist Party". This definition 
reflected a significant change in the Soviet view of the internal
1. On the elections and the formation of a new government, see, 
Joel Gordon,* "The False Hopes of 1950: The Wafd's Last Hurrah 
and the Demise of Egypt's Old Order", I . J . M. E . S , 21 (1989), 
pp. 193-214.
2. Izvestiia (Moscow), 7 January 1950.
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political situation in Egypt and its readiness to cooperate with 
non-communist political parties which were supported by the 
Egyptian masses*. The explanation of the Soviet positive 
attitude towards the Wafd party was given in Bol'shaia Sovetskaia
o
entsiklopediia . The Wafd, it said, was the party of the 
national bourgeoisie. After the Second World War, the Wafd 
occupied "an objectively progressive position on the question of 
denouncing the enslaving agreements with Britain and Egypt's 
refusal to participate in the aggressive measures of the Anglo-
*3
American bloc in the Near East" .
To eliminate the influence of the Western powers in Egypt, the 
U.S.S.R. was willing to cooperate with every group, even if not 
communist, which acted against or rejected Western domination.
Less criticism was therefore directed against the Wafd government 
than against previous Egyptian governments. This new Soviet 
approach was generally aimed at all Arab states, but the Soviets 
began to manifest a marked activity directed particularly towards 
Egypt as the leader of the Arab states and which coincided with 
the rising importance of the Arab-Asian bloc in the United 
Nations. This Soviet approach was reflected clearly in October 
1950, when A. Vyshinskii, the Soviet Foreign Minister and
I. Malik, the Soviet delegate to the U.N. held a banquet for their 
Arab counterparts in the U.N. This was intended to win Arab 
support against U.S. proposals for an international U.N. armed 
force and the abolition of the veto. The Soviets warned the Arab 
representatives that if U.S. proposals were adopted the world 
would be exposed to great dangers and the Arab countries would 
find themselves occupied by foreign forces. Both Soviet delegates
1. Trud (Moscow), 10 July, 1949.
2. Bol'shaia Sov etskaia Entsiklopediia, Vol. 15, (Moscow: 1952), 
p. 461.
3. Yodfat, Arab Politics in the Soviet Mirror, pp. 32-33.
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advised their Arab counterparts to adopt the socialist economic
system, which they claimed would create a new world in the Middle
East. To win Arab goodwill, Vyshinskii attacked Zionism and
expressed support for Arab claims to property lost to Israel^-.
In February 1950, the Egyptian and Soviet governments agreed
to accept each other's envoys. M. Simeon Kozyrov became the Soviet
Minister to Cairo and Anis al-Azr the Egyptian Minister to 
o
Moscow .
As early as April 1950, for the first time, statements of a 
neutral policy and a call to improve relations with the Soviet 
Union, were made by senior officials in the Syrian and 
Egyptian Governments. On 8 April, Al-Ahram wrote that Egypt 
informed Western Powers that it was not prepared to commit itself 
m  support of them in the cold war . On 9 April, during the Arab 
League session in Cairo, the Syrian Minister of National Economy, 
Ma*ruf al-DawallbT, proposed the conclusion of a non-aggression 
pact with the U.S.S.R. On 12 April, DawalTbi stressed that such 
a pact would "protect the Arab States in case a third world war 
will break out". He was opposed to reliance on the policy of the 
Western Powers^. Khalid al-^Azm, the Syrian Prime Minister who 
was also attending the Arab League session, stressed that he knew
1. See Report No. 5450 by the Office of Intelligence Research of 
the Dept, of State, entitled: "U.S.S.R. Approaches to Arab 
States and Israel June 1950- January 1951", 12 February 1951, 
RG 84, Cairo Embassy-General Documents, 1950-1952, 320:J-5W, 
box 219. See also, C.I.A. report NIE-3, entitled, "Soviet 
Capabilities and Intentions", 15 November 1950, Records of the 
Policy Planning Staff 1947-1953", box 23, National Archives, 
Washington D.C. Joint Services Staff College paper entitled, 
"Basic Factors in Soviet Policy: The Communist State in Theory 
and Practice", in letter No. JSSC/550 from Colonel A.N. 
Anderson, Joint Services Staff College, Latimarr 19 January 
1950, F0371/86731, NS1023/3. Report on "Soviet Intention" by 
Joint Intelligence Committee, American Embassy, Moscow, 25 
April 1950, Records of the Policy Planning Staff 1947-1953, 
ibid.
2. SWB, Arab World, 8 February 1950, p.49.
3. Al-Ahram (Cairo), 8 April 1950.
4. Al-Misri (Cairo), 9 April 1950. SWB, Arab World, 12 April 1949, 
p. 49.
-149-
nothing of Dawalibi's move. He claimed that DawalTbT had
coordinated his move with Salcih al-Din, the Egyptian Foreign
Minister, and that the latter had taken part in the formulation of
1Dawalibi's statement . From the Soviet reaction to Dawalibi's 
statement it was impossible to conclude whether the statement was 
coordinated with the Soviets or if they were informed of its 
content. Indeed, before and after DawalTbT made his statement, he 
had several talks with Daniil Solod, the Soviet Minister to 
Damascus, on the conclusion of commercial agreements between both
o — ^
countries . In fact, Dawalibi's move was welcomed by the Soviet 
Union. Daniil Solod, told the Arab News Agency: "Syria has
-a
extended her hand to us so we extended to her both our hands" .
In a comment made by New Times on Dawalibi's statement, it said,
"the whole Democratic camp has sincere sympathy for the Arab
states". The statement showed "on whose side the sympathy of the
Arab peoples lies in the struggle between the camp of democracy
4and the camp of imperialism" .
In connection with Dawalibi's statement, cAzzam Pasha, the Arab 
League's Secretary General, said that he believed that many Arabs 
had had enough of U.S. pro-Jewish policy and had received
—  -r- -r . . SAl-Dawalibi's remarks with satisfaction .
Towards mid-1950, an overwhelming hostility towards the West was 
being developed in Egypt. According to Jallad Pasha, a member of 
Faruq's court, many political circles and the press had inclined 
strongly in favour of the U.S.S.R. However, he stressed that 
the responsible elements in the country including the King, 
were opposed to the Soviets. He expressed his concern to
1. Khalid al-cAzm, Mudhakkirat Khalid al-cAzm (Beirut: al-Dar al- 
MutafcarTr liinashr, 1973), Vol. I, pp. 234-240.
2. See R o 'i , From Encroachment to Involvement, p. 80, and Soviet 
Decision Making in Practice, pp. 405, 435.
3. SWB, 22 April 1950, ibid.
4. New Times was quoted in New York Times (New York), 25 May 1950.
5. SWB, Arab World, 22 April 1950, p. 57.
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Caff ery, the American Ambassador in Cairo, that "America should 
redress the balance now going against the West and towards Russia 
in the Near East by giving some sign that it was genuinely 
interested in friendship with Egypt and the Arab world"*.
During April and May 1950, there were many reports, some 
considered reliable, indicating Soviet offers of arms to 
Egypt and Syria. On 27 April, C.I.A. reported to President Truman 
that according to information given by a senior Syrian official, 
Syria had signed a secret non-Aggression and Economic agreement 
with the U.S.S.R. under which Syria was to receive Soviet arms 
via the port of Latakia .
Reports from Caffery, the American Ambassador to Cairo, spoke 
of rumors that the Soviet government was prepared to furnish arms 
to Arab countries by way of new barter agreements . According to 
Al-Ahrcim, The Soviet Union offered Egypt arms on liberal terms 
including barter for cotton. It said that the Egyptian government 
"is not unfavourably disposed to purchasing these necessary 
defensive weapons" from the Soviet Union. The paper stressed that 
owing to the American and British refusal to sell arms to Egypt, 
the Egyptian government would consider positively the Soviet
1. Telegram 828 from Caffery, Cairo, 20 April 1950, RG 59,
611.74/4-2050.
2. Memorandum to the President by R.H. Hillenkoetter,
Director of Central Intelligence, 27 April 1950, President's 
Secretary's Files, File Subject: C.I.A. Memorandums 1950-1952, 
box 250, Truman Library. Daw'SlibT confirmed that the U.S.S.R 
offered arms to Syria and talks about a treaty of friendship 
and commerce had been going on between Farid Zain al-Din, the 
Syrian Minister to Moscow and Vyshinskyii, the Soviet Foreign 
Minister. DawSlibT was reported as saying that the Syrian 
Government had not made any decision about Soviet proposals to 
supply all Syria's requirements from arms manufactured in the 
Soviet Union or Czechoslovakia; see telegram 206 from F.O. to 
Damascus, 13 May 1950, F0371/82794, EY10338/2. Khalid al- 
(Azm, the Syrian Prime Minister, said that Syria would obtain 
its arms from any available sources; see telegram 128 from 
Damascus, 17 May 1950, F0371/82814, EY11338/2.
3. See Telegram 821 from American Embassy, Cairo, 20 April 1950, 
RG 84, Cairo Embassy-General Documents, 1950-1952: 320, box
219.
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offer. Al-Ahram said that the arms were necessary to help Egypt to 
realize its national aspirations*. Later, on 22 May, this 
information was confirmed by the Department of State who 
informed president Truman that the Egyptian Government "have 
indicated recently that if necessary, it could secure arms and
o
assistance from the U.S.S.R." .
To make clear Egypt's neutralism, Muhammad Salami al-Din, the 
Egyptian Foreign Minister stated that it was not at present in the 
interests of Egypt to turn towards either the Eastern or the
q
Western bloc . In an attempt to demonstrate Egypt's independent 
policy in international affairs, §>alah al-Din told Caffery that 
the position of the Egyptian government about recognizing 
Communist China was positive^.
b. The Tripartite Declaration and its Implications 
Whether the information of Soviet offers of arms to Arab 
countries was accurate, or not, Western powers were, presumably 
aware of the dangers inherent in such offers which could lead to 
an acceleration of the arms race in the Middle East. They were 
also worried by the recent Arab-Soviet rapprochement and the 
slight shift in the position of some Arab politicians towards the
1. Al-Ahram (Cairo), 3 May 1950. The American Embassy and Service 
Attaches could not confirm or reject this information; see 
Dispatch 983 from Caffery, Cairo, 3 May 1950, RG 84, Moscow 
Embassy-Confidential File, 1950: 320 Egypt, box 143. According 
to the daily paper Al-Asas, a high ranking Soviet diplomat who 
was asked, what would be the Soviet Government attitude should 
Egypt or any other Arab state apply to the Soviet bloc for 
arms? replied, that his country would welcome any cooperation 
with the Arab states; see telegram 1150 from Caffery, Cairo, 20 
May 1950, Cairo Embassy- General Documents, 1950-1952: 320, box 
219.
2. Papers of Harry S. Truman-Naval Aide Files, 22 May 1950, File 
Subject: State Dept. Briefs, May-July 1950, box 22.
3. The statement was given at a meeting of the Egyptian 
parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee, see, SWB, Arab World, 
16 May 1950.
4. Telegram 550 from Caffery, Cairo, 24 May 1950, RG 84, Cairo 
Embassy-General Documents, 1950-1952: 320, box 219.
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East ^ .
The tripartite declaration announced on 25 May 1950, by the
U.S., Britain and France, recognized the right of Middle Eastern
countries to purchase arms needed to ensure their internal
security and "their legitimate self-defence and to permit them to
play their part in the area as a whole". The three Powers opposed
the development of an arms race between Israel and the Arab
countries. They agreed that arms would be provided only to
countries that abstained from aggression. In case of a violation
of frontier or armistice lines by any country, the three Powers
would "immediately take action, both within and outside the U.N.,
o
to prevent such violation" . The commitment of the U.S. to 
guarantee Arab-Israeli borders, as outlined by the declaration, 
was the second stage of the Truman Doctrine of 1947, concerning 
American commitment to Middle East security.
The immediate Egyptian reaction to the declaration, as expressed 
by the Foreign Minister, was moderate. He considered it as being 
of "utmost importance", and said that it was being carefully 
studied by Egypt and other Arab governments with a view to 
drafting a common response . Indeed, on 21 June 1950, after the 
declaration was discussed, in the course of the session of the 
Arab League, (which took place from 12 to 16 June), the Arab 
governments informed the three Powers of their acceptance of the 
declaration with some reservations. They asked the Powers for 
assurances that they had "no intention of favoring Israel by their 
declaration or putting pressure on the Arab states to force them
1. See Record of conversation between Acheson and Eevin, 11 May 
1950, FRUS, 1950, Vol. V, pp. 158-160.
2. "Tripartite Declaration Regarding Security in the Near East", 
Department of State Bulletin, XXII, 5 June 1950, p.886
3. The statement was given by the Foreign Minister in the 
Chamber Deputies on 30 May 1950, see, telegram 583 from 
Caffery, Cairo, 31 May 1950, RG 59, 774.00/5-3150.
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into negotiation with Israel". More than everything else, the 
Arabs wanted to have it clarified that the declaration would in no 
way infringe on the independence and sovereignty of the Arab 
States. They stressed that "the level of armed forces each state 
must maintain is a question which must be left to the judgement 
of that state itself"1. Later, on 22 June, the Egyptian Foreign 
Minister justified the Arab reply to the three Powers declaration. 
He said, inter alia, that the Arab reply was quite clear in
noting that the three-Power guarantees would not affect the
2independence and sovereignty of the Arab states .
Although there was no official reaction from the Soviet 
government to the tripartite declaration, Soviet press comments 
indicated clearly its anxiety about Western intentions to 
interfere actively in certain circumstances. The Soviet press 
expressed its belief that the declaration intended, in the long 
term, to strengthen the strategic foothold of the Western Powers 
in the area. A day after the declaration was issued, Tass 
commented :
"...The statement abounds with assurances of the three Western 
Powers' peaceful intentions in the Middle East. However, it is
not difficult to discern that the real aim behind this move by
the Anglo-American bloc is the complete enslavement of the 
Middle Eastern countries and their transformation into 
advanced posts in the war which the imperialists are now 
preparing".
The Arabs' acceptance, with some reservations, of the 
declaration did not mean that, they were in favour of the West nor 
that the new policy of neutralism had been a passing episode. Some 
Egyptian politicians even stressed, that collaboration between
1. R o 'i , From Encroachment to Involvement, p. 83.
2. Radio Cairo, 22 June 1950, SWB, Arab World, p.34.
3. See the Tass announcement in SWB, U.S.S.R., 26 May 1950, p. 43.
For more details on the Soviet reaction to the declaration, 
see, Lurii Zviagin, "Total Diplomacy in the Near East", New 
Times, 5 July 1950. Radio Moscow, 1 June 1950, SWB, U.S.S.R., 
p. 25.
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Egypt and the U.S.S.R. was not only possible but necessary1.
From the Arab point of view, the main advantage of the 
declaration, was the renewal of arms deliveries. To quote Nazim 
al-Qudsi, the Syrian Prime Minister, "the Arab reply to the 
three-Power declaration did not imply that the Arabs were siding 
with the West; Syria was still free to purchase arms from any 
country including the U.S.S.R." . Nevertheless, the positive 
collective approach of the Arabs towards the declaration, led to a 
hesitant reaction from Moscow; this may have been due to a desire 
first to study all possible developments during the implementation 
of the declaration.
c . The Egyptian Position towards the Korean War 
The Egyptian position towards the Korean war which had broken 
out on 25 June 1950, as reflected at the U.N., was another link in 
a chain of attempts to adopt and implement a policy of neutralism. 
On the one hand, on 25 June 1950, Mahmud Fawzi, the Egyptian 
member of the Security Council, supported the American resolution 
that condemned the aggressive activities of North Korea. On the 
other hand, two days later, FawzT abstained on the American 
resolution that recommended collective action to defend south 
Korea. On 30 June, Natifras Pasha, the Egyptian Prime Minister, 
explained in a press conference, the reasons for abstention.
First, he said, the present conflict was merely a new phase in 
the disagreement between the Eastern and the Western blocs. 
Secondly, said Nahftas, in the past, there had been cases of 
aggression against peoples, "violations of sovereignty, and of the 
unity of the territory of states members of the U.N.". These
1. See for instance a declaration given by Bindari Pasha, the 
former Egyptian Minister to Moscow, in an article published in 
Al-Musawwar, dispatch 1397, from Caffery, Cairo, 16 June 1950, 
RG 59, 661.74/6-1650.
2. Radio Baghdad, 22 June 1950, SWB, Arab World, p. 34.
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aggressions and violations, he emphasized, were submitted to the 
U.N. which, "contrary to what it is now doing in the case of 
Korea, took no action to stop them"1. The underlying reason 
behind his words was undoubtedly a criticism for the Security 
Council's unfavourable handling of the Egyptian appeal of 1947, 
and later on, the anti-Arab approach taken by U.N. member states 
before and after the establishment of Israel.
The abstention of the Egyptian government was interpreted in a
moderate way by the Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who
emphasized Egypt's policy of non-alignment by criticising both the
Eastern and the Western blocs. Salah al-Din declared that the* F
abstention did not signify a leaning towards communism. Egypt, he 
said, was one of the few powers which strictly prohibited 
communist activity. He also declared that Egyptian interests were
, o
opposed to those of the Soviet Union and of the Western Powers^:
"Egypt, which combats imperialism and considers it one of the 
causes of international disturbances and of wars, is equally 
anxious to combat the hidden imperialism implicit in Communist 
methods. Like the Western Powers, Soviet Russia seeks to 
exercise domination by conquering other nations from within 
and submitting them to dictatorship. Egypt wishes to spare 
weaker nations and the whole world the ambitions of 
domination, imperialism and exploitation. All her acts are 
inspired by true democratic principles. This explains Egypt's 
refusal to recognize the Communist Government of China... Egypt 
desires that the U.N. should succeed in its mission and that 
the Western Powers should succeed in their attempts to stem 
the Communist danger, but these powers must prove to the world 
that they are not out for imperialism and exploitation".
A few days later, on 21 July 1950, Salaft al-Din stressed that
Egypt's attitude on Korea was unchanged. He said that the Egyptian
government was adhering to its decision not to support the
Security Council resolution to aid South Korea. Furthermore, Egypt
1.. Telegram 533 from Sir R. Stevenson, (the new British Ambassador 
to Egypt), Alexandria, 1 July 1950, F0371/80396, JE1073/1.
2. §arah al-Din made his speech during a press conference on 11 
July 1950, see, telegram 559 from Stevenson, Alexandria, 12 
July 1950, F0371/80396, JE1073/10.
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did not regret doing so*. On 30 July, he again emphasized that
o
Egypt was anti-Communist and would combat communism .
Soon after the outbreak of War in Korea, the Wafd government, 
via its press, kept on stressing its neutral policy. On 26 June, 
the Wafdist weekly, Al-Nida* , reported that the Soviet Union had 
officially, signified its readiness to supply the Egyptian army 
with all the necessary light and heavy arms. Furthermore, said 
Al-Nida* , the Soviets had expressed their readiness to build arms 
and ammunition factories in Egypt without reservations or 
conditions. The paper said that this offer was being seriously 
considered by the government because of the army's urgent need for 
heavy military equipment . A day later, Al-Misri, the leading 
Wafdist daily, expressed its fears that Egypt might in the 
inevitable collision between the great Powers, be involved on the 
side of the West if Britain insists on carrying out the 1936
4
treaty .
The Egyptian stand during the Korean war led to a great deal of 
concern in Washington. It raised the question of what had to be 
done to prevent the increase of the anti-Western tendency in 
Egypt. Some American statesmen had begun to reconsider their 
attitude towards the British position in Egypt. For instance, on 
19 September, George McGhee, summed up his alarm at increasing
1. See his statement in ibid, JE1073/13.
2. Salah al-DTn said this to Caffery on 30 July 1950, during a 
conversation between them. See Telegram 124 from Caffery, 31 
July 1950, RG 59 774.00/7-3150.
3. Dispatch 1531 from Caffery, Cairo, 28 June 1950, RG 59, 774.56/
6-2850. In a minute of D.V. Bendall of the F.O., on 7
July 1950, he pointed out that Egypt was believed to have 
received attractive offers of arms from Czechoslovakia; see, 
F0371/80396, JE1073/9. See also, secret dispatch from F.O. 
to British Embassy, Cairo, 14 July 1950, F0371/81921,
E10212/1G; the F.O. pointed out that they had had top secret 
reports that approaches have been made to the Arab 
representatives in Moscow and that Czech supplies of arms had 
been cut off from Israel while, at the same time, attractive 
offers of arms had been made to Syria and Egypt.
$. Al-MisrT (Cairo), 27 June 1950. ibid, 28 June 1950.
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"Egyptian nationalism". He asked Michael Wright and Roger Allen of 
the Foreign Office, to consider the possibility of evacuating the 
Canal Zone and moving their forces to Gaza, Iraq or Cyrenaica.
Both officials objected to McGhee's proposal and considered it 
unworkable^. Moreover, Britain estimated that the Egyptian 
position over Korea did not signify any inclination towards 
communism or a new orientation towards the Soviet bloc. The 
British Embassy in Cairo judged that there was no "party, in 
the parliamentary sense of the word", being formed in Egypt which 
would likely as a matter of policy, side with the U.S.S.R.
However, said the Embassy, there was a group of persons, for 
instance Kamil al-BindarT, the former Egyptian Minister to 
Moscow, who were expressing, both, privately and publicly, 
sentiments favourable to the U.S.S.R. These men, the Embassy 
stressrd, "might well influence policy in future" .
As appears from statements made by Egyptian senior officials or 
from American and British reports, there were several reasons why 
the Egyptian Government decided to abstain:
a. To put pressure on the Western Powers which would speed up 
the process of renewal of arms deliveries in line with the 
tripartite declaration;
b. To put pressure on the U.S. to force Britain to evacuate, 
unconditionally, its troops from Egypt
c. The fears of becoming a satellite of the West automatically 
supporting Western's interests in the international arena. Such 
a stand could damage Soviet-Egyptian relations and in case of
1. The discussion between the American Dept, of State and British 
F.O. officials took place in London on 19 September 1950. See, 
Memorandum of Informal U.S.-U.K. Discussion, FRUS 1950, Vol V, 
pp. 296-297. Memorandum of conversation, F0371/80383,
JE1055/55. See also memorandum by Allen, head of the Egyptian 
Department at the F.O., 20 September 1950, ibid.
2. Dispatch from British Embassy, Alexandria, to the British
Embassy, Ankara, 4 August 1950, F0371/80396, JE1073/17.
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global war, Egypt could find itself on the opposite side to the 
Soviets.
Egyptian fears of a Soviet offensive in the Middle East existed. 
Indeed, King Faruq summed up his impression of the efficacy of 
Soviet tanks and anti-aircraft artillery, as reports from Korea 
had revealed^-. Not long before the outbreak of the Korean war, 
he expressed, on several occasions, his wish that Egypt should
take the side of the West. To quote him, "neutrality was quite
2impossible but there were some people who believed in it" .
Indeed, several key figures in the Egyptian government, led by 
Salah al-Din, were determined to seek every political means which 
would bring about the British evacuation. Salah Al-D'Tn held the
view that the outbreak of war between the U.S.S.R. and the West
o —
was a possibility no longer . It seems that Nahhas Pasha, the
prime Minister, who, a few weeks before the vote expressed his
personal belief that after British evacuation, it would be
necessary to adopt a policy of cooperation with Britain^,
followed his ministers' line without being able to moderate it.
It can therefore be claimed that the fears of Soviet attack on
Egypt in case of a global war was not considered nor did it
constitute a significant argument for or against the decision.
Egyptian neutralism was not shaped as a new doctrine based on a
strategic view. It was a policy which derived from a strong desire
to protest against and to embarrass the Americans and the British
1. See Record of Conversation between King Faruq and Stevenson, 
took place on 8 August 1950, in, letter No. 327(1041/112/50G) 
from Stevenson, 9 August 1950, F0371/80452, JE1197/73.
2. Record of Conversation between King Faruq and Field Marshal,
Sir William Slim, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, 
on 4 June 1950, in dispatch 241 from British Embassy, Cairo,
5 June 1950, F0371/80450, JE1197/38G.
3. See a copy of notes on Field Marshal Slim's conversations with 
Egyptian Ministers in letter No. 249(1041/72/50G) from British 
Embassy, Cairo, 10 June 1950, F0371/80450, JE1197/45.
4. Ibid, JE1197/44.
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for their past and present policy towards Egypt. The Egyptian 
government presumably believed that its decision would put 
pressure on both of them which would force them to seek an 
acceptable solution to the Anglo-Egyptian conflict, and to speed 
up arms deliveries. But it would be unrealistic to argue that the 
Egyptian government believed that its action would lead to British 
withdrawal.
As early as the outbreak of the Korean war, Egypt had been 
described by the Soviet media as subjected to capitalistic 
exploitation and the Wafd government was blamed for preparing for 
talks on the conclusion of a new treaty with Britain*. Egypt's 
stand towards the Korean war was welcomed by the Soviet Union.
The Soviet press unanimously lauded the Egyptian government for 
its courageous decision. The Egyptian stand, stressed Radio 
Moscow, ignored American and British pressures. The Arabs, it 
said, "had not fallen into the trap set by America" .
A few months after the Egyptian abstention and despite that 
senior Egyptian officials had declared consistently that Egypt's 
position concerning the Korean war remained neutral, in January 
1951, at the Fifth Regular Session of the U.N. General Assembly, 
Egypt voted for the resolution that authorized the U.N. forces to
*3 . ,
cross the 38th Parallel into North Korea . This decision was 
presumably made by the Egyptian government as a result of extended 
pressure from King Faruq to adopt Western proposals. To quote 
Faruq, "Egypt was completely sound in the matter of support to the 
United Nations and in approval of the American action"^.
1. L. Vatolina, "Manevry imperialistov v Egipte", Izvestiia 
(Moscow), 12 May 1950. I. Tishin, New Times No. 8, 1950.
2. Pravda (Moscow), 7 July 1950. Radio Moscow, 3 July 1950, SWB,
U.S.S.R., p. 30. Ibid, 13 and 14 July, 1950, p. 28. Ibid, 18 
July 1950.
3. Ro'i, Soviet Decision Making in Practice, p. 414.
4. Report of an interview between King Faruq and Field Marshal 
Slim at Alexandria on 12 July 1950, in PRO, F0371/80451,
JE1197/58.
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Statements made by Egyptian and Soviet statesmen however, 
indicates the slow but gradual process of rapprochement between 
Egypt and the U.S.S.R. had been continuing. Satisfied with the 
Egyptian and Arabs stand towards Korea, Vyshinskii, the Soviet 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, summed up his willingness to 
negotiate with Arab representatives "any time they showed they 
had necessary authority"*. Later on, on 27 November 1950, in an 
interview to Al-MigrT, Vyshinskii was quoted as saying: "We have 
repeatedly declared that Soviet Russia and its democratic allies 
will always side with the Egyptian in the struggle against British 
imperialism" .
At the same time, on the Egyptian side, a series of pro-Soviet 
statements were made by Anis al-Azr, the Egyptian Minister to the 
U.S.S.R. These statements received a lot of attention, because 
unlike Bind'Sri Pasha who had preceded him, al-Azr had never been 
considered sympathetic to communism. On 9 September 1950, on his 
arrival in Paris to attend a conference of Egyptian diplomats, 
he said that the Soviet Union was not prepared to enter into 
war at present. Azr stressed that the intervention of the 
U.S. in Korea had come as "a hard blow". Regarding the Soviet- 
Egyptian bilateral relations, he said that great improvements in 
Egyptian-Soviet trade relations were expected. Azr emphasized that 
most of his official contacts in Moscow were of an economic rather
o . . . .
than a political nature . A few days later, m  an interview in
1. Vyshinskii said that during a conversation with Faris al-KhurT, 
the Syrian delegate to the U.N; see Telegram from Acheson, 18 
October 1950, RG 84, Cairo Embassy-General Documents, 1950- 
1952: 320, box 219.
2. Telegram 1259 from Caffery, Cairo, 29 November 1950, RG 59,
. 774.00/11-2950.
3. According to the Egyptian Foreign Minister, the purpose in 
convening the conference of Egyptian diplomats in Paris was "to 
become acquainted with the views of the European States with 
whom Egypt maintained diplomatic relations, especially in 
connection with the agenda of the forthcoming U.N. session".
On Azr and Salami al-DTn expressions see, SWB, Arab World, 9
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Al-Ahram, he declared that the relations between the two countries 
were cordial, mainly after Egypt's abstention on Korea. He again 
stressed that these relations focused mainly on economic 
affairs*. Indeed, Egypt's trade position with the Soviet Union 
during 1950 was in fact considerably stronger than that of the 
same period in 1949. Exports from Egypt to the Soviet bloc were 
almost 10% of total Egyptians exports while imports from the 
Soviet bloc increased by 3% during 1950 .
Reports from the American Embassies in Moscow and in Cairo which 
analysed the personal political view of Anis al-Azr, judged that 
they had never had the feeling that he was sympathetic towards 
communism. On the contrary, one report stressed, "he has 
manifested almost embarrassing admiration for America...we have 
felt that personally he has been somewhat unhappy over his 
government's stand on the Korean question". These reports 
attempted to find the reasons behind Azr's recent statements.
They concluded that they may have been dictated by purely 
political considerations arising from current Egyptian policy, or 
that he acted under instructions from his government to express 
Egypt's neutral policy . Indeed, Azr's expressions did not
September 1950, p. 33. Words in the same spirit were said by 
Azr in an interview he gave to Akhbcir al Yawm; see Dis. 939 
from American Embassy, Cairo, 19 October 1950, RG 84, Moscow 
Embassy-Confidential Files, 1950: 320- Egypt, box 143.
1. On his interview to Al-Ahram see dispatch 786 from American 
Embassy, Cairo, 27 September 1950, RG 59, 661.74/9-2750. Later 
on, during his visit to Egypt Azr continued to give pro-Soviet 
statements in the same spirit; see dispatch 1484 from American 
Embassy, Cairo, 23 December 1950, Moscow Embassy, ibid. SWB, 
Arab World, 18 December 1950, p. 37.
2. The economic relations between Egypt and the Soviet bloc during 
the period under review will be discussed in the following 
chapters. See for instance statistics on Foreign'trade of the 
Soviet bloc with Egypt for the first half of 1950 in dispatch 
930 from Hazel T. Ellis, Commercial Attache, American Embassy, 
Cairo, 18 October 1950, RG 59, 461.74/10-1850.
3. Dispatch 151 from American Embassy, Moscow, 7 October 1950, RG 
59, 661.74/10-750. Dispatch 191, ibid, 31 October 1950, RG 84, 
ibid. Dispatches 939, 786 and 1484, ibid. A few months later,
Azr criticised the Soviet Union and its domestic and foreign
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indicate any deviation from the political line shaped by the
Wafdist government. As Minister to Moscow, Azr served as an
effective vehicle for Sala£ al-DTn to disseminate his policy of
neutralism. In the government Salih al-Din represented a political
line shaped by the left wing of his party. The implementation of
his policy indicated a significant leaning towards the left among
members of the Wafd. Around this political principle a group of
various political parties (including communists) gathered during
1950. This group called itself the "Partisans of Peace Movement"
(Harakat Ansar al-Salam)*. Since §alafc al-DTn's policy was
supported by many political groups, he was determined to make
perceptible the cordial diplomatic relations between the U.S.S.R.
and Egypt. For instance, soon after the Egyptian abstention, the
Soviet Legation in Cairo protested to the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs that the customs authorities were interfering with
packages arriving from Moscow for the Legation. Contrary to the
orders of Siraj al-Din, Minister of the Interior, the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs ordered the customs not to examine packages,
mainly film shipments, to the Soviet and satellite legations.
This decision was made despite allegations from the Ministry of
the Interior that the shipments were being censored because they
7had been given to local communists to promote their interests .
The domestic quarrels within the Wafd weakened the party 
position vis-a-vis opposition parties. The Wafd was accused by 
its rivals of failure to carry out its election promises, namely 
to put an end to the continued presence of British troops in
policy; see dispatch 1582 and 1903 from Caffery,' 8 January 
and 9 February, 1951, RG 84, Cairo Embassy- General Documents, 
1951: 350, box 229.
1. See Part I, p. 60.
2. Dispatch 1618 from American Embassy, Cairo, 7 July 1950, RG 84, 
ibid.
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Egypt. The year 1951 was characterized by a growing 
dissatisfaction with the government. Owing to this, currents 
of unrest were felt all over the country*.
The power struggle between Siraj al-DTn and Salah al-Din became 
aggravated during 1951 . The first, who represented the 
Wafdist right wing, rejected and criticised his government's 
foreign policy, shaped by his younger opponent, Salah al-Din.
Owing to this rivalry, the Egyptian Government conducted 
contradictory foreign and internal policies. On the one hand, 
vigorous measures were taken by the Ministry of the Interior 
to stop the spread of Communism and Soviet influence inside Egypt. 
On the other hand, the Foreign Minister reaffirmed and committed 
himself several times to continue with a policy of neutralism.
Harakat Ansar al-Salam associated itself with the "World 
Movement for Peace" which was formed and supported by the Soviet 
Union. This movement had been an important vehicle for furthering 
Soviet interests beyond Eastern Europe. Harakat Ansar al-Salam 
supported and adopted the decisions made by the Second World
Congress of the movement held at Warsaw from 16 to 22 November
3 . — —1950 . In the Soviet view of Harakat Ansar al-Salam the
movement was composed of "many well-known social and cultured 
personalities". Since its formation, and despite government 
repression, Moscow claimed it had been gaining ground among the
1. See memorandum by Webb, Under-Secretary of State, to Lay, 
Executive Secretary, National Security Council, 26 January 
1951, FRUS 1951, Vol V, p. 20. See also dispatch 473 from 
Caffery, Cairo, 24 August 1951, RG 59, 774.001/8-2451.
2. On the political career of the two and their position inside 
the Wafd party, see, Joel Gordon, pp. 200-203. See also 
dispatch 282 from A. Schnee, First Secretary of Embassy, 10 
September 1955, RG 59, 774.00/9-1055.
3. Dispatch 1926 from Caffery, Cairo, 12 February 1951, RG 59, 
774.001/2-1251.
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people, mainly because of its struggle against imperialism*•
The legal activity of Harakat Ansar al-Salam was criticised 
sharply by Siraj al-Din, mainly the fact that some of its members 
were wafdists. In his campaign against the movement, Siraj 
al-DTn was supported by king Faruq. The Prime Minister Nahhas 
Pasha showed indecisiveness concerning the power struggle between 
his two senior ministers. He supported both contradictory policies 
and therefore lost his authority; his government was therefore 
unable to control the events which led the country into anarchy.
d. The strengthening of relations between Egypt and the 
U.S.S.R. - the collapse of Nabbas1 government.________
Egyptian foreign policy during 1951 clearly indicated its 
neutral stand and its wish to implement the national aspirations. 
Towards the end of 1951, the relations between Egypt and Britain 
were at a low ebb as a result of the Egyptian Government decision 
to abrogate the 1936 treaty. In addition to this, the Egyptian 
Government rejected the American and British proposals calling for 
the establishment of a Middle East Command for the protection of 
the Middle East against Soviet expansion. The relations between 
the Soviet Union and Egypt improved; several commercial agreements 
were concluded and more understanding and cooperation found their 
expression at the U.N. The Soviet media which had been 
concentrating on Far Eastern affairs, mainly the Korean war, 
showed, during 1951, growing interest in Egypt and the Arab 
countries. On 18 April 1951, Radio Moscow increased its Arabic 
broadcasts to three transmissions daily, extending its time by 
50%. On 20 April, it announced that students of the Moscow School 
of Oriental Studies had resolved to "support the struggle of
1. Radio Moscow in persian, 17 January 1951, SWB, USSR, p. 20.
Radio Moscow in Arabic, 20 and 21 July 1951, ibid, pp. 14-15.
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Muslim peoples against imperialism for peace". The increase of
Soviet interest in the Arab world found its expression in the fact
that the Moscow Academy of Sciences established at the end of 1950
an Institute for Oriental Studies, which set up a separate
department for Turkey, Iran and the Arab countries*. A new line,
emphasizing the desirability of close contact between Soviet
Muslims and Muslims abroad, appeared in Soviet broadcasts. This
represented a new Soviet approach as in previous years contacts
with Muslims abroad had been considered unacceptable.
The manifestation of friendliness towards the Soviet Union among
senior Egyptian politicians was continuing and reached a climax
when on 8 August 1951, Salah al-Din met in Cairo two Soviet
diplomats who had arrived from Beirut. The Soviet diplomats'
mission was twofold: first, to assess the Egyptian reactions to
the new Soviet peace offensive: second, to find out whether Egypt
would agree to lead the peace offensive in the Middle East by
signing a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union. The Soviets
emphasized that opening negotiations with the U.S.S.R. on such
a pact would reaffirm Egypt's stand for neutrality between the two
blocs. It was also said: "If Egypt were to conduct negotiations
with the U.S.S.R., such negotiations would nullify the 1936 treaty
and would be the first positive and sensational step towards real
neutrality". !!j>alah al-Din was quoted as replying: "I am also
a partisan of peace, of a well-balanced world peace, because peace
is our goal and wars will only do good to the imperialistic 
? — —states" . Salah a l - D m  assured the two diplomats that their
1. Francis Ofner, "Soviet voices cordiality to Middle East Muslims", 
Christian Science Monitor, 5 July 1951.
2. This information was given to the American Embassy in Cairo by 
a source classified as highly confidential; see dispatch 325 
from Caffery, Cairo, 10 August 1951, RG 59, 661.741/8-1051.
The Egyptian press, with various political views had called for 
the strengthening of relations with the Soviet Union and
fighting by all means to expel British Imperialism. For
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proposal would be discussed with his colleagues and refused to
commit himself. Although a non-aggression pact with the U.S.S.R.
had been considered by Salah al-Din as an essential element in the
implementation of his policy of neutralism, he preferred to keep
this option as a means of pressure on the Western powers. A few
weeks later, the prospects of signing such a pact seemed to be
closer than ever before.
On 26 July 1951, Israel and Britain complained to the Security
Council against Egypt's long-term policy of imposing restrictions
on Suez Canal traffic to Israel. Egypt found itself almost
completely isolated during six weeks of U.N. debates on this
complaint. The Soviet Union was the only Power to support Egypt.
Soviet officials regarded Egyptian policy as legal. For instance,
On 25 July 1951, during a conversation between Gromyko and
Eliashiv, the Israeli Minister to Moscow, Gromyko said that the
Egyptian assertions that Egypt and Israel were in a state of war,
were in line with international law. Throughout their
conversation, Gromyko sided with Egypt^. Later on, many efforts
to prevent the Soviet veto were made by the Israeli Foreign
Ministry in Jerusalem and by Abba Eban, the Chief Israeli delegate
to the U.N., who had had several meetings with Semyon K.
o
Tsarapkin, Soviet acting chief delegate to the U.N.
instance, on 10 May 1951, Al-Sha*b al-Jadid, the weekly of the 
Socialist Party said that Britain was to know that the Egyptian 
government was not afraid to conclude a non-aggression treaty 
with the U.S.S.R. If Britain itself had such a treaty with the 
Soviets, why should Egypt hesitate to conclude a similar pact? 
The same ideas were outlined on the same day by Al-Musawwar, 
the independent weekly. On 20 September 1951, Al-Ahr5m, the 
independent daily paper, said "we must not limit our national 
struggle to Britain but should enlarge it to include the allies 
of Britain as well". Britain, said the paper, diffused the 
false argument, that the Soviet Union was attempting to create 
another Korea in the Middle East.
1. Report No. 4 from Eliashiv, Moscow, 25 July 1951, ISA, FM2457/ 
14.
2. Ibid. J.T.A. News, 31 August 1951. New York Times, 1 September
1951.
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On 29 August, when the Security Council was about to vote on
a resolution calling on Egypt to end its restrictions, Tsarapkin
intervened in favour of Egypt to delay action against it-*-.
On 30 August, during a press conference in Cairo, Salah al-Din
regarded the Soviet intervention as a "happy surprise".
Nonetheless, his uncertain statement, saying that "active Russian
intervention in form of veto will make our task in Egypt
measurably more difficult" , did not presumably, encourage
the Soviet Union to side with Egypt during the vote. According to
certain reports from Cairo, the Soviet move was intended to gain
political benefit. These reports claimed that the Soviets asked
the Egyptian government to give freedom of action to Harakat
Ansar al-Salam and other fellow-travellers in Egypt and to
back the U.S.S.R. in international affairs. When the Egyptian
government refused to bargain, the Soviets decided to change their 
3position .
On 1 September 1951, Egypt was condemned by the Security 
Council. The Soviet Union abstained. By their abstention, the 
Soviet Union lost a considerable opportunity to improve their 
position in Egypt. The Soviets repeated the same mistake made by 
them during the Palestine conflict. The U.S.S.R. was not willing 
to sacrifice its interests in Israel by supporting the Arabs, 
without substantial political assurances from Egypt^. Despite
1. W.R. Frye, "Russia woos Arab bloc in UN, balks action on Suez 
blockade", Christian Science Monitor (New York), 30 August 1951. 
New York Times, 30 August 1951. Britain complained that all
its requests to lift the blockade against the transport of 
crude oil to its refinery at Haifa, were rejected by the 
Egyptian government. On this dispute and the debate in the 
Security Council, see, F0371/90196, JE1261/181-I86.
2. Dispatch 272 from Caffery, Cairo, 31 August 1951, RG 84, Moscow 
Embassy-Confidential File, 1951:320-Egypt, box 157.
3. "Russian prestige slips in Middle East", Christian Science 
Monitor, 18 September 1951.
4. A few days after the vote, Sobolev, the Press Attache of the 
Soviet Legation in Cairo said after a meeting with Husain
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the disappointment arising out of Israel's neutral or even pro- 
Western policy, Israel was still the only country in the Middle 
East in which the Communist party functioned legally and enjoyed 
equal opportunities. At that stage, a vote against Israel, while 
the Western Powers were united in condemning Egypt, could have 
led to a significant deterioration in the relations between the 
two countries. In this case, Israel would have probably found firm 
justification for changing its neutral policy and have officially 
taken the side of the West. A Soviet vote in favour of Egypt could 
have been a turning point in their policy towards the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. When the relations between Egypt and Britain were at a 
low ebb, every manifestation of Soviet support could have been 
a success for Salah al-Din's foreign policy and would have 
strengthened his political position vis-'k-vis Siraj al-DTn. The 
Soviet Union, presumably, did not pay much attention to the fact 
that the Egyptian government had spoken with two voices. That is 
to say, Salah al-DTn could not accept their condition that freedom 
of action would be given to leftist groups without having the 
consent of Siraj al-DTn, who was in charge on internal affairs and 
represented the anti-Soviet faction in the Wafdist government.
Soon after the vote, Siraj al-DTn rejected the accusations which 
had appeared in the Egyptian press, that owing to his refusal to 
accept the Soviet conditions, Egypt had lost Soviet support during 
the vote. He said that he had never had any expectations from the 
Soviets and summed up his determination to stop any communist 
activity. To quote him: "These events taught us the lesson that we 
should depend on ourselves...We will follow the road which will 
lead to our interests...We never start by antagonizing others...
Radiy, the Egyptian Under Secretary for Foreign affairs, that
it was still impossible to conclude a non-aggression pact with
Egypt, as Egypt was tied to Britain by a treaty of alliance.
See Arab News Agency, 16 September 1951, SWB, Arab World, p. 31.
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while we combat Communism in our country because it does not 
correspond with our religion and system, it does not mean that we 
fight Russia as a state"*.
The bitter Egyptian reaction and disappointment at the Soviet 
vote did not have great implications for the improvement of 
relations between the two countries. The pro-Soviet group in the 
Egyptian government realized that as long as the Arab-Israeli 
conflict was the subject under discussion at the U.N. arena, 
the Soviet government would prefer to hold a neutral position. On 
the other hand, they understood that the Soviets would take their 
side in any future conflict with the Western powers. They decided 
therefore, to control their emotions and to prevent any 
aggravation in relations with the U.S.S.R. This move seemed to 
meet with success. Soon after, the Egyptian government decided on 
8 October to abrogate the treaty of 1936 and declared Faruq King 
of Egypt and the Sudan; the U.S.S.R. supported Egypt.
A few weeks before the decision was made, manifestations of 
support for the intentions of the Egyptian government were summed 
up by the Eastern bloc press. The reason behind the new anti­
imperialist attitude of the Wafd government, said Radio Budapest, 
was that "the working masses are having an increasing say in 
political developments in Egypt". This new development indicated
that the struggle for peace was rallying the ever increasing 
3masses .
As early as the decision was made, a stormy debate was conducted 
inside the Wafd government between the two rival factions. On the
1. Siraj al-DTn was interviewed by Al-Ahram on 9 September 1951.
See translation of this interview in dispatch 668 from American 
Embassy, Cairo, RG 59, 774.00/9-1451.
2. See dispatch 618 from Caffery, Cairo, 8 September 1951, RG 84, 
Moscow Embassy-Confidential Files, 1951: 320-Egypt, box 157.
3. Radio Budapest, 22 August 1951, SWB, Communist Broadcasts, p. 7. 
Radio Moscow in Arabic, 23 August 1951, SWB, USSR, p. 18.
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one hand, Salah al-Din was determined to make a decision calling 
for the abrogation of the 1936 treaty. On the other hand, Siraj 
al-DTn endeavoured to prevent such a decision. To force the 
government to accept his opinion, Salah al-Din said that if the 
government did not abrogate the treaty he would resign and 
undertake a campaign against the government. Siraj al-Din realized 
that such a move could be disastrous for the Wafd as most of the 
political groups in Egypt supported abrogation. A few weeks before 
abrogation was announced, he held the view that there was no 
alternative to abrogating the treaty^-. Even King Faruq could 
not alter his government's decision. To quote him: "I cannot set 
myself in opposition to the whole country and in this instance the 
whole country is of the same mind as the government". Faruq 
affirmed that Salah al-Din was responsible for the existing 
situation. In comparison to Nahhas Pasha, who was described by 
Faruq as "old and his mind does not work as well as it did", Salah 
al-Din, said the King, "was young and impulsive and also has 
other drawbacks". Despite Faruq's disagreement with Salah al-Din's 
political views, he admitted that he could not ask for the Foreign 
Minister's resignation because: "If I ^Faruq] broke with him I 
would stir up a veritable hornets nest, and I do not like
o
hornets" .
The British government's response to the Egyptian decision was 
restrained. On 13 October, together with the governments, of the 
United States, France and Turkey, they proposed to the Egyptian
1. The information was given to Caffery by Jailed Pasha. See 
dispatch 577 from Caffery, Cairo, 5 September 1951, RG 59, 
774.00/9-551. See also, A^imad Uamrush, Qissat thaurat 23 
Yuliyo, Vol. 1, (Cairo: 1983), pp. 152-154.
2. See record of conversation between king Faruq and Caffery, 30 
September 1951, FRUS 1951, Vol. V, pp. 388-389. On the 
political instability and the anti-British struggle in Egypt 
during the second half of 1951 see, Vatikiotis, The History of 
Egypt, pp. 370-372. Selma Botman, The Rise of Egyptian 
Communism, pp. 100-104.
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government to join them in establishing a Middle Eastern Command. 
This command/ it was said, intended to protect Egypt and other 
Middle Eastern countries against aggression from without. The 
aim was, to prevent the penetration of the region by communism 
in peacetime and to prepare the defence of the region against 
Soviet military power in wartime. Egypt was invited to participate 
as a founder member of the Command on a basis of equality and 
partnership with other founder members^-. In case of Egyptian 
participation, the U.K. was willing to abrogate the 1936 treaty 
and to withdraw from Egypt "such British forces as are not 
allocated to the Allied Middle East Command by agreement between 
the Egyptian Government and the Governments of other countries
o
also participating as founder members" .
The Middle East Command proposal was the most significant 
commitment to the security of the area, made by the Americans, 
since the Truman Doctrine of 1947. The Americans were aware that 
the Western Powers were facing a real threat. They realized that 
under the present conditions of growing neutralism among the 
ruling circles in Egypt and the crisis in Anglo-Egyptian 
relations, their commitment to the defence of the area was an 
essential step .
On 15 October, the four-power proposals was rejected by the 
Egyptian government. It said that the acceptance of the proposal 
meant the substitution of other foreign troops for British ones.
1. Muhammad Khalil, The Arab States and the Arab League A 
Documentary Record, Vol. II, (Beirut: Khayats, 1962), pp. 314- 
315.
2. Ibid.
3. Harry N. Howard, "The development of United States Policy in 
the Near East, South Asia and Africa 1951-1952", 15 December 
1952, Papers of Harry N. Howard, File Subject: Near East-South 
Asia 1945-1955, box 3, Truman Library. C.I.A., "The British 
Position in Egypt", 15 October 1951, President's Secretary's 
Files, File Subject:C .I .A . Reports-NATL, Intelligence Estimate, 
NIE-44, box 253, Truman Library.
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To strengthen the government position, the Egyptian Parliament 
confirmed the abrogation of the treaties of 1899 and 1936*.
The Soviet Union attacked the four-power proposals. In a Tass 
bulletin, of 16 October, the Soviet Union claimed that the Middle 
East Command plan was intended to preserve Egypt as a military 
base for the "aggressive Anglo-American bloc". That was the reason 
why this proposal was made immediately after the Egyptian 
government decided to abrogate the 1936 treaty, which allowed 
Britain to keep their troops on Egyptian territory. This proposal, 
said Tass, was regarded by the Egyptian government as "not 
corresponding to the national aspirations of the Egyptian people",
o
and therefore, rejected by it . A lot of attention was given by 
the Soviets to the anti-British campaign which was accompanied by 
strikes and demonstrations as well as terrorist activity against 
British troops, mainly in the Suez Canal zone . This activity to 
liquidate the British imperial rule, said Pravda, was a basic 
natural task for the Egyptian people4 . The British imperialists, 
said Izvestiia, increased their forces in the Canal zone, under 
the pretext that the Egyptian government had lost its ability to 
maintain order. The British decision to take responsibility for 
the maintenance of order in the area, led the Anglo-Egyptian 
crisis to a climax. Despite the clash of interests, both the 
U.S.A. and Britain were united in a common aim- to preserve the 
colonial system. The American attempts to act as mediators in this 
dispute, said Izvestiia, were intended to strengthen their 
position in Egypt . The development of the events m  Egypt said
1. Ro'i, Soviet Decision Making in Practice, p. 408,.
2. Tass transmission, 16 October 1951, SWB, USSR, pp. 11-12.
3. On the anti-British campaign and clashes between British troops 
and Egyptian guerrilla fighters, see, Vatikiotis, ibid#
4. Pravda (Moscow), 23 October 1951. Literaturnaia Gazeta (Moscow), 
18 October 1951. Izvestiia (Moscow), 19 October 1951.
5. G. Akopian, "Bor'ba Egipta protiv kabal'nykh dogovorov",
Izvestiia, 20 October 1951.
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Pravda, "testifies to the further exacerbation of the crisis of 
the colonial system of imperialism. At the same time, said the 
paper, it testifies to the unabated attempts of the imperialists 
to drag the dependent and colonial countries into their aggressive 
war plans"*. It is to be pointed out that despite their fervent 
support for Egypt in its effort to expel Britain from the Suez 
Canal, the Soviets kept silent about Egyptian claims in the Sudan. 
From this viewpoint, their approach remained consistent and in
line with Gromyko's speech of 20 August 1947 at the Security
. ?
Council .
The Americans who seemed to believe that their commitments to 
the defence of the area, would persuade Egypt to accept the Four- 
Power proposals, were disappointed at the Egyptian response. In a 
statement on 17 October, Acheson said that the U.S.A. was 
surprised that "the Egyptian government rejected proposals of such 
importance without having given them the careful and considered 
deliberation which they merited". In order to put some pressure on 
the Egyptian government to reconsider its position, Acheson
declared that the Egyptian decision to abrogate its treaties with
3Britain was considered by the U.S.A. to be without validity .
Despite their anger, the Americans refused to take part in a plan 
to dismiss Salah al-Din. The plan was organized by British 
officials in contact with Siraj al-DTn and King Faruq, and was 
intended to dismiss Salah al-DTn whom they considered to be 
chiefly responsible for the present situation. They believed that 
his removal would create a basis for a mutual understanding and 
thus prevent a further rift in Egypt relations with the West. The 
Americans who agreed that §alaft al-Din should go, explained that 
their refusal to carry out such an action was in order not to
1. B. Korionov, "Mezhdunarodnoe obozrenie", Pravda, 22 October 1951.
2. On Gromyko's speech see p. 98.
3. Khalil, The Arab States, pp. 315-316.
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exacerbate the crisis. They believed that Salah al-DTn's policy 
was supported by most of the political circles in Egypt^.
Indeed, a gradual change towards neutralism had been reflected in 
statements made by prominent Egyptian politicians, known to side 
with the West. For instance, in March 1951, cAzzam Pasha, the 
General Secretary of the Arab League, declared in a public lecture 
that the Western Powers were the enemy of Egypt. He said 
furthermore, that there were no reasons, "past or present" for 
hostility between the U.S.S.R. and the Arabs. On 6 October 1951, 
in a public statement, he encouraged the Egyptian Government to
o
abrogate the 1936 treaty .
American assessment of the existing trend on Egypt's political 
scene was utterly correct. On 1 November, Siraj al-DTn warned 
Britain, that by cutting off the Suez Canal Zone from the 
rest of Egypt, they were increasing the possibility of a 
revolution. This state of affairs, stressed the Minister of the 
Interior, would lead to "bread riots" and undoubtedly be exploited
q
by the communists . Indeed, Western Powers had good reason to be 
anxious about §alafr al-DTn's short-and long-term policies. Soon 
after Acheson had expressed American anger at Egypt's rejection 
of the idea of the Middle Eastern Command, §alah al-DTn held 
a meeting with the Soviet Minister in Cairo. During their long
1. See secret telegram from Acheson, Rome, 26 November 1951, and 
secret letter from Caffery, Cairo, 30 November 1951, FRUS 1951, 
Vol. V, pp. 427-429. Secret telegram from Gifford, the American 
Ambassador in London, 7 December 1951, ibid, pp. 431-432.Letter 
from Stevenson, Cairo,13 November 1951, F0371/90182,JE11910/140.
2. Letter No. 1071/127/51 from British Embassy, Cairo, to African 
Department, F.O., 15 October 1951, F0371/90144, JE1051/366.
3. O.M. Marashian, "Soviet Bloc backs Egypt on Suez issue", 
Christian Science Monitor, 2 November 1951. See also a record 
of conversation between Stevenson and Siraj al-DTn, in, letter 
No. 137 from Stevenson, Cairo, 10 December 1951, F0371/90151, 
JE1051/525. The turning point in Britain decision to use force 
took place soon after the Conservative Party returned to power 
on 26 October 1951. During the election campaign, the labour 
government was accused by Conservatives of having created the
anti-British struggle owing to its weakness and inability to 
confront Egyptian extremists.
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talk, on 24 October, the Egyptian Foreign Minister examined 
the possibility of signing a non-aggression pact with the Soviet 
Union*. On the same day, he was attending a meeting of a new 
organization called the Committee of National Pact. This group was 
organized to mobilize the "nation behind the conflict with 
Britain". The organization adopted a resolution calling for a non­
aggression pact with the U.S.S.R. and the severing of diplomatic 
and economic relations with Britain^. Salah al-Din took almost 
every opportunity to insist that Soviet-Egyptian relations were 
friendly. In a press conference in Cairo, on 26 October, he did 
not mention explicitly that a non-aggression pact was to be signed 
with the U.S.S.R. but hinted at such a possibility. In a statement 
to the press, he made, inter alia, the following points:
"The relations between Egypt and the Soviet Union are the 
ordinary relations which exist between friendly states within 
the framework of the U.N. Charter. It is within the framework 
of this general principle that we will consider the basis of 
our relations with the Soviet Union in the future".
Stevenson, the British Ambassador, confirmed that Salah al-DTn
clearly said that it was very probable that Egypt would enter
into some kind of pact with the U.S.S.R. in the near future.
As before, the Egyptian government spoke with two voices and
again, the quarrels and contradictions between its two senior
ministers became apparent. In a conversation between Caffery and
1. Intelligence Report No. 5691, prepared by the Office of 
Intelligence Research, Department of State, 8 November 1951,
R&A Reports, IR 5691.
2. This group included $afiz Ramadan Pasha, the head of the 
Nationalist party, Hajj Amin al-^usaini, exiled Mufti of 
Jerusalem,various sheiks and the head of the Muslim Brotherhood. 
See, New York Times, 26 October 1951. See also, ibid, 23 October
1951. Following the abrogation, propaganda for a Soviet-Egyptian 
non-aggression pact was making progress. This propaganda was 
mainly conducted by Al-Misri, principal organ of the Wafd party. 
On 22 October, Al-Misri said that in the Second World War, 
"Britain allied itself with the Soviet Union to save itself from 
danger, so, it was necessary for Egypt to do the same thing now".
3. Ibid. Salami al-Din's statement was also quoted extensively by 
Pravda on 27 October 1951.
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Siraj al-Din, the latter denied that the Egyptian government had 
any intention to sign such a pact^.
The Four Powers appreciated that the only possibility of 
altering Egypt's rejection of their proposals, would be to make 
to other Arab states the same proposals. This move, they 
believed, would be positively received by the Arabs and would 
therefore put strong pressure on Egypt, which would find itself 
isolated. The results were however very different. As a result of 
Egyptian pressure, the Arab states decided to endorse Egypt's 
rejection. They refused to consider the Four-Power proposals
o
before the Anglo-Egyptian conflict had been settled . Soviet 
notes to the Arab states and to Israel, on 21 November, warning 
them against accepting the Four-Power proposals, was an immediate 
reaction to the approach to the Arabs. Unlike Egypt which rejected 
the idea of an M.E.C. (Middle East Command), the Arabs placed 
conditions that, if accepted, could have led to their joining.
AnTs al-Azr, the Egyptian Minister to Moscow, was the first to 
receive the note from Gromyko, the Deputy Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of the U.S.S.R. On the same day, Gromyko handed analogous 
notes to the representatives of Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Israel 
and on 22 November, to the governments of Saudi Arabia and 
Yemen . Although the Soviet Government was well aware that
1. Letter No. 844 from Stevenson, Cairo, 26 October 1951, F0371/ 
90182, JE11910/130. A confirmation of the existence of 
negotiations between Egypt and the U.S.S.R. was also given by 
Atasi, the Syrian Foreign Minister. See dispatch 269 from 
American Embassy,Damascus,8 November 1951, RG 59,661.741/11-851.
2. On the joint statement by the Four Powers to Arab states on 10 
November 1951, see, Khalil, ibid, pp. 316-317. On the American 
decision to apply to Egypt and the Arab states and on the Arab 
position concerning Four-Power proposals see, Top Secret letter 
from the Israeli Embassy, Washington, 6 November 1951, I.S.A., 
FM2551/8/A. See also,United States Government,Office Memorandum, 
made by Stabler, 26 November 1951, RG 59, 774.00/11-2651.
3. On Soviet notes to Arab countries, see, F0371/91230, E1192/354. 
On Soviet note to Israel and the conversation between Gromyko 
and Eliashiv, in the Soviet Foreign Office, on 21 November 
1951, see, Report No. 14 from S. Eliashiv, Israeli Minister to
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Israel had not been invited to join the M.E.C., and that Israel 
had no aggressive plans against the Soviet Union, it decided to 
warn Israel against joining such a command. This decision arose 
out of the Soviet need to keep a balanced position in their policy 
towards the Arab-Israeli conflict. If Israel had not received the 
note, Egypt could have blamed the U.S.S.R. for a pro-Israeli 
policy, since Egypt had definitely rejected the Four-Power 
proposals, in contrast to Israel whose official attitude to the 
proposals was unknown. Soviet notes to the governments of Israel 
and Egypt were therefore, more friendly in comparison with the 
other notes, despite the fact that most of the content was 
similar. In the note to Egypt, the U.S.S.R. expressed its fears 
that Middle East Command would lead to the loss of the 
independence and sovereignty of Middle Eastern countries and 
"their subjugation to certain big Powers, which are trying to use 
their territories, their material resources - oil. cotton, etc.- 
for aggressive ends of theirs". The Soviets rejected the argument 
made by the Four Powers, that the establishment of Middle Eastern 
Command was intended to defend the Middle Eastern countries. They 
stressed that Middle Eastern Command intended "to disguise the 
drawing of Egypt as well as of other countries... into military 
measures of the Atlantic bloc directed against the Soviet Union 
and the people's democracies". The note ended by expressing Soviet 
appreciation to Egypt for its firm stand against the Four-Power 
proposals, and with a warning, mainly directed to the other 
countries, that their joining such an organization would be a 
grave mistake and lead to severe results:
Moscow, 9 December 1951, I.S.A., FM2457/14. See full text of 
the note to Israel in, ibid, FM2512/27/A. On the reply of the 
Government of Israel to Soviet note, see draft in FM2457/14 and 
telegram 393 from Sir F. Evans, British Ambassador in Tel-Aviv, 
12 December 1951, F0371/91231, E1192/388.
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"The Soviet government fully appraises the stand taken at 
present by the government of Egypt with regard to the above 
proposals... and deems it necessary to draw the attention of 
the government of Egypt to the fact that the participation of 
countries of the Near and Middle East in the so-called Middle 
Eastern Command would cause serious damage to the relations 
existing between the U.S.S.R. and these countries, as well as 
to the cause of maintaining peace and security in the area of 
the Near and Middle East" .
Determined to express its objection to the idea of establishing 
a Middle Eastern Command, the Soviet government also sent notes on 
24 November, to the Four Powers. In the notes, the U.S.S.R. 
protested against the subordination of the Middle Eastern states 
through the M.E.C. and the establishment of such an aggressive 
organization so close to Soviet borders. The idea of a Middle 
Eastern Command, said the Soviets, represented "nothing but an 
attempt to draw the countries of the Near and Middle East into 
the war measures which are being carried by the aggressive 
Atlantic bloc". The note for the government of the United States 
ended with a warning emphasizing that
"The Government of the U.S.S.R. deems it necessary to draw the 
attention of the Government of the United States to the fact 
that it cannot overlook these new aggressive plans, expressed 
in the establishing of a Middle Eastern Command in an area 
located not far from the frontiers of the Soviet Union. The 
Soviet Government deems it necessary also to state that the 
responsibility for the situation which may arise as a result 
of this will rest with the Government of the United States and 
the other initiators of the establishing of the above- 
mentioned Command".
1. See full text of the note, in, Khalil, ibid, pp. 317-319. See 
full text in Russian in, Ministerstvo Inostrannykh del SSSR, 
SSSR i Arabskie Strany 1917-1960, Dokumenty i Materialy 
(Moskva: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo Politideskoii Literatury, 
1961), pp. 103-106. See also Tass transmission on 23 November 
1951, SWB, USSR, pp. 8-10.
2. See full text of the note to the Government of the United 
States in, Khalil, ibid, pp. 320-321 and in SSSR i Arabskie 
Strany, pp. 106-108. On the Conversation between Gromyko and 
Cumming, the American Charge in the Soviet Union, on 24 
November, see dispatches 898 and 899 from Cumming, Moscow,
24 November 1951, RG 84, Moscow Embassy-Confidential File,
1951: 350-Near East, box 162.On the note to the British 
Government, see telegrams 791 and 792 from Sir A. Gascoigne, 
the British Ambassador to Moscow, 24 November 1951, F0371/ 
91229, El192/343-344.
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The message to both the Four Powers and to Middle Eastern 
countries was clear - the Soviet Union would take any measure to 
prevent the establishment of Middle Eastern Command. The Soviets 
chose the right timing from their point of view. Undoubtedly, 
Soviet reaction came as a reply after an extended pressure put on 
Arab countries by the Four Powers to accept their proposals. In 
the period between 10 to 21 November Arab states were under strong 
pressure. On the one hand they were required to join the Four- 
Power plan, on the other Egypt was exerting tremendous pressure on 
these countries to side with it in rejecting the proposals. The 
Soviets realized that protesting sharply against both the Arabs 
and the Western Powers would achieve two goals. First, it would 
back Egypt and strengthen its position vis-a-vis other Arab 
countries which inclined to join the plan. Secondly, it would 
encourage Egypt to continue with the same line and not to 
surrender to pressure from without. Soviet notes to the Four 
Powers was inter alia, .a proof to Egypt that the Soviet government 
would support its efforts by all means, and that the Soviets were 
not in an inferior position vis-a-vis the Western Powers. Soviet 
notes were also intended to clarify to the Arabs that the U.S.S.R. 
did not have any expansionist aims in the Middle East or 
elsewhere. The Soviets stressed moreover that the Arabs should 
realize that the Middle Eastern Command would bring their 
independence to an end.
In a period of more than three weeks, the Four Powers discussed 
intensively the question of a reply to the Soviet Government. 
During this period, differences of opinions broke out between 
the Americans and the Turks on the one hand, and the French 
and British on the other. The bone of contention was that the 
former argued that the Soviets should be attacked for being
aggressive, whereas the latter wanted to confine themselves to a
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refutation of the charges levelled against them. In other words, 
according to the Americans, the British and French approach was 
too defensive in its tone. Towards the middle of December 1951, 
after consultations and exchanges of opinion, the Four Powers 
agreed that they should take a broadly similar line. The Four then 
decided that it was important from the publicity point of view 
that there should be no difference in tone and in the broad lines 
of argumentation*.
In their reply to the Soviet Government on 18 December 1951, the 
Four Powers rejected Soviet allegation that Middle East Command 
was aggressive in intent. The decision whether to join the command 
or not, was a free choice given to the independent governments of 
the Middle Eastern states. No pressure, the Four Powers stressed, 
had been put on any of these countries. In their reply, resolute 
in tone, the Americans blamed the Soviets for attempting to 
subvert, externally and internally, the existing regimes in the 
Middle East^. An immediate comment on the British reply was made 
by Gromyko after receiving the note from Sir A. Gascoigne on 18 
December. Gromyko stressed that its terms were quite unconvincing 
and that he could not agree with the Four-Power contentions .
The Soviet notes were the major Soviet diplomatic initiative in 
the Middle East, following the Palestine conflict, aiming to make 
it clear that the Middle East should remain neutral in the East- 
West conflict. This official move came about after a long and 
continuous campaign waged through the Soviet media, against the 
Western Powers' ideas and plans for a Middle Eastern defence
1. On the dialogue and correspondence between the Four Powers, see 
F0371/91230, El192/359-361, 374-375, 377-379. F0371/91231,
El192/381-383, 386-392, 394, 404. FRUS 1951, Vol. V, pp. 250- 
256.
2. See full texts of the American and British replies in Khalil, 
ibid, pp. 321-323.




The Soviet official line of supporting the Wafd government in 
its struggle against Britain continued until its collapse on 
27 January 1952. This support found its expression in the 
Soviet press which expressed its sympathy with the Egyptian 
government and people for their justified struggle against the 
"barbaric British attack" m  Suez Canal zone . To quote Radio 
Moscow: "The anti-imperialist struggle was merging all sections of 
the populations...highest spiritual leaders and lecturers of 
Al-Azhar, the Muslim University, and the Egyptian Government". The 
Soviet Government's notes, said Radio Moscow, had been "received 
with satisfaction by the varied classes in Egypt and other Middle 
Eastern countries". Now it was clear that the Egyptian people 
would not be frightened "by the aggression launched by Great 
Britain with the assistance of other imperialist powers" .
There was a direct connection between the events at the Suez 
Canal zone and the new line adopted by the Plenary Session of the 
Council of "The World Movement for Peace", held in Vienna from 1 
to 6 November 1951. The Council developed regional peace campaigns 
in terms of national liberation and anti-imperialism. More
1. See for instance, L. Vatolina, "Manevry imperialistov v Egipte" 
Izvestiia (Moscow), 12 May 1950. Vatolina said that both the 
British and the Americans, tried to realize their aggressive 
plans and to turn Egypt into one of their military bases in the 
Near East, by drawing Egypt into the projected aggressive 
Mediterranean bloc. Krasnaia Zvezda claimed that the visit to 
Egypt of Slim, the British Field Marshal, was connected with 
the realization of measures for the preparation of further war 
and the transformation of the Suez Canal zone into a military 
base for the imperialists in the Near East. See, "Na Temy Dnia: 
Fel'dmarshal Slim puteshestvuet", Krasnaia Zvezda, 11 June 1950. 
See also, Anglo-amerikanskoe sopernichestvo na Blizhnem Vostoke" 
Vecherniaia Moskva, 11 December 1950; Izvestiia, 13 January 
1951; Krasnyi Flot, 7 February 1951; V. Kudriavtsev, 
"Amerikanskie proiski na Blizhnem Vostoke", Izvestiia, 14 April 
1951; V. Kudriavtsev, "Nastuplenie SSHA na Angliiu v 
Sredizemnomorskom Basseiine", Izvestiia, 24 June 1951;
V. Mikhaiilov, "Egipet i Amerika", Zaria Vastoka, 1 July 1951.
2. Tass transmission, 7 December 1951, SWB, USSR, p. 7.
3. Radio Moscow, 4 December 1951, SWB, USSR, p. 17.
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emphasis was given to violence in this struggle. The movement for 
national independence was to refuse to collaborate "in any sort of 
defence pact under Western auspices". During the session, Kamil 
al-Bindari, the Egyptian delegate declared: "The Egyptian people 
had passed the stage of signatures and reached that of battle"*. 
Indeed, Harakat Ansar al-Salam of which Al-Bindari was one leader, 
played a major role in waging terrorist and guerrilla activities 
against British troops. The people behind these activities were
_ 9
described by Salah a l - D m  as "Egyptian patriots" . Their 
activities achieved the required aims. The British, who were 
determined to stop these activities by taking military action, 
including the occupation of the Suez Canal zone, lost their few 
sympathizers in Egyptian ruling circles. King Faruq, their main 
sympathizer, said that "they were making it impossible for him or 
any Egyptian government ever to accept a satisfactory solution of
q , .
either defence problem or Sudan question"0 . British military 
action contributed to reinforce Salah al-DTn's argument that 
Britain and not the U.S.S.R was Egypt's main enemy and that Egypt 
was to reject any military alliance with Britain.
The political and economic relations between Egypt and the 
Soviet Union were significantly improved in the second half of 
1951, mainly in the last quarter, when the two rejected the idea 
of a Middle Eastern Command, and the U.S.S.R. supported Egypt in
1. See Confidential Report PR/22/23, on Soviet policy in the 
Middle East, prepared by the British F.O., 5 December 1951, 
F0371/91231, E1192/408. A few days later, Bindarl stated that 
if the government of Egypt would give him the orders, he could 
import "arms for 2 million men from a highly cooperative 
U.S.S.R". See, dispatch 700 from Caffery, Cairo, 14 November 
1951, RG 84, Moscow Embassy-Confidential File, 1951:320-Egypt, 
box 157.
2. Salami al-Din was quoted by Tass on 17 November 1951, SWB, USSR, 
p . 14.
3. Telegram from Caffery, Cairo, 24 October 1951, FRUS 1951, Vol. 
V, p. 409. It is to be pointed out that Faruq was speaking to 
Caffery whom he must have known to be in favour of the British 
giving in to Egyptian demands.
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its struggle against Britain. This process of rapprochement 
culminated on 30 November 1951, when Salah al-Din made statement
9 *
that nothing would prevent Egypt from obtaining Soviet arms in a 
commercial exchange as the West had created serious difficulties 
in supplying and delivering arms to Egypt*. In his book Qissat 
thaurat 23 Yuliyo, Aljmad Uamrush has confirmed that negotiations 
for purchasing arms from Eastern European countries took place at 
the end of 1951. In order to strengthen police forces in the Canal 
Zone, to be able to maintain order, the Egyptian Government 
decided to approach the Legations of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia 
and the Soviet Union. Siraj al-Din represented the Egyptian 
Government in these negotiations. These attempts, said 
Hamrush, signified the first contacts between Egypt and the 
Eastern bloc for the purchase of arms. According to Siraj al-Din, 
these attempts did not meet with success because these countries 
feared that such a move would provoke the Western Powers . The 
reason for the Soviet refusal to supply arms to Egypt as given by 
Siraj al-Din was not realistic. How could the U.S.S.R. reject such 
an opportunity, especially when the Western Powers were 
endeavouring to convince Egypt to side with them and to form a 
Middle East Command directed against Soviet interests? The Soviet 
Union was the one who had been provoked by the Four-Power 
proposals. It would therefore make sense that the Soviets would 
reply positively to Egypt's request and by doing so, to create the 
suitable conditions to strengthen their position in this strategic 
area. The Soviet refusal could be explained in a different way. 
Siraj al-Din who planned and waged the anti-communist campaign in
1. §alah al-Din was interviewed by the French paper Paris Presse 
on 30 November 1951, see dispatch 3273 from American Embassy, 
Paris, 1 December 1951, RG 59, 774.00/12-151.
2. IJamrush, Qissat taurat 23 Yuliyo, Vol. 1, p. 155 and ibid,
Vol. 2, p. 61.
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Egypt was known for his anti-Soviet attitude. The Soviets, 
presumably, estimated that Siraj's request for arms was a tactical 
move intended to put pressure on Britain to stop its military 
activity in the Suez Canal. The Soviets ruled out the possibility 
of a change in Siraj's anti-Soviet approach and they still 
considered him as a pro-Western and as the main obstacle 
in the process of rapprochement between the two countries. 
Moreover, the Soviets probably assumed that a positive reply to 
him could have strengthened significantly his position vis-a-vis 
their main supporter- Salah al-Din and consequently to weaken the 
leftist wing inside the Wafdist government.
Whether Siraj al-Din's application for Soviet arms was motivated 
purely by military needs, his move indicated a complete turning 
point in Wafd policy. In the short term, it was a victory for 
Salah al-Din's neutralism. British complete disregard of the 
Minister of the Interior's calls to stop their military actions 
and Siraj al-DTn's inability to maintain order, put the latter in 
an inferior position and made him gradually lose his authority.
His application to the Soviets, could be therefore, explained as 
one of despair.
In its last month in power, the Wafd government worked to 
tighten its relations with the U.S.S.R. Internationally, the 
government instructed its representatives to gravitate towards the 
Soviet orbit, sometimes against their own inclinations. Such was 
the case with Ahmad FathT al-cAqqad, the Egyptian Ambassador to 
Kabul. American reports indicated that FathT al-^Aqqad and his 
Soviet counterpart, Artemi Fedorovitch Fedorov, were on much 
more friendly terms in January 1952 than was previously the case. 
Privately, the Egyptian Ambassador indicated to both his British 
and American counterparts his disagreement with his government's 
anti-British policy. Although, he was seen publicly with the
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Soviet Ambassador more and more frequently, and the two were 
meeting at regular internals in each other's missions1. It 
therefore makes sense that FathT al-(Aqqad had acted according to 
the Foreign Ministry's orders.
The Soviet Union continued to support the Egyptian government
in its struggle against Britain and its refusal to accept
the Four-Power proposals. During the discussions of the U.N.
Political committee, held in January 1952, Vyshinskii expressed
Soviet sympathy for "Asian national aspirations". Radio Moscow
pointed out that Egypt was one of these nations. Soviet policy,
said the broadcast, was compatible with the fundamental national
interests of the Near and Middle Eastern countries. Both, Arabs
and Soviets were therefore, rejecting Middle East Command
and British imperialism with its recent military activity in the
o
Suez Canal zone against the Egyptian people . The Egyptian 
government, said Pravda, was supported by "Millions of Egyptian 
patriots" in its policy vis-a-vis Britain. The Egyptian people 
should look towards the U.S.S.R., the country which sincerely 
sympathized with their struggle for freedom and independence . 
Manifestations of mutual support and understanding between Egypt 
and the U.S.S.R. found their expression during the session of the 
General Assembly of the U.N. in January 1952 in Paris. In several 
meetings between Soviet and Arab delegates, the former promised 
their support in the Arab efforts to reduce Western influence in
1. Dispatch 257 from John Evarts Horner, American Charge 
d'Affaires, Kabul, 19 January 1952, RG 59, 661.74/1-1952. In 
this connection, it is to be mentioned that on 24 October 1951, 
Salah al-Din said after a meeting with the Soviet Minister to 
Egypt, that Egypt would support the nomination of a Soviet 
Judge to the International Court of Justice. See, Radio Cairo, 
24 October 1951, SWB, Arab World, p. 19.
2. L. Zimin and D. Davydov, "Za nezavisimost i svobodu", Trud, 12 
January 1952; Radio Moscow in Arabic, 4 January 1952, SWB,
USSR, p. 29.
3. G. Rassadin, "Egipet Segodnia", Pravda (Moscow), 25 January
1952.
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the Middle East. On 20 January, Iakov A. Malik, Deputy Soviet
Foreign Minister, held an extended talk with Salah al-Din. The two
discussed various subjects including the tactics to be adopted
regarding the Tunisian crisis and the admission of Libya to the
U.N. A few days earlier, in a meeting between <Azzam Pasha, head
of the Arab League, and Vyshinskii, Soviet Foreign Minister,
*Azzam Pasha reaffirmed his position that the Arab states would
like to maintain friendly relations with both East and West
despite their internal opposition to communism*. On 23 January,
in an interview to Al-Misri, Vyshinskii expressed Soviet
satisfaction with Egyptian and Arab persistence in rejecting
military alliance with the West. He said that his government would
assist all Middle Eastern peoples "to free themselves of Western
. 2economic domination". Vyshinskii was quoted as saying:
"The unity of Middle Eastern people and their combined efforts 
are the obstacles halting military preparations to turn these 
countries into bases of aggression... these peoples must say no 
to all those who wish to make cannon fodder of them and try to 
make of them military equipment by means of which they can 
reach their aim of dominating the world...the struggle of the 
peoples of North Africa and the Middle East, whether in Egypt 
or Iran or elsewhere, to win their freedom has begun to shake 
the foundations of Western domination".
The cordial dialogue between Soviet and Egyptian delegates during
the January session of the General Assembly of the U.N. seemed to
have borne fruit. On 22 January 1952, Al-Misri reported that Iakov
Malik, the Soviet delegate to the U.N. had been invited by the
Egyptian Government to visit Cairo and that his visit was expected
3soonJ .
Stevenson, the British Ambassador, indicated a genuine increase 
of overt interest by the U.S.S.R. in Egypt. He appreciated 
that in the time of the Wafd government, the U.S.S.R. had gained
1. New York Times, 22 January 1952.
2. Ibid, 24 January 1952.
3. Al-MisrT, 22 January 1951. This visit was not carried out as a
result of events inside Egypt political scene.
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a footing in Egypt. Stevenson considered that the development 
and the increase of trade relations between the U.S.S.R. and 
Egypt contributed significantly to the spread of Soviet propaganda 
and Communism into Egypt^.
The Wafd government was dismissed on 27 January following the 
British military actions in Isma^ilia of 25 January and the Cairo 
riots of 26 January, (in which mobs looted and burned without 
restraint for most of the day). In both instances, the Nahhas 
government failed to maintain order. Its helplessness, weakness 
and inability to control events, gave Faruq an opportunity to 
get rid of a government conducting a policy which was unacceptable 
to him. These events introduced a period of disorder and 
instability in Egyptian politics. During the first half of 1952, 
Caffery continually warned that Egypt seemed increasingly 
vulnerable to revolution led by extremists from both the right and 
left2 .
The Wafd defeat was a hard blow for Soviet-Egyptian relations. 
During its period in power, the Wafd shaped and implemented a 
policy of neutralism, which suited Soviet interests. Towards the 
end of 1951, both governments found themselves struggling to 
achieve the same goals. First, to expel the British from Egypt and 
the Middle East. Second, to prevent Western attempts to form a 
Middle East Command. The process of rapprochement which 
temporarily seemed to be gathering momentum, came to an end. The 
Egyptian governments which came to power from 28 January to 23 
July 1952, clearly showed anti-communist and anti-Soviet
1. Dispatch 73 from Stevenson, Cairo, 14 March 1952, F0371/96925, 
JE1052/183.
2. P. L. Hahn, Strategy and Diplomacy in the Early Cold War;
United States Policy towards Egypt, 1945-1956 (unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, Vanderbilt University, 1987), pp. 351-352. 
The same appreciation was made by the British Embassy in 
Cairo. See letter (1012/15/52), 18 February 1952, F0371/96872,
E1018/78.
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tendencies if they were not actually pro-Western*.
The Soviet Union summed up its indignation and dissatisfaction 
about the change of government in Egypt and attacked (AlT Mahir's 
new government. Pravda claimed that the Cairo riots were of the 
nature of a "pogrom" organized for the purpose of "assisting court 
circles to remove Na^bas Pasha". This was an Anglo-American 
conspiracy, aiming to bring into power a new government of 
supporters of a rapprochement between Egypt and the West. cAlT 
Mahir's government, said Pravda, was preparing the ground in order 
to include Egypt m  the "Middle Eastern aggressive bloc" . A few 
weeks later, New Times stressed that the Wafd government collapsed 
owing to its anti-Western policy. The "upsurge of the national 
liberation movement", said New Times, compelled the Wafd 
government to abrogate the 1936 treaty and reject the proposed 
Middle East Command. These actions made the Western Powers 
dissatisfied because they feared that "the Egyptian people's 
national struggle would end in victory". The assumption of power 
by <Ali Mahir was therefore, an "Anglo-American intrigue" .
Indeed, the Soviet government believed that the United States and 
British governments were responsible for the Wafd downfall, 
because of the latter's refusal to accept their proposals to form
1. 'All Mahir's government (assumed power on 27 January 1952) was 
described by Caffery as strongly anti-communist. See dispatch 
1234 from Caffery, Cairo, 1 February 1952, RG 59, 774.00/2-152. 
Department of State, Intelligence Report No. 5776, "Significance 
of the New <Ali Mahir Cabinet", 5 February 1952. Najib HilalT's 
government (assumed power on 1 March 1952), was also described 
as strongly anti-communist. See Memorandum by Berry, the acting 
Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and 
African Affairs to the Secretary of State, 3 March 1952, RG 59, 
774.00/3-352. On the Egyptian governments policies and the 
political situation up to 23 July 1952, see FRUS~ 1952-1954, Vol. 
IX, pp. 1755-1761, 1770-1773, 1828-1831, 1837-1843. See also 
Vatikiotis, pp.372-373, 377-378.
2. K. Khabib, "Chto proiskhodit v Egipte", Pravda, 3 February 1952. 
See also, A. Korzin, "Mezhdunarodnyii Obzor: K Sobytiiam v 
Egipte", Moskovskaia Pravda 8 February 1952.
3. Miller, New Times, No. 9, quoted in Radio Moscow, 28 February 
1952, SWB, USSR, p. 26.
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a Middle East Command and for its policy of neutralism. The 
Soviets who feared that the new government would surrender to 
Western pressure and join such a Command, reacted quickly. On 28 
January, Gromyko handed notes to the British, French, United 
States and Turkish Ambassadors in Moscow. These notes were 
apparently the Soviet reply to the notes delivered to them on 18 
December by the governments of the Four Powers. In fact, these 
notes were intended to warn Western Powers against exploiting the 
existing instability in Egypt in order to promote their interests. 
The notes reflected Soviet fears of the possibility of forming 
a Middle East Command and rejected the Four-Power contention that 
the proposed command was purely defensive. The Soviets branded as 
false the Four-Power contention that the command was being 
organized for the purpose of aiding countries of that region to 
safeguard and protect their freedom and independence. In their 
reply to the British note, the Soviets asserted:*
"The Middle East Command is by no means being set up on a 
voluntary basis or for the purposes of defence, as is asserted 
in the note of the government of Great Britain, but is being 
directly foisted on the Middle Eastern countries by Britain 
the USA, France and Turkey. Nobody threatens the countries of 
the Near and Middle East and it was not on their initiative 
that the proposal arose for the creation of a Middle East 
Command. On the contrary, in the countries of the Near and 
Middle East serious fears are growing together with outright 
resistance to the plans for involving these countries in the 
military measures of such an aggressive group of states..."
The proposed command, said the Soviets, showed that the Western
Powers still looked on the Middle East countries as their colonies
o
to be used for their aggressive plans .
Attempts to renew the Anglo-Egyptian dialogue and to promote the
1. See telegram 46 from Sir A. Gascoigne, Moscow, 28 January 1952, 
F0371/98278, E1193/4. See translation of the note the British 
government (Similar, but not identical notes were delivered to 
France Turkey and U.S.) in dispatch 24, ibid, 31 January 1952, 
El193/7. See also a text of the note to the government of the 
U.S.A. in, SSSR i Arabskie Strany, pp. 109-113.
2. See dispatch 24, ibid.
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proposed plan of M.E.C. were made by American and British 
officials on the one hand and Egyptian officials on the other.
In its first month in power, tAli Mahir's government seemed to 
be seeking an acceptable solution to the extended conflict with 
Britain. This government tended to cooperate and coordinate its 
policy with the U.S.A. These activities increased Soviet 
indignation and criticism. On 23 February, Izvestiia asserted that 
the "American-British imperialists are undertaking new manoeuvres 
for the purpose of obtaining Egypt participation in the 
imperialist bloc in the Near East". Despite the sentiments of the 
Egyptian public, said Izvestiia, the Egyptian government were 
displaying an inclination to carry out Western demands*.
The Soviet media criticised the governments that succeeded 
the Wafd for their suppression of the "national liberation 
movement" and for siding with the West. However, they continued to
support the Egyptian people in their struggle for "national
? . .liberation" , m  spite of their government's policies.
1. V. Kudriavtsev, "Proiski imperialistov na Blizhnem Vostoke", 
Izvestiia, 23 February 1952. See also Kudriavtsev's 
article of 11 May 1952, in ibid.
2. See for instance, Tass transmission, 5 February 1952, SWB,
USSR, p. 15. "Egypt: the Working Class Struggle", Radio Moscow 
in Arabic, 9 February 1952, ibid, p. 18. "Egypt: the Latest
Government Change", Tass, 2 March 1952, ibid, p; 30.
V. Kudriavtsev, "Protiv militaristskogo obshchego dogovora", 
Izvestiia, 11 May 1952. "The Egyptian Intellectuals' Struggle", 
Radio Moscow in Arabic, 18 July 1952, SWB, Communist 
Broadcasts, p. 4-5.
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e. The Improvement in Economic Relations Under the Wafdist 
Government 1950-1952.______________________________________
The process of political rapprochement between Egypt and the 
U.S.S.R. during the Wafdist government of 1950-1952 had 
important implications for the improvement of the economic 
relations between the two countries, and commerce steadily 
increased.
By this time, Soviet policy makers had realized, that the 
economic factor, could serve as a tool to promote their political 
interests in the Arab world, and to these ends they rapidly 
widened their markets for products of the Arab countries. The 
Soviets quickly understood that barter, i.e., the direct exchange 
of goods without monetary transactions, was the most suitable 
method of trading with the Arab countries. Egypt and Syria, 
meanwhile, were deeply dissatisfied with the development of their 
trade with the U.S.A. The dollar gap in Egypt's commercial 
transactions widened from $192,000,000 in 1948 to $338,000,000 in 
1949. Senior Egptian officials realised that a significant 
decrease in American-Egyptian trade would be inevitable as Egypt 
could not continue to bear such a large trade imbalance1.
The trade between Egypt and the U.S.S.R. in the first six 
months of Nahljas1 government was much greater than in the same 
period of 1949. Two barter pacts were concluded in this period. 
The first was signed on 9 April 1950 at the Egyptian Ministry of 
Supply. In this agreement, Egypt was to exchange 10,000 tons of 
cotton for 100,000 tons of Soviet wheat. This pact was based on 
the draft agreement offered by the Soviets in 1949 and which had 
been refused by Egypt. A few weeks later, another agreement was
1. Egon Kaskeline, "Soviet glow with promises to barter; Egypt 
sways on fence of uncertainty", Christian Science Monitor, 11 
August 1950.
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signed under which Egypt was to exchange 8,000 tons of Egyptian 
cotton for 100,000 tons of Soviet maize*. It is significant to 
note that the most influential class in Egypt, the landowners, 
played an important role in persuading the senior government 
officials, who represented them, to promote trade with the Soviet 
bloc. As a very high percentage of the exported cotton came from 
their private firms, their interest was to sell the cotton 
wherever it made a profit. The sharp decline in sales to 
traditional markets, mainly in the West, was the main reason for 
this position.
The motives of the successive Egyptian governments on one 
hand, and that of the landowners on the other, to improve the 
commercial relationship with the Soviet bloc, were utterly
different. The governments were influenced by political and
2economic policy considerations. The landowners were interested 
in improving their profits.
The Soviet doctrine under Stalin towards the Arab world, 
described in depth in earlier chapters, was not designed to 
promote contact between communist and non-communist governments, 
in any fields. The commerce between Egypt and the U.S.S.R. 
illustrates once again the contradictions between doctrine and 
Realpolitik that existed in Soviet policy.
Statements in favour of improving economic relations with the 
U.S.S.R. were made by senior Egyptian officials throughout 
1951. For instance, In Moscow, *Abd al-Hasib, the Egyptian Charge
1. On Egypt's commercial agreements with the Soviet bloc in 1950, 
see, dispatch 930, 461.74/10-1850, ibid. On the two barter 
agreements of 1950, see, Radio Cairo, 10 April 1950, SWB, Arab 
World, p. 52. Dispatch 755 from Caffery, Cairo, 14 April 1950, 
RG 59, 461.7431/4-1450.
2. See for instance dispatches 104 and 184 from G.G. Howard, 
Counselor of American Embassy for Economic Affairs, 29 July 
1950, RG 59, 461.7431/7-2950. Dispatch 421 from American 
Embassy, Moscow, RG 59, 461.7431/2-251.
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d'affaires, emphasized to an officer of the American Embassy the
importance that his government attached to its trade with the
Soviet bloc. He confirmed that private Egyptian interests had
recently concluded a deal with the U.S.S.R. for an unstated
quantity of Soviet timber and that the Egyptian government also
had concluded a deal for Soviet wheat. According to him, more
deals were soon expected*. The Egyptian Ministry of Supply
confirmed that an inter-governmental deal had indeed been
concluded, under which Egypt was to purchase 150,000 tons of
wheat. This, he said, represented an additional 50,000 tons over
and above the 100,000 tons purchased by Egypt in December 1950.
This was not a barter deal and the payment was made by the
?Egyptian government in transferable Sterling .
The total trade with the Soviet Union in 1950 amounted to 
L .E .14,649,777, which was about 4% of the total value of Egyptian 
trade. Imports from the Soviet Union amounted to L.E. 5,864,632, 
accounting for about 3% by value of total imports. Exports 
amounted to L.E.8,785,145; approximately 5% of the value of total 
exports .
The following table^ clearly illustrates the significant 
increase in the trade between both countries in comparison to 
1949. The table shows Egypt's trade with Foreign countries during 
1950 (in Millions of L.E.), again excluding gold or re-exports.
1. Dispatch 421, ibid. It doesn't say when the conversations were 
held, but it is pointed out "recently", that is, sometimes 
towards the end of January 1951. The dispatch was sent on
2 February.
2. See dispatch 1861 from Caffery, Cairo, 6 February 1951, RG 59, 
461.7431/2-651.
3.. See dispatch 2471 from Hazel T. Ellis, Economic Officer,
American Embassy, Cairo, 14 April 1951, RG 59, 461.74/4-1451.
4. The figures were taken from Enclosures No. 1 to dispatch 2042 





L.E. % L.E. % Balan<
Western Countries
United Kingdom 40.7 21.2 37.9 21.9 -2.8
France 18.0 9.4 14.1 8.1 -3.9
Western Germany 6.1 3.2 5.5 3.2 -0.6
Italy 15.5 8.1 14.9 8.6 -0.6
Netherlands 4.3 2.2 6.2 3.6 + 1.9
United States 12.6 6.6 15.4 8.9 + 2.8
Soviet Bloc & China
Czechoslovakia 2.5 1.3 4.0 2.3 + 1.5
Hungary 1.3 0.7 1.1 0.6 -0.2
Poland 0.5 0.3 1.0 0.6 +0.5
Rumania 0.8 0.4 0.3 0.2 -0.5
Soviet Union 5.9 3.0 8.8 5.1 + 2.9
China 0.3 0.2 1.2 0.7 +0.9
Arab Countries 4.0 2.1 3.7 2.1 -0.3
Other Countries 79.0 41.3 58.9 34.1 -20.1
Total for
All Countries 191.5 100.0 173.0 100.0 -18.5
From the above figures we can seei that the greatest amount of
trade was still with the West (U.K, U.S. and France). In 1950,
37.2% of Egypt's imports came from the West while exports were
38.9% of the total . Egypt imported only 5.9% , by value , from the
Soviet bloc and China and exported only 9.5% by value to those
countries. Exports to the Soviet Union increased by 2.4% in 
comparison to 1949 and constituted 53.7% of Egypt's total exports 
to the Eastern bloc. Imports from the Soviet Union increased by 
2.6% compared to 1949 and constituted 50.8% of Egypt's total 
imports from the Eastern bloc. In 1950 Egypt achieved a favourable 
balance of trade with the Eastern bloc of L.E.5,100,000. 
Nevertheless, this surplus was not enough to improve the overall 
negative balance of trade of L.E.18,500,000, of which 
L.E.3,200,000 was due Egypt's trade with the West.
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Negotiations for barter took place between Egypt and the 
U.S.S.R., as early as June 1951/ on the latter's initiative. The 
Commercial Counsellor of the Soviet Embassy in Cairo, offered the 
Egyptian Ministry of Supply, Soviet wheat for Egyptian rice.
The offer was first turned down, as the Egyptians preferred to 
keep their rice in stock for possible domestic use. However,
Egypt expressed its willingness to exchange cotton for Soviet 
wheat. In their reply, the Soviets stressed that they were mostly 
interested in rice, but that they believed, that Hungary and 
Rumania, would exchange wheat for cotton, if the prices were fair. 
In July, the two countries agreed to exchange both rice and cotton 
for wheat. On 9 July 1951, A£mad Hamza, the Egyptian Minister of 
Supply, signed a barter agreement with representatives of The 
U.S.S.R., Hungary and Rumania*. According to Hamza, the Egyptian 
government's decision to accept the Soviet offer was because of an 
urgent need for wheat, as the U.S.A., Egypt's main supplier, 
could not furnish Egypt with the necessary quantity. Egypt,
2therefore, was looking for wheat wherever it could be found .
The agreement of 9 July established the following points:
a. The U.S.S.R. agreed to sell Egypt 72,141.4 metric tons of 
wheat for L .E .3,174,217.2. Egypt agreed to sell the U.S.S.R.
50,000 tons of rice from stock and 10,000 tons of glazed 
rice from the 1951-1952 crop (due in December), for L.E.3,185,314. 
The Soviet wheat was to be shipped between July and December 1951, 
and the same ships would return with Egyptian rice.
1. On the agreement see, dispatches 41 and 88 from American 
Embassy, Cairo, 10 and 16 July 1951, RG 59, 461.7431/7-1051 and 
461.7431/7-1651. Radio Cairo, 9 July 1951, SWB, Arab World, p. 
33.
2. See dispatch 60 from Caffery, Cairo, 17 July 1951, RG 59, 
461.7431/7-1751.
3. See dispatch 88, ibid.
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b. Hungary agreed to sell Egypt 10,000 tons of wheat for
L.E.440,000. Egypt would sell Hungary 1,042 metric tons of cotton 
for L .E .504,351.98. Shipment of the wheat was to be made between 
July and December from Black Sea ports, and the same ships were to 
return with cotton.
c. Rumania agreed to sell Egypt 64,625 tons of wheat at
L .E .2,843,500 against the delivery of 5,500 tons of Egyptian 
cotton for L.E.2,926,000. The delivery of Rumanian wheat was to 
start immediately and be completed by the end of August 1951. The 
same ships would return with Egyptian cotton.
d. The payment arrangements were as follows: the Egyptian 
government would open credits in L.E. in Egyptian banks to the 
accounts of the other countries. The credits would be used to 
purchase Egyptian cotton. Three days after the official notice 
to the Egyptian government, that the grain shipments had been 
made, the sellers would be "free to draw on this account to the 
value of the grain shipped, and apply the sum towards cotton 
purchases".
The deterioration in Anglo-Egyptian political relations during 
1951, especially after the abrogation of the Treaty of 1936 also 
had implications on the economic relationship between the two 
countries. Britain was the traditional supplier of goods Egypt 
needed. It also, was the buyer of about one-third of Egypt's 
cotton crop? more than 80% by value of all Egyptian exports. In 
order to prevent the collapse of the Egyptian economy with its 
reliance on Britain, both as a market for Egyptian cotton and as 
a source of imports, the Egyptian searched for alternative 
markets. At the end of 1951 the Soviet Union offered to sell Egypt 
what it needed and talks took place. The Soviets were in special
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need of cotton in 1951, owing to the failure of the crop in the 
Soviet Union. The Soviet Union therefore aimed to achieve 
a most-favoured-nation clause and priority in purchasing Egyptian 
cotton. To counterbalance the effect of the British sanctions 
imposed against Egypt, the Soviets considered a trade arrangement 
that would amount to underwriting for some time to come, the 
continuation of Egypt's post-war prosperity, based on high cotton 
prices. In the meantime, Egypt was also offered by Eastern 
European countries oil, grains, arms and ammunition, timber, 
newsprint, machinery and medicines in return for cotton, rice, 
manganese and other products*.
A comprehensive agreement between the Soviet Union and the 
Wafdist government was not signed, both parties however coming 
close to doing so. The downfall of Nahhas' government and the 
coming to power of ^ l T  Mahir's government did not hinder the 
success of the talks started in October 1951. Despite the new 
government's often stated anti-Soviet approach, the economic 
policy of the Wafd of tightening relations with the Soviet bloc 
continued and there was a steadily increase in trade, in the first 
half of 1952. Trade with the Soviet bloc was motivated purely by 
economic interests. On 23 Februatry 1952, only a several weeks 
after the Wafd downfall, <Ali Mahir announced the conclusion of a 
barter transaction with the Soviet Union. The agreement was signed 
on 3 March and covered the exchange of 200,000 tons of Soviet wheat
1. On Soviet-Egyptian economic raproachment and talks on future 
agreements, see, "Egypt and Soviet to discuss Trade Pact in 
another Anti-British move by Cairo", New York Times, 26 October 
1951. Christian Science Monitor, 26 October 1951. Arab News 
Agency, 6 November 1951, SWB, Arab World, p. 26.' "Soviet Deal 
Hinted on Egyptian Cotton", New York Times, 9 November 1951. 
Dispatch 1206 from J. Wesley Adams, Second Secretary, American 
Embassy Cairo, 21 November 1951, RG 59, 461.74/11-2151.
Dispatch 1208 from Caffery, Cairo, 21 November 1951, ibid, 
461.74/11-2151. "Egypt, Russia Ready for Final Talks on Trade", 
New York Herald Tribune, 9 December 1951.
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for 20/000 tons of Egyptian cotton. This deal was much smaller 
than the one planned earlier, by the Wafd. One of the immediate 
results, of the coming to power of a pro-American government, was 
that Wafdist plans of replacing the West by the Soviet bloc 
countries, as Egypt's main suppliers, were cancelled, for the time 
being. The new agreement established, inter alia, the 
following:*
a. Shipments of wheat would be effected from March to June 1952 
from the Black sea and/or Azov ports. The dates of the Bills of 
Lading were to be considered as the dates of shipment.
b. The weights indicated in the Bills of Lading as well as the 
qualitative data given in the Certificates of Quality issued by 
the Grain Inspection Bureau of the U.S.S.R. were to be final and 
binding on both parties.
c. Payments were to be effected within three days of the receipt 
by the BUYERS (the Egptian Ministry of Supply) of the SELLERS (the 
Soviets) cable notices of consignments of wheat being ready for 
shipment. The BUYERS had to pay the full amounts of the invoices 
in Egyptian pounds to the special account, of the State Bank of 
the U.S.S.R. held at the National Bank of Egypt.
d. Any possible disputes arising from this Contract were to be 
settled in Moscow by the Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission at 
the U.S.S.R. Chamber of Commerce, whose decisions were to be be 
irrevocable, final and binding upon both parties.
e. Moscow was considered to be the place of conclusion and 
fulfilment of the Contract.
1. On the Agreement see, dispatch 1413 from Caffery, Cairo, 24 
February 1952, RG 59, 461.7431/2-2452. Dispatch 1838 from C.F. 
Conover, Assistant Attache at American Embassy, Cairo, 1 March 
1952, RG 59, 461.7431/3-152. Dispatch 70(E) from Stevenson, 
Cairo, 13 March 1952, F0371/96961, JE11338/1. See a translation 
of the full text in dispatch 1934 from Caffery, Cairo, 20 March 
1952, RG 59, 461.7431/3-2052.
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Comparing with the previous barter agreements-*-, we see that in 
this agreement, the Egyptian government was forced to make 
concessions. For instance, its acceptance of clause b' meant that 
it had no recourse under the contract if, for instance, half the
o
wheat was rotten, or if the dirt admixture ran to 50% .
Regarding clause d', the previous agreements, established that 
arbitrations were to be held under the auspices of a professional 
body, nominated by the Seller, and agreeable to the Buyer, whose 
decision would be final. That is, in the case of cotton, the 
chosen body was Egyptian, and in the case of wheat, it was 
a Soviet body. According to clause d' of the new agreement, all 
disputes were to be settled only by the Soviet professional body. 
Another difference between the new transaction and the previous 
ones, was in the place of conclusion. According to clause e' the 
place of conclusion of the new agreement was Moscow, while in 
the previous cases it was Cairo.
The main reason for the concessions made by the Egyptian 
government was that the Egyptian cotton market was in a state of 
utter confusion. The government's attempt on 18 February to 
abolish minimum prices gradually by permitting a 3% variation in 
prices per day ended disastrously. After one day's trading, when 
all prices dropped 3% with no buyers, it became clear that 
continued drops in prices would mean bankruptcy to many traders in 
"long" positions and resulting losses to growers and holders of 
cotton.
According to *Ali Mahir, the new deal would enable the trade to
unload without crippling losses; and would, in fact, "solve the
3critical situation on the 'Ashmouni' cotton market" .
1. See for instance the full texts of the agreements of March 1948 
and July 1951.
2. See the full text in dispatch 1934, ibid.
3. See dispatch 1838, ibid.
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The following tables give detailed statistics of Egypt's trade 
with the Soviet Union during the second half of 1951. We see 
from the following figures, that trade with the Soviets gave 
Egypt a favourable balance of trade of L.E.905,299. However, this 
was not enough to balance the deficit of L.E.5,169,769 of the 
first half of 1951^. As a result of this change, Egypt's overall 
trade balance with the Soviet Union improved, yet, at the end of
o
1951, was still negative at L.E.4,264,470 . In contrast to 
previous years, the cotton was only 1.8% of Egypt's exports to the 
Soviet Union with 98.1% of the exports being rice. However, 
exports to other Eastern bloc countries during 1951 were of the
*3
same products as previous years, but mainly cotton .
Total Egyptian Exports to the U.S.S.R.
(July-December 1951)
DESCRIPTION QUANTITY VALUE
















1. The table was taken from enclosure No.l to dispatch 1719 from 
T. Howard Peters, Economic Attache, American Embassy, Cairo,
12 February 1952, RG 59, 461.74/2-1252.
2. See dispatch 1719, ibid.
3. Ibid. See also, dispatch 1955 from ibid, 24 March 1951, 461.74/ 
3-2452.
-201-
Total Egyptian Imports From the U.S.S.R
(July-December 1951)
DESCRIPTION QUANTITY VALUE
_______________________________ Kilograms____________ $_____________ L . E .
Wheat 32,236,541 3,006,556 1,043,943
Perfume,Raw Materials 9,900 4,378 1,520
Meat Preparations 180 288 100
Caviar 67 1,290 448
Tobacco 180 72 25
Chemical Products 342,456 345,606 120,002
Medicine & Pharmaceuticals 279 4,516 1,568
Cinema Films 249 5,962 2,070
Indigo artificial 32,414 44,712 15,525
Timber of all types 8,273,039 852,034 295,845
Wood, Veneer 552,295 281,943 97,897
Valises 18 92 32
Tires 75 72 25
Tubes 15 14 5
Books & Manuscripts 34 35 12
Unspecified Wares 6,900 1,949 673
Porcelain Wares 23,289 2,972 1,032
Cotton Piece Goods 34,188 70,249 24,392
Glass 57,884 2,713 942
Sheet Iron 4 17 6
Radio Tubes 5 40 14
Radios 375 132 46
Bicycles 1,800 1,106 384
Hydrometers 89 786 273
Cinema & Photographic Apparatus 1,000 5,031 1,747
Postal Parcels 25 6 2
Miscellaneous 8 6 2
TOTAL 41,579,571 4,633,802 1,608,959
The following tables* show Egypt's trade with Foreign
countries (in Millions of L.E.), again excluding gold or
re-exports. Table A' covers 1951 and table B' covers 1952 . In 1951
there was no significant change in Egypt's trade with the Soviet
Bloc and Communist China. The percentages of export and import
trade were relatively unchanged. Egypt's total foreign trade in 
1951 valued at L.E.432.7 Millions while the total trade with the 
Soviet bloc and China amounted to L.E.34.1 Millions, that is, 
7.88% of the total value. The trade statistics of the Soviet bloc
1. The figures were taken from Enclosure No. 1 to dispatch 2042, 
ibid. See also Enclosure No. 1 to dispatch 1452, ibid, 20 
January 1953, 874.00TA/1-2053.
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and China in 1951 were almost similar to those of 1950. For 
instance, exports to the Soviet bloc in 1951 were 9.3% of the 
total exports while in 1950 were 9.5%. In 1951 imports increased 
by 0.6% compared to the previous year, and were 6.5% of Egypt's 
total imports in 1951. Against an adverse total balance of trade 
in 1951, of L.E.31.5 Millions, Egypt had a favourable balance of 









United Kingdom 41.5 17.9 38.6 19.3 -2.9
France 20.3 8.7 19.7 9.8 -0.6
Western Germany 9.8 4.2 8.6 4.3 -1.2
Italy 15.7 6.8 16.2 8.1 +0.5
Netherlands 5.2 2.2 2.6 1.3 -2.6
United States 27.4 11.8 19.5 9.7 -7.9
Soviet Bloc & China 
Czechoslovakia 2.1 0.9 9.5 4.7 +7.4
Hungary 1.8 0.8 2.1 1.0 +0.3
Poland 0.6 0.2 1.1 0.5 +0.5
Rumania 3.2 1.4 3.5 1.7 +0.3
Soviet Union 7.1 3.1 2.5 1.2 -4.6
China 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.2 0
Arab Countries 9.3 4.0 3.8 1.9 -5.5
Other Countries 87.8 37.9 72.6 36.3 -15.2
Total for









United Kingdom 28.8 13.6 6.4 4.5 -22.4
France 14.1 6.7 18.2 12.7 +4.1
Western Germany 12.2 5.8 11.4 8.0 -0.8
Italy 12.2 5.8 15.6 10.9 + 3.4
Netherlands 7.8 3.7 1.9 1.3 -5.9
United States 32.9 15.5 16.8 11.8 -16.1
Soviet Bloc & China 
Bulgaria 0.5 0.4
Czechoslovakia 2.6 1.2 7.2 5.0 +4.6
Hungary 1.0 0.4 2.2 1.5 + 1.2
Poland 0.4 0.2 1.9 1.3 + 1.5
Rumania 0.9 0.4 0.5 0.4 -0.4
Soviet Union 10.8 5.1 10.0 7.0 -0.8
China 0.2 0.1 3.1 2.2 + 2.9
Arab Countries 8.9 4.2 2.5 1.8 -6.4
Other Countries 78.8 37.3 44.7 31.2 -34.1
Total for
All Countries 211.6 100.0 142.9 100.0 -69.2
In 1952 there was a drastic change in Egypt's trade with the 
Soviet bloc and China. Egypt's total foreign trade in 1952 was 
valued at L.E.354.5 Millions. Total trade with the Soviet bloc and 
China amounted to L.E.41.3 Millions, or 11.65% of that amount. 
During 1952 exports to the Soviet bloc and China were 17.8% of 
Egypt's total exports, a growth of 8.5% compared to 1951. Against 
an adverse balance for total foreign trade in 1952 of L.E.69.2 
Millions, once again Egypt had a favourable balance of trade with 
the Soviet bloc and China, of L.E.9 Millions. During 1952 there 
was a significant decrease in Egypt's trade with the Western 
Powers. Exports from Egypt to these countries in 1952 went down by 
9.8% compared to 1951. This fall found its expression mainly in 
Egypt's exports to the U.K. which dropped from 19.3% in 1951 to
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4.5% in 1952. Meanwhile, Egypt's imports from these countries 
went down by only 2.6%. This was because the Soviet bloc was able 
to supply some raw materials and heavy goods, for example, 
agricultural machinery, yet, could not supply the large amount of 
consumer goods demanded by Egypt, and traditionally supplied by 
the Western powers. Generally, during 1952, there was a fall of 
L.E.78.2 Millions in Egypt's total foreign trade compared to 1951.
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CHAPTER THREE 
SOVIET-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS UNDER NASIR, 1952-1955
A . Soviet Response to the July 1952 Coup D'etat
The "Free Officers" coup d'etat on 23 July 1952-*-, was 
understood by the Soviets to be another link in a chain of 
attempts by the Western Powers to bring into power in Egypt a 
government which would serve their interests. The Soviets did not
pay much attention to the fact that for the first time in the
20th century, the Egyptian army was deliberately involved in 
politics. The first Soviet comment, issued by Tass on 24 July,
did not mention General Muhammad Najib's statement explaining
o
the motives behind the coup. It mainly focused on (All Mahir, the
new Prime Minister who was described as a tool in the hands of the
Americans. Tass remarked that *AlI Mahir's previous accession to 
power in January 1952, had followed "consultations with U.S.
diplomats aimed at involving Egypt in the aggressive Middle East
? . . . . .Command" . The Soviets concluded that the political instability
in Egypt had been caused by "the interests of foreign 
imperialists" and also by the rivalry between the Americans and 
the British for domination in the Middle East. For instance, the 
former Prime Minister Hilali Pasha was known to be pro-British and 
his successor, <AlI Mahir was "fully trusted by the Americans".
The strengthening of American influence would probably increase 
the prospects of Egypt's acceptance of the M.E.C. proposals .
The Soviet image of Egypt's new rulers changed soon after (All
1. On the coup d'etat, see Weekly Summary of Events, in,
Memorandum by Alta F. Fowler, the Office of Near Eastern 
Affairs to the Officer in Charge of Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian 
Sudan Affairs, 28 July 1952, FRUS 1952-1954, Vol. IX, pp. 1844- 
1847. Hamrush, Qissat thaurat 23 Yuliyo, Vol. 1, pp. 177-208. 
Muhammad ^asanayn Haykal, MilaflTat al-Suways (Cairo: Markaz al- 
Ahram, 1986), pp. 139-151.
2. Tass report, 24 July 1952, SWB, USSR, p. 12.
3. Ivanov, Tass International Review, 1 August 1952, ibid, pp.
3-4.
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Mahir's resignation on 7 September. For the Soviets, a series of 
measures taken by the military rulers to maintain order, was seen 
as the starting point of a process of establishing a new political 
structure. To quote Iakov Malik: "Many changes have been taking 
place in the area, the most prominent one has been the replacement 
of old kings by babies and youngsters". Malik described this 
process as a "monarchical dehydration" which preceded the 
liquidation of the monarchies of the Middle East*.
The links which were known to have existed between the military 
officers and the American Embassy in Cairo, had utterly 
convinced the Soviets that these ties would pave the way for Egypt 
to take the side of the West. Under the heading "Egypt" in the
Soviet encyclopaedia which was published in September 1952, it was
2wr i tten:
"On the night of 23 July 1952 a reactionary officers' group 
linked with the U.S.A. and headed by Gen. Najib seized power 
in Cairo. King Faruq was deposed on 26 July...the Regency 
Council and the government being controlled by Gen. Najib, who 
established a military dictatorship... The 1952 coup sharply 
aggravated Anglo-American differences concerning Egypt. After 
the coup, Najib began savage reprisals against the workers' 
movement, setting up drumhead court-mae»£itvi " .
The first Soviet attack on the military rulers came as a result
of the Kafr al-Dawwar's incident. On the night of 12 August, a
strike of 500 workers broke out at the Misr Textile Works in Kafr
al-Dawwar near Alexandria. On 13 August, early in the morning,
army troops arrived from Alexandria. In the exchange of fire
between the demonstrators and the army, one policeman, two
soldiers and four workers were killed and many others wounded. To
contain the unrest, the new leaders authorized the arrest 545
1. See record of conversation between Malik and G. Refael, Israel 
delegate to the U.N., took place on 26 August 1952, in secret 
letter from G. Refael, 3 September 1952, ISA, FM2410/18.
2. Bol'shaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia, 2nd e d ., Vol. 15, p. 460, 
in: R o 1i , From Encroachment to Involvement, p. 103.
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workers1. The military rulers assumed that communists were 
responsible for inciting the workers to demonstrate against their 
authority. This development led therefore to strengthening the 
position of the anti-communist faction vis-a-vis the minor 
communists and communist sympathizers among the "Free Officers". 
Vigorous measures to isolate the communists and to remove them 
from key positions were taken . On 25 September, during a 
conversation between Najib and Stevenson, the former outlined 
Egypt's policy towards Communism. Najib said that his government 
intended to take the strongest measures against Communism in 
Egypt. According to him, the regime had "recently brought the 
total of interned communists up to about 200" .
The Soviet press gave an accurate description of the events. It 
covered them under the headlines: "Shooting of strikers in Egypt" 
and "Harsh Suppression of the Egyptian Textile Workers' strike"^. 
The Polish Press Agency concluded that the riots against the 
British under the Wafd government and the events in Kafr 
al-Dawwar, had shown the potential strength of "the Egyptian 
national movement". The new rulers of Egypt and their "hidden 
American-Nazi advisers", it said, were using bloody methods of 
terror against the workers .
Soviet criticism of Egypt's new leaders continued even when the 
latter's social policy intended to improve the status of the 
peasants through the laws of agrarian reform decreed on 9
1. On the events in Kafr al-DawwSr, see Beinin and Lockman,
Workers on the Nile, pp. 421-426. Selma Botman, The Rise of 
Egyptian Communism, pp. 125-130.
2. Beinin and Lockman, ibid, p. 426. See also telegram 406 from 
Caffery, Cairo, 20 August 1952, FRUS 1952-1954, Vol. IX, pp. 
1851-1852.
3. Telegram 1428 from Stevenson, Cairo, 24 September 1952, F0371/ 
96892, 1024/3.
£. Polish Press Agency, 26 August 1952, SWB, Communist Broadcasts, 
pp. 3-4.
Ho Radio Moscow in Arabic, 14 and 15 August 1952, SWB, USSR, p.14.
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September 1952. These laws attempted to solve a serious agrarian 
problem which stood as an obstacle on the road towards social 
progress and development. In fact, these laws did not lead to a 
solution of the problem-*-. Despite the socialist nature, of the 
agrarian reform and its goals, Soviet commentators criticised it 
and indicated that the prospects of considerable change were very 
small. In a Radio Moscow survey of Egypt, Vinogradov, a Candidate 
of Historical Sciences, did analyse accurately the implications of 
the reform. He stressed that despite the land reform which 
restricted the size of private land holdings and provided that any 
in excess should become state property within five years, the 
landowners would be paid by the government with treasury bonds 
bearing interest at three per cent. He concluded that the reform 
did not address the situation of the landless peasants and 
smallholders because they could not pay for the smallest bit of 
land confiscated from the landowners .
The Soviet negative approach towards Egypt's military regime 
arose from understandable considerations. It seems that the 
Soviets knew that close relations between the American Embassy and 
the Free Officers had been maintained before and after the coup 
d'etat of 23 July . Indeed, soon after the coup, American
1. On the agrarian reform in Egypt see, Gabriel Baer, "The 
Agrarian Reform in Egypt-Consequences and evaluations",
Hamizrah Hahadash, Volv 9, (1958), pp. 1-25. M.H. Kerr, "The 
Emergence of a Socialist Ideology in Egypt", Middle East 
Journal, Vol. 16, No.2, (1962), p. 127. Radwan Samir, Agrarian 
Change in Egypt (London: 1986), pp. 6-10.
2. Vinogradov, "The Map of the World", Radio Moscow, 26 September 
1952, SWB, USSR, pp. 12-14.
3. The question whether the American Embassy in Cairo had known 
of the Free Officers' intentions and that the C.I.A. expected 
the coup d'etat is disputed among scholars, and cannot be 
confirmed by American declassified files. On this subject see, 
Hahn, United States Policy towards Egypt, pp.368-369. On the 
C.I.A. contacts with the "Free Officers" before the coup, see, 
Hamrush, Qissat thaurat 23 Yuliyo, pp. 182-188. Miles Copeland, 
The Game of Nations (London: 1969), pp. 51-53. Muhammad 'Abd 
el-Wahab Sayed-Ahmed, Nasser and American Foreign Policy 1952-
1956 (London: 1989), pp. 33-50.
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influence in Egypt had significantly increased. On 19 September, 
Acheson reported to President Truman that Caffery had developed 
considerable influence and would perhaps be able to get Egypt into 
the Middle East Defence Organization (M.E.D.O.). He assumed that 
the creation of a vacuum in Egypt owing to the complete collapse 
of British influence could be filled by the U.S.A.*.
Furthermore, the new Egyptian leaders did not hide their sympathy 
towards the U.S.A. In fact, as they were opposed to Communism and 
both distrusted and disliked the British, the U.S.A. became their 
favoured alternative. Soon after the coup they declared publicly 
and officially their intentions to be affiliated with the West, 
under conditions. In a message from General Najib to Caffery, 
handed by Colonel AmTn, on 18 September, the former made the 
following points:
a. The new regime was completely on the side of U.S. and 
unalterably opposed to Communism.
b. The military officers wished to create favourable conditions 
for "selling the U.S. to the Egyptian public". This development 
could only come about if the U.S.A. would supply arms and support 
Egypt financially. In this case, Egypt would commit itself to the 
Middle East Defence Organization.
Later on, the new rulers went further in their pro-Western 
approach. In a conversation between Najib and Zafir Rifa^T, the 
Syrian Foreign Minister, during the Arab League session in Cairo,
1. Papers of Matthew J. Connelly, Set I, File Subject: Cabinet 
Meeting Friday, 19 September 1952, box 1, the Truman Library. 
See also report by Lakeland, American Embassy, Cairo, 5 
November 1952, RG 84, Cairo Embassy-General Documents, File 
Subject: 320 US/Egypt, box 219.
2. Telegram 730 from Caffery, 18 September 1952, FRUS 1952-1954, 
Vol. IX, pp. 1860-1861. See also a statement made by Najib, in 
reply to the first installment of ex-King Faruq's memoirs, in 
which Faruq blamed the Free Officers of being communist. 
Dispatch 728 from Caffery, 20 October 1952, RG 59, 774.00/10- 
2052.
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Najib was quoted as saying that:*
"It was impossible for the Arabs to remain neutral and 
effective defence against Russia must be organized, 
particularly as the Arabs have nothing in common with Russian 
Communism. The British were not the enemies of the Arabs...".
These manifestations of sympathy and the wish to link Egypt with
the West did not receive the requisite attention from the West.
While the U.S. Government had welcomed the new regime and close
contact had been established with it, the U.K. Government's
attitude had been more cautious. Najib1s attempts to persuade the
U.S. Government to prove its good intentions by supplying Egypt
with military and economic aid were not met with success. The
Department of State agreed that military assistance to Egypt was
essential for stabilizing Egypt's new regime and for the
settlement of the Anglo-Egyptian dispute. Yet, President Truman,
supported by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, refused to give Egypt
military equipment, as he believed this would create pressure from
2Israel and other Arab countries for similar assistance .
Truman's decision was a serious failure for both Acheson and Najib 
who hoped that substantial American aid would strengthen Najib's 
authority and later on would pave the way for Egyptian 
participation in M.E.D.O.
By late 1952, it seemed that Egypt's new leaders no longer spoke 
with one voice. For the first time since the coup d'etat, 
criticism of U.S. policy towards Egypt, was expressed by <Abd
1. Letter from British Embassy, Damascus, to British Embassy, 
Cairo, 3 October 1952, F0371/96933, JE1052/422. On Najib's anti 
-communist approach, See FRUS 1952-1954, Vol. IX, pp. 1894- 
1895.
2. On the Anglo-American appreciation of Egypt's new leaders see, 
secret report from British Embassy, Cairo, 30 September 1952, 
F0371/96892, JE1024/3. On the Anglo-American difference of 
views regarding military aid and the contradictory approaches 
among American policy makers, see, R.J. Watson, History
of the Joint Chiefs of Staffs, Vol. V, (Washington: Historical 
Division Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1986), pp. 326-329. Hahn,
United States Policy towards Egypt, pp. 371-391. The Anglo-
American dialogue took place in London from 31 December 1952 to 
7 January 1953.
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al-Nasir, the strongest figure among the officers. In a
conversation with William Lakeland, a Political Officer of the
American Embassy, Nasir blamed the Americans for taking Britain's
side in its dispute with Egypt. The British, he said, "are losing
this country and you with them because you are tied to their
policy". Nasir stressed that if the U.S. was to take the same
stand in the future, it would lose its advantages and prestige in
Egypt and the Arab world*. On 15 January 1953, Najib hardened
his approach towards a defensive alliance with the West. He
declared that "Egypt will never join a Western alliance for the
defence of the Middle East so long as British troops are in the
Suez Canal Zone". Najib went further and confirmed that Egypt was
selling cotton to all countries including "Communist China",
o
because the U.K. had stopped purchasing Egyptian cotton .
In the book In search of Identity, Anwar Sadat said moreover that 
owing to the American refusal to supply Egypt with arms, the Free 
Officers contacted the Soviets early in 1953, before Stalin's 
death. The Soviets, stressed Sadat, refused Egypt's request for 
arms because: "Stalin's principles prevented him from supplying 
weapons to non-communist states" .
B . Stalin's Successors' Policy Towards Egypt 
Two significant events took place on the international scene 
during the first quarter of 1953. First, the end of Truman's 
presidency and the accession of President Eisenhower in January 
1953. Second, the beginning of a new era in the Soviet Union after 
the death of Stalin in March 1953. For the long term, these 
changes were to have great importance for both super-power 
policies towards Egypt and the Middle East. As far as American
1. Dispatch 954 from Caffery, Cairo, 15 November 1952, RG 59, 774. 
00/11-1852.
2. New York Herald Tribune, 16 January 1953. Christian Science
Monitor, 16 January 1953.
3. Anwar Sadat, In Search for Identity (London: 1978), p. 127.
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Middle Eastern policy was concerned, the basic postwar goal which 
opposed Communism and sought its containment was intensified. The 
new administration, which reconsidered the American defence policy 
came up with an alternative approach, called "The New Look 
Policy". Briefly, this policy determined that the U.S. reaction 
to communist aggression would no longer be restricted to the 
place of its occurrence, or to the use of conventional weapons 
only. The U.S.A. would react with massive retaliation by means and 
at places of its own choosing. American second strike capacity, 
depended therefore on establishing bases placed near Soviet 
borders. The importance of the Middle East in implementing this 
policy was mainly its nearness to Soviet borders. American 
interests in the area thus significantly increased. Consequently, 
the Department of State, headed by John Foster Dulles, went much 
further in its endeavours to form a Middle East Command*.
The downfall of the Wafd in January 1952 inaugurated a period of 
mutual suspicion and distrust in Soviet-Egyptian relations. In his 
last months in power, however, Stalin moderated his negative 
attitude towards the officers' regime in Egypt. The new tactic 
adopted by the Soviets was one of wait and see. Eventually, the 
officers position vis-a-vis Western powers did, to some extent, 
satisfy Soviet policy makers. They believed that Western failure 
would serve Soviet interests. In the meantime, the Soviet media 
supported Egypt and the Arabs in their "just struggle" and "right" 
to a full independence.
At the 19th congress of the Soviet Communist Party, held in 
Moscow from 5 to 14 October 1952, Soviet statesmen called for the 
full liberation of the colonial and dependent countries. They 
therefore increased their efforts to encourage disorder and to
1. On the American New Look Policy see, Nadav Safran, From War to
War, pp. 103-105. Louis L. Gerson, John Foster Dulles (New 
York: Cooper Square Publishers, 1967), pp. 241-300.
I
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stir up revolts against the West in the Arab world. The Wafd 
period in power taught the Soviets how to exploit the substantial 
opportunities created by the opposition between Egypt and the 
Western powers, in order to promote their interests. They realized 
that Egypt could be effectively denied to the West without being 
brought under direct Communist control. To improve its position in 
the Arab world and to demonstrate goodwill towards the Arabs, the 
Soviets attacked Israel and Zionism. On 11 February 1953, two days 
after a bomb exploded in the courtyard of the Soviet Legation in 
Tel-Aviv, the Soviet government decided to break off relations 
with Israel. Officially, the Soviets explained that their move was 
a result of the anti-Soviet campaign, conducted by the Israeli 
government1. Pravda claimed that the explosion was directly 
connected with subversive activity which the Intelligence services 
of Israel were carrying out against the Soviet Union . It can 
be assumed that the Soviet decision to sever relations with Israel 
derived from a desire to win over the Arabs. The Soviets believed 
that their move would improve their position in the Arab world for 
two reasons. First, Arab disappointment with the American stand 
concerning the Anglo-Egyptian dispute and the Arab-Israeli conflict 
as reflected in their refusal to supply arms to the Arab countries. 
Second, the Soviets realized that the new American administration 
was determined to form a Middle East Command and therefore, 
the Arab countries were going to be under great pressure to
1. Ro'i, Soviet Decision Making in Practice, pp. 378-379. On the 
motives behind the anti-Israeli policy taken by the Soviets, 
see notes of conversation between William Epstein, officer in 
the Secretariat of the U.N., and Pavel Shakhov, senior Soviet 
member of the Secretariat of the U.N., 27 January 1953, I.S.A., 
FM2457/14. Shakhov blamed the Israelis for "becoming more and 
more identified with the U.S.A. and the West and have become in 
effect an agent of theirs". He spoke in favour of the Arabs, 
and denied his colleague's allegation that the Arabs were 
interested in getting American arms. Shakhov claimed that the 
Arabs "were more neutral than the Israelis".
2. IU. Zhukov, "Terroristicheskii Akt v Tel-Avive i Fal'shivaia 
Igra Praviteleii Izrailia", Pravda, 14 February 1953.
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carry out the project. An anti-Israeli policy and the expression 
of friendliness towards the Arabs would refute the Western 
argument of Soviet aggressive and expansionist intentions in the 
Middle East. The Arabs might therefore reject Western pressure1 .
The Egyptian and Arab official reaction to the Soviet move, 
presumably, did not satisfy Soviet policy makers. To conclude from 
the immediate Arab official statements, the Soviet move did not, 
for the short term, seem to have drawn the Arab world any closer 
to the Soviet bloc. For instance, the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs spokesman said on 18 February, that the breaking off of 
relations was the result of the explosion in the Soviet Legation 
and not the outcome of any change in Soviet policy towards the 
Palestine question or Israel. This move would not affect relations 
between the Arab states and the U.S.S.R. and its satellites. 
Quoting "a military source", the spokesman stressed, that this 
state of affairs would not lead to any rapprochement between the 
Soviet Union and the Arab countries. The spokesman blamed the 
Soviets for sending intentionally, Jewish emigrants, who were 
"partisans of Communism", to Israel; for constituting a source of
o
subversive activities m  "the bosom of the Arab world" .
After the death of Stalin on 5 March 1953, a slow and gradual 
change in Soviet foreign and domestic policy took place. Stalin's 
successors established a collective leadership with G.M. Malenkov
1. On the implications of the breaking off relations between the 
Soviet Union and Israel on Soviet Middle Eastern policy, see, 
memorandum by A. Levavi, director-general of the Israeli 
Foreign Office, 29 January 1953, I.S.A., FM2512/27/A; dispatch 
775 from American Embassy, Tel-Aviv, 18 February 1953, RG 59, 
661.84A/2-1853; letter 14303/3/53 from British Embassy, 
Damascus, 20 February 1953, F0371/104197, E1072/2; dispatch 
1773 from American Embassy, Cairo, 3 March 1953, RG 59, 
774.00/3-353.
2. See his statement in dispatch 1695 from Caffery, Cairo, 21 
February 1953, RG 59, 661.84A/2-2153. On the Arab reaction see 
also, Michael Clark, "Arab World Wary of Soviet Moves", New 
York Times, 17 February 1953.
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as Chairman of the Council of Ministers and N.S. Khrushchev as 
First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
A change of personnel also took place in the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. V. Molotov returned as Minister of Foreign Affairs (a 
post he had handed over to Vyshinskii in 1949) thus replacing 
his successor who was appointed as First Deputy to Molotov and 
permanent delegate to the U.N. Molotov's appointment did not 
seem to promise rapid change as he had always pursued a 
persistently anti-Western line and was one of the main shapers of 
Soviet foreign policy during Stalin's last period. However, on 15 
March 1953, Molotov outlined before the Supreme Soviet what was 
seemed to be the new approach of Soviet foreign policy, this 
approach said that problems between the Soviet Union and all 
foreign countries could be solved peacefully*. The main 
principles of Soviet foreign policy as shaped by Stalin's 
successors were outlined by Kommunist, in an article entitled:
"The foreign policy of the U.S.S.R. is a policy of peace and 
international cooperation". The article repeated Malenkov's 
statement of 15 March and emphasized that Soviet foreign policy 
was fulfilling its national and international tasks. It defended 
peace for the peoples of the U.S.S.R. and extended assistance to 
the "toiling masses" of all countries in their struggle for peace.
1. On the implications of Stalin's death for Soviet foreign policy 
and information about the Soviet new leadership, see, dispatch 
29 from British Embassy, Moscow, 6 March 1953, F0371/106515, 
NS10110/33; C.I.A., "Probable consequences of the death of 
Stalin and of the elevation of Malenkov to leadership in the 
U.S.S.R.", 10 March 1953, White House Office, Office of the 
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, Records 1952- 
1961, File Subject: NSC Series, Miscellaneous (March-August 
1953), box 5, Eisenhower library, Abilene; Bohlen, "Policy 
implications of Stalin's death, 10 March 1953, Records of the 
Policy Planning Staff 1947-1953, box 23, National Archives, 
Washington; F0371/106517, NS10111/5-11, F0371/106525. See also, 
Isaac Deutscher, Stalin (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1972), pp. 
556-615; Isaac Deutscher, Russia, China and the West 1953-1966 
(Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1970), pp. 1-40.
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The Soviet Union, stressed the article, rejected the false 
assertions that it did not desire peaceful cooperation between 
countries which maintain different social and economic systems.
The Soviet Union proceeded from the fact that there was no 
disputed or unresolved question which could not be settled 
peacefully on the basis of mutual understanding of the countries 
concerned. This concerned relations of the U.S.S.R. with all 
states including the U.S.A. The article repeated Malenkov's 
statement to the 19th Congress of the Communist Party of the 
U.S.S.R., that the Soviet friendly attitude and support for the 
peoples of the colonial and dependent countries would continue. 
Special reference was made to the "toiling Muslims" of the 
East1 .
On 8 August 1953, Malenkov reaffirmed his commitment to a Soviet 
peaceful initiative. He held the view that the statesmen on both 
sides who were responsible for the conduct of relations between 
the Communist bloc and the "outside world" must take into account 
the existence of a certain equality of power, and he therefore 
accepted the principle of "peaceful co-existence" .
As far as Soviet policy in the Arab world was concerned, 
considerable emphasis was put on presenting the Soviet Union as 
a friend of the Arabs. Stalin's successors attempted to persuade 
the Arabs that they had no reason to consider the Soviet Union as 
a potential enemy, or to be afraid of Soviet imperialist 
intentions. On the contrary, they used Egypt's failure to reach an 
acceptable solution to its extended dispute with Britain, as a
1. A. Nikonov, "The Foreign policy of the U.S.S.R. is a policy of 
peace and international cooperation", Kommunist, No. 7, May 
1953. See translation in F0371/106526. See also, "For the 
peaceful settlement of international questions", ibid, No. 13, 
September 1953. See translation in F0371/106527, NS1021/114.
2. Dispatch 221 from British Embassy, Moscow, 29 September 1953, 
F0371/106527, NS1021/107.
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proof that Britain and not the Soviet Union was the real enemy of 
Egypt. The Soviet media attacked all Western proposals for 
settling the Anglo-Egyptian dispute*. The American efforts to 
seek a solution throughout 1953, by eliciting substantial British 
concessions when necessary, led the Soviets to the conclusion that 
this policy was intended to pave the way for Egypt to accept the 
M.E.C. proposals. On 8 April 1953, P. Kozyrev, Soviet Minister to 
Egypt, called upon Mahmud FawzT, Egyptian Foreign Minister, to 
discuss "matters which concern relations between the two 
countries". The principal matter to be discussed was the Soviet 
view on Egyptian participation in an M.E.C. During the course of 
their conversation Kozyrev spoke in moderate terms. However, he 
made it clear that his government would look unfavourably on the
o
formation of an M.E.C. and Egyptian participation in it . From 
the Soviet viewpoint, the timing for this move was correct. It was 
a few weeks before Dulles' visit to Egypt and other Middle Eastern 
countries. The Soviets appreciated that this visit was designed to 
prepare the ground for Egypt participation in an M.E.C. Soviet 
expression of peaceful intentions and a precise resistance to 
the formation of an M.E.C., could achieve three purposes. First, 
Egypt could reject Dulles' argument of Soviet expansionist plans. 
Second, it could claim that by joining a Western defence 
organization it would no longer be considered neutral. In the 
case of a global war, it would find itself facing a real threat
1. These attacks continued the campaign conducted by the Soviet 
press against the Anglo-Egyptian agreement on the Sudan, 
signed on 12 February 1953. The agreement was described
by Izvestiia as a victory for the American diplomacy which 
urged Egypt and Britain to reach an agreement. See, I.
Potekhin, "K Itogam Anglo-Egipetskikh Peregovorov o Sudane", 
Izvestiia, 19 February 1953. See also, Radio Moscow in Arabic, 
24 February 1953, USSR, pp. 27-28.
2. Robert Doty, "Soviet bids Egypt shun defence pact", New York 
Times, 9 April 1953*
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near its frontiers. Third, to make it clear to the Egyptian 
rulers that the U.S.S.R. would stand behind them if they remained 
strict in their rejection of the Western proposals-*-. So far, the 
Soviets were pleased with Egypt's position. Several steps which 
were taken by the Egyptian government indicated clearly that it 
wanted to improve its relations with the Soviet Union. For 
instance, on 2 March 1953, it appointed as Minister to Moscow 
*AzTz al-Mi§r7, a well-known nationalist figure. This was a 
reversal of previous practice when only second-rank diplomats were 
sent. Al-Mi§rT was known for his anti-British record and after the 
officers' coup, he was frequently mentioned in the press as a
o
candidate for. some important diplomatic assignment . On 7 March 
1953, a surprising comment, following Stalin's death, was made by 
General Najib. He described Stalin as "a unique hero" and said 
that, "his name will be immortalized among the great heroes 
of history who had unusual talents. Neither the greatness and 
glory he registered for his country during the Second World War 
nor the love of peaceful policy for which he was known, will be 
forgotten" . A few weeks later, on 23 March, in an interview 
with United States News and World Report, Najib made the following 
points: a. He refused to say whether Egypt, in case of evacuation,
1. This assumption can be also based upon information given by the 
Egyptian army organ Al-Tafrrir. The organ quoted Egyptian 
official circles who said that "the recent steps taken by the 
Russians for promoting peace have strengthened Egypt's position 
by refuting the arguments of the West concerning the need to 
maintain military bases". See Radio Moscow in Arabic, 8 May 
1953, SWB, USSR, p.19.
2. A1 Mi^rT had been retired from the army since 1941 when he was 
dismissed at British insistence because of suspected pro-Axis 
activities. He was tried on charges of treason in 1942 but had 
to be released because of lack of evidence. In November 1951, 
after the abrogation of the treaty of 1936, he vas chosen to 
lead the non-official "Liberation Battalions" formed to fight 
the British forces in the Canal zone. This information was 
given in dispatch 1771 from Caffery, Cairo, 3 March 1953, RG 
84, Moscow Embassy-Confidential Files, 1953: 320, Egypt, box 
172.
3. Radio Cairo, 7 March 1953, SWB, General Arab Affairs, p.32.
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would join a Middle East Defence Organization; b. Egypt must be
careful of U.S. offers of economic or technical assistance, since
they might lead to domination; c. He did not know whether N.A.T.O.
forces would be allowed to move into Egypt in time of war. To
quote him: "why should N.A.T.O. forces rather than Egyptian forces
defend Egypt?"*. Similar words were uttered by Nasir in a speech
at Mansura, on 9 April 1953. He called for an immediate evacuation
of British troops and declared: "We shall not allow a single
foreign soldier to remain in our land. The Egyptian army is
capable of defending its country" . The Soviets could also be
satisfied with the positive reaction of the Egyptian media to
their statements in favour of peace. A remarkable succession of
events, said Radio Cairo, since Stalin's death clearly
demonstrated a change of attitude in Soviet internal and external 
3 —policy" . Al-Ahram said that Malenkov had given the world proof 
of the Soviet desire to make peace and reduce tension between East 
and West^. From the economic aspect, very important agreements 
were signed on 10 March 1953, between Egypt on the one hand and 
the Soviet Union, Bulgaria and Poland on the other. The agreements 
covered the exchange of 12,670 tons of Egyptian cotton against 
115,000 tons of wheat . After Egypt had abrogated its 1936 
treaty with Britain, the latter stopped buying cotton from Egypt. 
As cotton was Egypt's principal cash crop and foreign exchange 
earner, it was necessary to find new markets. The agreement with
1. See telegram 546 from Stevenson, Cairo, 25 March 1953, 
F0371/102780, JE1072/4.
2. Nasir speech was quoted by Radio Moscow in Arabic, 11 April 
1953, SWB, USSR, p. 20.
3. Radio Cairo in English, 6 April 1953, SWB, Egypt and the Sudan, 
pp. 29-30.
4. Radio Cairo, 8 April 1953, ibid, p. 31.
5. Dispatch 1870 from American Embassy, Cairo, 13 March 1953, RG 
59, 461.7431/3-1353.
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the Soviet bloc came therefore at the right time for Egypt.
When talks between Egypt and Britain were opened in April
1953, the Soviet media attacked Britain and the West for demanding
to link British evacuation with the establishment of an M.E.C.
The Soviet view on the development of the events in Egypt and the
Middle East was outlined in an article, published by New Times.
The article established that the situation in the Middle East was
subject to contradictions which derived from the nature of
the capitalist system. It indicated three different kinds of
contradictions. First, contradictions between the interests of the
Western capitalist powers and the Middle Eastern states which were
politically and economically dependent on them. Second,
contradictions between the policies of the Western powers which
were competing for domination of the Middle East. Third,
domestic social conflicts inside Middle Eastern countries. New
Times claimed that the first group of conflicts was the sharpest.
To quote it, "A proof of the growth of the national resistance
struggle is the stubborn fight waged by the peoples of the Near
East against the imperialists' plan to set up a so-called Middle
East Command, a plan calculated to bring about in practice the
occupation of the countries concerned by the armed forces of the
imperialist Powers". The article stressed that a proof of the
existence of the second group of contradictions lay in the acute
rivalry between the U.S.A. and Britain over the exploitation of
Middle Eastern oil resources. This rivalry was under the cover of
"technical aid"^. The talks between Britain and Egypt were also
subject to considerable discussion in Pravda. The paper's main
argument was that the talks were a failure as the Egyptian
government refused to surrender to British pressure to link the
1. Skuratov, "The Near East Tangle", New Times, No. lla April 1953, 
in Radio Moscow, 23 April 1953, SWB, USSR, pp. 20-21.
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evacuation with a mutual defence system, and insisted on 
unconditional evacuation. This stand, said Pravda, was a result of 
pressure brought by Egyptian "public opinion"1. The underlying 
reason behind this emphasis was presumably derived from Soviet 
inability to foresee what position was to be taken by the Egyptian 
government in the following stage of talks. In case that the 
Egyptian government would surrender to Western pressure, the 
Soviets could easily criticise it, and blame the government for 
making decisions which contradicted the people's will. Indeed, the 
Egyptian rulers made frequently contradictory statements regarding 
Egypt's future relations with the West and its participation in an 
M.E.C. For instance, a few weeks before the talks with Britain 
took place, Nasir expressed his anti-communist feelings and 
stressed that he did not agree with the "neutrality campaign that 
some people were running in Egypt". Any agreement, he said, would 
have "to have the support of the people of Egypt...the people 
would not allow this regime to make less favourable bargains that
o
the ones their predecessors had declared were acceptable" . On 
26 April, a day before the talks with Britain started, Nasir 
declared that the Arab states opposed the Four-Power proposals for 
an M.E.C. These proposals, he said, were regarded as another form 
of occupation. The only way to defend the Middle East, Nasir 
emphasized, "was by means of an Arab security pact and Egypt was 
ready to maintain the Suez Canal zone as an Egyptian base for its 
purpose". Nasir then went further by pointing out that Communism 
would be the only winner should the talks fail. British 
occupation, he said, played "Russia's game by exacerbating Arab
1. I. Plyshevskii, "Prekrashchenie Anglo-Egipetskikh Peregovorov", 
Pravda, 10 May 1953. See also Radio Moscow, 9 May 1953, SWB, 
USSR, p. 25
2. See record of conversation between Selwyn Lloyd, British 
Minister of State and Nasir, held in Cairo on 28 March 1953, 
F0371/102803, JE1192/160.
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nationalist feeling". This happened, he said, despite Egypt being
anti-communist1. On 29 March 1953, Nasir said to the British
Oriental Counsellor that in the event of war, Egypt could not
defend its frontiers alone nor could the Middle East as a whole
be defended without Western help. Consultation and planning on
. 2a military level could start immediately, Nasir said .
After several days of talks between Britain and Egypt, the gap
between the representatives of both countries was still
significantly wide. To keep the talks going, the Americans
proposed their mediation. This move was described by the Soviets
as one intended to press Egypt to keep the Canal zone as a base
for a military bloc headed by the U.S.A. Behind the scenes, noted
Trud, "an Anglo-American struggle is going on for control of the
Suez region, the great strategic and economic significance of
2which is generally known"0 .
On 9 May 1953, Dulles left Washington for a three-week visit to 
the Middle East and South Asia. Dulles said that the visit was 
intended to "express the friendship of the American people for the 
governments and people of the countries we visit". He emphasized 
that he did not bring with him specific plans and that he was 
going to listen and to learn the problems as they would be 
introduced by his hosts. Egypt was his first stop, and there he 
stayed for three days. After a series of meetings with Egypt's 
rulers, Dulles concluded that a Middle East Defence Organization 
was no longer a possibility. He stressed that the U.S.A. was 
therefore to avoid "becoming fascinated with concepts that have no
1. Nasir interviewed by Reuter correspondent in Cairo on 26 
April 1953; see the interview in F0371/102806, JE1192/233.
2. See telegram 578 from British Embassy, Cairo, 29 March 1953, 
F0371/102802, JE1192/129.
3. M. Nadezhdin", "Pereryv ili Proval?" Trud, 22 May 1953. Radio 
Moscow, 9 May 1953, SWB, USSR, p. 25. See also, Pravda,
ibid.
-223-
reality". At the end of his visit, he put forward an alternative 
to a M.E.D.O. According to him, the new efforts were to be 
concentrated upon building a defensive alliance in the northern 
tier. This tier was to include Pakistan, Iran, Syria, and 
Turkey. After his return to Washington, Dulles engaged in 
spreading his new doctrine. He tried hard to persuade Eisenhower, 
the Pentagon and the British of the realism behind his ideas. They 
however all stood firm by the old idea of a M.E.D.O. with Egypt's 
participation as the key stated
In spite of Dulles' conclusion that a M.E.D.O. was no longer 
a possibility, the Soviet view regarding his visit was 
utterly different. The Soviets believed that this visit was 
connected directly with plans for establishing a military bloc in 
the area. The Soviets considered that as Anglo-Egyptian relations 
were at a low ebb, the Americans aimed to take the opportunity to 
act as mediators, "since both of the negotiating parties had hoped 
he fDulles} would intervene in their favour"^. By taking such a 
stand, the Soviets stressed, Dulles hoped to improve and increase 
American influence and prestige and later on to replace British 
domination .
Commenting on Dulles' report on his visit, Izvestiia said that
1. On Dulles visit to Egypt and its consequences see, John Foster 
Dulles Papers, Selected Correspondence and Related Material: 
1953 (Mi-Oz), box 73, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, 
Princeton University (hereafter cited as Dulles Papers with 
appropriate reference). FRUS 1952-1954, Vol. IX, pp. 2-29; 
F0371/102731, JE10345/10, JE10345/14-16; F0371/102732, 
JE10345/27, 10345/30. F0371/104257, E10345/1, E10345/23; 
F0371/102807, JE1192/273. See also, Muhammad ^asanayn Haykal, 
Milaffat al-Suways, pp. 259-269. Hahn, United States Policy 
towards Egypt, 1945-1956, pp. 401-405.
2. Zelyagin, "Behind the Screen of Anglo-U.S. Cooperation", New 
Times, May 1953.
3. On the Soviet reaction to Dulles' visit, see, V. Korionov, 
"Arabskie Strany dlia Arabov", Pravda, 25 May 1953;
V. Kudriavtsev, "Angliia i Egipet", Izvestiia, 23 May 1953;
"K Poezdke Dallesa", Literaturnaia Gazeta, 2 June 1953.
Radio Moscow, 18 May 1953, SWB, USSR, pp. 10-11.
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Dulles was compelled "to admit the difficulties of implementing 
imperialist plans" in the area visited. However, the paper went 
on, his aims remained unaltered. His final proposals were "only 
in this or that way a revision of the means of their
achievements"*. The Soviet media gave a lot of prominence to the
results of Dulles' visit. The common appreciation was that the 
trip had been a failure from the military and commercial points of 
view. To quote Radio Moscow; "his attempts to form "a Middle 
Eastern branch of N.A.T.O. had completely failed as had his 
attempt to increase the influence of U.S. monopolies" throughout 
the areas visited .
The failure of both the U.S.A and Britain to move forward with 
their plans to establish a M.E.D.O. in the first half of 1953 was, 
according to the Soviets, due to the change which was taking 
place in the Arab world. This change found its expression in 
the growth of "the national liberation movement" of the Near 
Eastern peoples. This movement frustrated the intentions of the 
"imperialist powers". To quote Izvestiia, "the struggle of the 
Near Eastern peoples for national independence is becoming such a 
factor that any state which does not want to take it into account
will inevitably fail in its policy in the Near East" .
Although it was clear to the Soviets that Egypt's policy was 
made only by its ruling circles and influenced by their own needs, 
not by other factors, they kept following Stalin's line. This line 
as outlined by Stalin in his book Problems of Leninism, said that 
the national liberation movement in dependent territories had 
a vital part to play in the movement towards world revolution.
1. M. Mikhaiilov, "Posle Poezdki Dallesa", Izvestiia, 6 June 1953.
2. Radio Moscow in Arabic, 5 June 1953, SWB, USSR, p. 25. See 
also, Izvestiia, ibid; B. Leont'ev, "Zarubezhnaia Pechat o 
Poezdke Dallesa po Stranam Blizhnego i Srednego Vostoka",
Pravda, 5 June 1953.
3. Izvestiia, ibid, 23 May 1953.
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The implications of using an old concept in analysing the 
development of the events in Egypt and the Arab world after 
Stalin's death were twofold. First, the Soviets could not find 
ideological justifications which would enable them to express 
support to a military regime as such regimes were deemed 
reactionary in the Stalinist doctrine. Second, a revision in 
Soviet doctrine towards the Arab world had not yet been made. At 
this stage, when the dialogue with Egypt's military rulers was in 
its infancy, the Soviets seemed to be waiting to see what the next 
steps taken by Egypt's leaders would be. Practically, the Soviets' 
immediate intention in the Middle East was the neutralization of 
the area. They therefore were assuring the Egyptian government of 
all possible support against the "Anglo-American imperialists"*. 
The process of rapprochement between Egypt and the U.S.S.R. 
several months later, was a result of Egyptian insistence on 
conducting a policy of neutralism.
The Soviet initiative to resume relations with Israel, announced 
on 20 July 1953, was a step forward in implementing Soviet policy 
of neutralizing the Middle East. In a period when Western efforts 
were focusing on persuading Middle Eastern countries of the real 
danger of Soviet expansionism, it was necessary for the Soviets 
to refute this contention by creating a base for cooperation 
and improving relations with all Middle Eastern countries 
including Israel. The Soviet Union expressed clearly its 
strong opposition to any form of a defence organization in the 
Middle East, particularly the participation of the Western powers. 
The Soviets claimed frequently that such defence arrangements in
1. See report by Allen Dulles, the Director of C.I.A. to the 
National Security Council at the 145th Meeting, 20 May 1953, 
in, Eisenhower, Dwight D. Papers as President of the U.S.A. 
1953-1961, N.S.C. Series, File Subject: 145th meeting of 
N.S.C., box 4, Eisenhower library.
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an area contiguous to their borders, would be considered as 
aggressive plans and that the U.S.S.R. would react accordingly. 
Because of its strategic location and its tendency to side with 
the West, the continued Soviet severance of relations as well as 
their support of the Arabs, might have convinced Israel of what 
the West was claiming, i.e., that the Soviet Union was a potential 
aggressor. Consequently, the way would be paved for the 
participation of Israel in a Western military alliance. Such a 
development could have spoiled Soviet plans of neutralizing 
the Middle East. In this connection, it is to be noted that one of 
the Soviet pre-conditions for resuming relations with Israel was 
to receive assurances from Israel that it would not agree to 
support aggressive actions or make preparations against the 
U.S.S.R.1
In a speech before the Supreme Soviet on 8 August, Malenkov
reaffirmed that the new Soviet government wished to win
international support and to spoil Western defensive plans
wherever and whenever it could. To refute Western contentions of
Soviet expansionism, he stressed that the Soviet Union had no
territorial claims against any state and this included every
neighbouring state. The principle of Soviet foreign policy was to
respect the national freedom and sovereignty of every country,
great and small. The difference in the social and economic systems
of the U.S.S.R. and some neighbouring states was not an obstacle
1. On the resumption of relations between the U.S.S.R. and Israel 
see, memorandum 696 from the Israeli Foreign Office to Israel 
missions abroad, 22 July 1953, ISA, FM2410/18. According 
to M.S. Divon, the Israeli Charge d'Affaires in Paris, contrary 
to the impression created by Israel Foreign Minister Sharett's 
note of 6 July 1953 to Molotov, the initiative in raising the 
question of the resumption of relations came from the Soviets. 
On the dialogue between both sides see dispatch 423 from 
American Embassy, Paris, 30 July 1953, RG 59, 661.84A/7-3053.
On Soviet policy towards the Middle East, see, memorandum by 
Jefferson Jones III, First Secretary, American Embassy,. Cairo, 
17 July 1953, RG 59, 661.80/7-1753.
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to strengthening friendly relations with them. The Soviet
government, he said, had undertaken steps to strengthen "good-
neighbour relations" with such states, and now it was up to the
governments to show their readiness to take an active part, "not
in words but in ideas, in bringing about this friendship, which
presupposes mutual concern for strengthening peace and the
security of our countries"^-. According to him, The resumption of
relations with Israel was part of this policy. He explained that
this move came about because
Striving to ease the general tension, the Soviet government 
agreed to restore diplomatic relations with Israel. It took 
thereby into consideration the pledge of the government of 
Israel that Israel will have no part in any union or agreement 
pursuing aggressive aims against the Soviet Union. We consider 
that the restorations of diplomatic relations will promote 
cooperation between the two states .
Malenkov made it very clear that the renewal of diplomatic
relations with Israel did not mean that the Soviet government
would not continue to strengthen its cooperation with the Arab
countries. To quote him, "The activity of the Soviet government
will be directed also in the future toward the strengthening of
friendly cooperations with the Arab states" . Soon after, in
order to demonstrate its sincere intentions, the Soviet government
instructed its diplomatic representatives in the Arab capitals to
deliver copies of Malenkov's speech to each government.
Considerable emphasis was put on the passages dealing with the
relations between the U.S.S.R. and the Middle Eastern countries^.
A turning point in Soviet-Egyptian relations took place in the 
second half of 1953. Soviet political activity in the Middle East
1. Malenkov was quoted in Papers of Harry N. Howard, File Subject: 
Middle East chronological File, 1953, box 14, Truman Library. 
See full text of his speech in Radio Moscow, 8 August 1953,
SWB, USSR, pp. 1-21.
2. Ibid. See also, Jewish Telegraph Agency, (New York), 11 August 
1953, Vol. XX No. 154-35th year.
3. Ibid.
4. Radio Cairo, 12 August 1953, SWB, General Arab Affairs, p. 17.
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was gathering momentum and it can be claimed that the Middle
Eastern pot was moved from the back of the Soviet stove to the
front. One of the most important moves made by the Soviet
government was the appointment of Daniil Solod on 11 October 1953,
as Ambassador to Egypt. Solod who had served as the Soviet
Minister to Syria from 1946 to 1950, was regarded as one of the
top Middle Eastern experts in the U.S.S.R. He played a leading
role in the process of rapprochement between the Soviet Union and
Syria and Egypt in 1950. Solod suceeded Semen P. Kozyrev, who was
transferred "to other work"■*■.
By this time, Stalin's successors' decision to join the U.N.
programme of granting technical assistance to underdeveloped
countries, and Malenkov's call to tighten cooperation with the
Arab states, had fallen on attentive Egyptian ears. Western
restrictions on supplying arms to Egypt, and Britain's refusal to
evacuate its troops and to buy Egyptian cotton, had led Egypt's
rulers to seek for other sources of supply, exports and outlets.
Negotiations with some European countries were held during 1953,
o
for instance, with Germany, Italy and Yugoslavia . An official
survey of Egypt's trade prospects, prepared by the Egyptian
Foreign Ministry, assessed that, "great gaps can be filled in
Egypt's needs for arms, coal and heavy industry", by trading with
the Eastern bloc. The report stressed that a Soviet-Egyptian trade
agreement providing for the exchange of Egyptian cotton for Soviet
wheat, coal and industrial equipment, had already been initialled
3by representatives of both sides . La Bourse Eqyptienne
1. New York Times, 12 October 1953. Radio Cairo, 14'October 1953, 
SWB, Egypt, p. 42.
2. See F0371/102828, JE1193/68-70, 96. On the visit of Egyptian 
military delegation to Yugoslavia in August 1953, see, 
F0371/102829, JE1193/102, 102A, 102B.
3. New York Times, 10 August 1953.
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confirmed on 30 July, that a trade and payments agreement between 
Egypt and the Soviet Union was initialled on 25 July in Cairo by 
Victor AleKS'€<t^oJthe Commercial Counselor of the Soviet Embassy, 
and Kamil (Abd al-Nabl, the Director of the Economic Department in 
the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs^-. On 11 August, the
Egyptian Council of Ministers approved the payments agreement, and
2on 18 August, the agreement was signed by both sides . An 
Egyptian official in the Foreign Ministry said that in the course 
of talks for a payments agreement, the Soviet Union had agreed to 
furnish Egypt with military equipment if requested to do so. The 
official clarified that the payments agreement authorized each 
signatory to purchase freely from a list of available products 
submitted by the other so long as trade remains within a 
£1,000,000 balance. He also said that Egypt had already begun 
negotiations to purchase arms from the "Skoda works" in
“3
Czechoslovakia .
The highlight of this process of rapprochement occurred in 
December 1953, when an Egyptian trade mission headed by Hasan 
Rajab, Deputy War Minister, commenced a three-month tour to 
Eastern Europe. The delegation spent nearly two months in the 
Soviet Union and the rest in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, 
Rumania, Bulgaria and East Germany^. Although the purpose of 
the visit was to widen cooperations in the fields of economics and 
industry with the Eastern bloc, Hasan Rajab emphasized that the 
visit was also a proof that Egypt's new regime "wished to work
1. This information was confirmed by a responsible official of the 
National Bank of Egypt. See, dispatch 287 from American 
Embassy, Cairo, 31 July 1953, RG 59, 461.7431/7-3153.
2.. Dispatch 398 from American Embassy, Cairo, 12 August 1953, RG 
59, 461.7431/8-1253. Dispatch 444 from ibid, 18 August 1953, RG 
59, 461.7431/8-1853. See also, Radio Cairo, 18 August 1953,
SWB, Egypt and the Sudan, pp. 25-26.
3. New York Times, 18 August 1953.
4. On the commercial aspect of the visit, see Chapter Five.
-230-
with all peoples for the insurance of peace11^ . The delegation 
was warmly welcomed by the Eastern European governments. For 
instance, a few days after its arrival in Prague, the
2
Czechoslovak Telegraph Agency reported on 16 December:
"The main aim of the visit...is the strengthening and 
development of goodwill already existing between the two 
countries, as far as co-operation in the field of economy, 
technique and national industry is concerned. The delegation 
wants to make use of this favourable opportunity to convey to 
the Czechoslovak people and government the sincere and 
irrevocable desire of the new Egyptian government to cooperate 
without difference with all nations of the world on the 
maintenance of peace, if these nations cherish the same 
desire".
Although not clearly mentioned, the Egyptian decision to send
Brigadier Rajab, "Undersecretary for War Factory Affairs at the
Ministry of War", as the head of an economic delegation composed
of industrial experts and economists was twofold. First, as
officially stated, it was to widen economic relations with the
Eastern bloc by sending a senior official. Second, in order to
seek for alternative sources of arms, it was necessary to send
a high ranking military man who specialized in armament affairs.
Indeed, reports from Prague confirmed that during its five-day
visit, the delegation visited several arms factories and the firm
which manufactured the fighter-plane "Mig". As early as the
delegation's departure from Egypt, it was reported, that Egypt
•a
had ordered "Migs" from Czechoslovakia .
According to the Israeli paper Yediot Ahronot of 19 January 
1954, a first shipment of Czech and Polish arms which was
1. See Radio Cairo, 20 December 1953, SWB, Egypt, p. 35.
2. The delegation arrived in Prague on 12 December 1953, after 
staying first in Warsaw. See report on their visit to 
Czechoslovakia in, Czechoslovak Telegraph Agency, 16 December 
1953, SWB, Communist Broadcasts, p. 3.
3. On the "Migs" order, see letter 3896/PR from Israel Legation,
Prague, 8 December 1953, ISA, FM2506/5/A; and letter 421/408/D
from the Eastern European Department, Israel F.O., to Israel
legation, Prague, 27 December 1953, ibid. On the Egyptian
legation visit to Arms factories, see letter 601/PR,from Israel
Legation, Prague, 29 December 1953, ibid.
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purchased by the Egyptian commercial delegation, arrived in Egypt 
and was to go through a routine inspection. The shipment contained 
rifles and machine-guns. The paper referred to "political circles" 
in the Middle East who considered the purchase as a move intended 
to put pressure on the U.S.A. and Britain to supply arms to 
Egypt^. Wether the sources quoted were reliable or not, the 
question of purchasing arms from Soviet bloc countries had come up 
during the three-month visit^. On 14 February 1954, Al-Misri 
quoted a statement made by $alah Salim, that Egypt had already 
submitted its requests for arms to various countries, including 
the Soviet Union. Salim revealed that there was a possibility 
that the Soviets would agree to supply some of Egypt's 
requests .
In his book Qissat thaurat 23 Yuliyo, Hamrush claimed that one 
of the main reasons for dispatching the commercial delegation, was 
to put pressure on the Western powers to change their attitude 
towards Egypt. He said that attempts to purchase arms from the 
Soviet bloc were made by both Hasan Rajab in Prague and Muhammad 
Najib in Cairo. According to him, in December 1953, Najib held
1. See letter 412/408/Z from Eastern European Department, Israel 
F.O., to Israel Legation, Prague, 26 January 1954, ibid.
2. Several months later, the Israeli Embassy in Moscow reported 
that the Egyptian request for arms was refused by the Soviet 
Union. No reasons or explanations were given. See, letter 
3/1702/SM from the Israeli Embassy, Moscow, 3 August 1954, ISA, 
FM2506/4. On the dialogue with the Czechoslovak government 
see,Hamrtish, Qissat thaurat 23 Yuliyo, Vol. 2, p.64. Hamrush 
claimed that after considering the Egyptian request for arms, 
the Czechoslovak government replied negatively. It said: "We 
are a peace loving state and will not supply arms to others". 
See also Intelligence Report No. 7292 entitled: "The evolution 
of Egyptian Neutralism", 9 July 1956, R&A Reports, N.A., 
Washington. In his book Soviet Foreign Policy after Stalin 
(Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Co., 1961), p. 389, David Dallin 
said that the purpose of the visit was to submit and discuss 
various Egyptian industrial projects; under the heading of 
"agricultural machines" the Egyptians included arms. The 
Egyptian proposals, said Dallin, were coolly received by the 
Soviets.
3. ^amrush, ibid, p. 65.
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talks with Daniil Solod, the Soviet Minister to Cairo. During 
these talks, Najib checked on the possibility of purchasing arms 
from the Soviet Union. Several weeks later, in January 1954, Solod 
replied positively by expressing Soviet readiness to commence 
furnishing the Egyptian army with arms. Najib told Solod that he 
would ask <Abd al-Hakim *Amer, the Commander in Chief of the 
Egyptian armed forces, to supply him with a list of the required 
equipment. Yet, this dialogue was not crowned with success, 
because of Nasir's objection*. This objection arose out of 
the following internal and external political considerations.
When the existence of a power struggle between Najib and Nasir 
became known, the Soviets, understandably, misjudged Najib's 
power as he was the key figure behind the contacts with them. 
Towards the end of 1953 and at the very beginning of 1954, Najib 
was still considered the strongest figure in Egypt. In fact, he 
was supported by most political circles in Egypt including 
the radical groups, the Muslim Brotherhood and the Communists. 
Furthermore, when the power struggle gathered momentum during 
February and March 1954, it appeared from the outside that Najib 
had the advantage over Nasir, owing to the massive demonstrations 
of support in his favour. Yet, inside the Revolutionary Command 
Council (R.C.C.), practically the ruling body, Najib found 
himself isolated. The R.C.C. was fully controlled by Nasir and of 
all its members, Khalid Muhyi al-DTn, the well-known communist, 
was Najib's only supporter. The Soviet decision to reply 
positively to Najib's request for arms was derived, inter alia,
1. Hamrush, pp. 64-65. Several years later, Nasir confirmed that 
Egypt's decision to break up the Western monopoly of arms 
supplies to the Middle East, had been first made in 1954. In 
his speech in Alexandria, on 26 July 1962, he said inter alia: 
"In 1954 and 1955...we did not hesitate to break up the arms 
monopoly". See quotation in, Uri Ra'anan, The USSR Arms the 
Third World (Massachusetts: M.I.T. Press, 1969), p. 42.
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from a wish to strengthen his position vis-a-vis Nasir who was 
known for his anti-Soviet and anti-Communist approach*. It was 
therefore, not an accident, that both Najib and Muhyl al-Din were 
the only R.C.C. members who attended the opening of the Hungarian 
industrial exhibition in Cairo on 29 January 1954 . The Soviets 
and the Egyptian communists who believed that Najib was to take 
over, assumed that owing to their firm support for him their 
interests would be promoted in the long term. At the beginning of 
1954 the Soviets consistently expressed their satisfaction with 
Egyptian foreign policy. A special reference was made by Izvestiia 
to a statement made by Najib concerning the U.S. policy towards 
Egypt. Najib was quoted as saying that he was wrong when he 
thought, soon after the coup, that the U.S.A was the friend of the
Arabs; he also expressed Egypt's disappointment with the
3 . .U.S.A. . On the other hand, Nasir was attacked indirectly by the
Soviets for his willingness to reach an agreement with Britain and
to cooperate with the West. The struggle of the peoples of the
Near and Middle East for freedom and independence, said Radio
Moscow, was progressing under difficult conditions:^
"The reactionary circles of these countries, acting under 
pressure from without, have intensified their reprisals 
against the democratic forces, against the courageous fighters 
for peace and national independence...all attempts by Britain
1. On the power struggle between Najib and Nasir during the first 
quarter of 1954, see, P.J. Vatikiotis, Nasser and his 
Generation (London: Croom Helm, 1978), pp. 138-149. Jean 
Lacouture, Nasser (Tel-Aviv: Am Oved, 1972), pp.86-92 (Hebrew). 
Mohammed Neguib, Egypt's Destiny (London: 1955), pp. 213-236. 
See also, FRUS 1952-1954, Vol. IX, pp. 2222-2229, 2242-2245. 
Dispatch 1022 from Cafery, Cairo, 3 March 1954, RG 59, 
774.00/3-254. Dispatch 161 from ibid, 28 July 1954, RG 59, 
774.00/7-2854.
2. Radio Cairo, 29 January 1954, SWB, Egypt, p. 46-47.
3. "Zaiavlenie Prezidenta Egipta Nagiba", Izvestiia, 14 February 
1954.
4. Radio Moscow, 7 January 1954, SWB, USSR, p. 14. See also A. 
Kvitnitskii, "Sredizemnoe More-Uzel Amerikano-Angliiskikh 
Protivorechii", 9 January 1954, Krasnaia Zvezda. Radio Moscow, 
23 January 1954, ibid, p. 5-6
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to bind Egypt with a new military agreement...have failed... 
the persistent attempts by Britain, with U.S. support, to 
maintain military control over the Canal zone at all costs, 
have inclined Egyptian public opinion still further towards 
neutrality, that is, non-participation in any military plans 
of the Western Powers".
Najib's inability to persuade the members of the R.C.C. to 
welcome Soviet approval to furnish Egypt with arms, reflected his 
weakness. From this stage on, the Soviets learned the lesson and 
insisted that every official negotiation with Egypt was to be 
"subject to Colonel <Abd al-Nasir's personal approval"*. The 
Soviets also avoided publicly supporting either Najib or Nasir 
when the power-struggle reached its climax. Their news reports
on the February-March events and on the removal of Najib from his
2posts in November, were objective and balanced .
The conclusion of the Turkish-Pakistani pact, under Western 
inspiration, on 2 April 1954, was a hard blow to the U.S.S.R. They 
therefore concentrated their efforts on persuading other Middle 
Eastern countries not to take part in such a move. The Soviets 
warned Egypt and other Arab countries that they would consider the 
conclusion of any military pact oriented to the West as "an 
unfriendly and even hostile act" directed against the U.S.S.R. .
Nasir who criticised and vigorously attacked the pact proved 
that Egypt under his rule was not ready to join any military pact
1. See dispatch 902 from Caffery, Cairo, 12 February 1954, RG 59, 
661.74/2-1254.
2. Most of Soviet reports on the events were based upon Egyptian 
and Western reports. See for instance, Tass, 25 and 27 February
1954, SWB, USSR; and ibid, 9 March 1954. See also reports
on the R.C.C.'s announcement of the removal of Najib, in Radio 
Moscow, 14 and 15 November 1954, ibid, p. 30.
3. The Soviet warning to Egypt was given on 23 March 1954. During 
March 1954, the Soviets exerted a lot of pressure on Middle 
Eastern states to avoid of joining any military pacts sponsored 
by the West. The Soviet media vigorously attacked the Turkish 
and Pakistani governments for their move. On the Soviet 
response, see, letters 411/409/Z from Eastern European 
Department, Israel Foreign Ministry to Israel legations in 
Eastern Europe, 30 March and 6 April 1954, ISA, FM2506/9/A. See
also, New York Times, 23 March 1954.
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inspired by Western powers. Moreover, Nasir declared consistently 
that Egypt was to follow a policy of neutralism in international 
affairs.
Nasir's main concerns in the second half of 1954 were: First, to 
strengthen his control over the Egyptian army and through it to 
establish his hegemony over the country. Second, to reject 
any military alliance between the Arab world and the West as long 
as the Anglo-Egyptian conflict was continuing. Nasir believed that 
once the conflict with Britain was over, arms deliveries from the 
West would be renewed. The dialogue with the Soviets during the 
first quarter of 1954 was therefore intended mainly to put 
pressure on Britain and the U.S.A. Nasir responded negatively 
to the Soviet agreement to supply Egypt with arms, because he did 
not want to provoke Britain and the U.S.A. while talks on British 
evacuation were due to start. This move seemed to meet with 
success. Soon after Britain and Egypt initialled the agreement on 
27 July 1954, Britain agreed, in August, to supply Egypt with arms. 
There was therefore no need, for the time being, to seek for arms 
in the Soviet bloc, a matter which could have provoked the West^.
From the economic aspect, Rajab1s visit was a great success.
On 11 February, an Egyptian official, described as reliable, told 
an officer from the American Embassy that Kabanov, the Soviet 
Minister of Trade had made an attractive offer to the Rajab 
delegation in Moscow. He had offered Soviet assistance to Egypt in 
constructing the High Dam in Aswan. The source said that two 
members of the Egyptian mission returned to Cairo to transmit the 
Soviet proposals to Nasir. Nasir's comment was: "That is all very 
fascinating". Nasir then ordered the mission to return with 
fullest information on the Soviet offers, and stressed that
1. IJamrush, ibid.
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"careful consideration" would be given*.
During the visit of the Egyptian economic delegation in Moscow, 
special mention was made in the Soviet press of a statement made 
by <AzT z *A1i al-Misri, the Egyptian Minister to Moscow, on his 
arrival in Cairo on 4 January. Al-Misri was quoted as saying:
"there are not the slightest anti-Egyptian sentiments in Russia... 
Russia wants to cooperate with all nations in the interests of 
progress of humanity" . On 15 February, Tass reported that 
Mikoian, Deputy Chairman of U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers,
Kabanov, the Soviet Trade Minister, Kuznetsov, Soviet Deputy 
Foreign Minister, and other Soviet senior officials, were
attending a reception at the Egyptian Embassy in Moscow on the
3occasion of the visit of the economic delegation .
Soon after the delegation returned to Cairo in March 1954, Rajab 
said that the visit to the U.S.S.R. revealed that the 
possibilities of economic cooperation were unlimited^. Indeed, 
during March 1954, several agreements with the Soviet Union and 
its satellites were signed. For instance, on 27 March 1954, a 
barter agreement for the exchange of Soviet industrial equipment, 
petroleum and other products for cotton and other Egyptian products, 
was signed between Egypt and the Soviet Union . At the signing 
ceremony held at the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, V.D. 
Alekseenko, the Soviet signatory expressed willingness to widen 
commercial relations with Egypt as the agreement would open an
1. Dispatch 902 from Caffery, Cairo, 12 February 1954, RG 59,
661.74/2-1254.
2. Tass in English, 6 January 1954, SWB, USSR, p. 15; see also 
Radio Cairo, 5 January 1954, SWB, Egypt, p. 28.
3. Tass, 15 February 1955, SWB, Communist Broadcasts, p. 2-3.
4. See dispatch 2362 from American Embassy, Cairo, 2 April 1954,
RG 59, 661.74/4-254.
5. On the agreement see, F0371/108403, JE11338/1-3. Dispatch 1169 
from American Embassy, Moscow, 30 March 1954, RG 59, 
461.7431/3-3054. Dispatch 2232, ibid, 20 March 1954, RG 59, 
461.7431/3-2054. Dispatch 2157, ibid, RG 59, 461.7431/3-1254.
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advantageous field for economic cooperation.
The trade agreement [he saidj...is to work on the basis of 
equal treatment insofar as concerns rights and advantages and 
it will certainly help fostering and promoting the trade 
relations between the two countries. For the promotion of 
trade between the two countries, to their mutual benefit, 
there have been laid down all the conditions on which the 
Soviet Union will be able to supply Egypt all the goods it is 
in need of, whereas the Soviet Union will purchase from Egypt 
the commodities it requires. The Soviet Union is also able to 
supply Egypt... complete equipments for various industrial 
enterprises together with technical assistance.1
Kamil {Abd al-Nabi, the Egyptian signatory replied that the
agreement would help to establish economic cooperation and would
o
start a new era in the relations between the two countries .
There is no doubt that the three-month visit opened a new era 
in the relations between Egypt and the Soviet bloc. The visit 
contributed to the renewal of the cordial understanding 
interrupted with the downfall of the Wafd government in January 
1952. The visit took place at the right time for both Egypt and 
the Soviet Union. Soviet willingness to supply Egypt with arms 
unconditionally, had undoubtedly strengthened Nasir's rejection 
of any military alliance with the West before British evacuation. 
Nasir realized that the Soviet option might be useful for two 
purposes. First, as a bargaining card for weakening the British 
position in the coming talks for a future agreement. In the 
meantime, it would also decrease American pressure on Egypt to 
take part in a military pact. Second, in case of deterioration of 
relations with the West, and the latter's refusal to support Egypt 
financially and militarily, Egypt could use the Soviet 
alternative. The visit uncovered the great latent possibilities 
of purchasing arms from the Soviet bloc. Egypt had no longer 
to surrender to Western pressure to join a military alliance in
1. Alekseenko was quoted in Al-Ahram, 28 March 1954, in dispatch 
2362 from American Embassy, Cairo, RG 59, 661.74/4-254.
2. Ibid.
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order to get arms. The arms could be received unconditionally 
from the Soviet bloc while Egypt could maintain its neutral policy 
without being committed to particular bloc. There is no clear 
evidence to establish that the arms deal was concluded during the 
three-month visit. However, basic inspection of the Eastern 
armaments industry and the possibilities of adjusting it to the 
requirements of the Egyptian army, was indeed made. Basan Rajab 
who specialized in military industrial projects was not chosen by 
Egypt's leaders by accident. His visits to military factories and 
his hosts' requests to exchange Egyptian cotton for arms, laid 
down the basis for the arms deals of 1955.
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C . Nasir's Neutralism and the Baqhdad-Pact
Towards the end of 1953 many calls were heard within Egyptian 
political circles for adopting both a policy of neutralism and of 
nurturing relations with the Soviet Union. Anti-Western feelings 
increased steadily owing to the continuous British refusal to 
evacuate their troops from Egypt. The inability of the military 
regime to implement the main clause of Nasir's political 
programme, i.e., the liberation of Egypt, made the political 
atmosphere in the country revert to what it had been during the 
Wafdist government. Nasir and his partners could not ask for less 
than §alah al-Din, the last Wafdist Foreign Minister. After the 
end of 1953, it did seem that the new rulers decided to adopt the 
doctrine of neutralism as shaped and implemented by Salah 
al-Din*.
During the second half of 1953, the Egyptian press launched 
a massive campaign explaining why Egypt should adopt a neutral 
policy. For instance, Muhammad Hassanein Haykal, the editor of 
Akhir Sa<ah, an independent anti-British weekly, advocated on 20 
August, that Egypt should immediately recognize Communist China 
and Albania. To quote him: "One can hardly overlook the fact that 
the government which truly represents the Chinese people and is 
evidently supported by them is the government of Mao Tse Tung". 
Since Egypt recognized the U.S.S.R., he said, it cannot possibly 
claim that the reason for non-recognition of Mao's government was 
that it was communist. "We are entitled to fight against Communism 
in our country. We have no right to do so elsewhere", concluded 
Haykal. A call to improve relations with the U.S.S.R. was made by
1. Muhammad Salami al-Din the former Wafdist Foreign Minister was 
one of the only pre-coup politicians not to be hurt by the 
R.C.C. in its first years in power. See Jean Lacouture, Nasser, 
p. 85. See also Jean and Simonne Lacouture, p. 242.
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the weekly, Al-Liwa* al-Jadid. The paper stressed that Egypt's 
attitude toward the Soviet Union should be similar to its 
attitude toward the U.S.A. and France. The paper made the 
following point: "We want to adopt a foreign policy which will 
convince Britain that we will not devote our lives to the West, 
and that we are perfectly willing to stretch forth our hands to 
the East so long as this is to our advantage"*. The Soviet media
paid much attention to these views and quoted frequently Egyptian
2papers which wrote on this subject .
On 29 December 1953, New York Times reported from Cairo that 
<Aziz *Ali al-Misri, had been ordered to return to Cairo for 
consultations. According to the paper, Nasir said that al-Misri 
was recalled to advise the government regarding its prospective 
new policy of neutralism in the "cold war". This position was 
taken up, said the paper, because of Egypt's disappointment with
o . . .
the West . Egypt's new line of neutralism was clarified soon 
after by members of the R.C.C. For instance, *Al! Sabri, director 
of Egyptian Air-Force Intelligence, said that Egypt's new policy 
intended to maintain a position of independence from both the 
Soviet or Western bloc and to obtain what it could from both sides 
without becoming committed to either"*. Further clarification of 
Egypt's neutralism was given by Nasir on 19 April 1954, during a 
press conference in Kafr al-Dawwar. Nasir made the point that 
neutrality was of no avail, particularly in time of war, "for in 
order to preserve your neutrality, you must have sufficient 
strength. Our policy is one of non-cooperation with those who
1. See dispatch 473 from Caffery, Cairo, 21 August 1953, RG 59, 
661.74/8-2153. See also Al-Balaqh of 13 August in dispatch 421 
from ibid, RG 59, 661.86/8-1453.
2. See for instance, Tass, 11 December 1953 and Radio Moscow in 
Arabic, 12 December 1953, SWB, USSR, p. 11.
3. New York Times, 30 December 1953.
4. See dispatch 1635 from Caffery, Cairo, 12 January 1954, RG 59, 
774.00/1-1254.
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occupy our territory or encroach on our sovereignty". Nasir 
stressed that Egypt was working to strengthen the Egyptian army 
and to supply it with heavy weapons in spite of all obstacles. He 
explained that weapons could only be obtained from the Big Powers 
but the Western powers, he emphasized, refused to supply Egypt 
with such weapons^-. The underlying idea behind Nasir's words was 
that under the present circumstances, Egypt would not rule out the 
possibility of obtaining heavy weapons from the Soviet bloc. 
Although not clearly stated, this could be deduced from the new 
dialogue between Egypt and the Soviet bloc.
Towards the end of 1953, the international situation created 
a basis for more understanding and cooperation between the Soviet 
Union and Egypt. A pro-Arab stand was taken by the Soviets in the 
U.N. debates dealing with the Arab-Israeli conflict. Soviet 
delegates at the U.N. also frequently attacked Western powers for 
exerting pressure on Egypt and other Arab countries to join a 
military pact with them. As usual Britain was again attacked for 
its refusal to evacuate its troops from Egypt. In a speech before 
the U.N. General Assembly on 22 September 1953, Vyshinskii, the 
Soviet Ambassador to the U.N., attacked the Western policy of 
setting up military bases in foreign countries. Vyshinskii 
suggested that the General Assembly should rule that the 
establishment of military bases by certain states in foreign 
countries increased the threat of war. He asked the Assembly to 
recommend to the Security Council the adoption of the necessary 
measures for the evacuation of Foreign bases. His speech was 
received warmly by yilmi Bahgat Badawi, the Egyptian chief delegate 
to the U.N., who said that following Vyshinskii's speech, he would 
ask the General Assembly to revise the U.N. Charter on several
1. See dispatch 2519 from Caffery, Cairo, 20 April 1954, ibid,
674.00/4-2054. See also, telegram 536 from Stevenson, Cairo, 20
April 1954, F0371/108349, JE1022/15.
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parts. For instance, "that no member of the U.N. should be 
permitted to place troops and forces in foreign territory against 
the wishes of its population, unless this is based upon provisions 
of a treaty between two independent states and provided that no 
pressure is exerted by one party on the o t h e r B a d a w i  
believed that if such a revision were adopted, probably with 
Soviet support, the presence of British troops in Egypt would no 
longer be legal. Several weeks later, referring to Western 
proposals for the solution of the Anglo-Egyptian conflict, 
Vyshinskii told Al-MisrT correspondent in Washington on 9 
November, that foreign forces were not more capable than the 
Egyptian themselves of effectively defending Egypt. To quote 
him: "the Western forces can't fill the vacuum if the citizens of 
Egypt are hostile to them. Only the Egyptians themselves could 
fill the vacuum because they defend their country". Vyshinskii 
expressed his government's wish to strengthen friendly relations
o
with the Arabs .
The Soviet policy of supporting Arab causes brought before the 
Security Council resulted from the growing interest of Stalin's 
successors in the Middle East. This development was discussed 
during a conference of American Chiefs of Mission on Regional 
Security in the Middle East held in Istanbul on 14 May 1954. The 
participants were convinced that one of the objectives of the 
Soviet Union was "to bring the Middle East behind the Iron Curtain 
and that the Soviet Union is constantly manoeuvring with the 
purpose of facilitating the attainment of this objective". Many 
reports indicated that the Soviets might be able to turn the 
increasing tension on the Arab-Israeli frontiers to their
1. See Radio Cairo, 22 and 23 September 1953, SWB, Egypt, p. 26. 
Such a revision had never been adopted by the General Assembly 
and the situation remained as before despite Soviet support.
2. See F0371/102730, JE10338/2.
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advantage*. During the last quarter of 1953 and the first
of 1954, as a result of a Soviet veto, Israel did indeed lose its
cases in the Security Council. The first case introduced on 19
October 1953, was the dispute between Israel and Syria on the
Benot Yaacov Project . On 22 January 1954, the Soviet Union
voted against a draft resolution which was submitted by the three
Western powers. Generally, this draft criticised Syria for
interfering with regional development projects and censured
Israel for ignoring instructions issued by General Bennike, the
3Chief of Staff of the U.N. Truce Supervision Organization.
The second Soviet veto came two months later on 29 March 
1954, two days after Egypt and the U.S.S.R. signed a trade 
agreement. This time the subject under discussion was a complaint, 
made by Israel to the Security Council, on 28 January 1954, 
against Egypt. The latter was accused of renewing its 1951 policy 
of imposing restrictions on Suez Canal and Gulf of Aqaba traffic 
to and from Israel. After several weeks of discussions, a draft 
resolution, based on the one adopted by the Security Council, 
on 1 September 1951, was submitted by New Zealand. This draft
was not adopted when it was put to a vote as a result of
Vyshinskii's veto. He explained that the previous resolution 
was no longer effective. Vyshinskii insisted that there could 
be no advantage in adopting again a resolution which had proved
1. On the conference and its conclusions, see, White House Office, 
National Security Council, Staff Papers 1948-1961, File 
Subject: OCB 091.4 Near East(File 1), box 77, Eisenhower 
Library.
2. On the Benot Yaacov Project and the dispute behind it, see,
R o 'i, Soviet Decision Making in Practice, p. 484.
3. During the continuous discussion, the Western draft underwent 
certain alterations to satisfy the Soviets. However, the 
Soviets rejected it and in fact took the side of Syria. On the 
Soviet stand as summed up by Vyshinskii during the discussions, 
see, ibid, pp. 484-488.
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unsatisfactory*.
The Soviet veto demonstrated the change which had taken place 
in the Soviet attitude towards the Arab-Israeli conflict. On the 
vote of 1 September 1951, the Soviets abstained because they were 
not willing to sacrifice their interests in Israel by supporting 
the Arabs without substantial political assurances from Egypt. 
During 1954 the situation was quite different. Both the Soviet 
Union and Egypt had been going through domestic political 
changes which had an impact on their foreign policies. The two 
countries were in a process of tightening their economic and 
political relations. On 21 March 1954, Tass reported from Moscow 
that the governments of the U.S.S.R. and Egypt "with the aim of 
consolidating and developing relations between both countries, 
have decided to raise the legation of the U.S.S.R. in Cairo and
the legation of the Republic of Egypt in Moscow to the status of
2 . . . . .Embassies" . This was the result of a Soviet initiative.
Two months later, on 20 May 1954, Daniil Solod became the first 
Soviet Ambassador to Egypt^, While *Aziz rAli al-Misri became 
the Egyptian Ambassador to the U.S.S.R. While presenting his 
credentials, Misrl expressed the wish that the two countries 
would develop cultural, commercial and economic relations. 
Voroshilov replied that this would meet with complete support
1. Ibid, pp. 488-490. See also dispatch 839 from American Embassy, 
Cairo, 8 February 1954, RG 59, 674.84A/2-854. Dispatch 1896
from Caffery, Cairo, ibid. The same line was summed up by
Grigorii Zaitsev, the Head of the Soviet Foreign Ministry's 
Middle and Near East Department, during his conversation with 
Eliashiv, the Israeli Minister to Moscow; on the conversation 
see, letter 54418/Z from the Eastern European Department of the 
Israeli Foreign Ministry to the Israeli legations in Eastern 
Europe, 6 April 1954, ISA, FM546/7/A.
2. Tass, 21 March 1954, SWB, USSR, pp. 4-5.
3. Radio Cairo, 14 March 1954, ibid, Egypt, p. 41. On 18 March 
Radio Cairo announced that the decision was made; see, ibid, 
p . 25.
4. See, Radio Cairo, 20 May 1954, SWB, Egypt, p. 29; and Radio
Moscow in Arabic, 21 May 1954, ibid, USSR, p. 33.
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from the Soviet government, which "was exerting efforts to protect 
and consolidate peace and to develop cordial relations and 
economic links with all countries"^.
The Soviets made attempts to counterbalance this friendly 
decision by taking similar action in Israel. The resumption of 
relations with Israel and, soon after, the raising of diplomatic 
representation to the rank of embassies, indicated the Soviet 
intentions to maintain normal relations with Israel. However, to 
promote their growing interests in the Arab world the Soviets, in 
their short-term policy, took the Arab side in international 
disputes, even when they concerned the Arab-Israeli conflict. The 
Soviet leadership believed that by doing so, their positive image 
in the Arab world would be enhanced. This would enable them to 
gain a foothold in a very strategic area, and in the meantime, 
Western hegemony would be weakened for two reasons. First, they 
were committed to Israel and attempted to settle the Arab-Israeli 
conflict peacefully, despite Arab opposition. In contrast to this, 
the Soviets were willing to sacrifice their limited interest in 
Israel for the sake of gaining the friendship of the whole Arab 
world. Second, the Soviet short-term tactic of giving 
unconditional support to the Arabs in international disputes and 
in improving bilateral relations intended to demonstrate to the 
Arabs how friendly Soviet intentions were. This move aimed to 
refute the Western argument of the existence of a continuous 
Soviet threat to the Arabs and therefore the need to defend the 
area by forming a military alliance with the West. Indeed, the 
Soviet veto on the Suez Canal dispute, was hailed by the 
Egyptian press as a bright sign of Soviet goodwill for Egypt, 
and a powerful rebuke for the West who "did nothing to gain the




The main goal of Soviet policy in the Middle East throughout
1954 intended first and foremost to prevent a military pact
between the West and the Arab world. Egypt's leaders had indeed
o
expressed frequently their refusal to join such a pact . Their
talks with Britain and the U.S.A. on future settlement of the
Anglo-Egyptian conflict caused some concerns to Soviet policy
makers. The latter feared that Egypt would be tempted to join a
military alliance with the West as the price of a full evacuation
of the British troops. The basis for the Soviet fears was the
change which took place in U.S. policy towards the Anglo-Egyptian
dispute. During the second quarter of 1954, U.S. involvement in
this conflict had markedly increased. They exerted pressure on
q
both Egypt and Britain to achieve a compromise settlement . In 
July 1954, when the Anglo-Egyptian negotiation was at an advanced 
stage, the Soviet Union endeavoured to discourage Egypt from 
granting Britain re-entry rights to the Suez Canal zone in a 
future war in the Middle East. During the course of a meeting in
1. Christian Science Monitor, 14 May 1954. A special reference to 
the Arab positive reaction to the Soviet veto and 
justifications to this move were made by the Soviet press. See 
for instance, New Times, 24 April 1954, in ISA, FM2503/14/B.
See also Henry Byroade (Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern, 
South Asian and African Affairs), "Facing Realities in the Arab 
Israeli Dispute", a speech addressed before American Council 
for Judaism, Philadelphia, 1 May 1954; in, Selected 
Correspondence and Related Material, File Subject: Re Israel 
1954, 1954 (Ha-Jz), box 82 (dup), Dulles Papers.
2. See for instance dispatch 2754 from Caffery, 24 May 1954, RG 
59, 774.00/5-2454. See also Nasir's speech at a press 
conference held on 24 July, for foreign correspondents on the 
second anniversary of the revolution, in dispatch 158, ibid,
28 July 1954, 774.00/7-2854. An interview with Nasir in 
Newsweek, 26 July 1954.
3. The Soviet press paid much attention to the Anglo-Egyptian 
talks. A special reference was given to the increasing 
influence of the U.S.A. in Egypt. See for instance, Radio 
Moscow in Arabic, 28 June 1954, SWB, USSR, p. 23-24; S. Losev, 
"Popytki SSHA Rasshirit Agressivnyii Turetsko-Pakistanskii 
Blok", Izvestiia, 30 June 1954; Radio Moscow in Arabic, 7 July 
1954, ibid, p. 15; "Imperialism's unchanged aims", New Times,
12 July 1954.
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Cairo, between Nasir and Daniil Solod, on 9 July 1954, the latter
made it clear that the Soviet government would not look with
favour on any agreement that would give the "British and other
Western forces the right to return to the Canal zone in the event
of an attack on a state in this area". Nasir replied that Egypt
was pursuing its own interests in the Canal zone negotiations^.
In the meantime, Soviet diplomats in Cairo and Tehran made
unsuccessful efforts to get formal commitments from the Egyptian
and Iranian leaders to renounce any intent to join the Western
defence pacts in the future . On 31 July, soon after the
initialling of the Anglo-Egyptian treaty, Daniil Solod was
received by the Egyptian Foreign Minister, and left Cairo on
his way to Moscow for consultations with the Soviet leaders on the
3implications of the new development .
The initialling of the agreement between Britain and Egypt on 27 
July 1954, created, temporarily, a better atmosphere in Anglo- 
Egyptian relations. It also strengthened the Anglo-American 
alliance, after a period of disagreements. Both Britain and the 
U.S. hoped that the agreement would stop the spread of neutralism 
and that Egypt would remain with the Western camp.
In the last quarter of 1954, however, U.S. policy towards the 
Middle East did not fall into line with Nasir's views. Nasir 
rejected the main basic ideas of the U.S. plan, which were as 
follows: a. to organize a mutual defence pact between states 
along the northern tier of the Middle East. b. to settle the 
Arab-Israeli conflict, in order to prevent the Soviets from using 
this conflict for creating tension and instability in depth behind
1. On the meeting see, Robert C.Doty, "Soviet rebuffed in plea to 
Egypt", New York Times, 15 July 1954.
2. Robert C. Doty, "Old Middle East disputes appear near 
settlement", New York Times, 18 July 1954.
3. R a d i o  C a i r o . 1 August 1954, SWB, Egypt, p. 36.
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the Northern tier. c. to create conditions which would bring about 
a rise in the general economic welfare, d. to work for the 
preservation and strengthening of democracy*.
In his public speeches and interviews, Nasir made the point 
that Egypt "stands in every respect with the West". However, 
he made it clear that Egypt had been opposed to any form of Middle 
East defence organization, in which the U.S.A. and Britain 
participated. Nasir stressed that the most effective way of 
defending the Middle East was to leave it in the hands of the 
peoples of the area. Egypt, Nasir emphasized, was ready to 
cooperate with all who sought its friendship but that foreign 
control, whether British or Communist, would be rejected. He 
defended the provision in the Anglo-Egyptian agreement permitting 
the British to return to their bases within seven years in the 
event of an attack on Turkey or any Arab state. He urged his 
people to be "realistic" in siding with the West if the U.S.S.R. 
attacked Turkey. Nasir had frequently attacked the Egyptian 
communists who were stirring up the people against the government 
for its agreement with Britain. He often stressed that
ideologically, Egypt was outspokenly anti-communist. In his view,
2the communists were working under Soviet direction . In a 
conversation between Nasir and Colonel Harrison A. Gerhardt of the
1. On U.S. policy towards Egypt during 1954 and the Anglo- 
Egyptian negotiations and its immediate results, see, Hahn, 
United States policy towards Egypt, 1945-1956, pp. 435-458. 
John C. Campbell, Defence of the Middle East (New York: Harper 
& Brothers, 1958), pp. 67-70. Henry Byroade, "The Middle East 
in New Perspective", speech before Dayton World Affairs 
Council, Dayton, 9 April 1954, in, Dulles Papers, ibid.
2. See his interview with the American weekly United States News 
and World Report on 5 August 1954, in dispatch 246 from
. Caffery, Cairo, 13 August 1954, RG 59, 774.00/8-1354; and in 
telegram 190 from Stevenson, Cairo, 3 September 1954, F0371/ 
108349, JE1022/20-22. See also an interview with AP, in 
dispatch 158 from Caffery, Cairo, 4 August 1954, RG 59, 
674.00/8-454. New York Times, 23 August and 2 September 1954. 
Christian Science Monitor, 2 and 4 September 1954. Dispatch
296 from Caffery, Cairo, 3 September 1954, ibid, 674.00/9-354.
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C.I.A., on 23 November 1954, Nasir summed up his understanding of 
the strategic importance of the Middle East and of Egypt in 
particular. He realized that a vacuum existed between the 
northern tier of defence and the Egyptian base. Nasir appreciated 
that "the Soviets would strike first at the oil fields and as a 
second priority, the Egyptian base cross roads". In the course of 
the conversation, Nasir argued that he did not accept the view of 
"neutralist elements in Egypt who felt that with a strong national 
army the frontiers could be defended and the Soviets would bypass 
Egypt". In his opinion, Egypt did not have the "capability of 
developing a sufficiently strong force to deter a Soviet attack on 
Egypt". Nasir's conclusion was that the vacuum between the 
northern tier and Egypt must be filled. But, he stressed, the 
defence arrangements for the Middle East "must be based upon 
indigenous factors". A Middle East defence organization with a 
superimposed command structure, Nasir said, was out of the 
question. That is to say, Nasir accepted the idea of forming a 
defence arrangement for Egypt and the Middle East, and he 
believed that the Soviet Union was a potential aggressor. 
Nevertheless, in his view, the structure of a M.E.D.O. was to be 
different from the one offered by the West, yet, it was to be 
oriented towards the West*.
Soon after the initialling of the Anglo-Egyptian treaty, the 
Soviet media criticised it without attacking Nasir directly.
The agreement, it said, was received with anxiety by many of the 
newspapers and prominent figures in Egypt and the Arab world. 
Special emphasis was put on the following clause: "In the event 
of an armed attack by an outside power on Egypt or any country 
which at the date of signature of the present agreement is a party
1. See Editorial Note No. 1374, FRUS 1952-1954, Vol. IX, pp. 2319- 
2320.
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to the treaty of joint defence between Arab League states...or on
Turkey, Egypt will afford to the United Kingdom such facilities as
may be necessary in order to place the base on a war footing and
to operate it effectively. These facilities will include the use
of Egyptian p o r t s . . . T h e  Soviets claimed that this clause
could mean that Egypt, despite its alleged rejection of the
Turkish-Pakistani pact, would participate in it, if not directly,
then indirectly. The Soviet press emphasized that the treaty was
a victory for American diplomacy. American interest in the Middle
East, said Izvestiia, derived not only from the area's wealth in
raw materials but also from its strategic importance. American
pressure on both Britain and Egypt to reach agreement was part
of a plot to transform the Near and Middle East into a link in the
chain of blocs, alliances and military bases under American
hegemony. This agreement intended to remove the obstacles to
o
Egyptian participation m  a Middle Eastern military bloc .
Towards the end of 1954, after the period of uncertainty, which 
began in July 1954, the Soviets who paid great attention to 
Nasir's statements and moves , realized that he was determined
1. See a full text of "Anglo-Egyptian Agreement Regarding the Suez 
Canal Base: Heads of Agreement", 27 July 1954, in, Khalil, Vol. 
II, pp. 729-730.
2. V. Kudriavtsev, "Vokrug Novogo Anglo-Egipetskogo Soglasheniia", 
Izvestiia, 8 August 1954. See also, I. Aleksandrov, "Anglo- 
Egipetskoe Soglashenie i Plany SSHA na Srednem Vostoke", Pravda, 
8 August 1954. USSR, p. 25. Radio Moscow in Arabic, 13 August 
1954, SWB, USSR, p. 15. "The Anglo-Egyptian Agreement", New 
Times, 17 August 1954. Radio Moscow and Tass, 20 and 21 
October, 1954, SWB, USSR, p. 7. Tass, 6 December 1954, ibid,
p. 15.
3. During this period and according to the nature of his 
statements, Nasir was intermittently attacked or praised
by the Soviet media. The Soviets' main concern was of Nasir 
considering the U.S.S.R. as a potential aggressor in a future 
. war and his statements that Egypt was naturally oriented with 
the West. On the Soviet ambivalent attitude towards Nasir, see 
for instance, Radio Moscow in Persian, 1 September 1954, SWB, 
USSR, p. 15-16. "0 Podlinnoii i Mnimoii Ugroze Egiptu", Pravda,
8 September 1954. K. Petrov, "Pod Flagom Amerikanskoii 
'Pomoshchi'", Izvesti ia, 16 November 1954.
\ '
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to implement a policy of non-alignment. Considerable support was 
therefore given to Egypt by the Soviets, in order to back Nasir 
in his coming conflict with Western powers.
Soviet policy in the Middle East throughout 1954 was a reaction 
to the challenge made by the West. The formation of the Turkish- 
Pakistani pact and Western attempts to extend its membership 
constituted a direct threat to Soviet interests. The Soviets 
realized that the state of affairs created by the Western powers 
required drastic changes. It became clear that the tactic of 
sending warning notes had not proved successful. It was therefore 
concluded, that the only way to contain and to nullify Western 
hegemony was to encourage and in every way support those elements 
in the Arab world who opposed Western military pacts and expressed 
a wish to go in a neutral direction. The Soviets therefore 
increased their activity in the area, focusing it on three levels.
First, supporting the Arabs against Israel in order to create 
tension* which would carry with them real danger of an outbreak of 
war. This tactic, they hoped, would put an end to the extended 
efforts made by the West to settle the Arab-Israeli conflict 
peacefully and thereafter to unite the rival parties under a 
Western military alliance. American security officials appreciated 
that the vetoes cast in the U.N. Security Council against 
resolutions to which the Arabs objected, provided the U.S.S.R. 
with an effective and inexpensive means of improving its position.
They moreover claimed that, "should Israeli aggression occur and 
the Western powers fail to restore the situation a decisive 
movement of the area away from the West and possibly into the 
Soviet sphere of influence must be anticipated"^-. Second, the
1. "U.S.A. objectives and policies in respect to the Near East",
Proposed Amendments to Statement of Policy in NSC 155/1, 6 
July 1954, White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant
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Soviets were engaged in a long-range campaign intended to rally 
the world's underdeveloped countries to their side by extending 
commercial relations and supplying technical assistance to these 
countries. The Middle Eastern countries were considered by the 
Soviets as an integral part of this group of nations. According 
to a plan outlined by the Soviets, the U.S.S.R. was to become an 
international commercial centre, and eventually a political 
lodestar, for underdeveloped countries*. Third, there was an 
increase in cultural exchange between the Soviet Union and Middle 
Eastern countries; two groups of Soviet Muslims visited Cairo 
between 6 to 9 September 1954. They were received by the Grand 
Mufti of Egypt, Sheikh Makhluf and other Muslim key figures in 
Egypt . At the beginning of November, the Soviet football team 
"Torpedo" arrived in Beirut and was received by the President and 
the Foreign Minister of Lebanon. Later on, on 19 November, the
o . . .
team played a game m  Damascus . A large number of invitations 
to conferences and exhibitions in the Soviet Union were 
distributed by Soviet representatives in Arab countries. For 
instance, <Izzat al-Saqqal, the Syrian Foreign Minister, described 
these invitations as "so couched as to be difficult to refuse". He 
said that when he had refused because of the expense involved, the
for National Security Affairs, Records 1952-1961, File Subject: 
NSC 155/1- Near East (1), box 5. This policy was approved by 
the President on 11 July 1953. See, ibid, 29 July 1954. This 
appreciation proved to be accurate a few months later, when 
in February 1955, an Israeli military attack in Gaza was used 
by Nasir as a pretext to justify his decision to buy arms in 
the Soviet bloc. This subject will be discussed in the next 
chapter.
1. On Soviet economic policy towards the underdeveloped countries 
see, Paul Wohl, "Soviet Strategists use trade bait in traps for 
underdeveloped areas", Christian Science Monitory 12 June 1954.
2. On the visit see, Radio Moscow in Arabic, 12 September 1954; 
and Tass, 15 September 1954, SWB, USSR, pp. 11-12. See also, 
Akhbar al-Yaum (Cairo), 7 August 1954.
3. Al-Hayat (Beirut), 20 November 1954. On the visit of a Soviet 
basketball team to Egypt in October, see, Radio Moscow in 
Arabic, 8 October 1954, ibid, p. 42.
/ 'I
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Soviets offered to pay all expenses*.
The initialling of the Anglo-Egyptian treaty was a turning point 
in Nasir’s foreign policy. Satisfied with his recent success in 
putting an end to the presence of foreign troops in Egypt, Nasir 
formulated the principles of his new foreign policy. This policy 
aimed to achieve two objectives. First, to bring Egypt and the 
Arab world to complete independence from foreign influence and 
interference. Second, to unite the Arab world under the political 
leadership of Egypt. Nasir aspired to export the ideas of the 
"Egyptian revolution", to the rest of the Arab world, the Islamic 
world and Africa. Contrary to Western defence plans in the Middle 
East, Nasir held the view that the area was to be defended by 
forming a collective security pact to include all members of the 
Arab league. He expected to lead such a pact .
The development of the events in the area, between December 1954 
and February 1955, led to a significant change in Nasir’s attitude 
towards the Northern tier security arrangement. During this
1. On the Soviet invitations to the Syrian government see, letter 
21901/22/54 and telegram 340 from Sir John Gardiner, British 
Embassy, Damascus, 13 and 21 September 1954, F0371/111168, 
VY2191/1-2. It is noteworthy that after Shishakli’s downfall in 
February 1954 the Soviet and Communist influence and activities 
increased in Syria and the various governments which were
in power were unlikely to take determined action to counter 
this development. On this subject see, F0371/111144 and F0371/ 
110846. On the Soviet Embassy's efforts to increase cultural 
influence in Egypt, see, dispatch 1221 from Caffery, Cairo, 22 
December 1954, RG 59, 661.74/12-2254.See also Patrick Seale,
The Struggle for Syria (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), 
pp. 148-185.
2. On Nasir social-political credo as issued soon after the coup, 
see, Jamal *Abd al-Nasir, The philosophy of the Revolution 
(Tel-Aviv: Ma'arakot, 1961) (Hebrew). R.H. Dekmejian, Egypt 
Under Nasir (New York: 1971), pp. 122-123. Louis Awad, 
"Cultural and Intellectual Development in Egypt Since 1952" in: 
P.J. Vatikiotis (ed.), Egypt Since the Revolution (London: 
1968), p. 143. Fayez Sayegh, "The Theoretical Structure of 
Nasser's Socialism" in: S.A. Hanna and G.H. Gardner (eds.),
Arab Socialism (Leiden: 1969), pp. 100-102. Morroe Berger, The 
Arab World Today (New York: 1962), pp. 387-388. Rami Ginat, 
Medina Vehevra Behaguto shel Lutfi Al-KhulT (State and Society 
in Lutfi Al-Khuli's Thought) (Tel-Aviv: Thesis submitted to the 
Tel-Aviv University, 1987), pp. 14-18.
-254-
period, the struggle to lead the Arab world reached a climax.
Nasir's plans to become the master of the Arabs did not fall 
in line with the ambitions of the Iraqi leader, Nuri al-Said, who 
became Nasir's main rival in this struggle. Nuri took the 
initiative and separately bargained with the West. He wished that 
the establishment of a Turkish-Iraqi alliance as the nucleus for a 
regional security network, would attract further Western support 
and arms. This he assumed, would put Iraq in a position of 
hegemony in the Near East*. The signing on 24 February 1955 of 
a mutual defence pact between Iraq and Turkey, known as the 
"Baghdad Pact", put an end to Western efforts to win Egyptian 
support for the Northern Tier security arrangement. This 
development led Nasir to change his view of future cooperation 
with the West. He blamed the West for violating a "gentlemen's 
agreement that Egypt should be permitted to take the lead in 
constructing a purely Arab defence alliance free from formal links 
with outside powers" . Indeed, Only a few months earlier, the 
R.C.C. issued its programme for cooperation with the West which 
was based on the following principles:
"Left to themselves, the Arabs would naturally gravitate to the 
West in the quest for arms and assistance. By the same token, 
they would build their entire defensive system against a 
possible communist aggression- the only serious aggression 
actually threatening the Middle East. With time, the masses 
would be convinced that the West is no longer trying to conquer 
the Arabs, and ties built on solid friendship will arise that 
are stronger than any written pact".
For these reasons Egypt wanted that the initiative for military
collaboration with the West should come from the Arab side at the
appropriate time. Egypt's leadership needed moreover time to prove
1. Patrick Seale, The Struggle for Syria, pp. 186-212. Uri 
Ra'anan, The USSR Arms the Third World, pp. 14-16.
2. Uri Ra'anan, ibid, p. 16.
3. See "Background Paper Number 1" released to foreign 
correspondents on 2 September 1954, by R.C.C. press officer; 
in: dispatch 296 from Caffery, Cairo, 3 September 1954, RG
674.00/9-354.
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to their people and to the Arabs that the agreement for British 
evacuation was a great success; that from then on, Egypt would 
deal with the West on an equal footing; the matter of future 
cooperation with the West was to coincide with Egypt's interests 
and the latter would decide on the right time. Nasir's refusal to 
accept American military aid offered in the second half of 1954, 
derived from similar motives. During their talks, the Americans 
demanded that a military mission should be permitted to come to 
Cairo to supervise it. Nasir argued that the U.S.A. should look 
for "some means to extend military aid without forcing him to 
accept a military mission". He explained his refusal in "domestic 
political terms, specially extremist opposition to his compromise 
base with Britain"*. The American failure to grant Egypt 
military aid and its activity behind the scenes, in encouraging 
the northern tier countries to promote the Dulles plan, created 
a gloomy atmosphere in the relations with Egypt. The extension of 
military and economic aid by the Americans, to induce Turkey and 
Pakistan to sign a mutual defence pact in April 1954, and their 
encouragement of Iran and Iraq to take part in this arrangement 
proved successful. Although the signing of the "Baghdad Pact" 
seemed to be a great success for the Dulles diplomacy, the State 
Department however decided not to join the pact. The State 
Department stated that the signing of the pact came as a surprise 
and it knew nothing of it . The U.S.A. gave its blessing to the
1. Hahn, United States Policy towards Egypt, pp. 462-473.
2. John R. Beal, John Foster Dulles (New York: 1959, p. 249. The 
Baghdad Pact was signed on 25 February 1955. Britain joined it 
in April, Pakistan in September and Iran in October 1955. See, 
J.C. Hurewitz (ed.), Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East (New 
Jersey: D. Van Nostrand, 1956), pp. 390-391. The State 
Department argument that it knew nothing was not accurate. In 
Full Circle (London: 1960), pp. 335-336, Anthony Eden, argued 
that the Americans were fully informed. He stressed that the 
American refusal to join the pact constituted the main factor 
of its later collapse. Stevenson said that shortly before 7
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pact but refused to join it despite urgings from country members 
of the pact. By taking this stand concerning the Baghdad Pact, the 
American containment policy was to be the most damaged. The main 
reason for their decision not to join the pact was due to their 
wish to appease Nasir. The latter felt hurt as his leadership in 
the Arab world had been seriously challenged by his rival, Nuri 
al-Said. For the U.S.A., Egypt was still strategically important 
in securing the Middle East against Soviet encroachment. The 
Americans believed that, as the most influential Arab state, Egypt 
could determine the attitudes of other Arab states toward the 
defence of the area. American attempts to appease Nasir, however, 
did not meet with success. After the signing of the "Baghdad 
Pact", Nasir became its principal Arab opponent. He interpreted it 
as a Western attempt to isolate Egypt in the Middle East and to 
bring the Arab world under Iraqi leadership. He therefore deemed 
the pact to be directed mainly against Egypt. As early as the 
conclusion of the pact, Egypt's efforts were focused on 
establishing a united Arab front against Iraqi plans. These 
efforts did not meet with great success and split the Arab world 
into rival camps^.
January 1955, "my former American colleague, on instructions, 
informed the Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs that the 
United States Government were in favour of a pact between 
Turkey and Iraq and that if the Egyptian Government were 
opposed, they (the U.S.A.'s Government) could only regret it". 
See letter No. 24 (1195/18/55G) from Stevenson, 10 February 
1955, F0371/115489, V1073/244. See also, Campbell, Defence of 
the Middle East, p. 60. L.L. Gerson, John Foster Dulles (New 
York: 1967), pp. 258-259.
1. Wishing to unite the Arab countries in condemning the proposed 
Iraqi-Turkish pact, Egypt held a conference of Arab Prime 
Ministers in Cairo from 22 January to 6 February 1955. The 
conference ended without substantial results. Just a few 
weeks later (owing to domestic political changes in Syria, and 
the old rivalry between Iraq and Saudi Arabia), Egypt, Syria 
and Saudi Arabia, announced on 6 March agreement on measures 
to "strengthen the Arab structure politically, militarily and 
economically". In the long term, politically and economically, 
it proved to be an unworkable alliance. However, in the short
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In his struggle against the Baghdad pact Nasir found a new ally, 
the Soviet Union. The immediate interest of both was to prevent 
its growth. Yet, the basic argument against the northern tier was 
different. For the Soviets, this was the second link in a chain of 
actions conducted under Western inspiration and intended to harm 
Soviet strategic interests. Since the conclusion of the Turkish- 
Pakistani treaty, the Soviet media had focused its massive attacks 
mainly on the Western powers. The Soviet government newspaper 
Izvestiia, stressed that the Turkish-Pakistani treaty was not an 
isolated agreement but a basis and a nucleus for the aggressive 
Middle Eastern bloc. The creation of such a bloc was part of a 
global American strategy intended to close the ring of U.S. 
military bases and aggressive blocs around the democratic camp*. 
The American aim, argued the Soviets, was to replace British 
domination of the Middle East. The American plan, said Izvestiia, 
was first to convert the Arab collective security pact into a 
reliable instrument dominated by the U.S.A., and then to join it 
to the Turkish-Pakistani axis. The Americans were blamed for 
acting behind the scenes in carrying out this plan. This tactic 
was intended to cover the extensive pressure put by the U.S.A. on 
the Arab states to accept its defence arrangements, and thereafter 
to claim that this development was a result of a "local
term, it succeeded in containing Iraq's aspirations of 
becoming the Arabs' leader. On Egypt campaign in the Arab 
world against the Baghdad Pact and on its motives, See,
Patrick Seale, The Struggle for Syria, pp. 213-226.
F0371/115484, 115486/7, 115489. ISA, FM/2603/8, 9531/3. Robert 
Doty, "Egypt says Iraq binds Arab Unit", New York Times, 23 
January 1955. O.M. Marashian, "Iraq-Turkey Pact widens Arab 
split", Christian Science Monitor, 21 January 1955. Robert 
Doty, "Three of Arab States join in Military-Economic plan", 
New York Times, 7 March 1955. ibid, "Arabs split sharply on 
plans for defence", 13 March 1955. Ibid, "Nasser says West 
stirs Arab Fears", 4 April 1955.
1. "Podgotovka Agressii pod Flagom Oborony", Izvestiia, 3 August
1954.
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initiative" ^ . A few weeks before the Iraq-Turkey pact was 
concluded, Pravda said that in order to extend the Turkish- 
Pakistani alliance the U.S.A. pretended to be the friend of the 
Arab peoples. The Americans and their imperialist ally, said 
Pravda, were basing their policy on the local bourgeoisie and the 
land-owning classes. To some extent, this policy succeeded as some 
of the Arab political leaders were already advocating cooperation 
with the West^.
The Iraqi government decision of 3 January 1955 to close its
legation in Moscow and to terminate diplomatic representation
with the Soviet Union, was severely attacked by the Soviets. A few
days later, the Soviet government responded by recalling its
diplomatic mission from Iraq, and placed responsibility for this
move and its future consequences on the Iraqi government . Such
actions, said Izvestiia, testified to the Iraqi government's
dependence on imperialist powers. They "will inevitably lead
to tension in international relations, and in this way they
4threaten peace and security in the Near East" . Soviet
anger increased when on 12 January Turkey and Iraq officially
announced that they had decided to conclude a military treaty. The
5final text of this treaty, it said, would be released shortly . 
This treaty means, said Izvesti ia, "indirectly, if not directly, 
Iraq's adherence to the Turko-Pakistan pact and its having been 
drawn into the system of American military groups". Iraq, said
1. V. Kudriavtsev, "Agressivnye Zamysly SSHA na Blizhnem Vostoke" 
Izvestiia, 23 October 1954.
2. V. Medvedev, "Kto Ugrozhaet Narodam Arabskogo Vostoka", Pravda, 
28 December 1954. Despite the fact that the paper did not 
mention the name of the Arab political leaders,'it certainly 
meant to Nuri al-Said, who was the main Arab leader to push the 
Arabs to cooperate with the West.
3. Tass, 8 January 1955, SWB, USSR, p. 20. See also, V. Sergeev, 
"Vopreki Interesam Irakskogo Naroda", Pravda, 10 January 1955.
4. S. Losev, "Dlia Chego Menderes Posetil Irak", Izvestiia, 14 
January 1955.
5. Tass, 13 January 1955, SWB, USSR, p. 17.
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Izvestiia, had become the Western Powers' weapon for dividing 
the Arab countries, and "for destroying the solidarity of the 
Arab East which has in many ways assisted the Arab states in 
their resistance to imperialist plans". The Turko-Iraqi military 
treaty was "hostile to the cause of the peace and independence of 
the people"^. The hostile orientation of these Western blocs to 
the Soviet Union, emphasized Pravda, was doubted by no one. The 
Soviet public cannot be indifferent to the "machinations of the 
aggressive circles of the U.S.A., Britain and their accomplices, 
which are taking place on the borders of the U.S.S.R.". The 
Soviets praised the Syrian and Egyptian governments for their 
determined refusal to participate in military blocs. In this 
connection, Pravda said that the policy of "neutrality and 
national independence" conducted by these countries had served as 
a "serious obstacle to the aggressive forces in implementing their
q . . . .
claims" . Nevertheless, the Soviets were disappointed that owing 
to "pressure from the Western Powers", the Cairo conference of 
Arab Prime Ministers refused to "satisfy the demands of the 
public which insisted upon resolute and open condemnation of the 
Turko-Iraqi treaty". Yet, Soviet reports on the conference 
emphasized that the majority of Arab countries, "first and 
foremost Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia, are inclined against Nuri 
al-Said's treacherous machinations". Special mention was given 
of Nasir's sharp criticism of Iraq's actions. Nasir was described 
as the leader of Egypt, "the most important and influential 
country in the Arab East"^. To strengthen and to back these 
countries in their struggle against the Baghdad Pact, the Soviets
1. S. Losev, ibid.
2. V. Medvedev, "Turetsko-Irakskii Voennyii Sgovor", Pravda, 19 
January 1955.
3. Ibid. See also S. Losev, ibid.
4. "Iraksko-Turetskii Voennyii Sgovor", Izvestiia, 15 February
1955.
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often repeated that their policy towards the Arab countries was 
based on respect for their independence and territorial immunity? 
and on "profound sympathy for their struggle against the 
imperialist yoke and profound understanding of their national 
problems"*.These principles were summed up by Molotov on 8 
February 1955, in his report at the session of the supreme Soviet. 
He promised the Arab countries that the U.S.S.R. "have always
given and will give reliable support in the defence of their
2sovereignty and national independence" .
From the Soviet strategic point of view, Syria, of all Arab 
countries, was the one to be paid the most attention owing to its 
proximity to Soviet borders. The Soviets were pleased with the 
downfall of Faris al-Khuri's government on 7 February. This 
government, stressed Izvestiia, collapsed as a result of its 
tendency to approve the policy of military blocs in the Arab 
East^. It is noteworthy that during the Cairo conference, the 
Soviets praised Faris al-KhurX for his firm insistence upon 
condemnation of the Baghdad Pact, and his refusal to join it4 .
The reason for this Soviet ambivalence was to be explained 
by developments on the Syrian political scene. This was the 
coming to power on 13 February 1955 of a government headed 
by SabrT al-*AsalX and dominated by Khalid al-cAzm, the 
Minister of Defence and Foreign Affairs, who was known for his
1. Ibid.
2. Ibid. See also, F. Fedorov, "Turetsko-Irakskii Voennyii Pakt- 
Pridatok Severo - Atlanticheskogo Bloka", Krasnaia Zvezda, 4 
March 1955.
3. V. Osipov, "Ne Myt'em, Tak Katan'em, Novyii Nazhim SSHA na 
Siriiu", Izvestiia, 2 March 1955.
4. See Izvestiia, 15 February 1955. On 9 January 1955, Pravda 
expressed Soviet satisfaction of Faris al-KhurT's statement that 
Syria was against participating in aggressive blocs. He was 
quoted as saying: "We reject any alliance and any agreement 
contradicting the interests of the country or able to deprive
it of sovereignty, independence and freedom". See, V. Medvedev, 
"Naglye Domogatel'stva SSHA v Sirii", Pravda, 9 January 1955.
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pro-Soviet approach. Al-*Azm was supported by the two leftist 
parties, the B a 1th and the Communist. However, he explained that 
his positive attitude towards the Soviet bloc was derived only 
from their mutual understanding in international affairs. He 
stressed that his cooperation with the Communist Party was 
confined to international, and excluded domestic socio-political 
affairs-*-. The primary item in the political programme of 
*AsalI's government was the re-confirmation of the principle of 
Syrian's non-participation in foreign military blocs. This Syrian 
stand caused a great deal of satisfaction in Moscow and Cairo, and 
indignation in the West, Iraq and Turkey. The Soviet press had 
frequently reported that the U.S.A., Britain, Iraq and Turkey were 
exerting pressure on the Syrian government to join the Baghdad 
Pact and warned that the Soviet Union would not remain 
indifferent . The threat from Turkey and Iraq to Syria reached 
a climax soon after the latter signed an agreement with Egypt 
and Saudi Arabia. The Syrian government received warning 
notes from Turkey and Iraq and on 20 March it was reported that
these countries had concentrated their forces near the Syrian
? . . .borders . The Soviet Union which appreciated Syria's neutral
policy responded quickly to the Turkish threat. On 23 March 
Molotov invited FarTd al-KhanT, the Syrian Minister to Moscow, 
who was informed that the U.S.S.R. supported Syria's attitude
1. On the new government and its policy towards the Soviet Union 
and the Baghdad Pact, See Patrick Seale, The Struggle for Syria, 
pp. 219-237. On the motives behind Khalid al-'Azm's pro-Soviet 
approach, See, Khalid al-^Azm, Mudhakkirat Khalid al-cAzm,
Vol. II, pp. 48-49, 427-433, and Vol. Ill, pp. 28-30. In this 
connection, see his quotation in Seale, ibid, pp. 219-220.
2. See for instance, V. Osipov, ibid. V. Bogoslovskii, "Proiski 
Imperialistov na Blizhnem Vostoke", Trud, 30 March 1955.
M. Afonin, "Vdokhnoviteli i Ispolniteli", Pravda, 31 March 
1955.
3. Patrick Seale, ibid, p. 233-234. On the Turkish note and the 
deterioration of the relations between the two countries, see 
F0371/115501, V1073/560.
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vis-a-vis Turkey and was prepared to intervene if necessary to 
assist Syria in maintaining independence and freedom*. On the 
same day, Khalid al-^Azm received the Soviet Minister to Damascus, 
in order to learn about the Soviet stand towards the dispute with 
Turkey^.
On 16 April, just a few days after Britain had joined the 
Baghdad pact (on 5 April 1955), and a day before the opening of 
the BandUng Conference, the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
issued an official statement on "Security in the Near and Middle 
East". The statement made it clear that the Soviet Union was no 
longer indifferent to political developments in the Middle East. 
The statement opened by declaring that recently the situation in 
the Middle East had considerably deteriorated owing to Western 
pressure for participation in military pacts. In this connection 
it was said:
"Ultimatums have begun to be made that Syria should join the 
Turco-Iraqi alliance, and these demands are accompanied by 
threats calculated to intimidate the government and people of 
Syria and to force Syria to change its position of non­
participation in aggressive military blocs...Great pressure is 
also being brought to bear on Egypt, on whom demands are being 
made that she change her negative attitude to the Turco-Iraqi 
bloc and that she should not support Syria..." .
The Western powers' allegation regarding the existence of a
"Soviet threat" to the countries of the area, it said, intended
to cover up their aggressive plans. Soviet foreign policy
rested on the desire to strengthen peace among peoples on the
basis of the "observance of the principles of equal rights,
1. See telegram 286 from British Embassy, Moscow, 24 March 1955, 
F0371/115501, V1073/566. Dispatch 523 from American Embassy, 
Moscow, 25 March 1955, RG 59, 661.83/3-2555.
2. See telegrams 127 and 128 from British Embassy,'Damascus, 25 
March 1955, F0371/115502, V1073/576, 578. Telegram 135, ibid, 
28 March 1955.
3. See the full text in, SSSR i Arabskie Strany, pp. 116-120.
See translation of the full text in enclosures to letter 
2231/18/55 from British Embassy Moscow, 22 April 1955, F0371/ 
115508, V1073/733A.
-263-
non-interference in internal affairs, respect for national 
independence and state sovereignty". The Soviets made it clear 
that they could not be indifferent to the setting up of foreign 
military bases on Middle Eastern territory. Such actions had a 
direct bearing on their security owing to the near proximity of 
those countries-*-. The statement ended with a warning that:
"If the policy of pressure and threats against countries of the 
Near and Middle East continues, this matter will have to be 
considered in the United Nations... the Soviet Government... 
will defend the freedom, independence and non-interference in 
the internal affairs of the states of the Near and Middle 
East" .
The Soviet statement was warmly welcomed by Syria and Egypt. On 
23 April, Farid al-KhanT called on Molotov to express his 
government's gratitude for the Soviet statement. Molotov assured 
him that the U.S.S.R. would firmly maintain its position . Two 
months later, in an interview in Al-Jumhur, Khalid al-tAzm said 
that the Soviet attitude towards Syria had had a definite effect 
in easing foreign pressures on his government. The Soviet 
Union, he said, had informed the Western powers that it would 
retaliate in the event of pressure on Syria by any other country. 
The Soviets, he stressed, were undoubtedly a friendly country 
which Syria respected. He repeated his argument that there was a 
difference between the Soviet Union as a country and communist 
doctrine. Syria did not approve of Communism as a social system, 
emphasized al-^Azm^.
1. Ibid. The same argument was made by S. Semenev, Deputy Minister 
of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., on 17 June 1955, during his 
conversation with Y. Avidar, Israel Ambassador to Moscow. See 
letter from Avidar, 17 June 1955, ISA, FM546/7/A.
2. F0371/115508, ibid.
3. See telegram 400 from British Embassy, Moscow, 24 April 1955, 
F0371/115509, V1073/753. Dispatches 1902 and 424 from American 
Embassy, Moscow, 25 and 28 April 1955, RG 59, 661.83/4-2555 and 
661.83/4-2855. On the Egyptian press comment, see telegram 90 
from British Embassy, Cairo, 21 April 1955, F0371/115509, 
V1073/756.
4. See the interview in letter 11901/762/55 from British Embassy, 
Damascus, 15 June 1955, F0371/115513, V1073/876.
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D . Nasir and the Non-Alignment Camp
Nasir's plans to promote his political ambitions throughout 1955 
did not fall into line with the Western powers policy. The bone of 
contention was mainly centred on two issues. First, the Western 
efforts to strengthen and enlarge the Baghdad Pact by exerting 
pressure on Arab countries to join it. Second, the Anglo-American 
endeavours to promote their joint plan, known as Alpha^, to 
develop proposals for a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace 
settlement. The solution of these issues constituted a 
pre-condition for Egypt's acceptance of military and economic 
aid from the United States.
The rapprochement between Egypt and the U.S.S.R. which had been 
resumed at the end of 1953 started to gather momentum during 1955. 
Nasir believed that being supported by one of the two main blocs 
did not mean that such support would create a state of inferiority 
and dependency. Egypt, Nasir believed, had to search for new 
sources of political and diplomatic support. His meetings with 
Nehru and Tito, the chief spokesmen of neutralism before the 
Bandung Conference, convinced him that there was another way for 
him to conduct his foreign policy. Their policy of non-alignment 
suited him . A few weeks before his departure to Bandung, he
1. This project played a central factor in shaping and 
implementing the American and British policies in the Arab- 
Israeli scene throughout 1955 and early 1956. On Project Alpha 
see, FRUS 1952-1954, Vol. IX, pp. 1683-1741, 1730-1731. FRUS 
1955-1957, Vol. XIV, pp. 1-401. See also, Shimon Shamir, "The 
Collapse of Project Alpha", in: R. Louis and R. Owen (eds.), 
Suez 1956, The Crisis and its Consequences (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1989), pp. 73-100. Hahn, United States Policy toward 
Egypt, pp.481-487.
2. On Nasir's meeting with Tito and Nehru in February 1955, see, 
Mohamed H. Heikal, Cutting the Lion's Tail (London: Andre 
Deutsch, 1986), pp. 60, 68. Robert St. John, The Boss, The 
Story of Abdel Nasser (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1960), 
pp. 190-191. Jean Lacouture, Nasser, p. 103. According to 
Patrick Seale, p. 229, the two expressed publicly their 
support of Nasir's policy.
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put forward the principles of his new foreign policy which 
reflected an inclination towards neutralism. In a long speech 
before Egyptian army officers, on 28 March, he made it clear that 
Egypt would adopt an independent policy which would serve its 
interests. To quote him: "All we want today is to create for 
ourselves an independent personality which will be strong and 
independent, which will be free to direct its domestic policy the 
way it wants and direct its foreign policy in a way which serves 
its interests". Communism had been considered a danger, but, he 
stressed, "I still believe that imperialism or our being dominated 
by the other side [the West] represents another danger". According 
to him, Egypt's foreign policy was based on these principles. 
First, Egypt was for self-determination. Second, it was against 
imperialism and foreign domination. Third, it was for the 
freedom of the peoples*. These were also the guiding principles 
which he followed during the Bandung Conference.
The Afro-Asian conference, known as the Bandung Conference 
(held in Bandung on 18-24 April 1955), succeeded in demonstrating 
that there was an Afro-Asian consensus. Being a prominent 
figure at the conference and fully involved in formulating 
its resolutions, Nasir was convinced that the Afro-Asian 
bloc was a great power and could play a crucial role on the 
international stage. Nasir came to the conclusion that having an 
influential role in this bloc would enable him to conduct an 
independent foreign policy which would suit his interests. Indeed, 
in the course of the second half of 1950's, the bloc of the 
"Non-Aligned Countries" was consolidated, when the axis Nasir- 
Tito-Nehru constituted a central element in its leadership. During 
the conference, Nasir developed friendly relations with the
1. See the text of the speech in dispatch 1899, from Byroade, 
Cairo, 4 April 1955, RG 59, 674.00/4-455.
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communist leader, Chou en-Lai, who headed the Chinese delegation. 
Chou en-Lai expressed his sympathy and support for Egypt's 
struggle against foreign intervention in Egypt and in Arab 
domestic affairs. He likewise, took the Arab side when the subject 
of the Arab-Israeli conflict came up. Chou en-Lai made it clear 
that China was prepared to make a major effort to improve its 
relations with Asian and Arab countries and to develop peaceful 
relations with other countries regardless of ideologies. Indeed, 
Nasir and Chou discussed the possibility of a trade exchange 
between their countries and in August 1955 an Egyptian trade 
mission in China concluded a three-year Sino-Egyptian trade and 
payment agreement*. It is noteworthy that when the question of 
Egyptian recognition of Communist China came up during their 
talks, Nasir explained that under the present circumstances he
1. On the conference see, intelligence report entitled "Results of 
the Bandung Conference: a Preliminary Analysis", 27 April 1955, 
R&A Reports, IR 6903, N.A. Washington. ISA, FM2564/8. David 
Dallin, Soviet Foreign Policy, pp. 296-302. David Kimche,
The Afro-Asian Movement (Tel-Aviv: 1973), pp. 59-79. Rami Ginat, 
Medina Vehevra, pp. 16-17. On Nasir's talks with Chou, see, 
Haykal, Milaff"5t al-Suways, pp. 344-346. St. John, ibid, pp. 
196-202. Lacouture, ibid, p.105. In April, soon after the 
conference ended, the Egyptian Minister of Waqf visited 
China in response to an invitation received at Bandung. On 
his visit and on the trade agreement, see, intelligence 
report, "The Evolution of Egyptian Neutralism", 9 July 
1956, R&A Reports, IR 7292, ibid. Arab News Agency, 16 April 
1955, SWB, Egypt's Cotton Sales to Communists, p. 29. Ibid, 27 
April 1955, SWB, Egyptian Economic Affairs, p. 19. Radio Moscow 
in Arabic, 28 April 1955, SWB, USSR, p. 14. It is to be pointed 
out that this was not the first time that Chou had expressed 
sympathy and support for Egypt. In a message to the Egyptian 
people during an unofficial visit to Egypt on 24 June 1954, he 
said inter alia: "The Chinese people sympathize wholeheartedly 
with the Egyptian people in their struggle for independence".
See Radio Cairo, 24 June 1954, SWB, Egypt, p. 34. Throughout 
1954 there were many rumours that Egypt was considering 
recognition of Communist China. When this subject came up 
during a conversation between Caffery and Fawzi,' the Egyptian 
Foreign Minister, on 22 May 1954, the latter said that his 
government was pursuing a policy of strengthening relations 
with all countries. This policy, he said, proceeded primarily 
from consideration of the country's economic interests. See 
Tass report (based upon the Egyptian paper Al-JumhUrlyya), 24 
May 1954, SWB, USSR, pp. 32-33.
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could not commit himself.
In his speech at the conference, on 18 April, Nasir called for 
expanding the scope of co-operation among the Afro-Asian peoples. 
"It is my deep conviction", he said, "that cooperation among the 
Asiatic-African nations can play a dominant role in the lessening 
of the present international tension and the promotion of world 
peace and prosperity". In his call to the big powers to stop 
using small nations as tools for their selfish interests, Nasir 
was undoubtedly referring to the Western powers. Small nations, he 
said, "are entitled and bound to play independently their 
constructive role in improving international relations and easing 
international tension". Nasir ended his speech by calling for the 
liquidation of colonialism wherever it existed*.
Nasir succeeded in having his resolutions passed. For instance, 
on the Palestine issue, the conference expressed its support of
the rights of the Arab people of Palestine and called for "the
2implementation of the U.N. resolutions on Palestine" .
By following a middle path which appeared to be neither pro-West 
nor pro-Soviet, he improved his prestige with the uncommitted 
Afro-Asian states. His success in Bandung increased also his 
prestige on the Arab and international scenes and strengthened 
his position domestically.
Referring to the expected conference in Bandung, Molotov said in 
a speech before the Supreme Soviet, on 8 February 1955, that it 
symbolized the positive changes "which have taken place lately in 
Asia away from colonialism" . The American failure to prevent
1. See text of his speech in letter 2033 from Henry A. Byroade, 
the American Ambassador, Cairo, 28 April 1955, RG 84, Cairo 
Embassy-General Records, 1955: 050-321.3, File Subject: 310 
Afro-Asian Conference Bandung, box 262.
2. R&A Reports, IR 6903, ibid.
3. See intelligence report entitled: "Developments Relating to the 
Bandung Conference", 21 February 1955, R&A Reports, IR 6830.1, 
N.A. Washington.
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its taking place was marked by the Soviets as a great victory. The 
Soviet positive approach towards the conference, was derived 
from the following considerations^-. First, the conference was a 
rebuff to the U.S.A. which tried to prevent it. Second, it would 
serve the cause of peace, friendship and mutual understanding in 
Asia and Africa, and consequently, would unite the Afro-Asian 
nations against colonialism.
On 16 April, two days before the opening, Vasily V. Kuznetsov,
Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, addressed the conference with the
o
following statement :
"The peoples of the U.S.S.R. are watching with full 
understanding the struggle of the Asian and African countries 
against any form of colonial domination, and for their 
political and economic independence. The Soviet Union 
invariably sympathises with and supports the desire of the 
Asian and African countries to see relations between all 
countries based on principles of equality, non-interference in 
internal affairs, non-aggression and the renunciation of 
claims against the territorial integrity of other states, as 
well as on full respect for sovereignty and national 
independence".
A day later, Voroshilov, the Soviet president, sent his greetings 
to the conference, as did the Presidiums of the five Soviet 
republics of Central Asia . During and after the conference, the 
Soviet press continued to praise the reason for the success of 
the conference. It was often argued that the conference was an 
expression of the tremendous progress which was being made in the 
life of the Afro-Asian countries. The Soviets disregarded those 
pro-Western delegates who criticised the new Soviet colonialism. 
Most of the resolutions adopted by the conference satisfied the 
Soviets. Especially pleasing was the one which called for the 
abolition of collective defense arrangements which serve the 
interests of a big power; and the abstention by any country
1. Ibid. See also, ibid, 4 March 1955, IR 6830.2; ibid, 18 March 
1955, IR 6830.3.
2. Radio Moscow, 16 April 1955, SWB, USSR, pp. 8-9.
3. Dallin, Soviet Foreign Policy, p. 299.
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from exerting pressure on other countries*. An accurate
evaluation of the new international state of affairs created as a
result of Bandung is given by David Dallin in his book, Soviet
Foreign Policy After Stalin. He argued that the conference was a
great success for Soviet foreign policy. To quote him, the
conference represented "a landmark in post-Stalin foreign policy,
a symbol of communist-neutralist cooperation, and a step forward
2into the Asian and African world" .
1. See for instance, "Otkrylas Konfereniia Stran Azii i Afriki", 
Izvestiia, 19 April 1955. Radio Moscow 21 and 22 April 1955, 
SWB, USSR, pp. 29-30. Tass reports, 19 and 20 April 1955, ibid, 
pp. 28-30. On the resolutions and their implications from the 
Soviet and Western blocs viewpoints, see, IR 6903, ibid.
Dallin, ibid, pp. 300-302.
2. Ibid, pp. 301-302.
-270-
CHAPTER FOUR
EGYPTIAN ARM DEALS WITH THE SOVIET BLOC AND THEIR 
IMPLICATIONS
The Egyptian-Czechoslovak arms deal, officially announced in 
September 1955, has been the subject of many studies. Most of 
these studies have indicated that the deal was concluded as a 
result of the following events: The Baghdad Pact, the Israeli 
attack on Gaza on 28 February 1955, the Bandung Conference and the 
Western refusal to supply Egypt with arms. These studies have also 
argued that the first discussions on this subject between Egypt 
and the U.S.S.R. were initiated by Egypt during the Bandung 
Conference when Nasir first met Chou En-Lai and checked with him 
the possibilities of getting Soviet arms. The next contacts, 
according to these sources, took place in May when Nasir met 
Daniil Solod in Cairo. These studies have based their accounts 
on Egyptian sources considered to be primary sources. However, the 
versions given by these sources do not conform to the facts^.
A few studies have rejected this assumption and argued correctly 
that the above mentioned events were later used by Nasir as a 
pretext to justify his application to the Soviet bloc for arms.
For instance, Uri Ra'anan claimed that the arms deal was concluded 
in mid-February, i.e., two weeks before the Israeli attack on 
Gaza. He argued that the first contacts between Egypt and the 
U.S.S.R were conducted clandestinely and took place at the very 
beginning of 1955. According to him, by 12 January 1955, when the
1. A logical and acceptable criticism of these sources was made 
by Uri Ra'anan. He clearly proved that the two main Egyptian 
sources, Muhammad H. Haykal and Salciii Salim, were not primary 
sources containing full and precise information. Moreover, 
their versions regarding the genesis of the arms deal did not 
correspond with the facts. See Ra'anan, The USSR Arms the Third 
World, pp. 62-68.
-271-
Turkish-Iraqi military pact became publicly known, the interests 
and policies of Egypt and the U.S.S.R. came to be temporarily 
parallel, although not identical. The rapprochement between the 
two countries was a result of this development in the Middle East, 
and coincided with domestic political changes in the Soviet 
leadership which led to the conclusion of the arms deal in mid- 
February^. A similar view, by Professor Vatikiotis, in his book, 
Nasser and his Generation, held that by January 1955 Nasir's and 
the U.S.S.R.'s interests in opposing Western policy seemed to 
converge. This suggested to Nasir, said Vatikiotis, the 
"possibility of challenging Western arrangements with Soviet
support, while the Soviet Union saw its chance to break up the
2strategic-political monopoly of the West in the region" .
In The Soviet Union and the Middle East, Walter Laqueur argued 
that the explanation for the motives behind the arms deal and the 
dramatic change in Egyptian policy towards the powers required 
going back at least a number of years, perhaps several decades.
He focuses on two points: the evolution of anti-Western feeling 
and the growing radicalization of the Arab intelligentsia from the 
late 1930's. His argument that the idea of an alliance and even an 
arms deal with the U.S.S.R. was not at all new, is indeed quite 
correct. However, this theme is only sketched, and moreover, 
regarding the genesis of the arms deal, Laqueur bases his 
arguments on the same disputable Egyptian sources
Quite an exceptional and a partly acceptable approach is made by 
Mohrez Mahmoud El-Hussini. In his book, Soviet-Eqyptian Relations, 
1945-85, he claims that it is not quite clear whether the Soviets
1. Ra'anan, ibid, Part I.
2. Vatikiotis, Nasser and his Generation, p. 232.
3. Walter Laqueur, The Soviet Union and the Middle East, pp. 
213-217.
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or the Egyptians were the first to initiate the arms dialogue.
He however stresses that "from circumstantial evidence it seems 
plausible that the U.S.S.R., motivated by certain ideological and 
strategic requirements, made the first move". According to him, 
the Soviet offer of arms to Egypt was part of a Soviet long-term 
plan of gaining naval and air facilities in Egypt*. The 
strategic arguments put forth by Hussini make sense. However, it 
would be a mistake to disregard the political and economic 
considerations which were the motive power behind the arms deal 
and constituted the cornerstone in the Soviet-Egyptian entente.
The present study argues that during 1955 Egypt concluded two 
separate arms deals with Soviet bloc countries. The first and 
smaller one, was concluded with the Czech government in the first 
quarter of 1955, and the second, bigger and more famous one, was 
concluded with the Soviet government at the end of July 1955, and 
was signed on 20 September 1955. These deals were a result of 
continuous contacts and negotiations between Egyptian and Soviet 
bloc officials which had begun sometimes towards the end of 1953. 
These contacts were conducted on official and unofficial levels 
and were motivated and affected by the political and economic 
climate which prevailed between the two countries.
1. Mohrez Mahmoud El-Hussini, Soviet-Egyptian Relations, 1945-85 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1987), pp. 55-64.
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A . Negotiations for Arms 1954-1955
As we have seen, high-level official dialogue between the Soviet 
Union and Egypt about arms sales took place in the first quarter 
of 1954. This subject had also been discussed with other East 
European countries and according to some reports Czechoslovakia 
and the Soviet Union expressed their agreement to supply Egypt 
with arms. Nasir's decision to abort Najib-Solod dialogue was a 
tactical move intended to promote his personal ambitions. This 
move was not a result of Nasir’s anti-Soviet policy as only two 
months earlier, he had supported the decision to dispatch Rajab's 
delegation to the Eastern bloc to seek arms^. In fact, Nasir 
continued his contacts with the Eastern bloc for getting arms on 
the diplomatic and clandestine levels throughout 1954. In Moscow, 
*AzT z tAlT al-MisrT, held talks with the Soviets on this subject
throughout 1954, yet, these were general discussions which did
2not involve a higher official level, or particular requests .
These contacts gathered momentum towards the end of the
3year as a result of political events in the Middle East .
In October, after the conclusion of the Anglo-Egyptian agreement, 
Aftmad LutfT Wakd, Nasir's Office Director, approached the Soviet 
Embassy in Cairo to discuss Nasir's plan to be present at 
the Bandung Conference. During his talks, the question of Soviet 
arms sale came up. Again, this dialogue remained on a low level 
and was intended more to learn about the Soviet attitude towards 
this issue than to formalize the frame of discussions^. Another 
attempt was made towards the end of 1954, while Nasir asked Husain 
*Arafa, then of the Egyptian Military Police, to check the
1. See previous chapter pp. 228-237.
2. yamrush, Qissat Thaurat, p. 65.
3. See previous chapter, pp. 210-268.
4. Hamrush, ibid.
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possibility of purchasing arms from the U.S.S.R. The results of 
'Arafa's inspection remain unknown^-.
The ascendancy of Khrushchev during January-February 1955 after 
a continuous power struggle with Malenkov, the then Prime 
Minister , contributed significantly to the acceleration of the 
Soviet-Egyptian clandestine dialogue. As far as foreign policy was 
concerned, Khrushchev maintained that the attitude towards 
neutral countries had to be revised, "rapprochement with their 
nationalist (though bourgeois) governments was imperative if the 
course pursued by these governments was to be directed against the 
West; abundant economic help, in addition to political 
rapprochement, must lead to the emergence of a firm coalition 
Communist-controlled nations with the 'neutrals'" .
In fact, from the end of 1954, Khrushchev had ultimate 
control over clandestine operations. He dominated the Central 
Committee apparatus, controlled the K.G.B., and maintained a close 
alliance with leading Red Army cadres, a matter which paved the 
way for a direct channel of communication with Soviet military 
intelligence^.
1. Ibid.
2. On 8 February 1955, Malenkov announced his resignation. A new 
government was formed, headed by Bulganin. However, the regime 
was dominated by Khrushchev who continued to hold the post
of the First Secretary of the C.P.S.U. On his ascendancy and on 
the internal power struggles and their influences on Soviet 
foreign policy, see, Ra'anan, ibid, pp. 86-130. Ra'anan claims 
that a power struggle between Khrushchev and Molotov continued 
after Malenkov's downfall. According to him, Soviet foreign 
policy was in fact conducted by Khrushchev, while Molotov 
remained passive. The question of selling arms to Egypt was 
one of the bones of contentions between the two. Molotov was 
skeptical as to Nasir's intentions and feared that dangerous 
results might arise from such a move. However, as the Soviet 
high authority, Khrushchev made the decision to sell arms to 
Egypt. See also, Dallin, Soviet Foreign Policy After Stalin, 
pp. 218-223. Isaac Deutscher, Russia, China, and the West 1953 
-1956 (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1970), pp. 28-38.
3. Dallin, ibid, p. 222.
4. Ra'anan, ibid, p. 72.
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By that time, clandestine activities and contacts had already 
been taking place between Egyptian and Soviet intelligence.
Soviet activity was handled by Soviet military intelligence, the 
Glavnoye Razvedovatelnoye Upravleniye (G.R.U.) [The Chief 
Intelligence Administration}, which was attached directly to the 
General staff. The G.R.U. collected and evaluated military field 
intelligence and extensive foreign espionage. It was also in 
charge of Soviet military shipments to other countries. By that 
time, the organization was interested in using Egypt "as an anti­
capitalist military power in the Near East"*. Egyptian 
clandestine activities were directed by *AlT §abrT, Director of 
Egyptian Air-Force Intelligence, who, according to some reports, 
negotiated Egypt's military requirements with a military 
representative, probably a member of the G.R.U. at the Soviet 
Embassy m  Cairo . Clandestine contacts between diplomatic 
representatives of the two countries in Turkey also continuously 
took place in Ankara at the very outset of 1955. Despite the 
Egyptian Embassy's denial, American and British reports from 
Ankara, based on reliable sources, stated that such contacts were 
taking place. According to these reports, one of these meetings 
took place on 6 February: two diplomatic cars met at the Cubuk 
water reservoir, eight miles outside Ankara. The Egyptian 
Ambassador descended from the one car, and five officers from the 
Soviet Embassy headed by the Charge d'affaires from the other .
1. See Ra'anan, pp. 70-72. On the G.R.U. see, Barton Whaley, 
Soviet Clandestine Communication Nets (Cambridge, Mass.: 
M.I.T., Center for International Studies, 1969), pp. 84-108. 
American intelligence reports confirmed that details of the 
nature and extent of Moscow offers were obtained through 
intelligence channels. See, Report on the Near East by the 
Director at the White House to a bi-partisan Congressional 
group, 9 November 1956, White House Office, Office of the 
Staff Secretary Records, 1952-1961, in: U.S. Declassified 
Documents Reference System, U.S., 1978, 18A.
2. Ra'anan, ibid.
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All met, walked together for some time in the adjoining park, then 
parted-*-. This information was also confirmed by Menderes, the 
Turkish Prime Minister, on 8 February, during his conversation 
with Sir James Bowker, British Ambassador to Turkey. Menderes 
blamed the Egyptian government for conducting a continuous violent 
campaign against Iraq and Turkey. Egypt, he said, aimed to isolate 
the Arab states from any defence association with the West. He 
believed that several moves made recently by the Egyptian 
government clearly indicated that Egyptian policy had basically 
taken a pro-Soviet orientation which could affect the security of 
the Canal Zone; he therefore called for the closest observation. 
According to him, this oscillation in Egypt's policy found its 
expressions in:
a. statements by Egyptian political leaders that Egypt should 
furnish the Arab states with all the arms they required.
b. Egyptian criticism of Iraq for breaking off diplomatic 
relations with the Soviet Union.
c. The recent clandestine contacts between Egypt and the 
U.S.S.R.2 .
Despite Menderes' evaluation which was based on solid grounds, the 
British Ambassadors in both Cairo and Ankara ruled out the 
possibility that Egypt's moves indicated a pro-Soviet 
reorientation. The two believed that Egypt would remain on the 
side of the West and that its present anti-Western policy derived 
from fears that Iraq was going to become the main ally of the West
o
and therefore would replace Egypt as leader of the Arabs . It is
1. See dispatches 894 and 903 from American Embassy, Ankara, 9
and 10 February 1955, RG 59, 661.82/2-955 and 661.82/2-1055.
Telegram 93 from Bowker, Ankara, 9 February 1955, F0371/115489, 
V1073/193. Letter 1073/289/55 from Bowker, Ankara, 14 February 
1955, F0371/115493, V1073/311. Telegram 9, ibid, 18 February 
1955, V1073/318. See also, Ra'anan, pp. 72-73.
2. See telegram 93, ibid.
3. See telegram 220 from Stevenson, Cairo, 10 February 1955,
F0371/115489, V1073/212, and also V1073/220.
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quite possible that Egyptian statements on furnishing the Arab 
states with arms, presumably, came after they had received Soviet 
assurances that they would supply the arms. By that time, the 
interests of both the U.S.S.R. and Egypt were to prevent other 
Arab states from joining the Turko-Iraqi pact. As Iraq received 
new modern weapons from the Western powers in return for siding 
with the West, the Soviets realized that this state of affairs 
required them to take counteraction in order to back the Arab 
states opposed to this. It therefore makes sense to argue that 
the Soviets stood behind these statements and encouraged the 
Egyptian government to continue in the same direction.
On 28 January 1955, in a message to the American diplomatic 
missions, Dulles informed them that: "In recent months there have 
been several reports of Soviet bloc offers to provide technical 
assistance and equipment to non-communist countries, particularly 
to less developed countries"*. Intelligence reports which were 
being received as early as March 1955 indicated that Moscow was in 
direct contact with the Arabs, and was offering them economic and
o , . . .
military aid . But although American and British policy makers 
were informed that the relations between Egypt and the Soviet 
Union were in a process of convergence and tightening, they did 
not pay the necessary attention to this development.
1. See message CA-4913 from Dulles to all American Missions, 28 
January 1955, RG 84, Cairo Embassy-General Records, 1955, File 
Subject: Soviet Bloc Trade, 511.12.
2. See, Report on the Near East given by the Director of the 
White House, 9 November 1955, ibid. The Egyptian War Minister 
and Commander-in-Chief, Major General <Abd al-flakim *Amer, 
confirmed, on 27 June, during a conversation with the British 
Oriental Counsellor that a Soviet offer of arms had already 
been made in March 1955. See dispatch 161 from Sir Humphrey 
Trevelyan, British Ambassador to Cairo, 24 October 1955, 
F0371/113680, JE1194/368. See also telegram 812 from British 
Embassy, Cairo, 28 June 1955, F0371/113672, JE1194/107. Sir 
Humphrey Trevelyan also claimed that the Soviets had offered 
Nasir arms in the spring after the conclusion of the Baghdad 
Pact. See, telegram 1325 from Trevelyan, Cairo, 26 September 
1955, F0371/113674, JE1194/161.
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B. The Conclusion of Arms Deals with the Soviet Bloc
The so called Czech-Egyptian arms deal, officially announced in 
September 1955, was in fact a combination of two separate deals. 
The first was concluded in the first quarter of 1955 between Egypt 
and Czechoslovakia and the second was concluded towards the end of 
July with the Soviet Union, and signed in September 1955 with 
Czechoslovakia. In fact, the second deal was a direct continuation 
of the first. Both deals were the result of several stages in 
negotiations which started at the end of 1953, gathered momentum 
at the end of 1954, and reached their final stage in 1955. The two 
deals were actually concluded by the Soviets while Czechoslovakia 
was given the green light to go ahead with sales*. The first 
deal was concluded in Cairo in February 1955. This information
1. British and American reports from Cairo claimed that the 
negotiations were with the Soviet Government. Some of these 
reports suggested that there were two separate contracts, one 
with Czechoslovakia and one with the Soviet Union. Referring to 
this information, Trevelyan said: "This is quite possible, but
1 have no confirmation of this". See letter 1191/123/55 from 
Trevelyan, Cairo, 29 September 1955, F0371/113675, JE1194/241. 
The French Military Attache in Cairo confirmed that there 
were two separate deals; one with Czechoslovakia and one
with the Soviet Union. See telegram 1455 from American Embassy 
Paris, 29 September 1955, RG 59, 774.56/9-2955. The American 
Embassy in Prague thought that it was quite possible that the 
question of selling Czech arms to Egypt, or other Arab states, 
was under study in Prague from the end of 1954, or the 
beginning of 1955. The Embassy suggested that owing to the need 
of the Czech industry for new markets, other than in Eastern 
Europe and China, in order to expand its exports, the Middle 
East was in fact a good choice for the Czechs. Indeed, in the 
second half of 1954, Syria purchased 44 German Mark IV tanks 
from Czechoslovakia at extremely favourable prices. Towards the 
end of 1955, it was reported by the American Embassy in Prague, 
that 50 tanks of the same type but with modifications had 
already been delivered to Egypt. See telegram 128 from American 
Embassy, Prague, 5 October 1955, RG 59, 774.56/10-555.
"U.S.A. Objectives and Policies with Respect to the N.E.",
2 November 1955, White House Office, Office of the Special 
Assistant for National Security Affairs, Records 1951-61,
File Subject: NSC 5428, Near East (Deterrence of Arab- 
Israeli War) (2), box 12, Eisenhower Library. Seale, The 
Struggle for Syria, p. 233. Telegram C-121 from American 
Embassy, Prague, 6 December 1955, RG 59, 774.551/12-655.
On the extent of trade relations between Czechoslovakia and
Egypt, see pp. 143-144, 194, 202-203, 306-309.
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was first officially revealed by the Soviets, a decade later, 
when their semi-official organ International Affairs, confirmed 
that "Nasser's government concluded in February 1955 a commercial 
agreement with Czechoslovakia for the delivery of arms"*.
Indeed, on 10 February a Czech trade delegation arrived in Cairo 
for the reported purpose of general trade discussions and 
negotiation of the trade and payments agreement. The Czech 
delegation left Cairo towards the end of February, without any 
official announcement regarding the results of its visit. Soon 
after its departure, on 24 March 1955, a Czech trade exhibition 
was opened m  Cairo . This move was presumably intended to 
demonstrate that relations between the two countries were based 
mainly on commercial interests. Such an industrial exhibition 
could be used as a cover for clandestine negotiation for arms, 
and to refute some Western reports which claimed that the 
purpose of the recent dialogue was to negotiate a barter agreement 
to exchange of Egyptian cotton for Czech arms. For instance, 
a correspondent of the Agence France Presse, reported on 14 
February 1955:^
"It is learned from a well-informed source that Czechoslovakia 
is ready to exchange heavy arms for Egyptian cotton. A Czech 
mission headed by Dr. Otakar Teufer, Director General of the 
Prague Foreign Trade Department arrived in Cairo and had 
its first conference on February 14 at the Foreign Ministry 
with Egyptian Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Sami Abu 
al-Futuh and General Hassan Rajab, Under Secretary of the War 
Ministry."
The New York Herald Tribune reported that talks on this subject 
were going on between the two countries when the Czech government
1. K. Ivanov, "National Liberation Movement and Non-Capitalist 
path of Development", International Affairs, 1965, No. 5, p. 
61; quotation taken from Ra'anan, ibid, p. 76.
2. See report on Egypt economy for the first quarter of 1955, in, 
dispatch 1937 from American Embassy, Cairo, 11 April 1955, RG 
59, 874.00/4-1155.
3. Quoted in Ra'anan, ibid, p. 79.
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opened the industrial exhibition in Cairo in March‘d.
In a report which evaluated Egyptian-Soviet bloc relations,
Henry Byroade, the American Ambassador to Cairo, stressed that 
in the spring of 1955, following the Gaza incident of 28 February, 
Hasan Ibrahim, the Egyptian Minister of Production, and Hasan 
Mar*!, Ex-Minister of Commerce, visited Eastern Europe in search 
for arms. According to him, they were apparently successful in 
obtaining tanks and possibly jet planes in Czechoslovakia. Later 
on, he said, in May 1955, Daniil Solod, the Soviet Ambassador to 
Cairo, in response to Nasir's request, offered to furnish 
"heavy artillery" to Egypt. In both cases, the arms were to be 
exchanged for Egyptian cotton and "without strings" as to its 
potential use. Byroade said that Solod's offer was not immediately 
accepted by Nasir since "he would prefer for political and other 
reasons to obtain arms in the West if possible". Byroade 
concluded incorrectly that, "It is apparent that Nasir would be 
most reluctant to accept the (Soviet) offer since it would, of 
course, involve Egypt even more deeply with the Soviet bloc than
1. Ansel E. Talbert, "Nasser Effort to Lessen Mid-East Tension 
Seen", New York Herald Tribune, 7 April 1955. On 19 July 1955, 
after the six-week visit to Egypt of a Czech trade mission, it 
was announced officially in Cairo, that a new trade and 
payments agreement between the two countries was concluded. The 
fact that the arms deal was concluded before its official 
announcement, was first revealed by a senior Czech official on 
28 November 1955. In a press conference in Cairo, Richard 
Dvorak, Czechoslovak Minister of Foreign Trade, who headed a 
Czech trade delegation that visited Egypt in November 1955, 
said that the agreement to supply arms to Egypt was a part of 
the trade accord between the two countries. As aforesaid, 
officially, the talks on trade agreement had begun in February 
1955. On the July agreement, see, report on Egypt economy for 
the third quarter of 1955, dispatch 448 from American Embassy, 
Cairo, 22 October 1955, RG 59, 874.00/10-2255. Dispatches 125 
and 126 from George C. Moore, Second Secretary at American 
. Embassy, Cairo, 28 July 1955, RG 84, Cairo Embassy-General 
Records, 1953-1955, File Subject: 510.1, Trade Agreement, 
box 4, and File Subject: 510.1 Trade Agreements & Missions, 
box 266. I.S.A. FM2506/5/B, 421/408/Z. On Dvorak's statement 
see, dispatch 598 from James N Cortada, Second Secretary at 
American Embassy, Cairo, 29 November 1955, ibid, File Subject:
510.1 Trade Agreements, box 4.
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is now the case as a result of the current exchanges of cotton for 
petroleum and industrial goods"*.
From Byroade's report and from other intelligence and non­
intelligence reports, it may be concluded: a. That an arms deal 
between Czechoslovakia and Egypt was indeed concluded in February 
1955. Under this agreement Egypt was to exchange cotton for 
military equipment, b. That soon afterwards, the Soviets offered 
Egypt military equipment which could not be supplied by the 
Czechs. This specific Soviet offer was made only in May 1955.
This conclusion however requires elucidation. A close 
examination of Egypt's dialogue with Czechoslovakia and the 
U.S.S.R. after February 1955 will simplify this complex issue.
The mission of IJasan Mar1! and Hasan Ibrahim in Eastern Europe was 
not in order to obtain arms because of the Gaza incident. Two simple 
reasons indicate the opposite. First, the arms deal had already 
been concluded a few weeks before the Gaza incident; the visit was 
therefore undoubtedly made in order to discuss and complete 
technical details arising from the need to implement the already 
concluded deal. The decision to send the ex-Minister Hasan Mar1! 
was probably due to his previous experience and familiarity with
the subject. As the former Minister of Commerce, he had conducted
2the talks with the Czech delegation m  February . Second, during
1. Dispatch 95 from Byroade, Cairo, 20 July 1955, RG 59, 661.74/7- 
2055. The Office of Intelligence Research (OIR) of the 
Department of State, confirmed that soon after the Gaza 
incident, Egyptian officials purchased some arms from 
Czechoslovakia. The Czechs, it also said, "have recently also 
offered military planes in exchange for cotton". See, United 
States Government, Office Memorandum by Philip H. Trezise 
(OIR), "Soviet Arms Offer to Egypt", 6 September 1955, in:
U.S. Declassified Documents Reference System, U..S., 1976, 182E. 
According to the British Embassy in Cairo, the Soviet 
Ambassador in Cairo had already offered arms to Egypt in March 
1955, shortly after the Gaza incident. See dispatch 
56(10321/50/56) from British Embassy, Cairo, 19 April 1956, 
F0371/118846, JE1024/1. On the commercial agreement for the 
exchange of Egyptian cotton for Soviet petroleum and industrial
goods, see pp. 303-305, 309-311.
2. Radio Cairo, 13 February 1955, in: Ra'anan, p. 78, f.n. 23.
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Raj ab1s mission to Prague in 1954, he visited several arms 
factories including the firm which manufactured the "MIG" aircraft. 
This means that, during his talks with the Czech delegation in 
February 1955, he already knew what the Czech armaments industry 
could supply. There was therefore no need to dispatch another 
Egyptian delegation to the Eastern bloc countries in order to get 
some more information about their armaments industries. With his 
previous experience, Rajab could undoubtedly conclude such a deal.
By the time that talks with the Soviets for modern arms had 
been concluded at the end of July, Egyptian technicians 
had already flown to Prague to check the first consignment of "MIG 
15"*. On 19 July, a week before the technicians' departure, it 
was officially announced that Egypt and Czechoslovakia had 
concluded a trade and payments agreement. In fact, they signed two 
separate agreements on the same date. The first agreement was for 
one year and provided for the exchange of Egyptian cotton,rice and 
other products for Czech machinery and equipment, chemicals, 
rubber products, glass, timber and sugar. The Egyptian government 
also agreed upon the dispatch of Czech technical advisers. A three 
-year agreement was the second to be signed. It applied "only to 
government purchases", with $7 million total exchange value. The 
agreements were concluded after a six-week visit by a Czech trade 
mission, headed by Kohout, Vice-Minister for Foreign Trade, who 
handled in March 1955 the Czech industrial exhibition in Cairo. As 
officially announced by Dvorak, Czech Minister of Foreign Trade, 
the arms deal was a part of the trade accord . Thus, it follows 
that the second agreement which related to "government purchases"
1. This information was given by SalSl} Salim. See his statement in 
Patrick Seale, The Struggle for Syria, pp. 234-236.
2. On the agreement and Dvorak's statement, see, f.n. 1, p. 280. See 
also, "Soviet Bloc Economic Activities in the Near East and 
Asia as of November 25, 1955", Report, Office of Research, 
Statistics, and Reports, Clarence Francis Papers, Eisenhower 
Library.
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was probably a cover for the arms purchases.
From a close examination of similar barter deals between Egypt 
and other Eastern bloc countries in the 1950’s, it follows that 
the conclusion of such deals did not require such a long period of 
negotiation. It is therefore certain that during the six-week 
visit, technical and financial details arising from the conclusion 
of the arms deal of February, were discussed and concluded before 
the departure of Egyptian technicians to Prague.
The Egyptian government's consent in the first agreement to 
facilitate the work of Czech technicians, was in contrast to its 
policy of not allowing foreign advisors into the country. Its 
decision to allow many of the Czech technicians who entered Egypt 
in March 1955 (in connection with the industrial exhibition) to 
stay in Egypt (despite the end of the exhibition), and its consent 
to the arrival of some more, was intended to prepare the ground 
for the acceptance of the new military equipment some of which 
had already arrived in Egypt.
The Soviets were certainly involved, both directly and 
indirectly, in the Czech-Egyptian clandestine negotiations which 
led to the agreement. Their complete control of their allies' 
legations in Cairo, was well described by Zakariya Mulpyi al-Din, 
Egypt's Minister of Interior. According to him, "more and more 
persons of Russian nationality are handling Soviet Bloc affairs in 
Egypt", whereas in the past, he emphasized, the Soviets had left 
the handling of Middle East affairs to the "Satellite 
representatives"*. It can also be deduced that the Soviets 
were fully aware of Egypt's military needs from the fact that on 
23 May, during a meeting between Solod and Nasir, on the latter's
1. See a report which made by an anonymous American officer, on 
his conversation with Zakariya Muftyi al-Din, took place on 19 
June 1955, in dispatch 2298 from American Embassy, Cairo, RG 
59, 674.00/6-2155.
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initiative, Solod provided a list of available military equipment 
and terms of purchase. They undoubtedly, played a crucial role in 
the first half of 1955, in bringing the arms deal between Egypt 
and Czech to a conclusion. Solod's offer was made after the 
conclusion of this deal and included a list of military equipment 
some of which was similar and in addition to the Czech equipment, 
and some, like submarines, heavy tanks and jet bombers, which 
could not be supplied by Czechoslovakia*.
Soon after the Nasir-Solod meeting, clandestine negotiation
between Egypt and the Soviet Union took place in Cairo. <Ali SabrT
again represented the Egyptian government and his Soviet
counterpart was Colonel Nimoshenka, Military attache at the Soviet
Embassy in Cairo. This negotiation was kept secret and only a few
. 2officials from both sides knew about it . An American 
intelligence report indicated on 5 June that Nasir had designated 
Hasan Rajab to head a mission to the Soviet Union "to negotiate 
the purchase of artillery items offered for barter against 
cotton"^.
This deal was concluded at the end of July 1955 during a visit 
by D.T. Shepilov, editor of Pravda, C.P.S.U. Central Committee 
Secretary, a specialist in Foreign affairs, and a favourite of 
Khrushchev's. The decision to send Shepilov and not a
1. According to the British Assistant Military Attache in Prague, 
the Czechs did not themselves produce very heavy tanks (T-34), 
though they did assemble them. However, they produced lighter 
tanks of their own design, 75mm. self-propelled guns, other 
armour and artillery as well as MIG 15 aircraft. See letter 
1192/2/55 from British Embassy, Prague, 28 September 1955, 
F0371/116193, NCI192/1.
2. From a conversation between Nasir and Byroade which took place 
at Nasir's home, on 16 June 1955, it follows tha^t even Maljmud 
FawzT, Minister of Foreign Affairs, had known nothing about the 
negotiation. A memorandum of the conversation is attached to 
dispatch 2311 from Byroade, Cairo, 23 June 1955, RG 59, 
674.00/6-2355. See also Hamrush, p. 69; and M.H. Heikal,
Nasser: The Cairo Documents (London: New English Library,
1972), p. 55.
3. See Philip Trezise, "Soviet Arms Offer to Egypt", ibid.
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representative of the Foreign Ministry to handle the final stage 
of the deal, was well-calculated by Khrushchev. Shepilov arrived 
in Cairo on 21 July, while talks on relaxing international 
tensions were going on in Geneva between the leaders of the East 
and West. Shepilov was in fact one of the main key figures in 
shaping Soviet foreign policy, and was Khrushchev's choice. 
Officially, he was invited by the Egyptian government as the 
editor of Pravda, to attend Egypt's Liberation Day celebrations, 
on 23 July. The argument put forth by David Dallin in his book 
Soviet Foreign Policy After Stalin*, that "with Shepilov rather 
than a representative of the Foreign Ministry conducting the 
negotiations, the proceeding would appear less official in case 
the issue should come up at Geneva", is fully acceptable. During 
his visit, all the details of the arms deal were decided upon, 
although the deal itself was not yet signed. Shepilov brought a 
message from Khrushchev that the U.S.S.R. was prepared to assist 
Egypt in every field. In his talks with Nasir, Shepilov made it 
clear that his government was willing to increase its latest 
offers substantially, and would provide Egypt with MIG aircraft 
and with the latest weapons. He promised quick delivery and agreed 
to a barter with Egyptian cotton. The Soviets agreed to sell to 
Egypt among others, 100 MIGs, 200 tanks, and jet bombers. The 
military shipments could begin to arrive within 30 days. The 
U.S.S.R. was also willing to finance the building of the high dam 
in Aswan, and Egypt could repay in cotton over a period of up to 
thirty years and in terms suitable to Egypt. Shepilov promised 
that the Soviet Union would also be of great assistance to Egypt
1. Dallin, Soviet Foreign Policy After Stalin, p. 394. The Geneva 
Summit Conference opened on 18 July. The Soviet Union was 
represented by Nikita Khrushchev, C.P.S.U. First Secretary and 
Nikolai Bulganin, Soviet Prime Minister.
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in economic development and technical assistance*•
On 10 August Solod handed Nasir an invitation to visit the 
U.S.S.R. On the same day, it was announced by Egyptian 
officials that Nasir had accepted the invitation and that the 
visit would take place in the spring of 1956 . This was the 
first Soviet invitation to an Arab leader and was, in effect, the 
Soviet official recognition of Egypt's military regime. On 8 
September, just a few days before the official conclusion of the 
arms deal, an accurate picture of the existing state of affairs in 
Egyptian-Soviet relations, was outlined by Lidiia Vatolina, a 
well-known Soviet orientalist. Referring among other things to 
Nasir's decision to accept the visit, she said:
"The announcement that the Prime Minister of Egypt, Jamal Abdel 
Nasser, has accepted an invitation to visit the Soviet Union 
was received with deep interest in our country. It is a source 
of particular satisfaction to one who, like myself, has 
devoted many years to a study of Egypt...Nasser's visit...will 
undoubtedly further strengthen Egypt's international position. 
The realization is rapidly gaining ground in Egypt that the 
principles of Soviet foreign policy stem from a genuine desire
1. On the visit and its results see, Philip Trezise, "Soviet Arms 
to Egypt", ibid. See also an interview made by David J. Dallin 
with ranking employees (Gilin, Chase, Johnston and Dick 
Mitchell) of the External Research Division of the State 
Department, Washington D.C., 15 December 1958, David J. Dallin 
Papers, File E, MSS. & Archives Section, New York Public 
Library. See also a record of conversation between Byroade and 
Aftmad Qusain, Egyptian Ambassador to U.S., in Cairo, on 14 
August 1955, in dispatch 234 from Byroade, Cairo, RG 59, 
774.56/8-1555. Hamrush, p. 70. In a press statement before his 
departure on 29 July 1955, Shepilov expressed his satisfaction 
about the visit and thanked the Egyptian government for its 
hospitality. He said, inter alia, "They Cthe Egyptians] have 
demonstrated their great energy in the struggle against the 
imperialist oppressors. They have shown their implacable 
resolve to defend their national rights, their freedom...The 
sentiments of the Soviet people are wholly on the side of the 
Egyptian people's aspirations".Tass announcement, 29 July 1955, 
SWB, USSR, p. 36. See also Daily Telegraph, 5 November 1955, 
in: F0371/113680, JE1194/368(A).
2. Walter Laqueur, The Soviet Union and the Middle East, p. 219.
O.M. Marashian, "Cairo Sees Prestige Boost in Soviet Invitation 
of Nasir", Christian Science Monitor(Boston), 27 August 1955. 
Tass, 10 August 1955, SWB, USSR, p. 12.
3. Lidiia Vatolina, "The new Phase in Egypt", New Times, 8 
September 1955, in: R o 'i , From Encroachment to Involvement, pp. 
140-142.
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for peace and consistent support of all countries and peoples 
that strive to fortify their political independence and to 
uphold their national rights".
Nasir made it clear that the coming visit did not contradict 
"our anti-communist principles". He emphasized that Solod assured 
him that the Soviet government had nothing whatever to do with the 
Egyptian communists. To quote him: "Nothing prevents us from 
strengthening our economic ties with Russia even if we arrest the 
communists at home and put them on trial"*. It is noteworthy, 
that throughout his period in power, Nasir, consistently, made 
such a distinction between his close relations with the U.S.S.R. 
and his hostile policy towards local Communism, a matter which 
more than once created a tension between the two countries.
Nasir's invitation was a subject of considerable discussion in 
both the Soviet and the Egyptian press. The Soviet press 
concentrated on the importance of this move and its contribution 
to strengthening the "Geneva Spirit". On 24 August, at a big 
ceremony, Muftammad (Awwad al-Quni, Egypt's new Ambassador to 
Moscow, presented his credentials to M.P. Tarasov, Vice-President 
of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. The Soviet 
press made special reference to this ceremony, and al-QunT was 
quoted as saying:^
"The great sympathy and good will of the government and the 
people of the Soviet Union towards my country which is fully 
resolved to uphold its independence and freedom, are 
unquestionable highly gratifying. We are deeply grateful for 
it. The lofty principles which are promoted by the Soviet 
Union which consist in respect for the sovereignty, 
independence, territorial integrity and equality of countries, 
big and small, and non-interference in their affairs have 
lately been proclaimed in many parts of the world. These 
principles are particularly highly valued by the Egyptian 
people after their recent liberation".
1. Laqueur, ibid, pp. 219-220.
2. See letter 35/120/SM from the Israeli Embassy, Moscow, 26 
August 1955, ISA, FM/2506/4, 411/408/Z.
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By the end of August the Egyptian government decided to sign an 
agreement with the Soviet Union. The deal was signed on 20 
September 1955 in Warsaw*, officially, with the Czech 
government, deputed by the Soviet government for this purpose. In 
fact, three communist countries were involved: the Soviet Union, 
Czechoslovakia and Poland . Under this deal Egypt was to receive 
from the Soviets and the Czechs the following military equipment: 
a. Between 120 and 200 MIG 15 fighters; b. between 30 and 60 IL 28 
bombers; c. small numbers of training aircraft; d. small numbers 
of transport aircraft; e. 200 medium and heavy tanks; f. light 
and heavy artillery and ammunition. Under this deal, Poland and 
the U.S.S.R. were to supply the naval equipment. This included two 
Skory class destroyers, two minesweepers T-43, twelve MTBs-P6 and 
three submarines, two W-class and one Malutka class. The total
O
arms purchase was estimated at $140 million .
1. This information is taken from the Egyptian Naval Archives,
"A Collection of Special Reports and Messages on Armaments",
5 November 1955, in: M.M. El-Hussini, Soviet-Egyptian 
Relations, 1945-85, pp. 57, 235-236. Byroade reported on 21 
September: "last night we were told by highly reliable source 
that Egypt's arms deal with Russia was now definitely decided". 
See telegram 518 from Byroade, Cairo, 21 September 1955, RG 59, 
774.56/9-2155. A week later Byroade pointed out that the actual 
agreement was with Czechoslovakia. However, he emphasized, the 
Soviet Union was behind the agreement. According to him, Daniil 
Solod had told Nasir that the deal could be arranged through 
"satellite country if this is better from Nasir's point of 
view". See telegram 600 from Byroade, Cairo, 29 September 1955, 
RG 59, 774.56/9-2955.
2. C.I.A., "The Communist Economic Campaign in the Near East and 
South Asia", 30 November 1955, in: U.S. Declassified Documents 
Reference System, U.S., 1986, 002516. El-Hussini, ibid, p. 57.
3. Intelligence Report No. 7117, "The New Soviet Approach to 
Syria: Diplomacy rather than Ideology", 15 December 1955,
Office of Intelligence Research, Department of State, in, 
memorandum to the Secretary of State, 21 December 1955, RG 59, 
661.83/12-2155. "Soviet Bloc Economic Activities in the Near 
East and Asia", ibid. See also, Annual Report (No. 6) on the 
Egyptian Air Force during the year 1955, prepared by Air 
Commodore C.M. Heard, former Air Attache at the British Embassy 
in Cairo, in dispatch 111(1221/8/56G) from British Embassy, 
Cairo, 19 July 1956, F0371/119009, JE1224/4. Egypt: Annual 
Report for 1955, in dispatch 13(10113/1/56), from British 
Embassy, Cairo, 31 January 1956, F0371/118830, JE1011/1. The
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On 27 September 1955, the day of Nasir's announcement of the 
conclusion of the arms deal with Czechoslovakia, a shipload of 
small arms, including machine guns, reportedly arrived in Egypt. 
According to this source, another shipment, including 60 heavy 
tanks, was to arrive within the week^. The arrival of these 
shipments, only a few days after the conclusion of the main deal, 
could be a result of two things. First, since the report concerned 
shipments of small arms, and according to the September deal 
Egypt was to receive heavy equipment, it makes sense that these 
shipments were part of the military equipment supplied by 
the Czechs under the agreement of February 1955. Second, the 
Soviets could make available for delivery, without special 
preparations, surplus stocks of military equipment, including 
tanks and planes, owing to their recent armed forces' re-equipment 
programme. As a result of the new programme, the Soviets could 
offer to Egypt huge quantities of arms surplus with quick
o
delivery . Nevertheless, it is pointless to try to establish 
which shipment came from which country. One thing is certain, 
the decision to dispatch arms shipments from Soviet bloc countries
data on the naval equipment were taken from El-Hussini, ibid. 
The first submarine for Egypt was on its way from Poland when 
Israel launched its attack in Sinai, see, "Status Report on the 
Near East given by the Director at the White House to a 
bi-partisan Congressional group", 9 November 1956, ibid.
1. "Soviet Bloc Economic Activities in the Near East and Asia", 
ibid.
2. See dispatch 56(10321/50/56), F0371/118846, ibid. United States 
Government, Office Memorandum, "Soviet Intentions Regarding 
Egypt", from William A. Crawford, Eastern European Department 
to Wilkins, Near Eastern Department, 17 August 1955, RG 59, 
774.56/8-1755. In addition to the re-equipment programme, 
Crawford said, that the Soviets were apparently engaged in 
reducing the size of their ground forces, as indicated by their 
recent announcement of a cut of 640,0000 men in the Soviet 
armed forces. This move, he stressed, would undoubtedly free 
considerable amounts of military equipment for use elsewhere.
He concluded that the initial stocks of weapons and equipment 
to Egypt were probably available. Both the British and the 
Americans suggested that this equipment might not be of the 
very latest models, yet, it could be serviceable and not
entirely obsolete.
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to Egypt was definitely made by the Soviet leaders.
Soviet and Egyptian official announcements of the conclusion of 
the arms deal, said that it was a barter agreement between the 
Czech and Egyptian governments. The question that arises is, why 
Czechoslovakia? There could be several explanations. First, the 
announcement was made shortly after the successful end of the 
Geneva Summit Conference of July 1955, between the leaders of the 
Eastern and Western blocs. In the summit, both blocs agreed to 
"relax international tensions", and to establish a peaceful 
atmosphere in East-West relations, known as the "Geneva Spirit". 
The Middle East area was not a subject under discussion during 
the summit, and the Soviet Union was not committed to any 
restrictions of arms supply in this area, such as the tripartite 
declaration of May 1950; however, Soviet official confirmation 
that the deal was concluded with them, could spoil the "Geneva 
Spirit", and might be sharply criticised by the Western powers who 
considered the Middle East as their zone of influence. The Soviets 
always could argue and indeed, they did before and after Nasir's 
announcement, that "if any state friendly to the Soviets wished to 
sell (arms} to Egypt, this was solely matter for it to decide as 
an independent s t a t e " S e c o n d ,  previous arms agreements which 
were concluded between Egypt and Czechoslovakia, did not attract 
much attention and were almost disregarded by the Western powers,
1. See telegram 129 from American Embassy, Prague, 6 October 1955, 
RG 59, 774.56/10-655. In a conversation between Yosef Avidar, 
Isralel Ambassador to Moscow, and Grigorii Zaitsev, Head of the 
Middle Eastern Department at the Soviet Foreign Ministry, on 12 
September 1955, a few days before Nasir's announcement, the 
latter denied reports suggesting that the Soviet bloc was 
to sell arms to Egypt. However, he said that the' U.S.S.R. was 
not ruling out the possibility of selling or buying arms if 
intended for defensive purposes. Moreover, arms transactions, 
stressed Zaitsev, were considered an integral part of normal 
commercial relations between two independent countries. See, 
letter 40/130/SM from Avidar, Moscow, 12 September 1955, ISA, 
FM546/7/A.
-291-
even though they knew about them. Third, Czechoslovakia had an 
impressive armaments industry which manufactured much of the 
military equipment to be supplied to Egypt by the Soviets. The 
Soviets could therefore argue in any future controversy with the 
West, that the arms shipments to Egypt came from Czechoslovakia. 
Fourth, as far as the Arab-Israeli conflict was concerned, 
Czechoslovakia was the best choice for the Soviets, as it was
well-known that in the past it had furnished arms to both the
Arabs and Israel, and therefore it could not be accused for siding 
with the Arabs. It follows from this, that the Czechs could argue 
that the deal was purely commercial, and that there was nothing 
special compared to previous transactions. Indeed, a few days 
after Nasir's announcement, The Voice of the Arabs used this 
argument in order to justify the deal. To quote: "Czechoslovakia, 
it is reported, at one time agreed to supply arms to Israel; and
what did the USA do at that time? Once again, we say that we have
enough of hypocrisy and deception"*. Fifth, the Soviet Union 
wanted to dispel Arab fears that they were getting involved with a 
new great power after a long struggle to get rid of Western 
domination.
Nasir's decision to accept the Soviet offer, despite the fact 
that, in August, the Americans had replied positively to his 
request for arms, requires explanation. Since Byroade was told 
by Nasir in June 1955, about the arms offer made by the Soviets, 
he had concentrated his efforts on persuading Dulles to respond 
favourably to Nasir's request for American arms. He endorsed 
Nasir's request to purchase $28 million worth of B-26 fighter 
planes, light tanks and other equipment. Byroade considered that
1. The Voice of the Arabs (Cairo), 29 September 1955, SWB, Cairo 
on Middle East Arms, p. 13.
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in the absence of favourable response, Egypt might accept the 
Soviet offer. "The West must meet, or better, the Soviet offer of 
arms and assistance", he warned, "or Nasir will either be 
overthrown or forced to accept the Soviet offer"*. Dulles 
dismissed Byroade's appreciation after he was assured by 
Khrushchev at the Geneva summit in July 1955, that the Soviets 
were not contemplating an arms deal with Egypt . Neither Dulles 
nor Byroade read the map correctly. The first suggested that 
providing arms to Egypt at that stage would spark an Egyptian- 
Israeli arms race that would destabilize the region. In a 
conversation with Allen Dulles, on 17 August 1955, he said that 
"he did not know how seriously we should take the Russian 
proposals about Egypt" . On the other hand, Byroade's 
appreciation was in fact anachronistic, as the deal with the 
Soviets was already in its final stage. As early as August 1955, 
Dulles decided to reply positively to Egypt's request. In a 
conversation with Eisenhower on 5 August he explained the motives 
behind his decision"*:
"I told the President that we planned to notify Nasser that we 
would sell certain military equipment to Egypt as desired by 
him. I said that this had perhaps been put up as a test of our
1. Hahn, United States Policy Toward Egypt, P. 486. Dispatch 2311, 
674.00/6-2355, ibid. Dispatch 95, 661.74/7-2055, ibid. See also 
Top Secret letter from Herbert Hoover, Acting Secretary of 
State to Charles E. Wilson, Secretary of Defence, 21 July 1955, 
RG 59, 774.5-MSP/7-2155. See also telegram 234, 774.56/8-1555.
2. Hahn, ibid, 486-487.
3. On the conversation see, Telephone Conversations Memoranda:
File Subject: Telephone Conversations - General, 2 May 1955 - 
31 August 1955 (2 of 8), box 4, Dulles Papers. From a later 
conversation between the two, on 24 September, arises that he 
was not quite sure if the deal was indeed concluded. He told 
Allen that the U.S. made Egypt "a big and liberal offer of 
arms". The Secretary stressed that "he really whnted to know 
how solid the facts were. Maybe we should wait". On the 
conversation see, ibid.
4. See Memorandum of Conversation between Dulles and Eisenhower, 5 
August 1955, Dulles John Foster Papers, 1951-1959, File 
Subject: John Foster Dulles Chronological, August 1955 (7), box 
12, Eisenhower Library.
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friendly relations and with the suggestion that if Egypt 
cannot buy here, they might buy in the Soviet Union."
This move was useless and indicated a confusion among American
policy makers, who were surprised by Nasir's intentions. The
argument put forth by American officials that Nasir's position in
the R.C.C. might be weakened if refused to accept the Soviet
offer‘d was unfounded, because he was the key figure behind the
continuous dialogue with the Soviets since the end of 1953. As has
already been said, the motives behind Nasir's decision to approach
the Soviets were political rather than tactical. However, his
application for American arms in June 1955 was indeed made for
tactical reasons. He knew that the Americans would not agree to
furnish Egypt with all the required items, or to accept Egypt's
payment proposal, that is, a long-term credit, repayable in goods
or soft currency; and this would enable him to justify his
decision to accept the Soviet offer. Practically, the Soviet
offer was much more attractive? it was on very favourable terms,
and with no strings attached. In comparison to the American offer,
it included a much larger quantity of arms and an easier mode of
payment, with Egyptian goods, mainly cotton, spread over a period
of several years. While the worth of the American military
equipment offered to Egypt was $27 million, the Soviet offer had
an estimated value of $140 million .
On 27 September 1955, in a speech at the armed forces 
exhibition in Cairo, Nasir officially announced that Egypt had
1. See for instance telegram 233 from Byroade, Cairo, 15 August 
1955, RG 84, Cairo Embassy-General Records, File Subject: 350 
Egypt, box 263.
2. "Soviet Bloc Economic Activities in the Near East and Asia", 
ibid. Philip Trzise,"Soviet Arms to Egypt", ibid. Ra'anan, 
ibid, pp. 55-56. Dallin, Soviet Foreign Policy After Stalin, 
pp. 393-394. IR 7117, 661.83/12-2155, ibid. See also,
Memorandum of Conversation between Dulles and Ahmad Husain, 
Egypt Ambassador to Washington, 29 July 1955, RG 59, 774.5/7 
-2955.
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concluded an arms deal with Czechoslovakia. Explaining the motives 
behind his decision, he accused the Western powers of a consistent 
refusal to supply Egypt with arms. These powers, he said, 
deliberately put forth unacceptable conditions for arms sale.
In his speech of 27 September and his interview with Arab News 
Agency of 30 September 1955, Nasir put forth, inter alia, the 
following arguments: First, he claimed that the U.S.A. expressed 
its readiness to supply Egypt with arms if the latter joined 
a military alliance with the West. Second, he stressed that Egypt 
did not conclude a deal with the U.S.S.R. since it accepted the 
Czech offer which was on a purely commercial basis. Third, 
he emphasized that he did not "intend to introduce foreign 
technicians into the Egyptian army. This is a matter which touches 
me more that any other person"*. These assertions, as we have 
already seen, did not correspond with the facts. Their main 
purpose was to justify Nasir's new policy of neutralism, by 
lessening the political significance of the deal, and by 
introducing it as a commercial transaction without conditions or 
restrictions. He repeated several times that this was not a great 
victory for Soviet influence in Egypt and that this move did not 
indicate of a turning point in Soviet-Egyptian relations.
The Tass announcement on 1 October 1955, four days after Nasir's
1. The speech of 27 September, announcing officially the 
conclusion of the deal, was made at the Egyptian armed 
forces exhibition in Cairo. See full text in, Radio Cairo, 27 
September 1955, SWB, Egypt's Arms Offers, p. 16-18. On his 
interview to Arab News Agency on 30 September 1955, see, SWB, 
Nasir's Statement, p. 9-10. As for Nasir's statement about 
foreign technicians, we have already seen that since March 
1955, Czech technicians were already in Egypt and more arrived 
later on. Towards the end of 1955, the number of Czech and 
Soviet technicians amounted to hundreds. See a paper on "The 
Opportunities for Communist Penetration of the Egyptian Armed 
Forces Resulting from the Recent sale of Communist Arms to 
Egypt", enclosed to letter 1191/291/55 from Trevelyan, Cairo, 7 
November 1955, F0371/113682, JE1194/401. See also Dallin, ibid, 
p. 397.
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announcement, was the first Soviet comment concerning the deal. It 
gave the impression that the U.S.S.R. had had nothing to do with 
the deal, which was described as a regular commercial transaction 
between two independent countries. The Soviet Government, it said, 
"holds the opinion that every state has the legitimate right to 
look after its defence and to buy arms for its defence needs from 
other states on the usual commercial terms, and that no foreign 
state has the right to intervene in this or to present any 
one-sided claims that would infringe the rights or interests of 
other s t a t e s T h e  Soviets rejected the Western powers' 
argument that the arms deal violated the balance in the Middle 
East. They repeatedly stressed that behind this argument lay 
hidden expansionist intentions. The Western powers, said 
Izvestiia, had no grounds for preventing Egypt or any other 
country from concluding commercial transactions which fall in line 
with their interests. The Western powers were accused of launching 
a new campaign against the freedom and independence of the Arab 
countries, by working out a plan to expand the Baghdad Pact. Such
o
a move, it said, might spoil the "spirit of Geneva" .
The Soviets often argued that economic considerations were a 
crucial factor in the decision of the Czech and Egyptian 
governments to conclude the deal. Egypt, it was said, paid for the 
arms by exporting its surplus of cotton, a product which did not 
find a good market in the West. Quoting the Lebanese paper 
al-Hadaf, Radio Moscow said, "Any commercial deal... concluded by 
any Arab state with another state on the basis of the sale of its
q
own produce is profitable" .
1. See full text of Tass announcement in, Ministerstvo 
Inostrannykh del SSSR, SSSR i Arabskie Strany, 1917-1960, pp. 
123-124.
2. Izvestiia, 3 November 1955.
3. Radio Moscow, 29 October 1955, SWB, USSR, pp. 23-24.
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C . British and American Response to the Arms Deal 
On 27 September, soon after the news of Nasir's announcement, 
Dulles and Macmillan, the British Foreign Secretary, discussed 
the subject in New York. They declared an agreed policy 
for supplying arms to the Middle East. This policy was based on 
the following principles. First, the desire to enable the 
countries of the Middle East to provide for internal security and 
defence. Second, to avoid an arms race which would inevitably 
increase the tensions in the area. The two ministers hoped that 
other governments would also be guided by these principles*. A 
day later, Dulles sent George Allen, Assistant Secretary of State,
to Cairo in order to emphasize Dulles' own deep personal concern
2over the situation, and to deal with the following issues: 
a. The factual situation regarding to the arms deal with the 
Soviet bloc. b. The Egyptian Government's policy and intentions in 
this regard, c. To explain the United States point of view.
Allen carried with him to Cairo a letter from Dulles to Nasir.
This was not a warning letter as expected, but a letter which 
reflected American confusion, insult and surprise, brought about 
by Nasir's move. In his letter, Dulles wrote, inter alia:J
"I wish to bring to you most urgently my deep concern over 
reports of the conclusion of an agreement by the Egyptian 
Government for the purchase of arms from the Soviet Union. It 
is possible that you may not have realized fully the 
seriousness with which such a transaction will be viewed in 
the United States and the consequent difficulty of preventing 
it from marring the existing good relations between our two 
peoples...We have placed full confidence in your repeated 
assurances regarding Egypt's identification with the West...
1. Department of State, "U.S. Policy in the Near East, South Asia, 
and Africa-1955", Papers of Harry Howard, File Subject: Near 
East South Asia, 1945-1955, box 3, Truman Library. "Egypt to 
Buy Arms from Russia", Manchester Guardian, 28 September 1955.
2. George Allen, "Talking Paper for Discussion with Nasir 
regarding Arms Deal with Soviet Bloc", RG 59, 774.56/10-655.
3. See letter from Dulles to Nasir, 27 September 1955, Dulles 
John Foster Papers, 1951-1959, File Subject: John Foster Dulles 
Chronological September 1955 (1), box 12, Eisenhower Library.
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our economic assistance programmes... approval of arms 
purchases, and my statement of August 26 on the Arab-Israel 
situation are all based on the same general thought. We have 
tried to handle our cotton surplus in ways which will not 
prejudice Egypt's economy and have otherwise sought to 
support that economy . I am convinced that the economic and 
social progress you so deeply desire for the Egyptian people 
can come best through continued association with the West. The 
proposed agreement... cannot be considered a simple commercial 
transaction. It has deep political meaning. The record of the 
Soviet Union in this respect is clear. Initial, supposedly 
friendly gestures, lead quickly to subversion, inextricable 
involvement in the Communist orbit, and loss of that 
independence of action which Egypt rightly values so highly...
I am hopeful that, as in the past, we will together find a way 
further to promote close association between our two countries.
As early as October 1955, both Dulles and Macmillan came to the
conclusion that there was no need to take any threatening or
drastic steps for the time being. Macmillan considered that the
Western powers must accept their diplomatic defeat and try to
narrow or limit it. He suggested the Americans that "we should now
talk to Nasir more in sorrow than in anger and tell him that we
2must endeavour to reduce his commitment with the Soviet bloc" .
On 4 October, Dulles noted that as a result of Allen's visit to 
Cairo, there was a better understanding of the problem, although 
he had no reason to believe that the arms transaction would not be 
implemented. He stated that the Arab countries were independent 
governments and free to act according to their interests. He 
expressed his wish that although the deal was concluded, it would 
still be possible, to avoid getting into an arms race in the 
Middle East. Dulles declared that as far as Soviet-American 
relations were concerned, "such deliveries of arms would not 
contribute to relaxing tensions" .
However, a few weeks later, Soviet promises of extending 
economic and technical assistance to Egypt and othet Arab
1. On this subject, see the economic sub-chapter, p.
2. See Memorandum of Conversation between Macmillan and Dulles, 3 
October 1955, RG 59, 774.56/10-355.
3. "U.S. Policy in the Near East, South East, South Asia...", 
ibid.
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countries, complicated the situation. On 10 October, Solod 
announced that the Soviet Government had decided to offer 
industrial and cultural equipment and technical assistance to all 
underdeveloped Arab and Asian countries that wanted it. To quote 
him, "We will send economic missions, scientific missions, 
agricultural missions, meteorological missions and any other kind 
of mission you can imagine that will help these countries"*.
These promises were intended to send signals to the Western powers 
that the arms deal was not a passing episode, but part of a 
long-term plan for increasing Soviet influence.
On 30 October, In a conversation between Dulles and Molotov, in 
Geneva, the Middle East was the main subject under discussion. 
Dulles made the point that owing to the arms deal, the risk of war 
between Israel and its Arab neighbours had greatly increased. He 
also stressed that the Soviet move of selling arms to Egypt, had 
created a wave of anti-Soviet sentiment in the U.S. and produced 
a sharp reaction from the atmosphere following the Geneva summit 
of July 1955. These two developments, concluded Dulles, "do 
concern us and should be, we think, a matter of concern to the 
Soviet Union" . In his report to Eisenhower, Dulles wrote that 
"Molotov was entirely non-committal. I feel he was impressed by my 
presentation and it may have some good consequences although we
•3
shall probably never know for sure" .
1. Kennett Love, "Moscow Offers Technical Help to Middle East",
New York Times, 11 October 1955.
2. This conversation took place during the conference of the 
foreign ministers of the Four Powers, opened in Geneva on
27 October 1955, and ended three weeks later on 16 November.
See Memorandum of Conversation between Dulles and Molotov, 30 
October 1955, Dulles John Foster Papers, 1952-59r, General 
Correspondence, File Subject: Memos of Conversation, box 1, 
Eisenhower Library.
3. See letter from Dulles to Eisenhower (undated), Eisenhower 
Dwight D. Papers as President of the U.S.A. 1953-61, Dulles 
-Herter series, File Subject: Dulles John Foster, Oct. 1955, 
box 4, Eisenhower Library.
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In two conversations between State Department and Israeli 
officials, on 11 and 20 October 1955, in Washington, the latter 
revealed some information on discussions between Israeli 
representatives and their counterparts from Soviet bloc countries. 
According to this information, the arms deal with Nasir had 
not been only commercial. The Soviets stressed that they had also 
obtained from Nasir assurances that he would not link Egypt in 
any way with the West. As for the Anglo-Egyptian agreement of 
1954, Nasir told the Soviets that he considered the agreement 
a dead letter. From the Israeli accounts it follows that the 
Soviet decision to supply arms to Egypt was a move which intended 
to achieve two goals: First, to counter Western efforts to obtain 
alliances and bases in the area for an aggressive attack on the 
Soviet Union. Second, to establish influence in an area which had 
hitherto been a Western preserve^. However, this information was 
not sufficient for the Americans and British policy makers.
They needed some more proofs in order to realize that a concrete 
change had been taking place in Egypt's relations with the powers. 
Their plan to appease Nasir and to draw him back into the Western 
camp by offering him economic support to build the Aswan High Dam, 
proved to be unworkable and unsuccessful. Egypt's efforts, at the 
end of 1955, to consolidate a front of anti-Western Arab nations, 
as a counterbalance to the Baghdad Pact were crowned with success. 
The support of the Soviet Union for the new front, which included 
Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Yemen, and the attractive Soviet 
offer to build the High Dam, indicated clearly of their long-term
1. See Memorandum of Conversation between Abba Ebarl, Israel
Ambassador to Washington, Gideon Rafael, the Israeli Foreign 
Ministry, Katriel Salmon, Military Attache at Israel Embassy, 
and George Allen and Donald Bergus, Office of Near Eastern 
Affairs, Department of State, 11 October 1955, RG 59, 774.56/10 
-1155. Memorandum of Conversation between Abba Eban, Reuven 
Shiloah, Minister at the Israeli Embassy, and George Allen and 
Donald Bergus, 20 October 1955, RG 59, 774.56/10-2055.
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plans in the area. The flow of arms shipments into Egypt without 
interference by the Western powers taught the Soviets that 
they could deepen their penetration into the Middle East. On 31 
October 1955, they signed in Cairo a "friendship pact" with Yemen. 
They also offered arms to Syria, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Sudan. In 
November 1955, negotiation with Syria for arms were conducted and 
in March 1956, arms from the Soviet bloc began to arrive in 
Syria^.
1. Dallin, Soviet Foreign Policy after Stalin, 396-397.
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CHAPTER FIVE
SOVIET-EGYPTIAN ECONOMIC RELATIONS UNDER THE MILITARY REGIME, 
1952-1955__________________________________________________________
In their first months in power, the Free-Officers who were 
engaged in consolidating their new administration, continued 
the same policy of trade established by their predecessors. In 
fact, the improvement in trade with the Soviet bloc and China 
during 1952, was brought about mainly as a result of the long-term 
economic policy- shaped by the Wafdist government- of seeking 
markets, other than Britain, to sell cotton and other Egyptian 
products. The first trade talks, between Egypt's new rulers and 
Soviet officials were held in Cairo at the end of 1952, and 
continued through the first quarter of 1953*. On 10 March 1953, 
the Egyptian Ministry of Supply and representatives of the Soviet, 
Bulgarian and Polish governments signed agreements covering the 
exchange of 12,670 tons of Egyptian cotton against 115,000 tons of 
wheat. Ninety thousand tons were to come from the U.S.S.R. The 
text of the contract between the Soviet Union and Egypt was 
identical to the one signed on 3 March 1952; however, there was a
slight difference in payment terms, and Egyptian officials
. 9expressed their satisfaction with the new deal .
Some months later, on 18 August, after a long secret 
negotiation, payment agreements relating to the exchange of goods 
and other current transactions were signed between the two
*3
countries . In order to create an atmosphere of mutual 
confidence, and to prevent any of the contracting parties
1. See dispatch 1288 from American Embassy, Cairo, 30 December 
1952, RG 59, 461.7431/12-3052. Dispatch 3651 from American 
Embassy, London, 5 January 1953, ibid, 461.7431/1-553. Dispatch 
1587 from Cairo, ibid, 6 January 1953, 461.7431/1-653. Radio 
Cairo, 1 February 1953, SWB, Egypt and the Sudan, p. 49.
2. See the full text of contract in enclosure No. 2 to dispatch 
1870 from Carroll F. Conover, Assistant Attache, American 
Embassy, Cairo, 13 March 1953, RG 59, 461.7431/3-1353.
3. See Chapter Three, pp. 228-229.
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re-selling to third parties without the approval of the exporters- 
as the Soviets did in 1948- the agreement established clearly 
that: "it is not permitted to proceed with barter operations 
without prior approval from the competent authorities of the two 
governments. Likewise, re-export of imported goods from one of the 
two contracting countries, to a third country, can only be 
effected after approval from the exporting country". The agreement 
was to be valid for one year with automatic renewal, unless three 
months' notice of non-renewal was given*.
A long visit by an Egyptian economic delegation to Eastern 
Europe, begun m  December 1953 , brought a turning point in the 
long-term political and economic relations between Egypt and the 
Soviet bloc. The timing was right as both the Soviet, and 
Egyptian governments were reviewing their economic policies aimed 
at widening their trade, with as many countries as possible. The 
new economic programme of Stalin's successors in their first year 
in power, called for slightly increased imports of consumer goods, 
and for a considerable increase in imports of capital goods, 
largely but not exclusively intended for the industries producing 
consumer goods and foodstuffs . The Egyptian market could offer 
the Soviets two important items- cotton and rice, which supported, 
to some extent, this Soviet goal. For Egypt, the sending of 
experts in various fields to the Soviet bloc was intended to 
explore and discuss the various possibilities of increasing 
trade and barter. It should be pointed out that this visit was
1. See full text of the agreement in dispatch 444 from American 
Embassy, Cairo, 18 August 1953, RG 59, 461.7431/8-1853.
2. On the visit, see, Chapter Three, pp. 23-31.
3. See a review of developments in the U.S.S.R. since Stalin's 
death, in, dispatch 22 from British Embassy, Moscow, 5 March 
1954, F0371/111671, NS1015/18A. David Dallin, Soviet Foreign 
Policy after Stalin, pp. 187-188.
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one link in a broad chain of visits to other countries, for the 
same purpose.
In March 1954, Egypt signed two separate agreements with the 
Soviet Union and Rumania. The first agreement was signed on 9 
March, at the Egyptian Ministry of Commerce and Industry between 
Egypt, and the U.S.S.R. and Rumania, under which Egypt was to 
exchange cotton for Soviet and Rumanian petroleum and petroleum 
products. Hasan Baghdadi, the Egyptian Minister of Commerce 
and Industry, said that the agreement was not exactly a 
barter deal, as the Egyptian cotton to be exported to the 
Soviet Union and Rumania, would be sold at market prices.
According to him, 1 no fixed amount of cotton is provided for, 
and as petroleum products are imported from the two Soviet bloc 
countries credits will be set up, against which, their imports of 
Egyptian cotton will be debited, to a limit of L.E.3 Million"^.
The agreement established that 340,000 tons of oil products were 
to be imported from the two countries and would have a value of 
L.E.4,157,757 including L.E.424,000 covering freight charges.
The petroleum shipments were to be delivered from March 1954 to
o , ,
February 1955 . The second agreement was initialled on 10 March
"1
and signed on 27 March between the U.S.S.R and Egypt . Egypt was 
to exchange cotton, rice, rayon yarns and other products for 
Soviet petroleum and petroleum products, timber, iron and steel 
products, tractors and agricultural implements, and other goods. 
The payments were to be made according to the agreement of 18
1. See dispatch 2144 from John Fitzgerald, Second Secretary at the 
American Embassy, Cairo, 10 March 1954, RG 59, 461.7431/3-1054. 
Radio Cairo, 9 March 1954, SWB, Egypt, p.32.
2. See dispatch 2232 from ibid, 20 March 1954, 461.7431/3-2054.
3. See Chapter Three, pp. 236-237. See also, SSSR i Arabskie 
Strany, pp. 113-114.
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August 1953. The agreement contained a most-favoured-nation
clause, which covered customs duties, import and export
regulations and quotas. Both governments undertook to endeavour
to exchange goods other than those mentioned in the agreement,
bearing in mind the requirements of both countries. The agreement
was for one year, automatically renewable for further periods of
one year, unless three months notice was given by either of the
parties for its termination or amendment^-. Kamil <Abd al-Nabi,
the Director of Economic Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, the Egyptian signatory, said that with the signing
of this agreement and the payments agreement of the previous
year, economic relations between the two countries had been freed
of the restrictions which had previously existed, and this would
help to promote trade between both countries^. *Abd al-Nabi also
said, on 30 March, to the American Embassy's Public Affairs
Officer, that the Soviets had offered Egypt economic aid via the
U.N. The Soviet Union had recently joined the U.N. programme of
3technical assistance to underdeveloped countries .
In an interview with the Cairo correspondent of the Hearst 
newspaper group, Nasir explained that the oil deal had been 
negotiated with the Soviet Union and Rumania, because of British 
threats to cut off Egypt's petroleum supplies. According to him, 
the threats were aimed at pressing Egypt to moderate its approach 
towards the settlement of the Anglo-Egyptian conflict^.
1. See footnote No. 5, Chapter Three, p. 236. See a full text of 
the agreement in, Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del SSSR, SSSR i 
Strany Afriki, pp. 274-276.
2. See telegram 64(E) from British Embassy, Cairo,,13 March 1954, 
F0371/108403, E11338/2.
3. Ibid.
4. See dispatches 2339 and 2362 from Perry Ellis, Cairo, 31 March 
and 2 April 1954, RG 59, 661.74/3-3154, 3-3154.
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These deals were, a part of a new oil policy made by the Egyptian 
Ministry of Commerce and Industry. Egypt's oil mainly came from 
Western sources, and the distribution was mainly handled by the 
facilities of British and U.S. oil companies operating in Egypt. 
The government believed that augmenting the oil supply, by 
purchasing it from the Soviet bloc at prices below the world 
market, and increasing competition among distributors by 
establishing private Egyptian carrier and distribution companies, 
would have two important results. First, the price might go 
down. Second, it would strengthen Egypt politically in future 
disputes with the West*. Indeed, several months later, the 
Egyptian paper Al-Musawwar, declared that the important result 
of importing oil from Rumania and the U.S.S.R., was, that it 
"played a great part in reducing the prices of petroleum 
products"^.
The payments agreement of 18 August 1953 between Egypt and the 
U.S.S.R. were renewed by both parties in March 1954 and provided 
for the same terms of validity and renewal. That is, the agreement 
was to be renewed for an additional year by the tacit consent of
1. See on this subject dispatches 2232, 2401, 2468, 2588, 2719, 
381, 596, 846, 1079, from John Fitzgerald, Cairo, 20 March, 8 
and 15 April, 1 and 19 May, 4 September, 2 October, 2 November 
and 4 December 1954, RG 59, 461.7431/3-2054, 4-854, 4-1554, 
5-154, 5-1954, 9-454, 10-254, 11-254, 12-454. After the 
agreement was signed, the Western marketing companies expressed 
their dissatisfaction with the agreement which from their 
viewpoint meant the loss of profit on oil imports and on tanker 
transport. Yet, they were asked by the Egyptian government to 
handle these products through their distribution facilities and 
were threatened that if they did not agree, their facilities 
might be requisitioned. This threat was intended to ensure that 
there would be no barriers during the implementation of the 
agreement, at least in the first stages, until the newly 
established companies could take part in this operation. In 
the end, the Western companies agreed to the government's 
request. See also, dispatch 1888, ibid, 2 April 1955, RG 84, 
Cairo Embassy-General Records, 1955, File Subject: Soviet Bloc 
Trade, 511.12, box 267.
2. Al-Musawwar was quoted by Radio Moscow in Arabic, 28 November 
1954, SWB, USSR, p. 38.
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both countries-*-. The agreement of 27 March 1954 was renewed once
o
again in March 1955 .
o
The following tables show Egypt's military regime trade 
(in Millions of L.E.) during its first years in power. Table A' 
covers 1953 and exncluding gold or re-exports. Table B' covers 



























































































All Countries 174.2 100.0 125.7 100.0 -48.5
1. See dispatch 2161 from George G. Moore, Second Secretary at the 
American Embassy, Cairo, 20 May 1955, RG 84,sCairo Embassy- 
General Records, 1955, 500-511.12, File Subject: Trade 
Agreements and Missions, 510.1, box 266.
2. Ibid.
3. The figures were taken from enclosure No. 1 to dispatch 2042 
from American Embassy, Cairo, 26 February 1954, RG 59,











United Kingdom 20.1 12.6 14.5 10.5 -5.6
France 16.0 10.0 16.0 11.5 0
Western Germany 17.8 11.1 11.5 8.3 -6.3
Italy 12.5 7.8 10.5 7.6 -2.0
United States 17.8 11.1 6.6 4.8 -11.2
Soviet Bloc & China 9.3 5.8 19.6 14.2 + 10.3
Other Countries 66.4 41.5 59.6 43.1 -6.8
Total For
All Countries 159.9 100.0 138.3 100.0 -21.6
At the end of 1953, a year and a half after the coup, there was 
a significant drop in Egypt's trade compared with 1952. Egypt's 
total foreign trade in 1953 was valued at L.E.299.9 Millions, 
a drop of L.E.54.6 Millions against the previous year and of 
L.E.132.8 Millions compared to 1951. In 1954 there was no 
significant change and Egypt's total trade was valued at L.E.298.2 
Millions. In this period trade with Britain improved and exports 
to that country in 1953 increased by 68.2% compared to 1952. The 
relaxation of controls on the use of sterling was largely 
responsible for the increased imports from Britain*. However, 
the percentage of export and import trade between the two 
countries had declined since the Wafd government abrogaed the 
treaty of 1936 in October 1951. It is worth noting that the 
percentages of export and import trade with the West in 1952, 1953 
and 1954 were relatively unchanged. Imports from these countries 
were approximately 35% of Egypt's total imports while exports 
were approximately 30% of Egypt's total exports. This shows of a
1. See dispatch 1573, ibid.
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decline of approximately 6% in Egypt's total trade with these 
countries in comparison to 1950 and 1951. Egypt's balance of trade 
with these countries since 1948 consistently shows an adverse 
balance. Moreover, it was a principal component of Egypt's 
consistently negative trade balance in that period. In the 
meantime Egypt's balance of trade with the Soviet bloc since 1948 
was steadily favourable and contributed to the improvement of the 
overall balances and in 1954 was the only favourable balance in 
Egypt's foreign trade. Of the total sum of L.E.19.6 Millions of 
exports to the Soviet bloc countries, L.E.6 Millions came from 
exports to Czechoslovakia and L.E.4 Millions from exports to 
China. Exports and imports to and from the Soviet Union were the 
largest thus far in 1954. Raw cotton continued to be the principal 
Egyptian export to the Soviet bloc countries particularly and to 
the other countries generally. In 1954 the value of the 
cotton was 82% of the total value of exports and re-exports 
(85% in 1953). Petroleum products were the principal products 
imported in 1953 (L.E.13.76 Millions) and 1954 (L.E.15.1 
Millions)1. Petroleum products at the total sum of L.E.4.154
o . . .
Millions came from the Soviet Union and Rumania, that is,
27.5% of the total imports of oil products. Parallels can 
be seen when examining 1951 and 1954. The total trade between 
Egypt and the Soviet bloc during these years did not reach a high 
value, despite the process of political and economic 
rapprochement. The explanation is, that during these years both 
countries established the basis for future agreements. Positive 
results can be seen each time one year later, that is, in 1952 and 
in 1955 as will be shown.
1. Ibid.
2. See dispatch 2232, ibid.
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During the first quarter of 1955 several economic missions from 
Soviet bloc countries arrived in Cairo to discuss commercial 
deals. In this period these countries increased their purchases 
of cotton and stepped up other economic activities with 
Egypt. At this period, sales of cotton to the Soviet bloc 
countries were approximately 30% higher than the parallel period 
in 1954. Payment difficulties arising from the chronic excess of 
Egyptian exports over imports, from these countries were eased 
by the relaxation of credit limits in payments with Poland,
Hungary and Czechoslovakia and the conclusion of barter agreements 
with the U.S.S.R. Rumania and Hungary. A trade delegation from 
Czechoslovakia was the first to arrive in Cairo on 10 February 
1955, for the purpose of general trade discussions and negotiation 
in order to modify their trade and payments agreement of 24 
October 1951. However, the agreement was signed in Cairo only 
several months later, on 19 July 1955. On 24 March, a Czechoslovak 
trade exhibition opened in Cairo*.
The agreements between Egypt and the Soviet bloc which had been 
concluded in previous years and limited to a year at a time 
were renewed automatically in 1955. The agreement of 27 March 1954 
was renewed for a year on 12 May 1955. Egypt was to deliver rice, 
cotton, textiles and hides and leather products, in exchange for 
Soviet grain, petroleum, lumber, agricultural machinery, tractors,
1. See reports on Egyptian economy cover the first and third 
quarters of 1955, in, dispatches 1937 and 448 from American 
Embassy, Cairo, 11 April and 22 October 1955, RG 59, 874.00/4 
-1155, 10-2255. Dispatch 2080 from George C. Moore, Cairo, 7 
May 1955, RG 84, Cairo Embassy-General Documents, 1955, File 
Subject: Soviet Bloc Trade, 511.12, box 267. During 1955 a lot 
of trade agreements were signed between Soviet bloc countries, 
including China, and Egypt. This review concentrates mainly on 
the trade agreements signed with the U.S.S.R., however, it 
refers partly to some other deals with Eastern European 
countries.
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automotive vehicles and medical supplies. The total value of the 
exchange was L.E.14,930,555^.
A tripartite barter agreement concluded on 28 April 1955 between 
Egypt, and the U.S.S.R and Rumania, provided for the exchange of
Egyptian cotton and yarn with a value of L.E.3 Millions for Soviet
2and Rumanian kerosene and crude oil of same value .
On 11 August the Egyptian Minister of Finance announced to the 
press that a new barter transaction with the Soviet Union had been 
concluded. Egypt was to exchange 60,000 tons of rice valued at 
L.E.2.5 Million for 500,000 tons of Soviet crude petroleum at the
3
same value. This agreement was signed on 6 September 1955 .
In 1955 the Egyptian government continued with the same oil 
policy adopted in 1954. The government decision to import 
petroleum from Soviet bloc countries was part of a comprehensive 
policy of improving political and economic relations with these 
countries. This decision was also derived from purely economic 
considerations viz: Egypt's need to dispose of cotton surpluses 
after having had difficulties selling to its traditional 
Western market. These difficulties were caused by two 
developments. First, a continued deterioration in Egypt's 
political relations with the West throughout 1955. Second,
Egyptian officials maintained that uncertainty among Egypt's 
traditional Western customers, about American cotton policy, had
1. "Soviet Bloc Economic Activities in the Near East and Asia as 
of November 25, 1955", Report, Office of Research, Statistics, 
and Reports, Clarence Francis Papers, Eisenhower Library. 
Dispatch 2161, ibid.
2. On the agreement, see, "Soviet Bloc Economic Activities...", 
ibid. Dispatch 2080, ibid. Dispatch 2067 from John Fitzgerald,
6 May 1955, RG 84, ibid.
3. On the agreement, see, "Soviet Bloc Economic Activities...", 
ibid. dispatch 448, ibid. dispatches 171 and 268 from John 
Fitzgerald, 13 August and 10 September 1955, RG 84, ibid.
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led to a considerable reduction in purchases by these buyers1.
As far as Western oil companies operating in Egypt were concerned, 
their position towards Soviet bloc oil shipments in 1955 was 
utterly different from their previous position. Undoubtedly, 
under the then current political state of affairs, and because of 
a worldwide shortage of kerosene, they could have faced 
difficulties in meeting the large Egyptian need for this product 
from the free world market, let alone from Western sources. The 
companies, therefore, adopted a moderate approach regarding 
imported oil from Soviet bloc countries. Moreover, they accepted 
the government's request to take part in handling Soviet and
o
Rumanian oil shipments .
The Soviet offer to assist Egypt to finance the High Aswan 
Dam, which was first made in 1954, during the visit of Rajab's 
delegation to Moscow, was made again in June 1955. According to 
Egyptian officials, the Soviet government offered to supply 
generating and transmission equipment for the project, together 
with financial assistance and engineering services. A part of the 
Soviet offer included an invitation for Egyptian engineers to make 
a trip to the Dnieper Dam, in order to inspect the equipment and 
methods employed there by the Soviets. Despite the fact that 
Egyptian engineers were reported to have accepted the invitation, 
officials showed a preference for obtaining equipment and
1. Uncertainty regarding future American cotton prices had 
significantly reduced world trade in cotton, and disposals of 
American surplus cotton for foreign currencies had had the 
effect of limiting, even in this shrunken market, the scope in 
which Egypt might compete. See telegram 95 from Byroade, Cairo, 
20 July 1955, RG 59, 661.74/7-2055.
2. Dispatch 2295, ibid, 20 June 1955. Until 1955, two-thirds of 
Egypt's oil requirements came from local oil fields and the 
rest from various sources, mainly Westerns. In 1955 the 
"Belayim Field" in the Sinai Peninsula was discovered and 
American oil experts estimated that it might make Egypt self- 
sufficient in crude oil. See, report on Egypt's economy
throughout 1955, in, dispatch 984 from American Embassy, Cairo, 
27 March 1955, RG 59, 874.00/3-2756.
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engineering services from other sources; they explained that in 
case of war between the Soviet bloc and the West, there might be 
serious difficulties in getting replacements and repairs from the 
U.S.S.R. Financial and payment terms for carrying out this 
project were put forward by the Soviets on 29 October 1955. They 
offered a 30-year loan of an unspecified amount at 2% interest, 
payable in Egyptian cotton and rice. The estimated cost of 
the dam was approximately $480 Million, while the amount of the 
proposed loan was assumed to be $275 Million*.
Nothing came of the Soviet offers during 1955. In December
1955, the U.S. government proposed to help financing the 
project together with the British government and the World Bank. 
However, on 19 July 1956, Dulles announced that the American 
government was withdrawing its offer owing to disagreements 
with Nasir. Thereafter, the ball returned to the Soviet court, 
and Nasir decided to conclude the deal with the U.S.S.R.
Egypt's total foreign trade in 1955 was valued at L.E.319.3
Million. Imports exceeded exports by a considerable margin in
1955. Imports were 57% (L.E.182.3) of the balance while exports
were 43% (L.E.137). Egypt's exports were more or less the same as
in 1954, while imports increased by 14% compared to 1954. In 1955
there was a change in the mix of commodities exported from Egypt.
Less cotton was shipped compared to 1954, however, exports of
textiles, yarns and rice increased considerably. Imports in 1955
were composed of as wide a range of goods as in 1954, but there
was a significant increase in imports of capital goods for 
——————• — — — — — — — ~ — —______ ______ ___________________ — — — — — —. —. _ — — — — — —
1. "Soviet Bloc Economic Activities in the Near East...", ibid. 
See also, C.I.A. intelligence memorandum entitled: "The 
Communist Economic Campaign in the Near East and South Asia", 
30 November 1955, in: U.S. Declassified Documents Reference 
System, U.S., 1986, 002516.
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economic development projects*.
Egypt's exports to China and Soviet bloc countries increased 
steadily in 1955. These countries took 27% of Egypt's exports 
(L.E.37 Million), by value. This was an increase of L.E.11.6 
Million compared to 1952, until then, the record year, and 
of L.E.17.4 Million compared to 1954. On the other hand, these 
countries supplied Egypt with only 7% (L.E.12.76 Million) of 
its total imports in 1955, a marginal increase of 1.2% compared 
with 1954. The large gap between exports and imports in Egypt's 
foreign trade with Soviet bloc countries in 1955, gave Egypt 
a favourable balance of trade of L.E.24.24 Million with these 
countries. However, this did not bring about any significant 
change in Egypt's adverse trade balance, which increased 
significantly compared to 1954.
1. See dispatch 984, ibid. See also dispatch 56(10321/50/56) from 
British Embassy, Cairo, 19 April 1956, F0371/118846, JE1024/1. 
2 This excluded the value of Soviet arms.
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CONCLUSION
From the end of the 1940's, the U.S.S.R. and to a lesser extent 
the local communist parties were appealing to Middle Eastern 
nationalist groups, to concentrate on the task of putting an end 
to Western influence in the Middle East. The ideas of revolution 
or reform were relegated to second place. The Soviet Union 
introduced itself not as the supporter of revolutionary and 
subversive elements but as the benefactor and champion of any 
regime which inclined towards a neutralist and anti-Western 
policy. The Soviet leaders, therefore, nurtured relations with 
governments which followed such a line, even if domestically, 
these governments often declared their anti-communist policy.
This Soviet pragmatic approach proved to be a pattern of success 
in the Arab world.
The Soviet policy makers took full advantage of the objective 
disabilities which the Western powers faced in handling
their Middle Eastern policy. Britain and France were considered by 
most of the Arab countries as imperialist powers whose interests 
remained to exploit and to bring the Arab world under their 
control. The emergence of the United States as the new superpower 
after the Second World War, raised hopes and expectations in the 
Arab world. There was a belief that with American support their 
liberation and full independence would soon be achieved. Arab 
manifestations and expressions of goodwill towards' the United 
States, gradually changed to bitterness and disappointment.
This was a result of mainly three factors. First, the U.S.
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policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict. Second, America's 
ambiguous stand during the years of bitter struggle against 
Britain, particularly, concerning the Anglo-Egyptian conflict. 
Third, the exertion of pressure on Arab countries to ally 
themselves with the West by establishing a Middle East Command.
In contrast to the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R., while not necessarily 
considered trustworthy, was viewed by the Arabs as a power which 
was never linked with Western imperialism, and did not have an 
imperialist record in the Middle East. Moreover, the Soviets, 
consistently and without reservations, gave full support to the 
Arabs in their struggle to liberate their countries from foreign 
powers. As far as the Arab-Israeli conflict was concerned, the 
Soviets, from the beginning of the 1950's, firmly took the side 
of the Arabs. The Soviet Union, like Egypt and other Arab states, 
although for entirely different reasons, opposed the northern tier 
arrangement and other Western pacts. Soviet fears greatly 
increased with the establishment of the Baghdad Pact. The prospect 
that a weak neutralist Syria might be taken over by Iraq which was 
firmly allied to the West, was the Soviet Union's main concern.
The Soviet interest was therefore, to prevent the emergence of 
such a vast potential base area for Western military forces, 
especially air forces, near the southwestern borders of the Soviet 
Union. Yet, it would be a mistake to think that the Baghdad Pact 
was the main development which led the Soviets to review their 
Middle Eastern policy. The process of rapprochement between Egypt 
and the U.S.S.R. had begun long before the formation of the Baghdad 
Pact. As we have already seen, Soviet interest in the area had 
been steadily increasing since the second half of 1940's. Towards 
the end of Stalin's period in power, many attempts were made
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by the Soviets to improve relations with Arab governments which 
conducted an anti-Western policy or declared neutralism. This was 
the case with the Wafdist government (1950-1952). §alah al-DTn, 
the Wafdist Foreign Minister, shaped and implemented Egypt's new 
policy of neutralism. He resolutely rejected the Western proposals 
for establishing a Middle East Command, and was the motive 
power behind his government's decision to abrogate the treaty 
of 1936 with Britain. As a result of this policy, the relationship 
between Egypt and the Soviet Union significantly improved; 
several commercial agreements were concluded and more 
understanding and cooperation found expression at the U.N.
During the second half of 1951, the idea of concluding a 
non-aggression pact between the two countries, had been seriously 
considered. In fact, the roots of the later Soviet-Egyptian 
honeymoon originated in this period.
After the end of 1953, owing to Nasir's inability to implement 
his political credo, and primarily his disappointment with the 
U.S. policy towards Egypt, it would appear he adopted Salah 
al-DTn's policy of neutralism. Nasir pursued such a policy in 
order to manipulate both American and Soviet interests which he 
would then in turn utilise to his own advantage, that is the 
furthering of Egypt's Foreign policy. The rapprochement between 
Egypt and the U.S.S.R. which had been resumed at the end of 1953 
gathered momentum during 1955. Nasir believed that being supported 
by one of the two main blocs did not imply inferiority and 
dependency. Egypt, he believed, had to search for new sources of 
political and diplomatic support. His meeting withNehru and Tito 
before the Bandung Conference, convinced him of the advantages of 
their policy of non-alignment.
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The significance of the Bandung Conference was that it succeeded 
in demonstrating that there was an Afro-Asian consensus. Being a 
prominent figure at the conference and fully involved in 
formulating its resolutions, Nasir was convinced that the Afro- 
Asian bloc was a great power and could play a crucial role on the 
international stage. Nasir came to the conclusion that by playing 
an influential role in this bloc it would enable him to conduct 
an independent foreign policy which would fall into line with his 
interests. By following a middle path which appeared to be neither 
pro-West nor pro-Soviet, his prestige improved with the 
uncommitted Afro-Asian states. His success in Bandung also 
increased his prestige on the Arab and international scenes and 
strengthened his domestic position.
The question of arms sale was not at all new. Arms from Soviet 
bloc countries had already arrived in Egypt and Syria during 
the Palestine war and soon after. During the first half of the 
1950's, this subject had come up several times when high and low 
level dialogues between Egyptian and Soviet bloc officials took 
place. Soviet approval to supply arms to Arab countries had 
already been given in 1954. Some reports suggested furthermore, 
that shipments of tanks from Czechoslovakia arrived in Syria 
that year. Shipments of small arms, including tanks and machine 
guns, from this country to Egypt had arrived in the first quarter 
of 1955 and possibly before.
From 1948, commercial relations between Egypt and Soviet bloc 
countries, especially, the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, had 
steadily increased. Gradually, the Eastern bloc opened its markets 
for Egyptian goods, and by the mid-1950's, these markets became 
the main consumers of Egyptian exports. At the same time, Soviet 
bloc countries gradually became Egypt's main supplier of
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industrial equipment, petroleum, etc., traditionally supplied by 
Western countries.
In 1955 commercial relations between Egypt and the Soviet bloc 
had reached a climax and a great quantity of arms from Soviet bloc 
countries flew into Egypt. However, this was not a turning point 
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